Multilevel governance and broadband infrastructure development: Evidence from Canada

This paper investigates the contributions of digital infrastructure policies of provincial governments in Canada to the development of broadband networks. Using measurements of broadband network speeds between 2007 and 2011, the paper analyzes potential causes for observed differences in network performance growth across the provinces, including geography, Internet use intensity, platform competition, and provincial broadband policies. The analysis suggests provincial policies that employed public sector procurement power to open access to essential facilities and channeled public investments in Internet backbone infrastructure were associated with the emergence of relatively high quality broadband networks. However, a weak essential facilities regime and regulatory barriers to entry at the national level limit the scope for decentralized policy solutions.     

Access regulation and geographic deployment of a new generation infrastructure

This paper addresses the impact of regulatory policy on levels of infrastructure deployment and derived welfare in the telecommunications sector. The model considers two potentially coexisting and partially competing technologies (the “old generation network” – OGN – and the “new” generation network – NGN). This framework allows us to show that the “regulation defining access charge in order to maximize infrastructure deployment” is strictly equivalent to the case in which “no regulation applies”. We also derive from the model that these two types of regulation induce higher social welfare, but lower numbers of NGN consumers, compared to the “ex post access prices” regulation. Finally, we show that the level of infrastructure deployment (as well as social welfare and number of NGN consumers) will be highest if both investment and access charge decisions are taken by the welfare maximizing regulator. This suggests that the social optimum will be achieved through a calls-for-tender process that includes deployment and access charge requirements.     

Access regulation,entry and investments in telecommunications

This paper presents a model of competition between an incumbent and an entrant firm in telecommunications. The entrant has the option to enter the market with or without having preliminary invested in its own infrastructure; in case of facility based entry, the entrant has also the option to invest in the provision of enhanced services. In the case of resale based entry the entrant needs access to the incumbent network. Unlike the rival, the incumbent has always the option to upgrade the existing network to provide advanced services. We study the impact of access regulation on the type of entry and on firms’ investments. We find that without regulation the incumbent sets the access charge to prevent resale based entry and this generates a social inefficient level of facility based entry. Access regulation may discourage welfare enhancing investments, thus also inducing a socially inefficient outcome. We extend the model to account for negotiated interconnection in the case of facilities based entry.     

Regulierung, Effizienz und das Anreizdilemma bei Investitionen in intelligente Netze

In this paper, we survey from a theoretical point of view to what extend cost-based and incentive-based regulatory regimes stimulate investments. For the purpose of this analysis, we furthermore differentiate by different efficiency measures, i.e. allocative efficiency, productive efficiency and dynamic efficiency and analyse to what extend each efficiency measure is stimulated by the regulatory regime. Eventually, we analyse to what extend regulatory incentives for network innovation in a smart grid context exist and to what extend different forms of regulation stimulate dynamic efficiency.     

Ex ante regulation and co-investment in the transition to next generation access

Investments in next generation access networks (NGANs) ask for a new set of regulatory remedies. This paper contributes to this debate by focusing on three issues: the migration from the legacy copper network to the NGA infrastructure, and how wholesale pricing regulation might affect this process; the introduction of differentiated wholesale remedies according to geographical differences in NGAN deployment; the impact of co-investment decisions on market outcomes and their interplay with access regulation. Using the recent economic literature, arguments and possible guidelines are proposed, which might be useful to regulators and policy makers.     

The European Electronic Communications Code: A critical appraisal with a focus on incentivizing investment in next generation broadband networks

In September 2016, the European Commission (EC) published its proposal for a directive establishing the European Electronic Communications Code (EECC) – with one key aim being the provision of sufficient incentives for infrastructure investments into high-speed communication networks. Based on a detailed review of the theoretical and empirical literature of the most relevant regulatory measures – that is, co-investment models as well as different types of access regulation – we provide a critical appraisal of the respective provisions in the EECC. We find that, although the EECC can generally be seen as a step into the right direction, the expected effects on investment incentives as well as substantial implementation challenges in combination with a high degree of complexity of the envisaged measures contain substantial potential for improvement.     

