Commercial Real Estate Valuation, Development and Occupancy Under Leasing Uncertainty

A model of commercial property valuation is developed where individual property owners are price takers and tenants randomly arrive and depart. Spot lease and tenant reservation prices are stochastic and correlated and can divert from but eventually revert back to market equilibrium. Within this framework we examine built property values and vacancy rates for varying parameter sets representing differing markets and economic conditions. We also examine how potential and existing vacancies, spot lease prices and tenant reservation prices feed back into development decisions. We demonstrate how preleasing acts as a hedge to the developer against the risk of leasing uncertainty.     

Collusion in a price-quantity oligopoly

In the context of an infinitely repeated oligopoly game, we study collusion among firms that simultaneously choose prices and quantities. We compare a price cartel with a price-quota cartel and analyze when and why firms prefer the latter to the former. Output quota may be required to solve coordination and incentive problems when market demand is sufficiently elastic. If market demand is sufficiently inelastic, then the cartel faces a trade-off between increasing prices and the amount of costly overproduction. We find that a price cartel prices consistently below the monopoly price to mitigate excessive production. In this case, a quota arrangement allows firms to avoid overproduction and to sustain the monopoly price. From a policy perspective, our findings suggest that an overall price increase in conjunction with more stable prices and market shares is indicative of collusion in industries where production precedes sales and outputs are imperfectly observable.     

Collusion Under Imperfect Monitoring with Asymmetric Firms

We explore the effects of asymmetries in capacity constraints on collusion where market demand is uncertain and where firms’ sales and prices are private information. We show that all firms can infer when at least one firm's sales are below some firm‐specific ‘trigger level.’ When firms use this public information to monitor the collusive agreement, price wars may occur on the equilibrium path. Symmetry facilitates collusion but, if price wars are sufficiently long, then the optimal collusive prices of symmetric capacity distributions are lower on average than the competitive prices of asymmetric capacity distributions. We draw conclusions for merger policy.     

Effects of Macroeconomic Uncertainty and Labor Demand Shocks on the Housing Market

This article shows that macroeconomic uncertainty affects the housing market in two significant ways. First, uncertainty shocks adversely affect housing prices but not the quantities that are traded. Controlling for a broad set of variables in fixed‐effects regressions, we find that uncertainty shocks reduce both housing prices and median sales prices in the amount of 1.4% and 1.8%, respectively, but the effect is not statistically significant for the percentage changes of all homes sold. Second, when both uncertainty and local demand shocks are introduced, the effects of uncertainty on the housing market dominate that of local labor demand shocks on housing prices, median sale prices, the share of houses selling for a loss and transactions. The aforementioned effects are largest for the states that exhibit relatively high housing price volatilities, suggesting real options effects in the housing market during the times of high uncertainty.     

Optimal Pricing Strategy in the Case of Price Dispersion: New Evidence from the Tokyo Housing Market

We adopt a multistage search model, in which the home seller's reservation price is determined by her or his opportunity cost, search cost, discount rate and additional market parameters. The model indicates that a greater dispersion in offer prices leads to higher reservation and optimal asking prices. A unique dataset from the Tokyo condominium resale market enables us to test those modeled hypotheses. Empirical results indicate that a one percentage point increase in the standard deviation of submarket transaction prices results in a two‐tenths of a percent increase in the initial asking price and in the final transaction price. Increases in the dispersion of market prices enhance the probabilities of a successful transaction and/or an accelerated sale.     

Impact of demand uncertainty on supply chain cooperation of single-period products

Cooperation is an approach of improving competitive advantages of a supply chain. A two-echelon supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer for a single-period product is studied, and retail-market demand uncertainty is described by coefficient of variation. We develop a cooperation mechanism to address the cooperation and its implementation between the manufacturer and the retailer, two market situations are considered: (i) the wholesale price and the order quantity are decision variables, (ii) the wholesale and the retail prices as well as the order quantity are decision variables. In both market situations, our research shows that: (1) the cooperation mechanism can improve the overall channel profits and the supply chain members’ allocated profits, (2) the described cooperation is conditional on retail-market demand uncertainty: it can be implemented if, and only if, the fluctuation of retail-market demand is relatively small and coefficient of variation of retail-market demand does not exceed an upper bound. Impacts of retail-market demand uncertainty on wholesale price, order quantity and/or retail price have also been investigated through analytical and numerical analyses. Although our research is based on the assumption that the manufacturer dominates the supply chain in the non-cooperative situation, which is not the case for most retailer-driven supply chains, this research is still significant on providing guidelines for practitioners in current China mid-level car market that is similar to situations described in the paper.     

