Rivalry within strategic groups and consequences for performance: the firm‐size effects

Our study examines how, in a given industry, rivalry functions within strategic groups defined according to the size of their member firms and how this rivalry affects performance. We hypothesize that, owing to several forms of group‐level effects including market power, efficiency, differentiation, and multimarket contact, strategic groups that comprise smaller firms will exhibit both increased rivalry and decreased performance compared with strategic groups that comprise larger firms. We test our hypotheses by estimating the effect of group‐level strategic interactions (i.e., conjectural variations) on firm performance. Ultimately, our analysis of empirical data on loans in the Spanish banking industry demonstrates that increased rivalry and decreased performance indeed characterizes firms belonging to a strategic group that comprises smaller firms. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

STRATEGIC GROUPS AND RIVALROUS FIRM BEHAVIOR: TOWARDS A RECONCILIATION

This research examines the question of whether rivalry is greater between or within strategic groups by utilizing more direct, dynamic and fine-grained measures of rivalry. Examining the competitive actions of firms in different strategic groups to determine if competitive responses were more likely to occur from firms in the same strategic group, or from firms in different strategic groups, the research found that competitive responses cannot be predicted by strategic group membership. Importantly, however, strategic group membership is a predictor of the manner by which firms compete with one another, or the frequency with which they undertake competitive actions, cut prices, instigate warfare and imitate rivals. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Asymmetric rivalry between strategic groups: response,speed of response and ex ante vs. ex post competitive interaction in the spanish bank deposit market

The objective of this study is to examine asymmetric rivalry between strategic groups in a given industry. Two research hypotheses argue for the existence of asymmetric rivalry in the sense that strategic groups of small companies have a greater degree of response but a slower speed of response to the actions of strategic groups of large companies, than vice versa. To test this, we use an ex post approach that examines the news releases published on the strategic actions and reactions of firms. A third hypothesis compares ex ante competitive expectations with ex post asymmetric rivalry between strategic groups. To test this, we compare ex post news on actions/reactions with an ex ante approach that estimates conjectural variations. The empirical application carried out on bank deposits in the Spanish market defines strategic groups in terms of size due to the historical and institutional conditions of the industry (deregulatory change). The results obtained show that rivalry patterns between strategic groups in terms of company size can be predicted as asymmetric in the sense that smaller bank strategic groups have a greater degree of response (Stackelberg ‘leader–follower’ competitive interaction), and a slower speed of response to the actions of larger bank strategic groups than is found the other way around. Moreover, ex ante expectations of aggressiveness on the part of larger strategic groups characterize greater ex post reactions from the smaller‐size strategic groups. Therefore, the size distribution of strategic groups is valuable to research on complex industries with deregulation changes. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Multimarket Contact and Rivalry over Knowledge‐based Resources

Research summary: Research shows that multimarket contact (MMC ) reduces rivalry involving downstream activities. Yet, studies showing that MMC can increase the threat of imitation suggest a need to better understand how MMC affects upstream rivalry over knowledge‐based resources. In this study, we argue that MMC increases rivalry over knowledge‐based resources since the deterrent threat of retaliation that typically leads to mutual forbearance in downstream activities will not be sufficient to restrain firms from protecting their knowledge from imitation in upstream activities. In support of these arguments we find that MMC increases the likelihood that a firm initiates patent litigation against a rival. This study suggests the relationship between MMC and rivalry may depend on the competitive domain and the type of resources over which firms are competing . Managerial Summary: How does market overlap or MMC affect rivalry between two competitors? Prior studies have largely found that an increase in market overlap decreases rivalry in less knowledge‐intensive context because of the deterrent threat of retaliation. However, in this paper, we argue that an increase in market overlap may not reduce rivalry in more knowledge‐intensive context because of heterogeneity in capabilities to protect knowledge. We find that a firm is more likely to initiate patent litigation against a rival as market overlap increases. Our findings suggest that the incentive to protect value across multiple product markets may surpass the motivation to cooperate with rivals and that managers should have a more nuanced view of how market overlap with competitors affects rivalry in more knowledge‐intensive contexts . Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Rivalry,strategic groups and firm profitability

An analysis of the U.S. pharmaceutical industry during the period 1963–82 finds that a substantial decline in industry profitability is not explained by changes in the number and size distribution of firms, in segment interdependence and in strategic distance. In contrast, declining industry profitability is strongly associated with increasing rivalry. This increasing rivalry is associated with changes in strategic group structure and a concomitant shift from within group rivalry to between group rivalry.     