Ultra-fast broadband investment and adoption: A survey

In recent years, and in line with EC plans, telecom operators have been facing the need to deploy high-speed, fiber-based infrastructure. What is the socio-economic impact of these new investments on growth and local development? What are their effects on the labor market outcomes, in terms of firm productivity and entrepreneurship? What is the role of regulation and competition in spurring the deployment and the adoption of ultra-fast broadband networks? In this survey, we review the existing literature on ultra-fast, fiber-based broadband network, devoting special attention to the results and to the methodology used in the most recent studies.     

Roaming and investments in the mobile internet market

This model discusses mobile network operators' (MNOs) incentives to invest in their network facilities such as new 4G networks under various regimes of data roaming charge regulation. Given an induced externality of investments (spillovers) due to the roaming agreements it will be shown that MNOs, competing on investments, widely set higher investments for below cost regulation of roaming charges. Otherwise, if MNOs are free to collaborate on investments, they set higher investment levels for above cost roaming charges. Both below and above cost charges may be preferred from a welfare perspective. Furthermore, the paper discusses effects of the roaming charge regulation on roaming quality and MNOs' coverage.     

Access regulation and investment in next generation networks — A ranking of regulatory regimes

This paper analyses how different types of access regulation to next generation networks affect investments and consumer welfare. The model consists of an investment stage with uncertain returns and subsequent quantity competition. The access price is a function of investment costs and the regulatory regime. A regime with fully distributed costs or a regulatory holiday induces highest investments, followed by risk-sharing and long run incremental costs regulation. Simulations indicate that risk-sharing creates most consumer welfare, followed by regimes with fully distributed costs, regulatory holiday and long run incremental costs, respectively. Risk-sharing benefits consumers as it combines relatively high ex-ante investment incentives with strong ex-post competitive intensity.     

Lessons from broadband development in Canada,Japan, Korea and the United States

Broadband network development does not always track closely a nations overall wealth and economic strength. The International Telecommunication Union reported that in 2005 the five top nations for broadband network market penetration were: Korea, Hong Kong, the Netherlands, Denmark and Canada. The ITU ranked the United States sixteenth in broadband penetration.Aside from the obvious geographical and demographic advantages accruing to small nations with large urban populations, broadband development thrives when it becomes a national priority. Both developed and developing nations have stimulated capital expenditures for infrastructure in ways United States public and private sector stakeholders have yet to embrace. Such investments have accrued ample dividends including the lowest broadband access costs in the world. For example, the ITU reports that in 2002 Japanese consumers paid $0.09 per 100 kilobits per second of broadband access compared to $3.53 in the United States.Economic policies do not completely explain why some nations offer faster, better cheaper and more convenient broadband services while other nations do not. This paper will examine best practices in broadband network development with an eye toward determining the optimal mix of legislative, regulatory and investment initiatives. The paper will track development in Canada, Japan and Korea as these nations have achieved success despite significantly different geographical, political and marketplace conditions. The paper also notes the institutional and regulatory policies that have hampered broadband development in the United States.The paper also will examine why incumbent local exchange and cable television operators recently have begun aggressively to pursue broadband market opportunities. The paper will analyze incumbents’ rationales for limited capital investment in broadband with an eye toward determining the credibility of excuses based on regulatory risk and uncertainty. The paper concludes with suggestions how national governments might expedite broadband infrastructure development.     

Strategic investments under competition for access provision

We examine competition for access provision when symmetric vertically integrated firms invest in infrastructure upgrades. Spillovers through access have two effects (a wholesale-profit effect and a retail-production effect) on infrastructure investment made by vertically integrated firms. When the vertically integrated firms freely set access charges, due to the dominance of the wholesale-profit effect, quality differentials endogenously occur between these firms (asymmetric equilibria). When access charges are regulated, symmetric equilibria occur with multiple equilibrium investments due to the retail-production effect. Because competition for access provision induces a strong incentive for infrastructure investment, it also achieves a higher social welfare than does access regulation.     

