The Licensing of Barbers in the USA

Barbering is one of the earliest professions to be licensed in the USA. This article discusses the origins of barber licensing, as well as its current status and scope, and then estimates the effects that such licensing has had on barbers' earnings. To estimate these effects we use micro‐level data from the 2000 US Census along with several measures of the strictness of state licensing of barbers. Our results suggest that certain licensing provisions may have increased barber earnings by between 11 and 22 per cent. The magnitude of our estimates is somewhat higher than those found in studies examining the effects of licensing in similar professions.     

The Labor‐Market Effects of Occupational Licensing Laws in Nursing

We study the labor‐market impacts of occupational licensing laws on nursing, an economically important occupation. States adopted licensing of registered and practical nurses at different times, which allows us to estimate the effects of licensing on wages and participation for each nursing profession. We find that licensure raised wages by 5 to 10 percent but there is no evidence that it reduced overall participation. Additionally, we show that licensure equalizes wages within the occupation with minority wages rising faster than nonminority wages; however, licensing had a negative but not statistically significant impact on the participation of minorities in nursing.     

Analyzing the Labor Market Outcomes of Occupational Licensing

Recent assessments of occupational licensing have shown varying effects of the institution on labor‐market outcomes. This study revisits the relationship between occupational licensing and labor‐market outcomes by analyzing a new topical module to the Survey of Income and Program Participation. Relative to previously available data, the topical module offers more detailed information on occupational licensing attainment, with larger sample sizes and access to richer sets of person‐level characteristics. We find that those with a license earn higher pay, are more likely to be employed, and have a higher probability of employer‐sponsored health insurance offers.     

Licensing Essential Patents: The Non‐Discriminatory Commitment and Hold‐Up

Licensors of patents essential to a standard are often required to license on reasonable and non‐discriminatory (RAND) terms. Using a model with owners of essential patents and licensees who invest into standard‐conforming technologies, this paper demonstrates that the non‐discriminatory commitment alleviates the hold‐up problem. Moreover, it improves consumer and social welfare, and promotes upstream innovation as licensing revenue is increased. In an extended model with each licensor independently choosing whether to make the commitment, all licensors voluntarily commit in the unique equilibrium.     

The Effects of Occupational Licensing: Evidence from Business‐Level Data

Occupational licensing currently affects more than 1,000 occupations in the United States. I use confidential US Census Bureau business micro‐data to shed light on the effect of occupational licensing in cosmetology on key market outcomes and study its effect on the providers of occupational training. Occupational licensing regulation does not seem to affect the equilibrium number of practitioners or prices of services to consumers, but is associated with significantly lower practitioner entry and exit rates. I further find states with more stringent licensing requirements to have more instructors and a larger median size of training facilities, suggesting possible barriers to entry for the training schools. Instructors, however, do not earn more in such states.     

The Prevalence and Effects of Occupational Licensing

Our study provides the first national analysis of the labour market implications of workers who are licensed by any agency of the government in the USA. Using a specially designed Gallup survey of a nationally representative sample of Americans, we provide an analysis of the influence of this form of occupational regulation. We find that 29 per cent of the workforce is required to hold a licence, which is a higher percentage than that found in other studies that rely on state‐level occupational licensing data or single states. Workers who have higher levels of education are more likely to work in jobs that require a licence. Union workers and government employees are more likely to have a licence requirement than are non‐union or private sector employees. Our multivariate estimates suggest that licensing has about the same quantitative impact on wages as do unions — that is about 15 per cent — and that being both licensed and in a union can increase wages by more than 24 per cent. However, unlike unions which reduce variance in wages, licensing does not significantly reduce wage dispersion for individuals in licensed jobs.     

