基于代理理论与管家理论视角的家族企业的公司治理选择：一个理论框架

企业组织是一个非常异质性的组织，企业的不同治理选择潜在影响着企业的代理成本和管家态度。最终体现为能力和企业绩效上的重要区别。本文从代理理论与管家理论这两种不同公司治理视角，分析了家族企业公司治理的四个维度即家族所有与控制、家族领导能力、多个家族成员的广泛参与、以及家族传承计划与实际参与下的各自的代理成本和管家态度，以及对企业能力和绩效的影响。     

Boards of Directors,Innovation, and Performance: An Exploration at Multiple Levels

This work reports on an investigation of the dynamics of governance over breakthrough innovation within Fortune 1000 firms. The primary research question investigates the boundary of agency theory within the firm. Using agency and stakeholder theoretic perspectives, the study tests the hypothesis that innovation will thrive in firms that combine a board of directors operating in accordance with a high agency theoretic focus in addition to an innovation governance board operating deeper within the firm that employs a strong stakeholder theoretic orientation in its behavior. The model is tested with data from 98 large firms. Results suggest that the relationship between board of directors' behavior and the firm's overall innovativeness is mediated by innovation decision‐making boards that (1) promote projects that are breakthrough in scope, (2) incorporate input of diverse constituencies within the firm, (3) exhibit patience with financial results, and (4) engage in frequent, informal interactions with project teams. Firms exhibiting high board of director agency orientation in combination with loyalty to mandate, patient financial capital disposition, inclusiveness, and project team interaction as described above for innovation governance board decision‐making prove to be the most innovative as measured by external indicators. For firm innovativeness, consolidated managerial power and behavior is frequently present at the upper levels of the firm, but must be broken down at deeper levels of the firm. This research offers implications to innovation decision‐makers as to how to proceed if the intent is to offer commercializably successful breakthrough innovations.     

Is family leadership always beneficial?

There has been much debate concerning the performance of family firms and the drivers of their performance. Some scholars have argued that family management is to blame when family firms go wrong; others claim that family management removes costly agency problems and encourages stewardship. Our thesis is that these disagreements can only be resolved by distinguishing among different types of family firms. We argue that family CEOs will outperform in smaller firms with more concentrated ownership and underperform in larger firms with more dispersed ownership; they will do neither where firms are smaller and ownership is more dispersed or firms are larger and ownership is more concentrated. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effects of market orientation on relationship learning and relationship performance in industrial marketing: The dyadic perspectives

From dyadic perspectives, this study explores the effect of market orientation on relationship learning and relationship performance and the moderating effect of relationship quality in Taiwan manufacturing industry. The results reveal that: (1) both customer market orientation and supplier market orientation are positively related to relationship learning; (2) relationship learning is positively related to relationship performance; (3) both customer and supplier market orientation has positively interaction effect on shared information and negatively interaction effect on sense-making activities; and (4) trust of relationship quality has moderating effect on the relationship between customer market orientation and relationship learning.     

顾客集中与管理层治理——基于薪酬契约和代理成本的视角

本文以创业板上市公司为研究样本，从薪酬契约和代理成本的视角，检验了顾客集中与管理层治理的关系。实证分析结果显示，顾客集中度与高管薪酬和代理成本存在显著负相关关系。结果表明：顾客集中显著影响公司薪酬契约，顾客集中降低了高管薪酬；顾客集中降低代理成本，减轻管理层代理冲突问题。这些研究结论丰富了公司治理的理论内容，同时对于缓解公司代理冲突、改善公司治理矛盾具有重要的现实意义。     

BS in the boardroom: Benevolent sexism and board chair orientations

Research Summary: Though research has focused on the ascent and acceptance of female CEOs, the post‐promotion circumstances female CEOs face remain unclear. In this study, we focus on a critical post‐promotion circumstance: the board chair–CEO relationship. Drawing on the gender stereotype literature, agency theory, and stewardship theory, we posit that firms appointing a female CEO are more likely to adopt a collaboration board chair orientation and less likely to adopt a control orientation. We further predict this effect is attenuated by female board representation. Using a sample of new S&P 1500 CEOs, we find support for our predictions regarding the collaboration orientation but not the control orientation. This research provides some evidence of benevolent sexism in the boardroom, with female directors acting as a countervailing influence. Managerial Summary: Whereas the notion that females encounter a glass ceiling on their path toward CEO is well documented, the conditions female CEOs encounter after promotion are less understood. The relationship between the board chair and the CEO is one important post‐promotion condition. Board chairs can focus on monitoring and/or working together with the CEO. We suggest board chairs are more likely to work in close collaboration with female CEOs than with male CEOs. We attribute this to benevolent sexism, which explains that board chairs are more likely to collaborate with female CEOs because they view females as more conducive to, and in need of, this type of relationship. We also suggest this benevolent sexism is less prevalent when there are more females on the board.     

