Market Structure and Market Performance

I review studies of the determinants of market performance in the aircraft, passenger airline, supermarket, liner shipping, and hospital industries, and of mergers and market performance in markets for fast food, soft drinks, and retail gasoline. Common factors are that more competitive market structures accompany better market performance, and that firm conduct and industry-specific factors play independent roles.     

国际零售商海外市场选择机理--基于市场邻近模型与心理距离视角的解释

市场邻近模型是以地理邻近与文化邻近为基点，并增加了经济、社会、零售结构与公共政策这几个标准，而构建起的市场邻近六角模型。国际零售商在海外市场选择时，尤其是在国际化初期，将偏好于向与母国市场具有邻近性的海外市场进行扩张。通过心理距离来对市场邻近程度进行衡量，更符合零售商海外扩张团队决策的实际。本文对心理距离的含义进行了界定，提出了心理距离的测量方法，并对心理距离悖论问题进行了分析。最后对市场邻近模型与心理距离之间的关系，以及两者在国际零售商海外市场选择中的作用进行了评述。     

议油品终端销售市场的开拓

分析了目前石化集团公司油品终端销售市场的优势与不足。建议建立并形成石化集团公司油口销售网络，建立成品油配送中心和市场研究中心，建立多种形式的终端销售网点，从而拓展沿品终端终端销售市场。     

日本电力市场化改革最新进展及启示

日本在保持原九大电力公司垂直一体化模式的同时,通过采取引入特定规模电力企业(PPS)从事发电和售电业务,实行售电侧放开,成立监督机构,建立公平、公正、公开的市场机制,日本电力市场化改革取得了较满意的效果:电价平均降低30%左右、供电质量持续稳定、社会各界认可改革成果。认为日本结合国情稳步推进电力市场化改革、对输配分开的经济效益进行量化分析等经验对我国实施电力体制改革具有参考意义。     

Fertilizer market liberalization and private retail trade in Kenya

This paper examined the factors influencing the entry and sales decision of private traders in fertilizer retail trade in a liberalized market using survey data from Kenya. A two-stage econometric model is used to examine traders’ entry and sales decision. The results provide insights into factors that are associated with private retail traders’ entry and sales decisions in an era of liberalized fertilizer markets. It shows substantial entry into fertilizer retail trade following market liberalization. Relatively limited investments in trading assets and equipment are predicted to hold back firm expansion. Implications drawn from the study provide insights into likely research and policy interventions.     

Price Controls and Market Structure: Evidence from Gasoline Retail Markets

In this paper we study the effect of price floor regulations on the organization and performance of markets. The standard interpretation of the effects of these policies is concerned with short‐run market distortions associated with excess supply. Since price controls prevent markets from clearing, they lead to higher prices. While this analysis may be correct in the short‐run, it does not consider the dynamic equilibrium consequences of price controls. We demonstrate that price floor regulations can have important long‐run effects on the the structure of markets by crowding them and creating endogenous barriers to entry for low‐cost retailers. Moreover, we show that these factors can indirectly lower productivity and possibly even prices. We test this in the context of an actual regulation imposed in the retail gasoline market in the Canadian province of Québec and show that the policy led to more competition between smaller/less efficient stations. This resulted in lowered sales, and, despite the reduction in efficiency, did not increase prices.     

RETAIL GASOLINE PRICE DYNAMICS AND LOCAL MARKET POWER*

Using monthly data from the 48 contiguous states (except Nevada) for the 1988–2002 period, it is shown that retail gasoline prices respond faster to wholesale price increases than to equivalent wholesale price decreases. Moreover, markets with high average retail‐wholesale margins experience a slower adjustment and a more asymmetric response. Since gasoline is the only variable input, average margins in a state likely reflect the degree of retail market power. This suggests that sticky prices and response asymmetries in the gasoline market are, at least partially, a consequence of retail market power.     

The Effect of Consumer Switching Costs on Prices: A Theory and its Application to the Bank Deposit Market

As demonstrated by Klemperer (1987), if households face a cost of switching among brands of a differentiated good, pricing is likely to be more competitive, the greater is the fraction of customers that move into or around the market. I generalize this theory to a world with arbitrary market structure and test it empirically using panel data on bank retail deposit interest rates. I find that the amount of household migration in a market has a significant competitive influence on price markups, that is, a positive effect on the level of deposit interest rates. Consistent with the model, the magnitude of this effect depends in some cases upon the degree of market concentration.     