Management heterogeneity,competitive interaction groups,and firm performance

One of the fundamental problems in strategic management is to map a heterogeneous set of firms in an industry into subsets of firms within which firms are homogeneous in their conduct and performance. The strategic group concept provides an answer to this intriguing question. Researchers in strategic group theory argue that firms within the same strategic group are behaviorally similar and thus tend to compete more fiercely within the group than across groups. In this paper, we focus on the question whether firms within the same group show similar decision‐making characteristics. Strategic‐choice theorists argue that top management teams in firms have substantial discretion in determining the future strategic contour of firms. Upper‐echelon theorists also argue that top managers are the strategists who set the direction of firms and the pace of competition in the industry. Further, they argue that top management team characteristics are an important element that determines the market niche in which a firm competes and the strategic direction a firm follows. Based on these arguments, we expect that there will be a significant link between grouping of firms by the patterns of competitive interactions and grouping of firms by top management team heterogeneity. Moreover, we argue that the closer the TMT heterogeneity of a firm is to the dominant heterogeneity in the competitive interaction group, the better it performs. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Dynamics of dyadic competitive interaction

In this study of firms’ entries into and exits from each other’s markets, we link research on multipoint competition to the emerging action‐oriented, dyadic approach to interfirm rivalry by specifying market interdependencies between pairs of firms that condition their potential for rivalry over time. Our dynamic analysis of competitive interactions between pairs of commuter airlines in California reveals the idiosyncratic and asymmetric market microstructures that characterize dyadic competitive relationships and helps explain why firms grapple vigorously with some of their competitors while being passive toward others. We show that there is an inverted U‐shaped relationship between firms’ rates of entry into and exit from each other’s markets and the level of multimarket contact in competitor dyads. We also show how this basic curvilinear effect varies from dyad to dyad as a function of relative levels of multimarket contact with competitors in other dyads and the relative sizes of competitors in a focal dyad. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Playing dirty or building capability? Corruption and HR training as competitive actions to threats from informal and foreign firm rivals

Research summary : We examine why a firm takes specific competitive action in nonmarket and resource‐market spaces, particularly when it perceives threats from informal and foreign competitor groups, respectively. We address this question by combining insights from competitive rivalry, strategic groups, and nonmarket strategy literatures in an emerging economy context. Specifically, we theorize how threats from informal and foreign rival firms in an emerging market influence a firm's engagement in corruption activities and its investments in HR training, respectively. We also argue that the likelihoods of such focal firm actions against competitor group threats differ, contingent on the focal firm's market and resource profiles. Results from the empirical analyses, with survey data from the Indian IT industry, provide broad support to our hypotheses. Managerial summary : Based on a World Bank dataset on the Indian IT industry, this study finds that corruption and HR training are pursued by firms in emerging economies as mindful strategies against specific types of rivals—informal and foreign firm rivals, respectively, and are not pursued simply as culturally‐based practices. Multinational companies may need to understand that domestic firms in emerging countries will engage in corruption strategically to reduce their costs and time to market of their products/services. Therefore, multinational firms may need to devise suitable strategies other than corruption to reduce their costs and time to market if they wish to compete with firms in emerging economies for customers who don't care about ethical issues and will buy a cheaper product/service that is delivered quickly. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The relative impact of actual and potential rivalry on firm profitability in the pharmaceutical industry

This paper estimates the effects of actual and potential rivalry on profitability of firms in the U.S. pharmaceutical industry during the 20‐year period 1963–82. The results show that during the 1960s actual rivalry among the sampled firms did not materially affect firm profitability, but that during the 1970s competition among incumbents had an increasingly adverse effect on their profitability. The results also show that potential competition significantly reduced drug firms’ profitability during the entire 20‐year period. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Strategic factor markets,scale free resources,and economic performance: The impact of product market rivalry

This paper analyzes how scale free resources, which can be acquired by multiple firms simultaneously and deployed against one another in product market competition, will be priced in strategic factor markets, and what the consequences are for the acquiring firms' performance. Based on a game‐theoretic model, it shows how the impact of strategic factor markets on economic profits is influenced by product market rivalry, preexisting competitive (dis)advantages, and the interaction of acquired resources with those preexisting asymmetries. New insights include the result that resource suppliers will aim at (and largely succeed in) setting resource prices so that the acquiring firms earn negative strategic factor market profits—sacrificing some of their preexisting market power rents—by acquiring resources that they know to be overpriced. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Strategic groups: Theory,research and taxonomy

This paper discusses the concept of strategic groups, focusing upon the importance of intra-industry strategic groupings in understanding differences across firms within an industry. The problems involved in identifying strategic groups within industries are examined through a comprehensive review of recent studies. It is demonstrated that much of the research has used surrogates for elements of a firm's strategic direction, e.g. vertical integration, product range, R & D expenditure, to suggest bases by which creative and sustainable groups are formed. The authors argue that certain theoretical concepts such as mobility barriers, isolating mechanisms and controllable variablesprovide much firmer bases for identifying strategic groups within industries. Thus, taxonomies for understanding the nature of strategic group formulation can be developed. Implications of the strategic group concept for such strategic issues as the structure-performance linkage, firm mobility, patterns of rivalry, industry evolutionand firm growthare then examined. The paper concludes by indicating fruitful directions for strategic group research in the context of the strategic management field.     

