How does trust affect alliance performance? The mediating role of resource sharing

Although the direct impact of trust on alliance performance is well documented, little is known about how trust affects alliance performance. Based on the resource-based view, this study develops a model that employs resource sharing as a critical mediating mechanism through which trust affects alliance performance. Using survey data from 205 Chinese firms that were engaged in alliances, we find broad support for the mediated effects of trust. Interestingly, we also find that goodwill trust matters more to tangible than to intangible resource sharing, whereas competence trust matters more to intangible than to tangible resource sharing. Overall, our research provides important implications for firms seeking to translate their trust into superior alliance performance.     

A Comparison of New Service versus New Product Development: Configurations of Collaborative Intensity as Predictors of Performance

Collaboration among firms for innovation has received considerable attention. However, little is known about how firm‐to‐firm collaboration is configured in new service development (NSD) versus new product development (NPD). This study takes a multidimensional approach and measures firm‐to‐firm collaboration on different intensity dimensions of (1) processes (mutual communication, joint engagement, sharing responsibilities) and (2) ownership (relationship commitment and mutual trust). By showing that the phenomenon of collaboration is multifaceted, this study is able to knit a more comprehensive and cohesive understanding of the differences between NSD and NPD success as the result of different patterns of collaboration. Specifically, it utilizes survey data collected from 194 alliances to substantiate how NSD and NPD differ on these collaborative dimensions and then explores their impact on NSD versus NPD performance. The findings suggest that collaboration between firms in NSD is configured and works differently than collaboration between firms in NPD. The results further show that there is a stronger, positive relationship of intensity levels of joint engagement among firms involved in product development and performance than when a new service is developed. However, the intensity of mutual trust has a stronger, positive relationship with development performance when a new service is developed than when a new product is developed. Implications are discussed, and suggestions for future research are given.     

Cooperative Innovation Projects: Capabilities and Governance Mechanisms*

This paper is concerned with how firms in a project‐based industry cooperate in technological innovation projects in the construction industry. The main focus of the paper is on the sharing of capabilities in cooperative innovation projects and how these cooperations are governed. A knowledge‐based perspective is applied, and four cooperative innovation projects in the construction industry are compared. Based on the case studies, a set of propositions is defined. First, a cooperation aimed at a mutual strategic benefit in mutually gaining access to the knowledge bases of the involved firms, while maintaining their own differentiated knowledge base, can result in more stable and long term relationships with mutual trust between the cooperating firms. Second, in a cooperation aimed at a mutual strategic benefit in mutually gaining access to the knowledge bases of the involved firms, partners not only gain access to each other's technological capabilities but also develop and share knowledge about organizational aspects and market situations and gain knowledge about the way of working of the partner firm. Third, in a cooperation aimed at mutual strategic benefit in mutually gaining access to the knowledge bases of the involved firms, noncodifiability of the capabilities is conditional to create a win–win situation. And fourth, cooperation aimed at a mutual strategic benefit in mutually gaining access to the knowledge bases of the involved firms is based on mutual competence and intentional trust as its main governance mechanism, whereas contracting between market parties aimed at knowledge–output transactions is represented by limited trust and arms' length (contractual) relationships as its main governance mechanism.     

Do Broad‐based Employee Ownership,Profit Sharing and Stock Options Help the Best Firms Do Even Better?

This article analyses the linkages among group incentive methods of compensation (broad‐based employee ownership, profit sharing and stock options), labour practices, worker assessments of workplace culture, turnover and firm performance in firms that applied to the ‘100 Best Companies to Work For in America’ competition from 2005 to 2007. Although employers with good labour practices self‐select into the 100 Best Companies firms sample, which should bias the analysis against finding strong associations among modes of compensation, labour policies and outcomes, we find that employees in the firms that use group incentive pay more extensively participate more in decisions, have greater information sharing, trust supervisors more and report a more positive workplace culture than in other companies. The combination of group incentive pay with policies that empower employees and create a positive workplace culture reduces voluntary turnover and increases employee intent to stay and raises return on equity.     

