The differential effects of CEO narcissism and hubris on corporate social responsibility

Research Summary: While prior studies have predominantly shown that CEO narcissism and hubris exhibit similar effects on various strategic decisions and outcomes, this study aims to explore the mechanisms underlying how narcissistic versus hubristic CEOs affect their firms differently. Specifically, we investigate how peer influence moderates the CEO narcissism/hubris—corporate social responsibility (CSR). With a sample of S&P 1500 firms for 2003–2010, we find that the positive relationship between CEO narcissism and CSR is strengthened (weakened) when board‐interlocked peer firms invest less (more) intensively in CSR than a CEO's own firm; the negative relationship between CEO hubris and CSR is strengthened when peer firms are engaged in less CSR than a CEO's own firm. Managerial Summary: Some CEOs are more narcissistic while others may be more hubristic, but these two groups of CEOs hold different attitudes toward the extent to which their firms should engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR). Our findings with a large sample of U.S. publically listed firms suggest that narcissistic CEOs care more about CSR, but hubristic CEOs care less. Interestingly, when narcissistic CEOs observe their peer firms engaging in more or less CSR than their own firms, they tend to respond in an opposite manner; in contrast, hubristic CEOs will only engage in even less CSR when their peers also do not emphasize CSR. Our findings point to a fundamental difference between CEO narcissism and hubris in terms of how they affect firms' CSR decisions based on their social comparison with peer firms.     

Making the same mistake all over again: CEO overconfidence and corporate resistance to corrective feedback

Firms often make mistakes, from simple manufacturing overruns all the way to catastrophic blunders. However, there is considerable heterogeneity in the nature of corporate responses when faced with evidence that an error has taken place, and, therefore, in the likelihood that such errors will reoccur in the future. In this paper, we explore an important but understudied influence on firms' responses to corrective feedback—a CEO's level of overconfidence. Using multiple distinct measures of overconfidence and the empirical context of voluntary corporate earnings forecasts, we find strong, robust evidence that firms led by overconfident CEOs are less responsive to corrective feedback in improving management forecast accuracy. We further show that this relationship is moderated by prior forecast error valence, time horizon, and managerial discretion. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

CEO career horizon,corporate governance,and real options: The role of economic short‐termism

Research Summary: Combining studies on real options theory and economic short‐termism, we propose that, depending on CEOs’ career horizons, CEOs have heterogeneous interests in strategic flexibility, and thus, have different incentives to make real options investments. We argue that compared to CEOs with longer career horizons, CEOs with shorter career horizons will be less inclined to make real options investments because they may not fully reap the rewards during their tenure. In addition, we argue that long‐term incentives and institutional ownership will mitigate the relationship between CEOs’ career horizons and real options investments. U.S. public firms as an empirical setting produced consistent evidence for our predictions. Our study is the first to theoretically explain and empirically show that a CEO's self‐seeking behavior will impact real options investments. Managerial Summary: This article helps to explain how a CEO's self seeking‐behavior may shape a firm's real option investment, which could result in different level of strategic flexibility. We argue that CEOs with short career horizons have less time to exercise their firms’ real options, which should lower the investments in the firms’ real options portfolios relative to CEOs with long career horizons. We study a sample of U.S. public firms and find strong evidence that a CEO's expected tenure in the firm is positively related to the real options investments at the firm level. We find that this agency issue can be mitigated by adopting appropriate corporate governance mechanisms such as long‐term incentives and institutional investors.     

What Makes a Family Firm Innovative? CEO Risk‐Taking Propensity and the Organizational Context of Family Firms