Equilibrium price dispersion with heterogeneous searchers

Firms simultaneously set prices in a homogeneous-product market where uninformed consumers search for price information. Some uninformed consumers are “local” searchers who visit only one seller, whereas others search sequentially with an optimal reservation price. Equilibrium prices may follow a mixture distribution, with clusters of high and low prices separated by a zero-density gap. When the (exogenous) reservation price of local searchers depart from that of the optimizing sequential searchers by a relatively small amount, the presence of local searchers either has no effect on market outcomes or benefits all consumers. A reduction in search cost sometimes leads to higher equilibrium prices.     

A protectionist foodgrain price policy : The case of rice in Panama

Panama has pursued a protectionist price policy for rice, with domestic prices well above the world market level. The government marketing authority purchases sufficient rice to support the established price level and stores or exports the surplus. Although producers benefit, this policy imposes significant costs on consumers, government expenditures and economic efficiency. One policy recommendation is to bring domestic prices in line with the international level. Although free trade is one possibility, a market stabilization programme could be retained. At a minimum Panama's rice price should reflect domestic demand and not production costs. The unfavourable rice-fertilizer price ratio also deserves attention.     

Smallholder market participation under transactions costs: Maize supply and fertilizer demand in Kenya

This paper assessed the effects of transactions costs—relative to price and non-price factors—on smallholder marketed surplus and input use in Kenya. A selectivity model was used that accounts for the effects of transactions costs, assets, technology, and support services in promoting input use and generating a marketable surplus. Output supply and input demand responses to changes in transactions costs and price and non-price factors were estimated and decomposed into market entry and intensity. The results showed that while transactions costs indeed have significant negative effects on market participation, institutional innovations—such as group marketing—are also emerging to mitigate the costs of accessing markets. Output price has no effect on output market entry and only provides incentives for increased supply by sellers. On the other hand, both price and non-price factors have significant influence on adoption and intensity of input use. Overall, the findings suggest that policy options are available other than price policies to promote input use and marketed surplus. The paper concludes with implications for policy to induce greater input–output market participation among smallholders in Africa.     

Provider involvement in business service definition: A typology

This paper proposes a typology for provider roles in defining business services. The starting point of the study is the underlying rationale of much of the service purchasing literature that buyers have or can easily access the necessary know-how to procure business services. If this does not hold, the implication is that buying firms would shy away from buying complex services. An alternative perspective recognizes that purchasing business services requires its own set of sourcing capabilities, which may be lacking. Buying firms may have limited know-how in terms of defining and articulating their requirements or not be fully aware of them in the first place. However, the buyer's lack of sourcing capabilities need not be an injunction to internalize the service. In these circumstances, service providers step in, help buying firms specify their requirements and play a key role in defining what is procured and how. We build on this interactive view of service definition to undertake a comparative case analysis of four business service contracting situations arrayed along two dimensions — buyer perceived uncertainty and provider's buyer-specific experience. We conclude that service providers play different roles in each case. These are classified as translating, re-engineering, developing, and fine-tuning roles.     

Discounts and Public Service Obligations in the Airline Market: Lessons from Spain

We examine the impact of the universal service policy that was applied to the Spanish airline market during the period 2001?C2009. Our analysis shows that routes that benefit from price discounts that were granted by the government to island residents enjoy higher demand than the rest of the country??s domestic routes. However, the lower elasticity of demand of these routes allows airlines to set higher prices. We also find that airlines that operate inter-island routes on which their services are regulated by price caps and frequency floors charge lower prices and schedule higher flight frequencies than is the case on unregulated routes. Overall, our analysis suggests that price discounts for island residents help guarantee the profitability of routes that are regulated by public service obligations.     

Preisdeterminanten des Stromgroßhandels in Frankreich

This article provides a model-based analysis of the French spot market for electricity. Therefore a cost optimizing dispatch model is applied in order to derive a broader understanding of the liberalized electricity market in France considering empirical spot market prices in 2009. At first analysis of market structure and power plant mix is done in accordance with the european framework. The state of supply side competition is suggested as well. Due to the high portion of nuclear energy in the French energy mix the technical availability forecast of the plants plays a crucial role during the price formation on the wholesale market. As a result prices determined by the model are highly correlated with the French spot market. The results suggest a functioning pricing mechanism although deviations occur by ex-ante uncertain demand or unscheduled non-usability of generating units.     

Is the variability of world wheat prices increasing?

Estimates are derived of the potential variability of world wheat prices and the sources of this variability. These indicate a sizable increase in the probability of large short-run fluctuations in price. The bulk of this variability is due to fluctuations in the domestic grain production of developing and centrally-planned economies. However, most market participants are unresponsive to short-run changes in world price, and transmit a substantial amount of domestic variability to the world market. The key factor in world price stability is the short-run responsiveness of wheat exports from the USA. It is likely that both the physical and policy factors that have contributed to increased variability will persist.     