Investments in next generation access infrastructures under regulatory uncertainty

This article studies the impact of regulatory uncertainty on an incumbent’s incentives to undertake the socially optimal investments in NGA networks. Thus, a regulatory non-commitment setting in which the regulator sets the access price after the deployment of the NGA network is used. In particular, it is assumed that the regulator sets the access price at the marginal cost of providing the access with some probability and gives an access markup, which equals the average cost of the investments, with the complementary probability. It is found that when the slope of the marginal investment cost function is not particularly steep in relation to the impact of investments on demand, the incumbent underinvests compared to the socially optimal investment level. On the contrary, in a more realistic case when the impact of investments on demand is low in relation to the slope of the marginal investment cost function, the incumbent may overinvest or underinvest depending on the probability of incorporating an access markup into the access price.     

A CDS approach to induce facilities-based competition over NGA networks

The current regulatory framework in the European NGA market provides the basic principles for the gradual migration from service-based competition over the legacy copper access networks to facilities-based competition over fiber-based Next Generation Access (NGA) networks. This paper initially reviews the related literature and shows that: (i) an unbundling policy that boosts entry by alternative operators promotes service-based competition but provides operators with disincentives to invest in network upgrade; (ii) there is no consensus about the optimal regulatory policy that promotes competition and encourages investments in NGA networks; and (iii) the reviewed research articles are not consistent with the current regulatory framework in the European NGA market in terms of both the evolution of the regulatory goals over time and the recommended regulatory settings. This paper aims to propose a novel approach in order to effectively meet the current regulatory goals using the recommended settings. It is shown that the proposed approach, which is based on the basic principles governing a Credit Default Swap (CDS), provides an effective migration path towards facilities-based competition over NGA networks.     

WiFi4EU: Techno-economic analysis of a key European Commission initiative for public connectivity

This paper analyses the WiFi4EU initiative, the measure proposed by the European Commission (EC) to speed up public access to Wi-Fi throughout Europe in the coming years by subsidising the infrastructure. We set out to analyse how these measures are incorporated into the EU policies for building a Gigabit Society and the EC's regulatory tradition, and what the impact is likely to be. This innovative initiative has been drawn up in a climate of uncertainties and delays, and will have an effect upon the network deployments strategies of operators and countries. The article puts all of this into the context of the current European regulation debate and conducts a techno-economic analysis to assess the expected impact of the initiative. We have observed a slight shift towards developmental models in the EC regulatory framework and a step ahead towards multi-level governance. Furthermore, the techno-economic analysis has revealed the limited extent of Community aid and the considerable variability of the equipment deployed and the expenditure involved. We have also highlighted the questionable formulation of the allocation mechanisms, and we have included certain examples or suggestions for improvement.     

Investigating the intertwining impact of wholesale access pricing and the commitment to net neutrality principle on European next-generation access networks private investment plans: An options-game application for capturing market players' competitive interactions

Whilst the deployment of next generation access networks (NGANs) is undoubtedly beneficial to the economy, new legal developments in the United States (US) regarding the issue of net neutrality (NN) pose a new challenge not only to policy makers but to telecommunication providers as well, that could justify a fresh approach when assessing NGANs investments. In particular, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) subverted extant NN rules in the US and if the European Union (EU) decides to follow a similar deregulatory path in the future it could change the way telecommunications providers on both sides of the Atlantic lay down their optical-fibre network infrastructure investment plans. For instance, if traffic prioritization is allowed then diversification of revenue sources can be achieved by charging customers for privileged data delivery to their premises. Currently, NGANs roll-out throughout EU is an ongoing process in a setting whereby access regulation in the form of network element unbundling is already imposed. As a result, these legal developments form a new context within which it makes sense to assess the role of NGANs wholesale access pricing in tandem with the degree of commitment to NN rules so as to i) determine their combinatorial impact on private telecommunications operators' financial figures and ii) capture their competitive interactions. Towards this end, an important aspect of particular value to market players (i.e. incumbents and competitive providers – CPs), and policy makers (i.e. National Regulatory Authorities – NRAs) that this article aims to examine is how to employ the option-game (OG) analysis, that reflects the intersection of game theory (GT) and real options (ROs), to model the competitive interactions between participants in a particular competition game set-up by means of deriving possible Nash-equilibrium (NE) outcomes within a regulatory setting part of which is the commitment or non-commitment to the NN principle. This, hybrid, evaluation tool is applied on top of a conventional discounted cash flow (DCF) techno-economic analysis assessment of an NGAN investment opportunity.     