Investigating the new product portfolio innovativeness of family firms connects two important topics that have recently received considerable attention in innovation and family firm research. First, new product portfolio innovativeness has been identified as a critical determinant of firm performance. Second, research on family firms has focused on the questions of if and why family firms are more or less innovative than other organizational forms. Research investigating the innovativeness of family firms has often applied a risk‐oriented perspective by identifying socioemotional wealth (SEW) as the main reference that determines firm behavior. Thus, prior research has mainly focused on the organizational context to predict innovation‐related family firm behavior and neglected the impact of preferences and the behavior of the chief executive officer (CEO), which have both been shown to affect firm outcomes. Hence, this study aims to extend the previous research by introducing the CEO's disposition to organizational context variables to explain the new product portfolio innovativeness of small and medium‐sized family firms. Specifically, this study explores how the organizational context (i.e., ownership by top management team [TMT] family members and generation in charge of the family firm) of family firms interacts with CEO risk‐taking propensity to affect new product portfolio innovativeness. Using a sample of 114 German CEOs of small and medium‐sized family firms operating in manufacturing industries, the results show that CEO risk‐taking propensity has a positive effect on new product portfolio innovativeness. Moreover, the analyses show that the organizational context of family firms impacts the relationship between CEO risk‐taking propensity and new product portfolio innovativeness. Specifically, the relationship between CEO risk‐taking propensity and new product portfolio innovativeness is weaker if levels of ownership by TMT family members are high (high SEW). Additionally, the effect of CEO risk‐taking propensity on new product portfolio innovativeness is stronger in family firms at earlier generational stages (high SEW). This result suggests that if SEW is a strong reference, family firm‐specific characteristics can affect individual dispositions and, in turn, the behaviors of executives. Therefore, this study helps extend the knowledge on the determinants of new product portfolio innovativeness of family firms by considering an individual CEO preference and the organizational context variables of family firms simultaneously.     

Digital Transformation Through Exploratory and Exploitative Internet of Things Innovations: The Impact of Family Management and Technological Diversification*

This study examines the impact of family management on digital transformation with specific regard to the firm’s development of Internet of Things (IoT) innovations. Drawing on the distinctive characteristics of firms with family managers, such as the focus on family‐centered noneconomic goals, long tenure, emotional ties to existing assets, and rigid mental models, it hypothesizes that increasing family involvement in the top management team is negatively related to the development of IoT innovations that are distant from a firm’s existing technology base (i.e., exploratory IoT innovations) compared to exploitative IoT innovations. Further, the study proposes that the firm’s degree of technological diversification, especially in unrelated forms, reinforces this relationship. The longitudinal analysis between 2002 and 2013 on a sample of publicly traded German firms allows us to test our hypotheses from the beginning of the emergence of the IoT concept. Our findings show that due to the particular characteristics of their managers, family‐managed firms do not welcome the risks related to exploratory IoT innovations, and the benefit of risk diversification from technological diversification is lower than the cost of abandoning family‐centered goals. As our results imply that the involvement of family managers constrains the development of exploratory IoT innovation, the top management team composition in firms that intend to be at the forefront of the digital transformation should be accurately designed by avoiding a high proportion of family members.     

Profitability Goals,Control Goals,and the R&D Investment Decisions of Family and Nonfamily Firms

Research and development (R&D) investments can help build sustainable competitive advantages and improve firm performance. Nevertheless, managers also acknowledge the difficulties associated with managing R&D and the low chances of success of innovation programs. For this reason, researchers have long been interested in understanding how managers make R&D investment decisions. Research grounded in the behavioral theory of the firm suggests that a primary driver of R&D investment decisions is profitability: when profitability goals have not been met, managers are more likely to initiate a problemistic search through increasing R&D investments. While emphasizing profitability goals and their relationship with R&D investments, prior research largely downplays the role of goals beyond profitability that exist in a significant number of firms (family firms) that are owned and managed by family members whose primary concern is preserving their control over the organization. Research indicates that these family‐centered noneconomic goals lead family managers to minimize R&D investments and that the coexistence of multiple goals produces highly variable R&D investment behavior. Yet, how family‐centered goals for control and profitability enter decision‐making in family firms is not fully understood. In this study, we propose that family managers form distinctive reference points that capture supplier bargaining power and are used to evaluate the degree of external obstruction to their managerial control. The empirical analysis of panel data on 431 private Spanish manufacturing firms observed over the period 2000–2006 shows that the importance of profitability and control goals follows a sequential logic in family firms, such that family firms react more strongly to increasing supplier bargaining power when their profitability reference points have been reached. This study extends current understanding of the distinctive organizational processes engendered by family management in business organizations leading to new research opportunities at the intersection of the innovation management and family business literatures.     