Why do incumbents sometimes succeed? Investigating the role of interorganizational trust on the adoption of disruptive technology

Previous research has noted that new firms traditionally have more success with the diffusion of disruptive technologies than do incumbent firms. For the development of disruptive technologies, newer firms appear to be advantageous as they are generally more flexible in resource allocation. However, exceptions can be found in various industries in which incumbents have been able to succeed with their own disruptive technologies. One possible explanation for these exceptions is the influence of pre-existing levels of trust already developed between incumbents and potential buyers of disruptive technologies. In order to explore this further, this article provides a link between interorganizational trust and the adoption of new, disruptive technologies in industrial markets. By surveying 134 current and potential Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) users, we show how pre-existing, interorganizational trust impacts the perceptions a potential buyer has towards a disruptive technology and how these perceptions influence a buyers' intention to adopt a new, disruptive technology. Beyond trust, we use perceived ease of use, perceived value, perceived usefulness and financial stability to create a predictive model for intention to adopt. Holistically, this article provides insight on how buyer–supplier relationships generally favor incumbent firms and can impact a buyers' perception of a new, disruptive technology.     

Family Ownership and R&D Intensity in Small‐ and Medium‐Sized Firms

Research was largely consistent in predicting a negative relationship between family ownership and research and development (R&D) intensity until Chrisman and Patel, using a behavioral agency model (BAM), called this general assumption into question. They argued that publicly owned family firms typically invest less in R&D than nonfamily‐owned firms. This behavior may however be reversed if economic performance levels are below family aspirations or if family long‐term goals, such as pursuing strong transgenerational family control, are highly valued. While most researchers, like Chrisman and Patel, primarily focused on large listed firms, more research on the relationship between family ownership and R&D intensity in privately held small‐ and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs) is required. This is because firm size can play an important role in understanding the innovation management behavior of firms. Building on the BAM perspective, in the present paper it is argued that Chrisman and Patel's results can be extended to the context of SMEs, albeit with one important specification: the relationship between family ownership and R&D intensity is likely to be contingent on the way the family has invested its wealth. Specifically, it is contended that in the context of SMEs, where goals are more fluid and mixed, when there is a high overlap between family wealth and firm equity (i.e., most of the family's wealth is invested in the firm) the relationship between family ownership and R&D intensity is negative because of the family owners' greater desire to protect their socioemotional wealth (SEW). However, if the overlap between the family's total wealth and single firm equity is low (i.e., firm equity is just a small part of the total family wealth), the relationship between family ownership and R&D intensity is positive as the low overlap between family wealth and firm equity reduces the family's loss aversion propensity. In such a situation, family ownership is likely to foster R&D intensity because of the long‐term orientation of family owners that increases the family firm's propensity to bear the risk of investing in R&D activities. The hypothesis is tested and confirmed in a study of 240 small‐ and medium‐sized firms based in Italy. The paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, adding to the literature on innovation management and R&D intensity, it increases the understanding of what drives or inhibits R&D investments in SMEs when a family is involved in the ownership of the firm. This is particularly important because research on innovation management, as well as research on R&D intensity in family firms, is primarily focused on large firms and much less on SMEs. Second, the study complements arguments from prior research on the correlates of R&D intensity in large listed firms, showing that the BAM and SEW perspective offer a theoretical framework that is also able to illustrate the complex nature of innovation management in the context of SMEs. Third, the study contributes to research on the effects of family ownership on the general functioning of a firm. In particular, it provides new insights into how family ownership may affect R&D intensity.     

Managing knowledge leakage in strategic alliances: The effects of trust and formal contracts

Although strategic alliances offer opportunities for knowledge sharing and leveraging, they also carry the risk of knowledge leakage to partner firms. In this study, we conceptualize the notion of knowledge leakage as a multidimensional construct and formalize its measurement. We examine the effects of two dominant governance mechanisms—trust (goodwill trust and competence trust) and formal contracts on knowledge leakage. A survey of 205 partnering firms in China indicates that goodwill trust has a U-shaped relationship with knowledge leakage, whereas competence trust has a negative impact. Moreover, goodwill trust and competence trust interact differently with formal contracts on knowledge leakage. This study offers important theoretical and managerial insights for firms to manage knowledge leakage in strategic alliances.     

