The Gradual Response of Market Power to Mergers in the U.S. Steel Industry

Studies of the impact of horizontal mergers on market power typically impose an immediate adjustment of market power following a merger. This paper adopts an alternative procedure to estimate the effect of four mergers on market power in the U.S. steel industry. Namely, by estimating a switching regression model that incorporates profit-maximizing behavior, the results show that mergers generally increased market power in the steel industry. However, it did take some time for market power to fully adjust after each merger.     

The effect of the Telefonica–BellSouth merger on the Argentine cellular telephone market

The aim of this paper is to evaluate the effects of the merger between Telefonica and BellSouth, which took place in December 2004, in the Argentine cellular telephone market. In this market the merger under analysis is horizontal. The evaluation is carried out by performing a demand estimation, using the PCAIDS model, and a marginal cost estimation, using supply prices and the elasticities inferred from the previously estimated demands. With those results, a merger simulation is run under different hypotheses related to possible marginal cost reductions. The merger is found to be able to lower supply prices for relatively small marginal cost reductions. This is basically due to the fact that the individual firms’ demands are highly elastic, and that the cross elasticity between the brands affected by the merger is relatively small.     

MERGER, EASE OF ENTRY AND ENTRY DETERRENCE IN A DYNAMIC MODEL

We analyze whether ease and speed of entry can mitigate the anti-competititve effects of a merger, in a dynamic model of endogenous merger. In our model, if new firms can enter quickly, it is more likely that merger is motivated by efficiency as opposed to increased market power. Thus, there is less reason to challenge the merger. On the other hand, if entry of new firms becomes less costly, firms may have a stronger incentive to monopolize the industry through horizontal merger. We also show that when the incumbent can engage in entry deterrence activities, anti-merger policy can decrease welfare.     

Market structure and product quality: A study of the 2002 Japanese airline merger

This study examines the economic consequences of a horizontal merger between Japanese airlines that took place in 2002, with particular emphasis on quality responses to the airline merger. A structural model allows firms to determine not only prices but also flight frequencies. The obtained estimates would reject the hypothesis that the merger facilitated coordinated effects. Efficiency gains from the merger are estimated as not trivial, and are more strongly observed in marginal costs per flight, rather than in marginal costs per passenger. Welfare effects of the merger are positive, but vary by market structure. Neglecting endogenous flight frequency overstates the welfare gains, especially for smaller markets. Finally, remedial measures imposed by the authority did little for the merger outcomes.     

横向合并控制中的资产剥离问题——基于古诺竞争的分析

本文基于古诺竞争构建了一个"三阶段"的博弈模型,分析了外资企业合并控制中的资产剥离问题,探讨了资产剥离的有效性及福利效应。研究发现:在一定条件下,资产剥离能够削弱合并带来的单边效应,改善社会福利,增加合并被批准的可能性。在此基础上,本文探讨了消费者福利标准与社会总福利标准之间的差别,认为提高社会总福利的资产剥离很有可能会降低消费者福利。同时,本文还详细模拟了外资企业与国内企业竞拍剥离资产的过程,认为竞拍结果的不同取决于市场规模的大小以及资产剥离的数量。最后,得出结论并为中国资产剥离的实施提出建议。     

The Competitive Effects of Not-for-Profit Hospital Mergers: A Case Study

Applying conventional horizontal merger enforcement rules to nonprofit hospitals is controversial. Critics contend that the different objective function of not-for-profits entities should mitigate competitive concerns about mergers involving nonprofit hospitals. We analyze a merger that reduced the number of competitors (both nonprofit) in the alleged relevant market from three to two. We find that the transaction was followed by significant price increases; we reject the hypothesis that these price increases reflect higher post-merger quality. This study should help policymakers assess the validity of current merger enforcement rules, especially as they apply to not-for-profit enterprises.     

Market Definition?

The 2010 horizontal merger guidelines issued by the antitrust agencies de-emphasize market definition, which has been a foundation of merger law for decades and was required by previous guidelines. The justification for this change is that unilateral adverse price effects caused by mergers of firms that produce differentiated products are best assessed using analyses that do not depend on market definition. Though the guidelines unquestionably serve a value in illuminating actual agency practice, any marginal benefit in dropping the exercise of market determination from the merger review process is likely to be small, and the marginal cost may be substantial.     