Customer retention: A source of value for serial acquirers

Customer retention, in most cases, is regarded as an indicator of acquisition performance, but factors influencing it have rarely been studied in the serial acquirer context. As a consequence, this paper presents a model of the linkage between serial acquirers and customer retention by drawing on serial acquirer and customer relationship marketing and management literature. The paper proposes that the serial acquirers' focus on retaining acquired firms' business customers per acquisition deals may enhance the post-acquisition value. Furthermore, serial acquirers' acquisition experience (skills), managerial overconfidence/hubris, own customers' behaviour and technological context are identified to impact the customer retention of the acquired firm. Moreover, two dual-purpose variables—acquired firms' customer experience and acquired firms' customer relationships—are proposed to moderate the effects of serial acquirers' acquisition experience (skills), managerial overconfidence/hubris, own customers' behaviour and technological context on acquired firm customer retention and also to autonomously influence acquired firms' customer retention. The implications for serial acquirers and practice are discussed.     

The Influence of CEOs' Visionary Innovation Leadership on the Performance of High‐Technology Ventures: The Mediating Roles of Connectivity and Knowledge Integration

Senior leaders play an essential role in facilitating knowledge creation processes and driving firms' innovation performance. However, little is known about the underlying relational mechanisms by which CEOs help build knowledge integration capability and drive firm innovation. We developed and tested a conceptual model about the ways in which CEOs shape a context conducive for knowledge creation processes and drive multiple innovation performance. A field, survey‐based, study among small‐ to medium‐sized technological ventures (SMVs) showed that CEO visionary innovation leadership (manifested by both vision for innovation and enactment of the vision through specific leadership behaviors) was positively related to a context of connectivity. Connectivity was related to firm knowledge integration capacity, which in turn resulted in enhanced firm innovation (new product quality, development speed, and product innovation). The findings also indicate direct links between CEO visionary innovation leadership and knowledge integration, and between connectivity and product innovation. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.     

CEO incentives,innovation, and performance in technology‐intensive firms: a reconciliation of outcome and behavior‐based incentive schemes

Building on the agency view of corporate governance, we propose that technology‐intensive firms use both outcome and behavior‐based performance criteria for rewarding CEOs. Using a sample of 206 firms from 12 U.S. manufacturing industries, we find that as technological intensity increases CEO bonuses are more closely linked to financial results and that total CEO incentives are associated with two indicators of desirable innovation behaviors: invention resonance and science harvesting. Invention resonance refers to the impact a firm's inventions have on other firms' inventions, while science harvesting reflects a firm's commitment to scientific research. As technological intensity increases, aligning bonus with financial results, total incentives with invention resonance, and total incentives with science harvesting predict firm market performance. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The impact of CEO core self‐evaluation on the firm's entrepreneurial orientation

Although much has been attributed to a CEO's personality, one particularly intriguing, and as yet unexplored, investigation is its impact on the firm's entrepreneurial orientation. Additionally, despite calls from the upper‐echelon literature, CEO personality research has been hobbled by the absence of a unifying construct that captures core dimensions of personality, and by the difficulty in obtaining such intimate assessments from executives. Building on recent advances in personality research, in particular the identification and validation of the core self‐evaluation construct that captures the core facets of an executive's sense of self‐potency, we develop and test a model of the impact of CEO core self‐evaluation on entrepreneurial orientation. Then, consistent with upper echelons and personality theory, we specify the contingent role of environmental dynamism. Using multisource data from a sample of CEOs and their top management teams from 129 firms, including a time‐lagged assessment of the firm's entrepreneurial orientation, we find evidence to suggest that CEOs whose personalities reflect higher core self‐evaluations have a stronger positive influence on their firms' entrepreneurial orientation. In addition, we find that this influence is particularly strong in firms facing dynamic environments, but negligible in stable environments. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Why do some outside successions fare better than others? The role of outside CEOs' prior experience with board diversity

Research summary: We develop a theory to explain why new outside CEOs can better manage their relationship with the board if they previously served on boards that were more diverse than the focal board. We predict that a new outside CEO's prior experience with more diverse boards not only reduces the likelihood of post‐succession CEO turnover and director turnover, but also improves firm performance. Results from an analysis of 188 outside CEOs in a sample of Fortune 500 companies provide support for our theory. This study contributes to upper echelon theory and research by identifying outside CEOs' prior experience with board diversity as an important aspect of their background that influences a range of major organizational outcomes, including CEO turnover, director turnover, and firm performance. Managerial summary: It is challenging to be a new CEO who comes from outside of the organization. Our study examines why some new outside CEOs fare better than others. We suggest that a positive relationship with the board of directors is a key factor in a new outside CEO's success. A new outside CEO can better manage the relationship with the board if he or she has prior experience working with other demographically diverse boards. In contrast, when the focal board is more diverse than the other boards on which the new CEO previously served, the new CEO tends to struggle in managing his or her relationship with the board, experiencing a higher likelihood of turnover and delivering worse financial performance. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Firm heterogeneity in growth option value: The role of managerial incentives