The momentum for network separation: A guide for regulators

Next Generation Access Networks (NGAs) are a challenge to regulators and operators insofar as they require large investments, there is a significant uncertainty about the ability to recover costs, and the choice of the appropriate regulatory regime is far from consensual. Regulatory authorities might want to seize the moment and reconsider mandatory vertical separation of telecommunication firms, without jeopardizing incentives to innovation and investment. This paper discusses the main elements of a possible test for the adequacy of network separation as a regulatory remedy. A sequential decision tree procedure with three questions is proposed: (1) “Is there significant market power in the provision of access under NGAs?”; (2) “Are there little vertical complementarities between services along the supply chain?”; and (3) “Is network separation a better regulatory tool than any other alternative?”. A positive answer to all the questions implies that the regulator should consider network separation as a regulatory remedy.     

Encouraging infrastructure competition via the ladder of investment

Recent discussion of regulatory interventions in telecommunications markets have considered an approach in which competitors are encouraged progressively to make investments in network assets which are less and less easily replicable—thus climbing ‘the ladder of investment.’ The paper proposes and illustrates methods for assessing the replicability of different assets and sets out the steps which regulators can follow in implementing the approach.     

The deployment and penetration of high-speed fiber networks and services: Why are EU member states lagging behind?

One of the most controversial regulatory issues in Europe (and elsewhere) is whether the emerging next-generation access (NGA) infrastructure should be subjected to cost-based access regulation or whether at least a temporary removal of ex ante obligations (“regulatory holidays”) should be granted. Likewise, the role of NGA-specific state aid policies is increasingly capturing the attention of policy makers and the academic literature.     

Singapore's transition to innovation-based economic growth: infrastructure, institutions and government's role

Technological progress and innovation plays a central role in a country's economic progress. As an economy advances to the global technological frontier and narrows the technological gap, an innovation-based growth strategy that focuses on investments in R&D and technology creation offers the greatest potential for economic growth. In this paper, we discuss the requirements for a successful transition, in terms of changes to the technology infrastructure, economic institutions and the incentives' structure. This paper outlines the efforts made by Singapore to re-make itself as an innovation-based economy, and the challenges faced by the government in transforming the nation's infrastructure and institutions to develop innovation capabilities and encourage entrepreneurship.     

Broadband investment and regulation: A literature review

Investment in broadband communications and its infrastructures (the so-called Next Generation Networks) is receiving extraordinary attention from policy makers all over the world, due to the significant impact of high-speed Internet access on the whole economy and society. However, even before the recent financial crises, a dramatic downward trend in telecommunications investment has occurred, mainly due – at least according to incumbent operators – to excessively intrusive regulatory intervention. The typical conflict between regulation, competition and investment emerges. It is therefore important, for both future research and regulatory and practitioners’ references, to review the specialized but growing branch of the literature on this interesting and policy-relevant issue. The purpose of this paper is therefore to survey the relevant theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between regulation, at both retail and wholesale level, and investment in telecoms infrastructures. The picture that emerges is not conclusive, and further research is still needed, both theoretically and empirically, to better understand the real impact of regulatory incentives on investments.