Ownership and Pay in Britain

Drawing on principal–agent perspectives on corporate governance, the article examines whether employees’ hourly pay is related to ownership dispersion. Using linked employee‐workplace data from the British Workplace Employment Relations Survey 2011, and using a variety of techniques including interval regression and propensity score matching, average hourly pay is found to be higher in dispersed ownership workplaces. The premium is broadly constant across most of the wage distribution, but falls at the 95th percentile to become statistically non‐significant. This contrasts with earlier papers which indicate that higher level employees are the primary beneficiaries of higher pay from dispersed ownership. The dispersed ownership pay premium is not readily explained by efficiency wage perspectives but is consistent with a managerial desire for a ‘quiet life’.     

Changes in Wage-setting Arrangements and Trade Union Presence in the 1980s

In this paper we detail the results of a retrospective survey of changes in trade union and wage-setting arrangements in the 1980s for a sample of 558 UK companies. Our key findings are as follows. (1) Complete derecognition of unions in a firm was rare even in firms with low trade union density. (2) Partial derecognition in multi-plant firms was more common. Some 13 per cent of companies with recognized unions in 1984 had had at least partial derecognition by 1990. (3) Large falls in trade union density within a firm have also been rare, though small but observable declines have been commonplace. (4) The coverage of the closed shop has substantially declined, and this decline has been most marked in the last five years. Around one-quarter of firms with recognized unions in 1990, however, still had closed-shop arrangement for at least part of their work-force. (5) There has been no clear decline in the prevalence of multi-unionism or multiple bargaining units. (6) There has been a significant move away from national/industry-wide bargaining, towards negotiations at the individual company or more often the establishment level. (7) In the absence of collective bargaining there have been clear moves away from wage-setting by formal external links, such as wages councils and multi-employer agreements, and even away from worker consultation towards more managerial discretion. (8) In deciding wage settlements, managers are increasingly influenced by company performance and less by multi-employer wage settlements.     

Collective Bargaining and the Evolution of Wage Inequality in Italy

Italian male wage inequality has increased at a relatively fast pace from the mid‐1980s until the early 2000s, while it has been persistently flat since then. We analyse this trend, focusing on the period of most rapid growth in pay dispersion. By accounting for worker and firm fixed effects, it is shown that workers' heterogeneity has been a major determinant of increased wage inequalities, while variability in firm wage policies has declined over time. We also show that the growth in pay dispersion has entirely occurred between livelli di inquadramento, that is, job titles defined by national industry‐wide collective bargaining institutions, for which specific minimum wages apply. We conclude that the underlying market forces determining wage inequality have been largely channelled into the tight tracks set by the centralized system of industrial relations.     

最低工资标准、劳动力素质与FDI

本文利用我国30个省区2000～2014年的面板数据，分投资地区和投资类型考察了最低工资标准、劳动力素质对FDI流入规模的影响。研究发现：最低工资上涨对FDI流入规模呈现正U型影响；最低工资上涨通过提高劳动力素质增大FDI的流入规模。在东部地区，最低工资上涨对FDI流入规模呈现倒U型影响；而在中西部地区，最低工资上涨对FDI流入规模呈现正U型影响。最低工资上涨通过提高劳动力素质，增大了劳动密集型和资本密集型FDI的流入规模；而对技术密集型FDI的流入没有影响。本文的研究成果可为中国当前的最低工资制度、人才发展战略以及“引进来”战略的调整提供参考依据。     

More than network structure: how knowledge heterogeneity influences managerial performance and innovativeness

This study deals with individual managerial performance, both overall and in generating innovation. While prior work has demonstrated a relationship between network structure and managerial performance, inadequate attention has been paid to network content. We consider several micro‐social processes that might account for differences in managerial performance, taken from economic sociology and studies of managers' exploitation of their social networks and derived from work in psychology on the genesis of ideas. We compare the influence of these mechanisms on managerial performance using a sample of 106 middle managers in a European telecommunications company. Our findings suggest that, while network structure matters, access to heterogeneous knowledge is of equal importance for overall managerial performance and of greater importance for innovation performance. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The British National Minimum Wage

Great Britain has had statutory regulation of minimum pay for much of this century but never previously had a national minimum wage (NMW). This paper outlines the history of minimum wage regulation culminating in 1997 with the establishment of the Low Pay Commission (LPC) and the introduction of the NMW in 1999. The main issues considered by the LPC were the definition of the NMW, the rate itself, and what to do about younger workers. Although there is general agreement that minimum wage systems reduce wage inequality, their impact on the distribution of household income is more controversial. Evidence presented suggests the NMW may have a more egalitarian impact on household incomes than is sometimes asserted. The Report of the LPC is only the beginning of the story. Responses to it were generally favourable; parliamentary regulations are needed to translate the recommendations into law; the NMW has to be enforced and evaluated. This necessary follow-up to the Report is discussed in the concluding sections.     