How Much Does Ownership Form Matter?

Research summary : Previous studies have emphasized firm and industry effects on variation in firm performance, but the relationship between forms of ownership and firm performance has been the focus of limited research. This article examines the extent to which ownership form (i.e., public or private ownership) and ownership structure (including diffused ownership and blockholding) affect firm performance. The results of an analysis of 30,525 European Union (EU) firms indicate that form of ownership is an important explanatory factor in the difference in performance among firms. These results underscore the need to study firms characterized by different ownership arrangements and to provide empirical evidence for the study of firm ownership in strategic management. Managerial summary : Motivated by growing evidence on the involvement of different types of owners in the strategies of firms, we studied the extent to which a firm's ownership form (type of legal incorporation, such as public and private ownership forms) and ownership structure (diffused ownership and blockholding) affect its performance. Our study of more than 30,000 firms from the European Union shows that ownership form differences explain some of the performance differences between firms. Our results also indicate that firms with different ownership forms are differently affected by their competitive environment. Overall, the study suggests that choosing the right ownership form can have important strategic consequences. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Resource allocation for open and hidden learning in learning alliances

A satisfying relationship between alliance members is important for the success of learning alliances, especially those in the Asia Pacific region. While learning alliances create conditions for firms to leverage each other’s knowledge, firms may be opportunistic and appropriate each other’s knowledge, and firms face a tradeoff because appropriation affects the relationship between alliance members. After reviewing previous studies on knowledge sharing in learning alliances, we differentiate firms’ learning into open and hidden learning, and argue that open learning contributes to competence trust, while hidden learning reduces goodwill trust, which consequently affects open learning. Learning uncertainty, introduced in this study, and learning benefits determine expected payoffs of open and hidden learning, which influence firms’ resource investment in them. This study also finds that behavior and output control are important moderators of the relationships between expected payoffs of open and hidden learning and the resources invested in them. Thus, this study advances our understanding of the tension between cooperation and competition and the learning dynamics in learning alliances. The solution to solving the knowledge sharing dilemma in learning alliances is to promote partners’ open learning and to restrain their hidden learning. Therefore, this study argues that, with open and hidden learning, implementing proper control measures and influencing partners’ learning benefits and uncertainties can settle this dilemma. Furthermore, this study classifies the relationships of learning alliances into four types and gives an explanation of why horizontal learning alliances are usually more competitive than vertical ones.     

Is family leadership always beneficial?

There has been much debate concerning the performance of family firms and the drivers of their performance. Some scholars have argued that family management is to blame when family firms go wrong; others claim that family management removes costly agency problems and encourages stewardship. Our thesis is that these disagreements can only be resolved by distinguishing among different types of family firms. We argue that family CEOs will outperform in smaller firms with more concentrated ownership and underperform in larger firms with more dispersed ownership; they will do neither where firms are smaller and ownership is more dispersed or firms are larger and ownership is more concentrated. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Managing tension in coopetition through mutual dependence and asymmetries: A longitudinal study of a Norwegian R&D alliance

Strategic alliances between competitors (coopetition) is perceived to be full of tensions that needs to be managed. This study explore the evolution of a Norwegian coopetition alliance, through how firms handle tensions over time. The study finds that the firms experience a mutual dependence towards one another and that this dependence evolves over time. In the early phases of a coopetition alliance firms handle tension by relying on a structural dependence with their partners whereas firms move towards a more harmonious relationship with their partners by building a psychological dependence through trust and generosity. Further, the results indicate these dependencies might reduce the possible tensions related to asymmetries in size and knowledge between firms.     

Financial Participation: Does the Risk Transfer Story Hold in France?

