Spectrum Licensing,Policy Instruments and Market Entry

Competition policy attempts to address the potential for market failure by encouraging competition in service markets. Often, in wireless communication service markets, national regulatory authorities seek to encourage entry via the spectrum assignment process. Instruments used include the assignment mode (auction or beauty contest), setting aside licenses and providing bidding (price and quantity) credits for potential entrants, and making more licenses (spectrum blocks) available than there are incumbent firms (excess licenses). The empirical analysis assesses the effectiveness of these policy instruments on encouraging entry. The econometric results show that the probability of entry is enhanced by using auction assignments and excess licenses. Furthermore, quantity, but not price, concessions encourage entry.     

Dynamic Entry and Investment in New Infrastructures: Empirical Evidence from the Fixed Broadband Industry

In the telecommunications industry, the ladder-of-investment approach claims that service-based competition (when entrants lease access to incumbents’ facilities) can serve as a “stepping stone” for facility-based entry (when entrants build their own infrastructures to provide services). In this paper, we build an empirical model that encompasses a complete ladder-of-investment, composed of three rungs: bitstream access, local loop unbundling and new access facilities. Using data from the European Commission’s “Broadband access in the EU” reports covering 15 European member states for 17 semesters, we test the ladder-of-investment hypothesis. We find no empirical support for this hypothesis, that is, for the transition from local loop unbundling to new access infrastructures, and weak empirical support for the transition from bitstream access lines to local loop unbundling. These results are robust when we take into account the migration effect, the number of access rungs, the development of broadband cable, the regulatory performance, and the evolution of local loop unbundling prices.     

Pricing response to entry and agglomeration effects

In contrast to the traditional approach that typically views entry solely as a threat, we argue that our understanding of this important phenomenon will remain incomplete until we consider the possibility that entry may also provide opportunity for incumbent firms. Drawing from agglomeration theory, which describes the benefit from colocating with competitors, we explicitly examine the combined impact of the competitive and agglomeration effects of entry using a unique dataset of Texas hotels. We find that incumbent establishments price higher when facing entrants whose agglomeration benefits are more likely to outweigh their competitive effects. This association is stronger for incumbents that have greater experience with entry. Our results bring a new perspective to the entry response literature helping clarify inconsistent empirical results. Further, we apply agglomeration theory to a new question, incumbent behavior, and demonstrate that experience appears to play an important role in recognizing situations that generate agglomeration externalities. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Quality-adjusted international price comparisons of mobile telecommunications services

Many countries' policymakers have conducted international price comparisons of mobile telecommunications services to prevent service operators from overcharging subscribers. However, those comparisons have become more complicated because of the escalation in service usage and telecommunications expenditures spurred by the proliferation of smartphones and broadband LTE wireless internet service networks. The basket-based methodologies that have been widely used for international price comparisons are also limited—first, because the baskets for comparison may not be representative of actual service usage patterns in some countries; second, because they are difficult to apply to highly differentiated service plans due to the significant increase in wireless internet service usage and widely used plans with unlimited voice call service and SMS/MMS; and third, because they cannot consider the quality of service, such as upload and download speed in various service environments, at all. As an alternative, this paper proposes a hedonic pricing model that accounts for service quality and its variation in potentially disruptive environments, as well as fixed charge for a mobile phone additional to the price of service plans. The model was used to derive quality-adjusted price indices of mobile telecommunications services for twelve cities in ten countries with broadband LTE wireless internet service. The empirical results confirmed that the price index of each city varied significantly across the specifications,—both within the United States and internationally—depending on whether the model was constructed to reflect service quality and its variation on roads, in buildings, and in subways. The price index of each city also varied depending on whether the subsidized price of a mobile phone was considered part of the monthly price of a service plan. These results have important implications for policymakers seeking to understand the ultimate level of mobile telecommunication service prices for their country in a global context.     

Big splash,no waves? Cognitive mechanisms driving incumbent firms’ responses to low‐price market entry strategies

Research Summary: Low‐price market entries, aiming for rapid sales growth, tend to prompt strong competitive reactions. This research explores whether and how firms using low‐price entry strategies can mitigate retaliatory incumbent reactions. An experiment with 656 managers shows that entrants can attenuate the strength of incumbents’ responses by fostering perceptions of high aggressiveness or low commitment. Entrants may be able to accomplish this by adjusting their entry strategy to embed (subtle) cues of aggressiveness and (lack of) commitment. A replication experiment with university students reinforces our overall theoretical argument. However, the results also indicate that the interpretation of cues embedded in the entry strategy may be affected by the experience of incumbent firm managers. Overall, these results clarify the cognitive foundations of competitive responses to market entry. Managerial Summary: What drives incumbents to respond strongly to market entries, and what can the entrant, if anything, do to mitigate those responses? This research offers empirical evidence and theoretical insights for managers faced with these questions by shedding light on the thinking processes preceding competitive responses. The study shows that while managers are motivated to respond strongly to market entries that appear to be highly consequential to their business, these responses may be mitigated if the entrant manages to foster perceptions of high aggressiveness or low commitment to the market. Managers form these perceptions in part on the basis of the entrant’s behavior, creating an opportunity for entrants to adjust their entry strategies in a manner that demotivates strong competitive responses.     