The Impact of an increasing share of RES-E on the Conventional Power Market — The Example of Germany

The intermittency of wind power has a decreasing effect on day-ahead spot prices. Data from Germany illustrate this effect and explain the underlying relationships. This short-term price effect leads to an adaptation process in the conventional generation capacity mix. In the long-run, a higher peak load plant share is required to cope with the increasing volatility of the residual demand. The result is an adapted merit-order. This merit-order intersects with an increasingly volatile residual demand curve and leads to a higher price volatility in the power market, which is going to trigger further adaptations. Therefore this article concludes with a list of open research questions, which can be derived from the illustrated relationship. These research questions should be investigated as soon as possible in order to induce the required adaptations in time.     

Distribution contracts to support optimal inventory holdings under demand uncertainty

When suppliers produce products for which demand is uncertain, they face a problem of inducing downstream distributors to stock inventory levels that the suppliers prefer. This paper considers a wide array of alternative supply contracts, each of which consists of a mixture of constant per-unit wholesale prices, buy-back arrangements, and post sale payments contingent on sales made, such as revenue sharing or buybacks. We show that linear supply contracts specifying any combination of two of these three instruments can implement the vertical integrated outcome for a monopoly, thereby generating the supplier's preferred inventory configuration and price distribution. We extend our results to differentiated product oligopoly, demonstrating that each supplier obtains its preferred inventory configuration and price distribution, given the choices of its rival. Distributors choose optimal inventories from the suppliers' standpoint, even if suppliers do not know the distribution of demand uncertainty, and, given the perfect competition among distributors, all profits in the supply chain are captured by suppliers. Thus, suppliers are able to deal with demand uncertainty with remarkably little information about demand, and without the need to control dealer actions in detail. In particular, suppliers need not specify either dealer inventories or resale prices, but instead encourage distributors to order based on information in their possession and to set prices that generate desirable resale price dispersion.     

Risikoprämien im Erdölhandel

Risk premiums are not directly observable, since they are only a part of futures prices. In an efficient market, the historical price at maturity of the futures prices can be taken as an approximation of expected spot price. Therefore, risk premiums are identified as the bias between the historical spot prices at maturity and futures prices with the correspondent maturity. The Brent Futures markets with maturities of four months are examined. The calculated risk premiums are positive and the deviations from the historical spot price are left skewed, which implies that buyers in crude oil markets are risk averse and prudent. The risk premiums have approximately tripled in 2001–2008 to 1991–2000. This is caused either by an increased specific market risk or by inefficient information of market participants.     

Multiproduct Price Regulation Under Asymmetric Information

We discuss the regulation of a multiproduct monopolist when the firm has private information about cost or demand conditions. The regulator offers the firm a set of prices from which to choose. When there is private information only about costs, the firm should always have a degree of discretion over its pricing policy. When uncertainty concerns demand, whether discretion is desirable depends on how demand elasticities vary with the scale of demands. If a positive demand shock is associated with a reduction in the market elasticity, discretion is good for overall welfare; otherwise it is not.     

The component procurement problem for the loss-averse manufacturer with spot purchase

This paper studies the purchasing behaviour of a loss-averse engineer-to-order manufacturer, who purchases a key component for his final product from a supplier under a single-wholesale-price contract with spot purchase opportunities, where both the product demand and the component spot price are uncertain. Through newsvendor type of models, we analyze several key issues, including the effects of the manufacturer's loss aversion, and the effects of demand and spot price uncertainties on the manufacturer's decision behaviour. We find that the purchasing behaviour of the loss-averse manufacturer differs from those of the risk-neutral and risk-averse ones. Specifically, we identify some sufficient conditions under which the loss-averse manufacturer may purchase a larger order quantity in advance when demand becomes more uncertain or when the price becomes more uncertain. We also discuss the two-wholesale-price contract and show that fixing the emergency supply price may lead to a smaller order quantity.     

Opportunity Cost Pass‐Through from Fossil Fuel Market Prices to Procurement Costs of the U.S. Power Producers

This paper investigates the transmission of fossil fuel commodity spot market price changes to procurement costs of U.S. power producers. We measure and compare the speed and magnitude with which spot prices predict procurement costs using restricted access fuel price data. Natural gas spot prices are quickly reflected in procurement costs. Coal spot prices offer very little predictive power to coal procurement costs. Although not causal, the empirical results also show differences across regulatory status. These findings may have implications for the electricity market deregulation literature that creates marginal cost curves as a competitive benchmark.