Taking industry structuring seriously: A strategic perspective on product differentiation

Given legal impediments to consolidation and collusion, firms often resort to product differentiation to attain market power. This paper provides a formal analysis of product differentiation as a tool for such industry structuring at both the firm and industry level. We examine: how industry structure differs when firms collaborate on their differentiation decisions, and when the profitability of such collaboration is greatest; how an individual firm's differentiation decisions affect subsequent market outcomes under price competition, such as margin, market share, and profit; how mere differentiation differs from a ‘differentiation advantage’; and how changing a firm's differentiation affects its rivals through both positive externalities (by restraining rivalry) and negative externalities (by shifting competitive advantage). Our results have implications for empirical research, strategy theory, and pedagogy.     

The influence of executive cognition on competitive dynamics

Prior competitive dynamics research has drawn on theories of information processing to model the subjective antecedents of executives' retaliation choices. This prior work has made great progress in developing our understanding of the retaliation choices most firms will make to a given type of attack. What the information processing perspective has not been able to do is explain firm‐specific behavior to predict which competitive moves individual firms will challenge, or explain why individual firms differ in the types of actions that they are most likely to challenge. The goal of this paper is to sharpen the theoretical and empirical focus on predicting firm‐level retaliation proclivities. We leverage managerial cognition research to examine the relationship between firm‐level differences in the cognitive frameworks that executives possess, and firm‐level differences in whether and how quickly firms challenge a market move. Results from a longitudinal study of the airline industry suggest that the addition of a cognitive perspective provides important insights into competitive retaliation. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The contingent effects of political strategies on firm performance: A political network perspective

Research Summary: We examine the performance impact of corporate political strategies by analyzing the relationships among firms and various government institutions. While a firm's political connections to a focal government with decision‐making authority enhance performance, connections to a rival government competing with the focal government harm performance, particularly when the rivalry is intense. Firms can neutralize the negative effect from this political rivalry by using direct or indirect connections to a constraining government with power over the focal government. We find support for our conjectures based on an analysis of interactions among Chinese steel firms and the central and provincial governments in acquisition decisions during the industry's consolidation period of 1999–2010. Managerial Summary: Firms invest in political capital in order to influence public policies in their favor. However, the government is a not a monolithic entity and the relationships among various government institutions can alter and even reverse the effects of a firm's political strategy. This research shows that a firm's political connections can be both an asset and a liability. That is, although firms benefit from their connections to governments with decision‐making authority, they can be caught in the crossfire when there is a rivalry between governments. Furthermore, our research suggests that firms can cope with the negative impact from political rivalry by taking advantage of the structural relationships within the political system and influencing governments that have constraining power.     

An evolutionary perspective on strategic group emergence: a genetic algorithm‐based model

We develop a simulation model to examine conditions under which strategic groups emerge and their performance difference persists. In our model, mobility barriers, strategic interactions among high performers, dynamic capabilities (the mechanisms that allow winners to continue to survive), and boundary of rivalry are put together to derive their joint implications for the evolution of strategic groups. Not surprisingly, our model behavior shows that mobility barriers and strategic interactions play an important role in sustaining intergroup performance difference. However, the extremely high level of mobility barriers is shown to impede the emergence of strategic groups. We also find that dynamic capabilities and boundary of rivalry are as essential as mobility barriers in understanding the emergence and stability of strategic groups. When dynamic capabilities are absent or when rivalry is extended over firms with dissimilar strategies, strategic groups are less likely to exist. These findings can serve as a guideline for empirical research to probe why strategic groups exist sometimes and why they do not at other times. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Strategic groups as subsets of strategic scope groups in the Belgian brewing industry