Mental Models and Successful First‐mover Entry Decisions: Empirical Evidence from Chinese Entrepreneurs

Existing research has identified a variety of mechanisms through which early entrants may be able to develop competitive advantages that favorably influence performance relative to later entrants. At the same time, later entrants can sometimes enjoy cost advantages arising from free riding and the resolution of uncertainty. Despite the impressive array of possible explanations linking entry timing with performance, it is unclear how these explanations align with the cognitive representations that guide managerial decision making. The authors address this gap in the literature by arguing that the resource‐based view of the firm provides potential insight into the way that perceived pioneer advantages and disadvantages influence managerial behavior. The resource‐based view argues that the value of various pioneer advantages will depend on the degree to which those advantages enable pioneers to access and control resources that are costly to copy. Because legal and cultural variables also influence access to resources, the value of specific dimensions of pioneer advantage will vary depending on the macroenvironment within which a firm operates. To test this reasoning, the authors examine the impact of perceived pioneer advantages on the number of first‐mover entry decisions of Chinese service entrepreneurs, who operate in an environment characterized by underdeveloped legal institutions and inadequate legal protections, a fledgling capital market, the limited availability of information about products and industries, and an emphasis on personal connections. The authors hypothesize that these unique characteristics of Chinese markets will affect the perceived importance of sources of pioneer advantage identified in studies of Western (primarily United States) firms. Using data collected from 302 Chinese service entrepreneurs, the authors find strong evidence that the number of pioneer entry decisions made by Chinese entrepreneurs are strongly tied to entrepreneurs’ perceptions that pioneer firms tend to outperform later entrants and have the ability to preempt key assets. In addition, the number of entry decisions is negatively related to perceptions of pioneer cost disadvantages and the level of uncertainty faced by pioneers relative to later entrants. However, consistent with the research hypotheses, perceptions of pioneer leadership and cost advantages do not significantly influence the entry decisions of Chinese service entrepreneurs.     

Battle on the Wrong Field? Entrant Type,Dominant Designs,and Technology Exit

Research summary : Startups often compete with diversifying entrants in the technology race to define dominant designs, which can be platform technology‐based or non‐platform technology‐based. However, little research has examined the relative risk of technological exits for startups vs. diversifying entrants in such “dominance battles.” We develop a contingency framework that links a firm's technology exit to its pre‐entry experience and the characteristics of the dominance battle. With a sample of 134 technologies involved in 31 dominance battles in the information technology industry from 1979 to 2007, we show that technologies of startups were more likely than those of diversifying entrants to exit from platform technology‐based dominance battles; however, this relationship did not exist in non‐platform technology‐based dominance battles, or after the emergence of dominant designs. Managerial summary : How can a startup that tries to create a dominant design strategize to survive the fierce technology race? This study demonstrates that choosing the right battlefield is of paramount importance. Two aspects of a battlefield are shown as relevant: the type of technology and the stage of industrial evolution. Our results show that technologies sponsored by startups tend to have higher exit rates than those sponsored by diversifying entrants in dominance battles characterized by platform technologies, but this penalty is not evident in dominance battles characterized by non‐platform technologies or after the emergence of dominant designs. Furthermore, our study suggests that lack of organizational legitimacy, complementary assets, and integrative capabilities may explain why startups have a higher risk of technology exit than diversifying entrants. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Asymmetry of information and contestability theory

In this paper, contestability theory is examined under conditions of asymmetric information. Signals of economic profitability to potential entrants are the incumbent's list price and accounting rate of return. A disequilibrium analysis indicates that, while potential entry imposes a price discipline, incumbents can earn profits, although not indefinitely under stable conditions. Also, there may be wasteful entry even into industries where prices approximate the optimum.     

How does institutional change affect heterogeneity among firms?

This paper examines the variation in performance of incumbents and entrants following the deregulation of prices and entry in the airline industry. Our approach is similar to earlier studies of interfirm performance heterogeneity across industries. Drawing on theories of industry evolution, we hypothesize that the performance of entrants will have higher variance than incumbents. Further, given the opportunities offered by price deregulation, we propose that incumbents will have higher variance in performance under deregulation than in the earlier regime. The findings indicate that entrant performance heterogeneity is significantly greater than incumbent performance heterogeneity following deregulation, but that the variation in performance among incumbents does not significantly change when deregulation occurs. The second result is surprising given the range of service and process innovations that incumbents initiated. These results suggest that the distinction between entrants and incumbents is critical to future studies of performance variation within and across industries. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Imports and domestic entry: an empirical study

The objectives of this study are twofold: (a) to investigate the influence of imports on domestic entrants and to see whether indeed imports have a deterring effect on potential entrants; and (b) to determine whether the common finding of a weakly negative, or even nonnegative, impact of imports on domestic firms' profitability can be attributed to imports' inhibiting effect on potential entrants. A reduction or removal of the threat of domestic entry enables existing firms to raise prices, therefore, this effect may partly counter the procompetitive, price reducing effect of imports on domestic oligopolistic markets.