双向视角的员工组织关系探索--I-P/S模型的实证研究

员工一组织关系(Employee-Organization Relationship,以下简称EOR)是组织对员工的投入与员工为组织的贡献之间的交换关系。国内外理论界对这种交换关系的研究主要运用了两个模型：心理契约模型(PC)和激励／贡献模型(I／C)。心理契约模型主要从员工的角度研究EOR,激励／贡献模型则主要从组织的角度研究EOR。本文在心理契约模型和激励／贡献模型的基础上,构建了从组织和员工两个角度揭示员工与组织互动关系的I-P／S模型,并且探讨了不同类型EOR的具体管理策略与方法。     

The choice of organizational form: Vertical financial ownership versus other methods of vertical integration

Vertical integration is a fundamental corporate strategy of interest to the fields of strategic management and organizational economics. This paper synthesizes theoretical arguments and empirical findings from this literature to identify the underlying advantages and disadvantages of choosing vertical financial ownership relative to vertical contracts. It then suggests that in the absence of agency and transaction costs, vertical financial ownership and vertical contracting are equivalent governance structures for achieving corporate objectives. However, given a world of positive agency and transaction costs, the key theoretic question then becomes predicting when market mechanisms are sufficient, when intermediate forms of vertical contracting become necessary, and when vertical financial ownership becomes the preferred governance structure. The concluding section of the paper provides a framework for making this analysis based on a synthesis of agency and transaction costs perspectives.     

Multiple agency perspective,family control,and private information abuse in an emerging economy

Using a comprehensive sample of listed companies in Hong Kong this paper investigates how family control affects private information abuses and firm performance in emerging economies. We combine research on stock market microstructure with more recent studies of multiple agency perspectives and argue that family ownership and control over the board increases the risk of private information abuse. This, in turn, has a negative impact on stock market performance. Family control is associated with an incentive to distort information disclosure to minority shareholders and obtain private benefits of control. However, the multiple agency roles of controlling families may have different governance properties in terms of investors’ perceptions of private information abuse. These findings contribute to our understanding of the conflicting evidence on the governance role of family control within a multiple agency perspective.     

Diversification and Economic Performance: An Empirical Assessment of Chinese Firms

Integrating the impact of both resource and institutional factors and taking into consideration potential agency problems, this study proposes to investigate the joint effect of both related and unrelated diversification strategies on firm performance in an emerging economy setting and to assess empirically the hypothesized relationship using Chinese firms. The empirical results support the basic contention that both resource building and utilization through concentration and related diversification and institutional environmental management through unrelated diversification are important for firm performance in emerging economies but they must be considered together. This paper concludes with a discussion of its contributions, practical implications, and directions for future research.     

幸福感、社会资本与代理成本

幸福感是社会学和经济学领域关注的热点问题,但较少研究幸福感对公司治理行为影响的经济后果。本文运用中国A股上市公司的经验数据,在对幸福感与代理成本的关系进行理论分析的基础上,首次检验了幸福感与代理成本之间的关系。研究发现:地区幸福感能够显著降低地方政府控制上市公司的代理成本,与之相反,地区幸福感加剧了民营控制上市公司的代理成本,并从幸福感的社会资本视角对地区幸福感与代理成本的关系进行了解读。本研究在一定程度上增进了企业代理成本问题的研究积累,研究结论对国民福利的公共政策和企业员工福利计划的制定具有一定的启示意义。     

Testing a model of reasoned risk‐taking: governance,the experience of principals and agents,and global strategy in high‐technology IPO firms

Research on the governance of risky ventures, like the initial public offerings (IPOs) of high‐technology firms, has focused primarily on the relationship between governance mechanisms and firm performance. While such an emphasis is clearly important, it does little to shed light on potential relationships between governance and the strategies pursued by risky firms, nor does it take into account the complementary role of key stakeholders in affecting those strategies. To partially remedy this deficit we integrate agency and behavioral perspectives to develop a theory of ‘reasoned risk‐taking,’ whereby the nature of risks undertaken is a consequence of the interaction of governance mechanisms and stakeholder characteristics. We demonstrate our theory by predicting when corporate governance should be associated with strategic risk‐seeking beyond a firm's technical core—as seen in the degree to which it has expanded internationally. Surprisingly, even though venture capitalists (VC) are risk specialists, we find that technology‐based IPO firms are less likely (i.e., a negative relationship) to have extensive global sales when they are backed by a VC. In support of our reasoned risk‐taking theoretical framework, we find that VCs are indeed risk‐seeking when VC backing is complemented by the international experience of their board appointees, top management team (TMT) members, or both. IPO firms with significant insider ownership are similarly global risk‐seekers, and those effects are strongest with an internationally seasoned board and TMT at the helm. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Corporate elites and corporate strategy: how demographic preferences and structural position shape the scope of the firm