Public–Private Sector Wage Gap in Australia: Variation along the Distribution

Previous research on public–private wage differentials in Australia has focused on the mean of the conditional wage distribution. Using six waves of the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia survey, this study employs quantile regressions to examine whether the sectoral wage effect varies along the wage distribution. For females, public sector wage premiums are relatively stable for almost the entire distribution. For males, they decrease monotonically and are negative for the top half of the distribution. The decomposition results show that the observed differences in individuals and job characteristics explain a substantial proportion of the sectoral wage gap.     

Working effectively in strategic alliances through managerial fit between partners: some evidence from Sino–British joint ventures and the implications for R&D professionals

To succeed in R&D strategic alliances requires not only strategic fit and cultural fit at the organisational level, but also managerial fit at the micro, inter–personal interaction level. This paper provides the results from a cross–cultural study of managerial fit between British and Chinese managers in joint ventures (JVs) initiated in 1993–1998 with a focus on two important issues: the perceived competence and managerial roles of the partners. Managerial fit between partners is critical for the success of R&D strategic alliances including JVs. Misfit in partners' managerial behaviour often results from the fact that JVs are characterised by the lack of specificity of various managerial tasks shared by the partners at the operational stage. In addition, a manager's managerial competence as perceived by the counterpart is a contributory factor to trust and supportive reaction from the counterpart, both of which are important for cohesive interaction between partners. This study has revealed that (1) there are similarities and significant differences in some of the characteristics of managerial competence perceived by the counterpart between the British and Chinese managers; and (2) there is often a mismatch of perceptions between the British and Chinese managers with regard to who plays a particular managerial role in a JV. Managerial implications are discussed and issues for further research are highlighted.     

Internal Wage Structures and Organizational Performance

This paper considers whether a hierarchical or compressed wage structure is positively associated with relatively high levels of organizational performance. To date, there has been little empirical research in this area (especially in the UK). Thus we present an operational measure of a compressed/hierarchical wage structure, using UK manufacturing micro–data in five industrial sectors, and examine its relationship with labour productivity. We find that the wage compression argument holds in one sector but not for the majority of sectors and that taking into account other, intra–industry characteristics, namely size and ownership differences, further weakens the relationship.     

Why Should Human Resource Managers Pay High Wages?

This essay is about human resource management, internal labour markets and assorted theories of wage behaviour. A stereotype of managerial activities and policies is sketched out in the first section, which, although reflecting a parochial (US) orientation, is intended to approximate a set of real-world conditions to which analyses of labour market behaviour should presumably relate. In the second section we consider 'institutionalist' interpretations, which either supplement or challenge standard market analysis by appeal to the historical record, the behavioural sciences or even the consensus of expert behaviour. In particular, the importance of 'conventional' forces, based heavily on perceptions of equity, interpersonal preferences and custom and practice, is revealed by the scholarship and insights of Henry Phelps Brown. Next (Section 3) are assessed the claims and contributions of a sample of theories based on the assumption of individualistic utility maximization in competitive markets: the theories of equalizing wage differentials, human capital, deferred compensation, transaction costs, implicit contracts and (least conventional) efficiency wages. None is found to be lacking in interpretive value or relevance to one or more attributes of the stereotype, and all help to relate it to a wider family of markets and to economic behaviour. In general, however, this group is less satisfactory in explaining why wages should be high enough - in a present-value sense and relative to market-clearing levels - to contribute to the relative insulation of internal labour markets and to restrict employment. An exception is provided by efficiency wage theory, in particular by one of its older variants, which, because it is based on group (rather than individualistic) psychology and behaviour, is discussed in Section 4.     

Firm heterogeneity in growth option value: The role of managerial incentives

Growth option value varies widely across firms. This research explores managerial incentives as a source of firm heterogeneity in growth option value. We argue that when the payoff structure of managerial incentives corresponds to that of growth options, managers will be motivated to pursue actions that increase firms' growth option value, particularly when greater growth opportunities are available in an industry. Results indicate that stock option holdings and managerial stock ownership have a positive effect on growth option value, while short‐term pay has a negative effect. We also find support for a positive interaction effect between equity‐based managerial incentives and industry growth opportunities on growth option value. These findings highlight the critical role of managerial incentives in affecting firms' realization of growth option value. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

‘Fair Work’ and the Modernization of Australian Labour Standards: A Case of Institutional Plasticity Entrenching Deepening Wage Inequality

Australia was long recognized for its relatively compressed wage structure. From the 1940s to the 1970s this was associated with a comprehensive regime of ‘award‐based’ minimum wages. Since the 1980s, this has been subjected to comprehensive ‘modernization’. After three decades of reform and in the most supportive economic environment in the OECD, Australian wage inequality has deepened. Although multiple political‐economic forces have been at play, the evolution of Australia's labour standards regime is an example of ‘institutional plasticity’ whereby the purpose and operations of wage‐setting institutions not only evolves but can actually be inverted over time.     