An interindustry analysis of merger activity 1960 – 1983

This paper highlights several trends in merger activity in mining and manufacturing, and commercial banking in the United States for the period 1960 to 1983. The specific data examined included commercial bank mergers by types (horizontal, market extension), by corporate structure of the acquiring organization, and by regulatory authority providing final approval of these mergers. Over the time period analyzed, significant differences appear to exist between the magnitude and the timing of mining and manufacturing as compared to commercial bank mergers. These differences may result largely from changes in long-existing legislation in the banking sector, particularly those in recent decades.     

QUANTIFYING THE SCOPE FOR EFFICIENCY DEFENSE IN MERGER CONTROL: THE WERDEN‐FROEB‐INDEX*

This paper introduces the Werden‐Froeb Index (WFI) to assist in evaluating merger‐specific efficiencies in horizontal mergers. The index measures the weighted average reduction in marginal costs required to restore pre‐merger equilibrium prices and quantities after the (full or partial) merger is consummated. The WFI is well defined, objective and robust, and it has relatively low information requirements. We propose to use the index as a natural complement to concentration measures such as the Hirschmann‐Herfindahl Index in the assessment of horizontal mergers.     

Measuring market shares for the analysis of a consummated merger

This paper asks how market shares should be computed for analysis of a consummated merger. It is argued that pre-merger market shares adjusted for the direct effects of the merger should be used. The actual post merger market shares (which are available only for consummated mergers) should not form the basis of an analysis of the competitive effects of the merger because they may reflect confounding factors, such as entry, exit, or a change in capacity of third-party rivals, unrelated to the merger.     

The impact of firm cost and market size asymmetries on national mergers in a three-country model

This paper studies the impact of firm cost and market size asymmetries on merger decisions. I consider a model where a small and a large country compete in a third (world) market. Each of the two countries has two firms (with potentially different costs) that supply the domestic market and export to the third market. Merger decisions in the two countries are modeled as a simultaneously move game. The paper finds that firms in the large country have more incentives to merge than firms in the small country. In contrast, the government of the large country has more incentives to block a merger than the government of the small country. Thus, the model predicts that conflicts of interest between governments and firms concerning national mergers are more likely in large countries than in small ones.     

EFFICIENCY GAINS AND STRUCTURAL REMEDIES IN MERGER CONTROL*

This paper studies the role of structural remedies in merger control in a Cournot setting where (endogenous) mergers are motivated by prospective efficiency gains and must be submitted to an Antitrust Authority (AA) which might require partial divestiture for approval. From a merger policy perspective, this paper's main contribution is two‐fold. First, it shows that if mergers do not involve all firms in the industry, then merger remedies help the AA to increase consumer surplus only if assets are divested to competitors already in the market. Second, it presents a model which clarifies that there can only exist social costs to ‘over‐fixing’ the anticompetitive effects of a merger if merger review policy treats mergers as one‐time events. When a more dynamic view is taken of sequential merger review, then there can never be an ‘over‐fixing’ problem. In this case, however, remedies are shown to be needed to make myopic merger review optimal.     

Analytical Screens for Electricity Mergers

Electricity mergers pose distinct challenges for competition policy. Electricity demand is highly inelastic in the short run, storage is limited, and transmission constraints limit the ability to substitute generation at other locations. As a result, a merger can affect prices in many different markets and even generators with small market shares may be able to exercise market power. The U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s approach for screening horizontal mergers, based on the concentration thresholds in the Department of Justice/Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines, can fail to identify mergers that lessen competition, and mergers that fail the FERC screen may have no significant anticompetitive effect. We propose competitive residual demand (CRD) analysis, which examines the supply curves of the markets affected by a merger and considers the ability and incentive of firms to raise prices before and after a proposed merger. CRD analysis is a relatively easy way to address the incentives for generators to exercise market power and relies on data that are often available. Vertical (convergent) mergers between electricity and gas raise additional concerns, and we propose a methodology to screen vertical mergers.     

Upstream merger in a successive oligopoly: Who pays the price?