Licensing as an Alternative to Foreign Direct Investment

This article addresses issues linked to the sales of manufacturing technology and know-how through licensing by British companies to unaffilated firms located overseas. It identifies a number of characteristics that make these companies more likely to license abroad. The authors test a model of foreign licensing on data gathered from 145 firms based in the United Kingdom. Many companies do evaluate licensing to unaffilated firms as an alternative to foreign direct investment when they consider manufacturing in foreign markets. These firms tend to be relatively large in their industry, highly diversified, spend a relatively higher proportion of their value-added on research and development, and have less foreign experience.     

Re‐Examining Advances in Occupational Licensing Research: Issues and Policy Implications

Much has changed in the realms of occupational licensing since BJIR last ran a special issue on the subject in 2010. The number of occupations subject to licensing has been growing, the data available to investigate the incidence and effects of licensing have improved immeasurably, and the policy environment surrounding licensing has changed. This issue reflects these changes with eight papers from North America and Europe covering the incidence of licensing, and its effects on wages, inequality, employment, quality of service provision and rent extraction by the organizations who undertake licensing.     

The Gender Gap in Funeral Directors: Burying Women with Ready‐to‐Embalm Laws?

Over the last few decades, the gender composition of funeral directors in the United States has changed dramatically as women have entered this traditionally male‐dominated occupation. To practise as funeral directors, women (and men) must be licensed in all but one state. The most extensive training requirements exist in the 27 states with ‘ready‐to‐embalm’ laws, which require funeral directors to be embalmers. Using a sample of 45,989 licensing records from 40 states, we find that 18.1 per cent of funeral directors were women in 2006. However, the proportion is significantly lower in states with ready‐to‐embalm laws. Our regressions imply that these laws reduce the proportion of female funeral directors by 24 per cent. More generally, we find that the number of funeral directors per capita is 17 per cent lower, on average, in states with ready‐to‐embalm laws.     

Licensing information goods

A significant amount of research on patent licensing and the diffusion of knowledge is organized around static frameworks of analysis. Patent holders, however, may face a dynamic problem, namely the intertemporal consistency problem of the durable-goods monopolist that is induced by durability on the demand side. Licensing practices such as exclusive licensing contracts and most favored customer clauses allow patentees to solve or mitigate this dynamic consistency problem. There are situations, however, where these practices are not possible either due to the nature of the patent (the case of information goods) or due to compulsory patenting laws. We study the effects of the intertemporal consistency problem on patent licensing in these situations. Relative to the existing literature, we obtain the following main results: (i) all of the firms that remain in the industry will be using the innovation; (ii) royalty licensing may be superior to fixed-fee or auction licensing from the licensor's point of view; (iii) social welfare and consumer surplus may be lower than when the patent holder can commit not to make additional sales; (iv) even for non-drastic innovations, the price of the good that is produced may be lower than the competitive price corresponding to the initial situation (before the innovation was discovered).     

How Much of Barrier to Entry is Occupational Licensing?

We exploit state variation in licensing laws to study the effect of licensing on occupational choice using a boundary discontinuity design. We find that licensing reduces equilibrium labour supply by an average of 17–27 per cent.     

The Effects of Minimum Wages on Low‐Skilled Immigrants’ Wages,Employment, and Poverty

Raising the minimum wage has been advanced as complementary policy to comprehensive immigration reform to improve low‐skilled immigrants’ economic well‐being. While adverse labor demand effects could undermine this goal, existing studies do not detect evidence of negative employment effects. We re‐investigate this question using data from the 1994 to 2016 Current Population Survey and conclude that minimum wage increases reduced employment of less‐educated Hispanic immigrants, with estimated elasticities of around –0.1. However, we also find that the wage and employment effects of minimum wages on low‐skilled immigrants diminished over the last decade. This finding is consistent with more restrictive state immigration policies and the Great Recession inducing outmigration of low‐skilled immigrants, as well as immigrants moving into the informal sector. Finally, our results show that raising the minimum wage is an ineffective policy tool for reducing poverty among immigrants.     