在现代企业分配制度中实行经营者年薪制

现代企业如何制定一套行之有效的激励机制，使出资、经营、劳动三的利益得以最大程度的实现，同时又使经营的行为得到约束，激发经营努力搞好企业，是在市场经济条件下建立现代企业管理制度的关键问题。对经营实行年薪制和劳动实行岗位责任工资制巳经成为现代企业分配方式的主要特征和必然趋势，本重点论述了经营年薪制的必要性和年薪制的合理性问题，并提出实行经营浮动年薪制和合理周期为考核时段的激励与约束机制。     

Minimum Pay Scale and Career Length in the NBA

We use data from the National Basketball Association (NBA) to analyze the impact of minimum salaries on an employee's career length. The NBA has a salary structure in which the minimum salary a player can receive increases with the player's years of experience. The NFL has a similar minimum wage policy; research suggests that the introduction of this system shortened career length in the NFL. Using duration analysis, we fail to find evidence that the new multi‐tiered minimum wage scale in the NBA increased the probability of exit.     

Gender Differences in the Returns to and the Acquisition of On-the-Job Training

This article finds that gender differences in on-the-job training significantly affect the male/female wage gap. First, we find that previously trained workers exhibit larger cumulative wage gains during their current training. Thus, a substantial portion of the gender wage gap results from the fact that women have little prior training relative to men. Second, a significant amount of the observed male/female wage differential is explained by less female acquisition of current training. Gender differences in workplace promotion and training practices help explain why women accumulate less training than men. Both of these sources of gender differences have lessened from 1976 to 1985, which has led to a narrowing of the male/female wage gap.     

Profit‐Sharing and Wages: An Empirical Analysis Using French Data between 2000 and 2007

Economic theory presents different arguments about how profit‐sharing may affect wages. First, profit‐sharing may substitute for the base wage. Second, profit‐sharing can be interpreted as an ‘efficiency wage’ that adds to the base wage and increases total compensation. The existing empirical literature has not determined which of these arguments is valid. This article attempts to address this issue for France between 2000 and 2007. Based on a difference‐in‐differences selection model, we show that bonuses in firms adopting profit‐sharing are too small to conclude whether it substitutes for or complements the base wage. While base wage levels are generally higher among profit‐sharing firms, changes in the base wage over this period are lower among firms that have had profit‐sharing for a number of years.     

Low Pay and Wage Regulation in the European Community

The prospect of direct intervention in the process of wage determination as envisaged in the Social Charter has met with considerable criticism. In particular, employers' organizations and certain governments have rejected outright the proposal to require firms to pay an equitable wage. However, in all member-states except the UK and Ireland, arrangements exist to ensure that nearly all workers are covered by minimum wage protection (through national minimum wages or full-coverage collective agreements). In this article the nature of low-paid employment in member-states is examined and different methods of wage regulation are described. After reviewing the economic effects of wage regulation, we discuss possible initiatives on wage regulation at the Community level.     

Does Individualizing the Labor Contract Hurt Women?

The twenty‐first century has been marked by a retreat of the collective bargaining rights of public employees throughout the United States. This study exploits the variation in legal environments resulting from these reforms to estimate the causal impact of different collective bargaining policies on public employee compensation. Using data from the American Community Survey, results show a modest wage penalty at the aggregate level for employees covered by constraints on collective bargaining. However, this wage penalty is differential and is concentrated on women in all but one case—a legal environment in which collective bargaining over wages has either been prohibited or directly constricted, allowing governments to periodically institute wage freezes and caps on raises for public employees. In this case, a pre‐existing wage gap in which men earned more than women is disappearing as male and female earnings converge at a lower wage. The paper suggests that the long‐term effects of restricting collective bargaining occur through the individualization of the labor contract and should be examined along individual‐level characteristics, such as gender.     

Trade Union Concentration and the Determination of Wages: The Case of Teachers in England and Wales

Multi-unionism is a common feature of the industrial relations scene, yet to date there has been relatively little economic analysis of its effects, in particular on the outcome of wage negotiations. In this paper, we examine the impact of multi-unionism—specifically, the degree of union membership concentration—on the determination of the relative pay of a particular occupational group, namely that of schoolteachers in England and Wales. We measure teacher trade union concentration using the Herfindahl index of concentration, and find that, after controlling for other possible influences, changes in the value of this index have a positive impact on schoolteachers' relative pay. In addition, we find union membership concentration to be a better indicator of 'union pushfulness' effects in wage determination than the traditional measure, union density. These findings are potentially of wider significance for the analysis of wage determination in multi-union environments.     

The Impact of Living Wages on Employers: A Control Group Analysis of the Los Angeles Ordinance*

This paper analyzes the impact of the Los Angeles Living Wage Ordinance on employers using two original data sets and a quasi‐experimental research design. Relative to a control group of establishments, the starting pay of low‐wage workers has risen by $1.74 per hour, paid days off have risen by two days, and employer‐paid health benefits have not significantly changed among establishments covered by the living wage ordinance. Living wage establishments have witnessed a sizeable reduction in low‐wage worker turnover, a drop in absenteeism, reduced overtime hours, and reduced job training relative to the control group of establishments. The ordinance appears to have had no significant impact on the use of part‐time workers, the intensity of supervision, or the tendency of living wage firms to fill vacancies from within.