Growth option value varies widely across firms. This research explores managerial incentives as a source of firm heterogeneity in growth option value. We argue that when the payoff structure of managerial incentives corresponds to that of growth options, managers will be motivated to pursue actions that increase firms' growth option value, particularly when greater growth opportunities are available in an industry. Results indicate that stock option holdings and managerial stock ownership have a positive effect on growth option value, while short‐term pay has a negative effect. We also find support for a positive interaction effect between equity‐based managerial incentives and industry growth opportunities on growth option value. These findings highlight the critical role of managerial incentives in affecting firms' realization of growth option value. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

External Venturing and Discontinuous Strategic Renewal: An Options Perspective

This study examines the relationship between a firm's venturing activities and its undertaking of strategic renewal. The study was motivated by some important gaps in the corporate entrepreneurship literature on venturing and renewal. The extant literature has not focused on the different types and dimensions of firms' renewal activities. In particular, discontinuous renewal involving shifts in firms' core businesses is not well understood. Moreover, the conditions that drive firms to undertake strategic renewal have not been examined. For example, it is not known how venturing increases or reduces the benefits of undertaking renewal. This study focuses on a discontinuous form of renewal involving major changes in firms' core businesses and examines firms' external venturing activities that complement their internal development. We examine corporate venture capital (CVC) investments, which are direct minority equity investments made by established companies in privately held ventures. Discontinuous renewal is conceptualized as resulting from a set of related, and often sequential, managerial decisions. The first managerial decision is to initiate growth in a business that is relatively newer or smaller for the organization. The second decision is to move away, or even withdraw completely, from the current core business that enabled prior growth and prosperity for the firm and served as its primary revenue earner. Employing a real options perspective, we argue that CVC investments create growth options in new and existing businesses but do not result in firms' withdrawal from existing businesses. Therefore, we expect CVC activity to be negatively associated with the likelihood of a firm undertaking discontinuous renewal. We also propose that the benefits of withdrawing from existing businesses are even lower, and the costs even higher, for firms in dynamic industries and for firms that possess strong internal capabilities. The predictions of the study are tested using longitudinal data on 477 firms from the 1990 Fortune 500 list for the period 1990–2000. We find support for all our predicted hypotheses. These results help address important limitations in the corporate entrepreneurship literature. The study also contributes to the real options and organizational capabilities literatures.     

Do make or buy decisions matter? The influence of organizational governance on technological performance

This paper investigates how firms' decisions to outsource or internalize production affect their technological performance. While several popular arguments and some anecdotal evidence suggest a direct association between outsourcing and technological performance, the effects of firms' governance decisions are likely to be contingent upon several specific attributes underlying a given exchange. This paper first demonstrates how standard performance models can improperly suggest a positive relationship between firms' outsourcing decisions and their technological performance. Models that account for firm‐ and transaction‐specific features are then presented, which indicate that neither outsourcing nor internalization per se result in superior performance; rather, a firm's technological performance is contingent upon the alignment between firms' governance decisions and the degree of contractual hazards. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How quickly do CEOs become obsolete? Industry dynamism,CEO tenure,and company performance

Scholars have characterized CEO tenures as life cycles in which executives learn rapidly during their initial time in office, but then grow stale as they lose touch with the external environment. We argue, however, that the opportunities for adaptive learning are limited because (1) a CEO assumes office with a relatively fixed paradigm that changes little thereafter; (2) inertia limits the speed at which an organization can align itself with a new CEO's paradigm; and (3) for any within‐paradigm learning to occur, the external environment must be stable enough so that the cause–effect relationships that CEOs glean today remain relevant tomorrow. In a longitudinal study of 98 CEOs in the relatively stable branded foods industry and 228 CEOs in the highly dynamic computer industry, we found results that strongly supported our hypotheses. In the stable food industry, firm‐level performance improved steadily with tenure, with downturns occurring only among the few CEOs who served more than 10–15 years. In contrast, in the dynamic computer industry, CEOs were at their best when they started their jobs, and firm performance declined steadily across their tenures, presumably as their paradigms grew obsolete more quickly than they could learn. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Difference in degrees: CEO characteristics and firm environmental disclosure