This study applies a successive oligopoly model, with an unobservable non-linear tariff between upstream and downstream firms, to analyze the possible anti-competitive effects of an upstream merger in the Norwegian food sector (specifically, the market for eggs). The theoretical predictions are that an upstream merger may lead to higher average prices paid by downstream firms and at the same time no changes in the prices paid by consumers. Consistent with the theoretical predictions it is found that the merger had no effect on consumer prices, but led to higher average prices paid by the downstream firms to the merged firm.     

Can no competition policy be better than some competition policy?

This paper examines how the market structure is likely to evolve in a situation of multi-stage oligopolistic production. The decision to merge across or within stages of production is treated as endogenous. It is shown that when firms at a particular stage of production are relatively dominant, simultaneous merger decisions are conducive to competitive vertically integrated outcomes while sequential decisions are not. The persistence of non-integrated market structures may be explained by the existence of equally dominant firms which make merger decisions sequentially. The credible threat of retaliatory merger may deter both socially desirable and undesirable forms of merger. Inferences are drawn for the design of competition policy.     

Network effects and merger analysis: instant messaging and the AOL–Time Warner case

The AOL–Time Warner merger, announced in January 2000, was and still is the largest merger ever consummated. The merger plan was submitted to the FTC for antitrust review and to the FCC for license transfer review. The FTC approved the merger with conditions relating to open access. The FCC approved the merger subject to a condition (among others) that mandated interoperability for future (but not present) generations of AOL's popular instant messaging (IM) service, based on the potential leveraging of merger assets together with current IM network effects into market power in next-generation IM services. This condition was controversial and represents a new departure in antitrust analysis for industries imbued with network effects. This paper analyzes AOL's IM service and the ability to leverage merger assets into future market power in the context of the FCC condition; counter-arguments are considered and larger lessons for “new economy” antitrust are drawn from this experience and analysis.     

Efficiencies,market power and horizontal merger

In June 1982 the Justice Department issued itsMerger Guidelines which specify in terms of the Herfindahl index (H) what combinations of merger size and post-merger H are likely to lead to a merger challenge. This paper assesses theseGuidelines using Williamson's (1968) well-known model in which an optimal merger policy is viewed as one that considers both the price and cost consequences of merger. The Williamson model is recast in terms of H and changes in H and linked to theGuidelines. This allows an assessment of the welfare congequences of an industry merger for any given level of concentration and merger-produce changes in concentration. Among the conclusions are that, consistent with theGuidelines, higher values of H make socially successful mergers less likely, and a more appropriate, if perhaps not more feasible, focus for theGuidelines are coordination adjusted measures of concentration and merger size.     

The determinants of merger waves: An international perspective

One of the most conspicuous features of mergers is that they come in waves that are correlated with increases in share prices and price/earnings ratios. We use a natural way to discriminate between pure stock market influences on firm decisions and other influences by examining merger patterns for both listed and unlisted firms. If “real” changes in the economy drive merger waves, as some neoclassical theories of mergers predict, both listed and unlisted firms should experience waves. We find significant differences between listed and unlisted firms as predicted by behavioral theories of merger waves.     

Localized Competition,Heterogeneous Firms and Vertical Relations

This paper investigates the link between firms' geographic configuration and market power in imperfect markets. We consider two related setups. The first illustrates the relevant characteristics of the pricing equilibrium. A main implication is that the equilibrium price vector changes in accordance with the firms' spatial configuration. The second, where firms operate as downstream retailers affiliated to rival upstream wholesalers, shows that upstream market power is strongly affected by an index of geographic concentration which reflects the spatial configuration of retailers. Finally, our analysis provides several insights for market delineation as well as merger evaluation and remedies.     

The Entry-Inducing Effects of Horizontal Mergers: An Exploratory Analysis

Antitrust law presumes that entry normally prevents or reverses anticompetitive effects from horizontal mergers. But when sunk costs associated with entry are at levels suggested by prevailing market structure, the opportunity for entry created by an anticompetitive merger plausibly is too small to induce entry, even absent Stiglerian ‘barriers to entry.’ This is illustrated for Cournot and Bertrand models. Significant entry also makes otherwise profitable Bertrand mergers unprofitable, assuming no efficiency gains. Consequently, the entry issue can be collapsed into the efficiency issue: if a presumably profitable merger does not generate significant efficiencies, it cannot be expected to induce entry.