Do Occupational Regulations Increase Earnings? Evidence from China

We examine the influence of occupational certification and licensing in China. In the empirical analysis, we find that licensing is associated with an average of 15 percent higher wages and certification with a 13–14 percent higher wage based on ordinary least squares estimates. However, using propensity score and instrumental variable estimates suggests that part of the positive effect of certification on wages is due to self‐selection. In addition, the characteristics of a certificate or license, such as the type and quantity, further influence wage determination in China.     

Licensing Innovations with Exclusive Contracts

We analyze licensing contracts specifying an exclusive territory clause and a fixed fee as a form of payment. While commonly observed, the effects of such licensing contracts have not been investigated in the licensing literature. We find that they can generate revenues for an innovator equal to those that would be obtained by a monopolist using the cost-reducing innovation that is being licensed. This result, however, depends on three factors: The size of the market relative to the pre-innovation marginal cost, the quality of the innovation, and the degree of substitutability between the goods being produced in the market.      

Licensing‐in fosters rapid invention! the effect of the grant‐back clause and technological unfamiliarity

Drawing on contractual economics and innovation management, licensing‐in is hypothesized to accelerate licensees' invention process. Studying a matched dataset of licensees and non‐licensees, licensees are shown to be faster at inventing, but the effect is negated if the license includes a grant‐back clause, shifting incentives from licensee to licensor. Also, the effect is significantly reduced if the licensee is unfamiliar with the licensed technology. The effect of the grant‐back clause is offset if the licensee is unfamiliar with the licensed technology, suggesting that the licensee retains the incentives to invent under these circumstances. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Technology Exploitation Paths: Combining Technological and Complementary Resources in New Product Development and Licensing

Technological resources in the form of patents, trade secrets, and know‐how have become key assets for modern enterprises. This paper addresses a critical issue in technology and innovation management, namely, the commercial exploitation of technological resources resulting from research and development (R&D) investments. Extracting economic value from these resources by maximizing the benefits for shareholders is an extremely challenging task because technological resources are intangible, idiosyncratic, uncertain, predominantly tacit, and with poorly defined property rights. In their attempt to extract the maximum value from their technological resources, firms increasingly combine their internal exploitation through new product development (NPD) with external exploitation through licensing. However, most existing studies on NPD and technology licensing have treated the two exploitation paths independently and in isolation, which has resulted in two separate research streams using different theories and addressing different managerial challenges. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to filling this gap by developing and testing a comprehensive conceptual framework that simultaneously considers the antecedents affecting the successful implementation of NPD and licensing strategies as well as their consequences on firm profitability. The paper in particular investigates the effects of the interplay between technological resources and three types of complementary resources, marketing, manufacturing, and relational. We test the model using structural equation modeling on a sample of 733 Spanish manufacturing firms observed from 2003 to 2007. The data provide support for the existence of different paths to market firm technologies: an internal path, whereby the ownership of technological resources fully explains NPD performance, and an external path, whereby high intensity of marketing and relational resources reinforces the positive effect of technological resources on licensing performance. This sustains the relevance of the resource‐based value‐enhancing effects of complementary resources in licensing, as opposed to the motivation‐reducing effects advanced by transaction cost‐based literature. Moreover, the empirical analysis shows a substitution effect between NPD and licensing, whereby their simultaneous pursuit at intense levels is associated with lower profit margins. This provides evidence of the much theorized, but seldom tested, rent dissipation effect. These findings offer several contributions to research on licensing, NPD, open innovation, and the resource‐based view of the firm. On a managerial level, they suggest that achieving maximum value from proprietary technologies may not entail exploiting them both through external and internal paths. Managers are also informed that the resource combinations that enhance licensing performance include marketing and relational resources.     

Licensing Exam Difficulty and Entry Salaries in the US Market for Lawyers

This article provides evidence of a correlation between licensing exam difficulty and salaries in a regulated profession. Exam difficulty is positively correlated with salaries across states and over time, both at the aggregate and individual state levels. The magnitude of this correlation is substantial: a 1 per cent increase in exam difficulty implies a 1.7 per cent increase in median entry‐level salaries. Exam difficulty does not significantly affect the inter‐quartile difference in salaries.     