Several articles report a positive effect of financial participation (profit sharing (PS) and employee share ownership) on firms' economic performance. This increase can be obtained in two main ways: by increasing the effort (extrinsic, intrinsic or commitment) of workers, directly or indirectly through worker selection; or by transferring more risk to the workers. The question is, of course, not neutral. Indeed, if the risk transfer story is true then it means that the increase of economic performance is obtained at the expense of workers, who take on the burden of more risks. The question is especially important in France where financial participation is associated with tax exemption for firms and where it is forbidden by law to substitute base wage and PS. The purpose of our article is to use an employer–employee dataset to answer the question of whether financial participation schemes are mainly designed as a risk transfer (from firms to workers) device.     

How national systems differ in their constraints on corporate executives: a study of CEO effects in three countries

Do CEOs matter more in some countries than in others? Based on a theoretical consideration of three fundamental national‐level institutions—national values, prevailing firm ownership structures, and board governance arrangements—we argue that CEOs in different countries face systematically different degrees of constraint on their latitudes of action, and hence they differ in how much effect they have on firm performance. To test these ideas, we apply a variance components analysis methodology to 15‐year matched samples of 100 U.S. firms, 100 German firms, and 100 Japanese firms. Results provide strong, robust evidence that the effect of CEOs on firm performance—for good and for ill—is substantially greater in U.S. firms than in German and Japanese firms. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Corrigendum to “The effect of spatial variables on the economic and environmental performance of bioenergy production chains” [Int. J. Prod. Econ. 131 (2011) 224-233]

Using a knowledge-based perspective, we identify and test the conditions enabling inter-firm learning in the aerospace supply chain. We focus on buyers accessing knowledge from their suppliers. Hypotheses are tested via a cross-sectional survey of supplier relationships of prime contractors in Canada's aerospace industry. The variables identified as having a significant impact on inter-firm learning are as follows: the quality of the buyer–supplier relationship in terms of trust, collaboration, socialization and information sharing; the proprietary links between both firms; and the use of ITC collaboration tools.     

Inside Ownership, Risk Sharing and Tobin's q-Ratios: Evidence from REITs

We investigate relations among inside ownership, managerial expenses, risk sharing and equity valuations. Our engine of analysis—Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs)—provides a unique and rich framework for analysis since we can calculate extremely accurate measures of asset replacement costs, and hence relative valuation (Tobin's q ). Further, the nature of the financial statements allows us to examine the impact of insider ownership on agency costs since we can accurately measure the costs of the entire management team. Our results show that firms with greater insider holdings tend to invest in assets with lower systematic risk and use less debt in their capital structure. At the same time, managerial expenses are lower as inside ownership increases. Finally, higher levels of insider ownership are associated with higher relative valuation as measured by both higher premiums to net asset value and higher multiples of cash flows. The results have implications for the design of optimal management contracts for both REITs and firms in general.     

Organizational governance and employee pay: how ownership structure affects the firm's compensation strategy

This research investigated how the ownership structure is related to the firm's overall compensation strategy. The findings extend previous research that focused primarily on CEO compensation strategy. We show that there are significant differences in the compensation practices that apply to all employees as a function of the ownership structure. The results show that for owner‐controlled firms and owner‐managed firms there is significant pay/performance sensitivity for all employees. In management‐controlled firms, changes in pay are related to changes in size of the firm. These findings lead us to conclude that ownership structure not only affects upper management's pay, but also the pay of all employees through substantial differences in the firm's compensation practices. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Leveraging foreign institutional logic in the adoption of stock option pay among Japanese firms