This study combines elements of the upper echelons and agency perspectives to resolve some of the ambiguity surrounding how corporate elites affect corporate strategy. We propose and test the notion that while differences in individual characteristics of corporate elites may imply different preferences for particular corporate strategies such as diversification and acquisitions, these basic preferences, when situated in different agency contexts (e.g., CEO, outsider director, non‐CEO top management team member), generate very different strategic outcomes. Our detailed empirical findings, based on extensive longitudinal governance and corporate strategy data from large U.S. corporations, also highlight the pitfalls of using aggregate units of analysis (e.g., board of directors or top management team) when studying the influence of corporate elites on corporate strategy. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Corporate social responsibility or CEO narcissism? CSR motivations and organizational performance

This study builds on insights from both upper echelons and agency perspectives to examine the effects on corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices of CEO's narcissism. Drawing on prior theory about CEO narcissism, we argue that CSR can be a response to leaders' personal needs for attention and image reinforcement and hypothesize that CEO narcissism has positive effects on levels and profile of organizational CSR; additionally, CEO narcissism will reduce the effect of CSR on performance. We find support for our ideas with a sample of Fortune 500 CEOs, operationalizing CEO narcissism with a novel media‐based measurement technique that uses third‐party ratings of CEO characteristics with validated psychometric scales. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Family ownership and acquisition behavior in publicly‐traded companies

Much of the literature on corporate acquisitions has focused on managerial incentives for making acquisitions but has underemphasized the role played by the social context of major shareholders. This study of Fortune 1000 firms argues that the priorities and risk preferences of family owners can have important implications not only for the volume but also for the diversifying nature of their acquisitions. Agency and family business perspectives are used to derive expectations concerning the acquisitions behavior of family owners. Consistent with both perspectives, and owners' desire to reduce business risk, we find that family ownership is inversely related to the number and dollar volume of acquisitions. However, whereas agency theorists differ about how ownership concentration influences whether acquisitions are diversified, the family firm literature is more definitive. The latter suggests that given family owners' desire to retain control of their firms for offspring, their wealth must remain concentrated. Hence they can most easily reduce the risk of their wealth portfolio by diversifying the business—that is, through diversifying acquisitions. Consistent with this logic, we found the propensity to make diversifying acquisitions to increase with the level of family ownership. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Maintaining Client Commitment in Advertising Agency–Client Relationships

A rapidly expanding base of theory and practice reflects the increased emphasis being placed on initiating, building, and maintaining close business relationships. Research on advertising agency–client relationships has been less complete with the focus being primarily on the diagnosis of failed relationships. This study examines the consequences of agency and client behaviors on the working relationships. The working relationship is then shown to influence agency performance and client disposition. Survey data collected from 194 advertisers show that agency and client behaviors influence productive interaction, conflict, and creative quality implementation. Results further indicate that agency performance increases client trust and commitment. Productive interaction also increases client commitment, whereas conflict decreases client commitment.     

Managing supplier-retailer relationships: From institutional and task environment perspectives

This study develops an integrated model of managing channel relationships that involves task and institutional environment perspectives. Using survey data from automobile dealers in China, the authors provide empirical evidence to demonstrate the utility of the legitimacy-based institutional environment perspective in clarifying channel relationship issues, which have been considered mostly only from an economic efficiency-based task environment approach. As the institutional environment perspective's factors, imposition asymmetry and bypassing have indirect impacts on trust in supplier and the level of conflict in a channel relationship. As the task environment standpoint's factors, explicit contracts and supplier's transaction-specific investments (TSIs) are posited to have direct effects on trust in supplier and the level of conflict, however, the hypothesized relationship between supplier's TSIs and the level of conflict is not supported. The results also indicate both building a retailer's trust in its supplier and lowering the level of conflict lead to improved relationship performance.     

When much more of a difference makes a difference: Social comparison and tournaments in the CEO's top team

We integrate the seemingly contradictory theoretical predictions of behavioral and economic perspectives about the relationship between pay disparity and firm performance and show that tournament and social comparison theories are more supplementary than contradictory in nature. Our results show that high levels of firm performance will be found around either meaningfully low or meaningfully high levels of pay disparity. Additional findings indicate that this curvilinear relationship is weakened in the presence of both an heir apparent and high CEO power, and strengthened when top management team members are more eligible as CEOs. These findings suggest that factors that increase or inhibit social comparison or tournament perceptions among TMT members play a role in the strength of the curvilinear relationship between pay disparity and firm performance. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Temporary Agency Work and Firm Competitiveness: Evidence from German Manufacturing Firms

This paper addresses the relationship between the utilization of temporary agency workers by firms and their competitiveness measured by unit labor costs, using a rich, newly built, dataset of German manufacturing enterprises. We conduct the analysis by applying different panel data models while taking the inherent selection problem into account. Making use of dynamic panel data models allows us to control for firm‐specific fixed effects as well as for potential endogeneity of explanatory variables. The results indicate an inverse U‐shaped relationship between the extent that temporary agency workers are used and the competitiveness of firms.