Market regulation of voluntary add-on contracts

This paper analyzes contract choices and the effectiveness of consumer protection policies when firms can offer voluntary add-on insurance for their products. We develop a model in which a base product can be sold together with a voluntary extended warranty contract that insures consumers against the risk of product breakdown. Some consumers do not pay attention to extended warranties before making base product choices, but overestimate the value of such warranties at the point of sale. Under retail competition, the consumers’ option to buy multiple base products can endogenously create a base price floor that may prevent firms from redistributing the full warranty profits via loss-leadership. Inducing competition in the warranty market weakly increases consumer welfare and weakly outperforms a minimum warranty standard, which can even reduce consumer surplus. The results are consistent with the effects of recent changes regarding extended warranty regulation by UK legislators.     

Price Competition and Market Segmentation in Retail Gasoline: New Evidence from South Korea

I examine price dispersion in retail gasoline and focus on differentiation along the service dimension: full service versus self service. Consistent with more intensive search by self-service customers, I find that price dispersion always decreases with the number of nearby self-service stations, but does not decrease with the number of nearby full-service stations. When I segment the market by brand, I observe that the estimates are sensitive to how brands are separated into different types. These findings show that the market is more clearly segmented by service level than by brand type and also highlight the importance of product differentiation when modeling price dispersion.     

Firm Size and Market Power in Carbonated Soft Drinks

Sutton (1998) offers us a simple way to model firm size distributions across differentiated products industries. We analyse the implications of this approach for company markups using a structural model for a specific industry. We incorporate the complexities of multi-product (brand) companies operating with different (strategic) configurations of product characteristics and stores to estimate brand markups, using Irish AC Nielsen retail data for Carbonated Soft Drinks. As a second step we estimate that market power does not increase in companies with higher market share, controlling for other factors. This challenges a traditional mind-set.     

Market Share and Price Setting Behavior for Private Labels and National Brands

In this paper, we focus on the nature of demand and competitive response in the market for private label and national branded grocery products. Specifically,we employ less restrictive functional forms than usedin prior research. Specifically, we incorporateLA/AIDS demands and the corresponding price reactionequations to estimate consumer price sensitivities andsupply side price strategies for national brand andprivate label products. Oligopolistic priceinterdependence is explored further by specifyingbrand share, brand Herfindahl, and a measure of thestructure of the local retail markets in the supplyside relations to evaluate explicitly the impact ofmarket structure.In our empirical analysis, we estimate a system of market share and price equations simultaneously inorder to examine (i) the determinants of the demandresponse to pricing and promotion decisions and (ii)the determinants of private label and national brandpricing behavior. Using data for 143 food productcategories and 59 geographic markets, we develop amodel that captures the variation in privatelabel-national brand share and pricing acrosscategories and markets. Key findings include: (i)demand response to price and promotion is decidedlyasymmetric, (ii) price followship between privatelabels and national brands is positive, but notstrong, and (iii) markets characterized by highernational brand market share and higher supermarketconcentration tend to have higher prices forboth national brands and private labels.     

Regulation of international roaming in the European Union—Lessons learned

This paper analyzes the evolution of prices and competition in intra-EU international roaming markets. It addresses three main research questions: (i) to what extent have market forces by themselves brought competition to retail roaming markets? (ii) Has the evolution of market dynamics in wholesale roaming improved competition? (iii) Is wholesale regulation sufficient to lead to a reduction in retail roaming prices? Data show that there has been little price-based competition both at wholesale and retail levels, despite prices being well above costs and the significant margins allowed by regulation. Available data from the period preceding the entry into force of the first EU roaming regulation also point to the same conclusion. Lack of competitive pressure in retail roaming markets and inelastic demand give little incentives for retail roaming service providers to lower prices. Wholesale international roaming markets have complex competition dynamics. They are characterized by the reciprocity of wholesale roaming agreements and traffic internalization inside transnational groups. These circumstances limit price competition at the wholesale level. The traditional regulatory approach applied to electronic communication markets has been primarily focused on wholesale regulation. However, empirical evidence shows that even if wholesale charges are reduced, retail roaming markets continue to operate at very high retail margins (for example, more than 200% retail mark-up over wholesale charges for data roaming services and incoming calls). This proves that in international roaming markets wholesale charge reductions are not necessarily passed on to retail prices. It can thus be inferred that wholesale price regulation alone is in most cases not sufficient to ensure that benefits are passed through to end users.     