Research summary : We investigate why Japanese firms have adopted executive stock option pay, which was developed with shareholder‐oriented institutional logic that was inconsistent with Japanese stakeholder‐oriented institutional logic. We argue that Japanese managers have self‐serving incentives to leverage stock ownership of foreign investors and their associated institutional logic to legitimize the adoption of stock option pay. Our empirical analyses with a large sample of Japanese firms between 1997 and 2007 show that when managers have elite education, high pay inequality with ordinary employees, and when firms experience poor sales growth, foreign ownership is more likely associated with the adoption of stock option pay. The study shows the active role of managers in facilitating the diffusion of a new governance practice embodying new institutional logic. Managerial summary : Why have Japanese firms adopted stock option pay for executives? Inconsistent with Japanese stakeholder‐oriented tradition in corporate governance, such pay has been believed to prioritize managerial attention to the interests of shareholders over those of other stakeholders. However, to the extent that shareholders' interests are legitimate in the Japanese context, executives who have self‐serving incentives to adopt such pay can leverage the need to look after shareholders' interest in their firms to legitimize their decisions. In a large sample of Japanese firms, we find that foreign ownership (representing shareholders' interests) is more likely to be associated with the adoption of stock option pay when managers are motivated to receive such pay, such as when they have elite education, high pay inequality with ordinary employees, or poor sales growth. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Exhibited trust and excessive knowledge specificity: A competitive altruism hypothesis

To expound upon a hidden and intrinsic mechanism in the formation of trust, this study links competitive altruism to a component of the trust phenomenon by introducing the concept of exhibited trust. It is speculated that initiating trust is a more value-oriented action, with the purpose of improving the reputation of a firm as an ideal partner through the exhibition of trust. The concern regarding the potential for opportunism is less in this situation. The motivation to form trust is linked to the moral aspect of cooperative actions. Exhibited trust, as a conspicuous display of altruism, can function to build and maintain reputation in a business relationship. A competitive altruism hypothesis is constructed in two ways to investigate the role of excessive knowledge specificity in exhibiting the trusting ability of a firm and is subsequently tested using two survey datasets.     

The persistence of knowledge‐based advantage: an empirical test for product performance and technological knowledge

Resource‐based theory maintains that intrinsic characteristics of resources and capabilities, such as their tacitness, complexity, and specificity, prevent imitation and thereby prolong exceptional performance. There is little direct evidence to verify these claims, yet a substantial literature encourages firms to formulate competitive strategies around resources with these attributes. Further, work outside the resource‐based tradition suggests that these attributes can slow innovation, and it is not clear when this effect outweighs the benefits of inimitability. This paper seeks to clarify whether and how the complexity, tacitness, and specificity of a firm's knowledge affect the persistence of its performance advantages. We find that the complexity and tacitness of technological knowledge are useful for defending a firm's major product improvements from imitation, but not for protecting its minor improvements. The design specificity of technological knowledge delayed imitation of minor improvements in this study. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Follow the leader (or not): The influence of peer CEOs’ characteristics on interorganizational imitation

Research Summary: We argue that because charisma and narcissism represent widely held prototypes of effective and ineffective forms of leadership, respectively, the likelihood that a focal firm will imitate the practices of its peer firms is affected by these peer firms’ CEO characteristics. We theorize that peer firm CEO charisma enhances the focal firm’s imitation of peer firms’ behaviors, while peer firm CEO narcissism diminishes it. We further posit that the uncertainty of the context affects these imitation processes: industry dynamism and prior experience in a given strategic domain, respectively, strengthens and dampens focal firms’ susceptibility to these peer CEOs’ attributes. We test and find support for these ideas using a longitudinal sample of Fortune 500 firms in two distinct domains, corporate strategy and corporate social responsibility. Managerial Summary: When companies are uncertain about the costs and benefits of strategic actions this may lead them to imitate the actions of peer companies. But given the uncertainty, the challenge for executives is: which companies to emulate and which to ignore? In a sample of Fortune 500 companies, we find that the charisma or narcissism of a peer company’s CEO positively or negatively influences, respectively, the degree to which the peer company’s strategic actions are imitated. We reason that this is because these particular CEO attributes are widely believed to drive leadership effectiveness or ineffectiveness, respectively. We also find that the effects of these CEO characteristics on imitation are stronger in dynamic industry environments and weaker for companies that already have experience with the given strategy.