We contribute to the literature on firms' responses to institutional pressures and environmental information disclosure. We hypothesize that CEO characteristics such as education and tenure will influence firms' likelihood to voluntarily disclose environmental information. We test our hypotheses by examining firms' responses to the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) and find that firms led by newly appointed CEOs and CEOs with MBA degrees are more likely to respond to the CDP, while those led by lawyers are less likely to respond. Our results have implications for research on strategic responses to institutional pressures and corporate environmental performance. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Chief executive scanning emphases,environmental dynamism,and manufacturing firm performance

Chief executives must allocate their scarce time for scanning efforts among relevant domains of their firms' external environment and their firms' internal circumstances. We argue that high‐performing CEOs vary their relative scanning emphases on different domains according to the level of dynamism they perceive in their external environments. The concepts of dominant logic and sector importance were used to develop predictions about which external domains and which internal domains should receive relatively more or less scanning emphasis in external environments that, overall, are more dynamic or more stable. A field survey of 105 single‐business manufacturing firms evaluated CEOs' scanning emphases and firm performance. Results indicated that, for dynamic external environments, relatively more CEO attention to the task sectors of the external environment and to innovation‐related internal functions was associated with high performance. In stable external environments, however, simultaneously increased scanning of the general sectors in the external environment and efficiency‐related internal functions produced higher performance. These relationships were strongest between relative scanning emphases among domains and sales growth. We discuss the implications of these results for researchers and practitioners. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Adaptive capacity to technological change: A microfoundational approach

Research summary> : W e take a microfoundational approach to understanding the origin of heterogeneity in firms' capacity to adapt to technological change. We develop a computational model of individual‐level learning in an organizational setting characterized by interdependence and ambiguity. The model leads to organizational outcomes with the canonical properties of routines: constancy, efficacy, and organizational memory. At the same time, the process generating these outcomes also produces heterogeneity in firms' adaptive capacity to different types of technological change. An implication is that exploration policy in the formative period of routine development can influence a firm's capacity to adapt to change in maturity. This points to a host of strategic trade‐offs, not only between performance and adaptive capacity, but also between adaptive capacities to different forms of change . Managerial summary : W hy are firms differentially effective at adapting to technological change? We argue that firms differ in the adaptive capacity of the routines that underlie their capabilities. These differences arise well before change occurs, and result because firms build routines that are differentially responsive to signals of performance decline associated with technological change. Thus, early managerial efforts to build superior productive efficiency must be complemented by efforts to build superior adaptive capacity. Our theory suggests that managers can prepare for technological change by implementing policies, in the formative period of organizational development, that promote individuals' exploration of novel actions. However, there are trade‐offs because preparation aimed at building adaptive capacity to one type of technological change may limit adaptive capacity to other types of change . Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Earthquake or glacier? How CEO charisma manifests in firm strategy over time

Numerous studies have focused on CEO charisma as an antecedent to firm performance, but this literature has largely overlooked the possibility that charisma manifests in more proximal strategic initiatives that (unlike performance) are largely under the CEO's control. In this study, we integrate perspectives from the upper echelons and charismatic leadership literatures to argue that CEO charisma influences year‐over‐year strategic change, the degree to which strategies deviate from industry central tendencies, and the degree of emphasis on corporate social responsibility. We also theorize that, depending on the outcome in question, the effects of charisma can become both amplified and diminished as CEO tenure advances. Employing a novel data collection approach for a sample of 113 S&P 500 CEOs, we find broad support for our theory. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Differences in managerial discretion across countries: how nation‐level institutions affect the degree to which ceos matter

The concept of managerial discretion provides a theoretical fulcrum for resolving the debate about whether chief executive officers (CEOs) have much influence over company outcomes. In this paper, we operationalize and further develop the construct of managerial discretion at the national level. In an empirical examination of 15 countries, we find that certain informal and formal national institutions—individualism, tolerance of uncertainty, cultural looseness, dispersed firm ownership, a common‐law legal origin, and employer flexibility—are associated with the degree of managerial discretion available to CEOs of public firms in a country. In turn, we show that country‐level managerial discretion is associated with how much impact CEOs have on the performance of their firms. We also find that discretion mediates the relationship between national institutions and CEO effects on firm performance. Finally, we discuss two inductively derived institutional themes: autonomy orientation and risk orientation. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.