Occupational Regulation in the European Union: Coverage and Wage Effects

We present the first EU‐wide study on the prevalence and labour market impact of occupational regulation in the European Union. Drawing on a new EU Survey of Regulated Occupations, we find that licensing affects about 22 per cent of workers in the European Union, although there is significant variability across member states and occupations. On average, licensing is associated with a 4 per cent higher hourly wage. Using decomposition techniques we show that rent capture accounts for one‐third of this effect and the remainder is attributed to signalling. We find considerable heterogeneity in the wage gains by occupation and level of educational attainment. Finally, occupational licensing increases wage inequality. After accounting for composition effects, licensing increases the standard deviation of wages by about 0.02 log points.     

An inquiry on dimensions of external technology search and their influence on technological innovations: evidence from Chinese firms

A central part of technological innovation for industrial firms involves search for new external knowledge. A well‐established stream of literature on firms' external knowledge search has demonstrated that firms investing in broader search may have a great ability to innovate. In this paper, we explore the influences of technology search on firms' technological innovation performance along three distinctive dimensions: technical, geographic, and temporal dimensions, using a unique panel data set containing information on Chinese firms that were active in technology in‐licensing and patenting during the period 2000–2009. Our findings reveal that Chinese firms' technological innovation performances are related to external technology search in quite different ways from the ones suggested in the extant literature using evidence from developed countries. We find that Chinese firms searching ‘locally’ along the technical dimension have better technological innovation performance than those searching ‘distantly’. However, when a Chinese firm in‐license relatively old (mature) technologies or those from geographically nearby areas, it will be less bounded to searching familiar technical knowledge.     

Licensing Strategies in the Presence of Patent Thickets

Many key industries (e.g., biomedical, pharmaceuticals, telecommunications, and information technologies) are characterized by cumulative innovations, where the introduction of a new product or service often requires many complementary technologies. When these technologies are protected by intellectual property rights owned by many firms, patent thickets exist, which researchers have argued may hinder the development of cumulative innovations. Specifically, patent thickets may lead to excessive royalty burdens for potential licensees, which is called “royalty stacking,” and if such costs are passed on to consumers, prices of products based on cumulative technologies will be driven up, dubbed as “double marginalization.” The literature, however, does not address these issues under different forms of licensing contracts. This article develops a game‐theoretic model where a downstream firm seeks to license N patents that read on its product from upstream firms. It discusses a variety of licensing forms widely used in practice and attempts to discover whether royalty stacking and double marginalization occur under these forms of licenses. It also studies the impact of bargaining power between parties. It is found that when patent ownership becomes more fragmented, neither royalty stacking nor double marginalization occurs under profit‐based royalty, fixed fee, and hybrid licenses. Such problems occur only under pure quantity‐based or pure revenue‐based royalty licenses when the downstream firm's bargaining power is low. It is also shown that no matter how fragmented the ownership structure of patent is, hybrid licenses consisting of a fixed fee and a quantity‐ or revenue‐based royalty rate lead to the same market outcomes as a fully integrated firm that owns all the patents and the downstream market. This article has interesting implications for both research and practice. First, the results show that even under the same patent ownership structure, different forms of licenses lead to quite different market outcomes. Therefore, it is suggested that firms and policy makers pay more attention to contractual forms of licenses when trying to minimize the negative impact of patent thickets. Second, the extant literature has largely assumed that quantity‐based royalties are used, where double marginalization is the most severe. In practice, revenue‐based royalties are most common, under which double marginalization is much milder. Third, the results show that patent pools can be most effective in mitigating royalty stacking and double marginalization when quantity‐based or revenue‐based royalties are the sole or primary payment form, especially when downstream firms have low bargaining power.