This research report proposes a distinction between strategic scope groups and strategic groups whereby strategic groups are delineated within strategic scope groups. A strategic scope group (SSG) includes firms within an industry that define their business using a four-dimensional ‘strategic space’ consisting of buyer types, product types, geographical reach and level of vertical integration, in a similar way. Within each SSG there may be several strategic groups (SGs). An SG includes firms within an SSG that deploy their resources in a similar way and that compete in the same way. While all firms within an SSG may compete against each other, firms within the same SG compete against each other in a similar way. Within the brewing industry in Belgium five SSGs could be identified. These SSGs differ statistically significantly on a risk-adjusted return on assets measure. SGs themselves did not differ on this performance measure. One may therefore conclude that mobility barriers between SSGs are higher than they are between SGs. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Strategic planning as a complex and enabling managerial tool

Research summary : The role of the strategic planning process in the ongoing generation of innovative knowledge is vital to the survival and growth of a firm, especially when technologies and market conditions are rapidly changing. We analyze data from a survey of firms in high‐technology industries to determine whether it is possible to break the commonly experienced trade‐off between strategic planning's positive influence on firm profitability and its negative influence on firm innovation. We draw on Adler and Borys's (1996) conceptualization of bureaucratic process types to identify several firm characteristics that have the potential to affect whether employees perceive strategic planning as enabling to their creative endeavors. We find that contingent effects between strategic planning and the identified firm characteristics exist that can break the trade‐off. Managerial summary : A tension exits in the literature about whether strategic planning hurts or helps innovative activity. Our analysis of data from 227 business units in high‐technology industries indicates that strategic planning is a complex process that can be perceived by employees as enabling or coercive. Our results confirm that strategic planning negatively affects innovative activity but positively affects profitability for average firms. We find, however, controllable firm characteristics—risk‐taking and knowledge‐based reward systems—affect the trade‐off. Given the higher levels of risk‐taking and knowledge‐based reward systems, firms can use strategic planning to achieve both high returns on investment and a high level of innovative activity. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Competitive positioning within and across a strategic group structure: the performance of core,secondary, and solitary firms

Drawing from economic and cognitive theories, researchers have argued that firms within an industry tend to cluster together, following similar strategies. Their positioning in strategic groups, in turn, is argued to influence firm actions and firm performance. We extend this research to examine performance implications of competitive positioning not just among but also within groups. We find that performance differences within groups are significantly larger than across groups, suggesting that some firms within groups develop better resource or competitive positions. We also find that secondary firms within a group outperform both core firms within the group and solitary firms, the latter being those not belonging to any multifirm strategic group. This suggests that secondary firms may be able to effectively balance the benefits of strategic distinctiveness with institutional pressures for similarity. We conclude that the primary implication of strategic groups does not relate to the ability of firms to create stable, advantageous market segments through collusion. Instead, strategic groups represent a range of viable strategic positions firms may stake out and use as reference points. Moreover, our results concerning secondary firms indicate that firm positioning within a group structure can have performance implications. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Scope versus speed: Team diversity,leader experience,and patenting outcomes for firms

Research Summary: How does the organization of patenting activity affect a firm's patenting outcomes? We investigate how the composition of patenting teams relates to both the scope of their patent applications and the speed with which their patents are approved, by examining the main effects of team members’ intra‐organizational diversity (based on affiliations with formal organizational units and informal organizational communities) and the moderating effects of team leader experience. We test our moderated mediation model in a sample of 121 teams that filed patents in a Fortune 50 company's India R&D center between 2005 and 2015, using proprietary employee data combined with newly released micro‐data from the U.S Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Our findings illuminate the micro‐foundations of innovation in firms by highlighting a trade‐off between organizing patenting activity to maximize scope versus speed. Managerial Summary: Patenting is an important strategic tool that firms can use to protect and create value from their innovations. A firm can benefit from filing a patent application that gives it a wider possible set of claims related to an innovation. It can also benefit from faster approval of a patent application by the Patent Office. However, our study shows that there is a trade‐off between patent application scope and patent approval speed, which creates tensions for the organization of patenting activities inside firms. In particular, we find that the diversity of a patenting team is positively related to patent scope but negatively related to patenting speed, and that these relationships vary with the experience of the team leader.     

Value creation and value capture with frictions

We use a formal value‐based model to study how frictions—incomplete linkages in the industry value chain that keep some parties from meeting and transacting—affect value creation and value capture. Frictions arise from search and switching costs and moderate the intensity of industry rivalry and the efficiency of the market. We find that firms with a competitive advantage prefer industries with less, but not zero, frictions. We show that rivalry interacts nontrivially with other competitive forces to affect industry attractiveness. Firm heterogeneity emerges naturally when we introduce resource development. Heterogeneity falls with frictions, but the sustainability of competitive advantage increases. Overall, we show that introducing frictions makes value‐based models very effective at integrating analyses at the industry, firm, and resource levels. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.