Antitrust and Sales-Below-Cost Laws: The Case of Retail Gasoline

Numerous states have sales-below-cost (SBC) laws, often directed at specific products such as gasoline. Potential violations of state SBC laws occur when prices are less than the seller's cost of doing business, or some proxy thereof. The most commonly stated purpose of these laws is to protect small independent firms from predation by larger firms. This study offers empirical evidence on the impact of SBC laws on the retail gasoline market. The result indicate that SBC laws directed specifically at the retail gasoline market have resulted in higher retail margins.     

Proliferation of Brewers’ Brands and Price Uniformity in Canadian Beer Markets

In this paper, we study retail pricing in Canadian beer markets, where access to the liquor distribution system and the retail price list is restricted by government ownership and control of the system. We consider alternative explanations for price uniformity in the differentiated beer products market. While an analysis of retail beer price data from six Canadian provinces for a 10-year period shows that no single explanation of price uniformity strongly dominates the others, some of the results are consistent with menu cost and demand uncertainty theories of price uniformity.     

Do International Roaming Alliances Harm Consumers?

This paper develops a model of international roaming in which mobile network operators (MNO's) compete both on the wholesale market to sell roaming services to foreign operators and on the retail market for subscribers. To allow their subscribers to place or receive calls abroad, they have to buy roaming services provided by foreign MNO's. In the absence of international alliances, competition between foreign operators would drive wholesale unit prices down to marginal costs. However, international alliances are endogenously formed since they serve as a commitment device to soften competition on the retail market, leading to excessively high roaming per‐call prices.     

The Impact of Private Label Introduction on Assortment,Prices, and Profits of Retailers*

We study how introducing private-label brands (PLs) affects retail prices and profits, accounting for assortment adjustments of national brands (NBs). We employ an event-study framework and scanner data on the US beef market. When a PL is added to the low-priced market segment, we find that retail stores further differentiate NBs from the PL and remove same-segment NBs. When a PL is added to the high-priced segment, however, NB assortment changes are limited. PL introduction and PL-driven NB assortment changes impose small price effects on NB, but strongly cannibalize NB demand and steer consumers toward PLs, likely increasing store profits.     

零售企业破坏性创新及其制约因素：一个理论框架

自中国零售市场对外开放以来，本土零售企业一直在复制与模仿外资零售企业的道路上艰难前行，虽有发展，但始终无法超越外资零售企业，更无法获得可持续的竞争优势。文章认为，本土零售企业只有走破坏性创新道路才有可能获得长足发展，进而阐述了本土零售企业进行破坏性创新的空间基础和破坏性创新过程，并对阻碍零售企业破坏性创新的因素进行了探讨，这些因素可分为四类：行为采纳障碍、思想障碍、风险障碍、创新过程的先期障碍。     

Can a margin squeeze indicate the need for deregulation? The case of fixed network voice telephony markets

In the beginning of fixed network liberalisation in Europe in the late 1990s, the main concern of regulators was to lower retail call prices. This was done by introducing wholesale regulation and promoting service-based competition. Some years later, the concern of some regulators turned from too high retail call prices to too low call prices, which might ‘squeeze’ entrants out of the market. This paper looks at a simple model in which this development is explained by increasing competitive pressure from an ‘outside opportunity’, most notably mobile telephony and cable. It is concluded that a margin squeeze is not necessarily used by the incumbent as a device to drive competitors out of the market and to increase market power but can also result from increased inter-modal competition. If this is the case, it is argued that the appropriate response would be deregulation or – under particular circumstances – a switch from cost-oriented access prices to alternatives such as retail-minus or capacity-based interconnection.