Meta-analyzing ownership concentration and firm performance in Asia: Towards a more fine-grained understanding

We present a meta-analysis of the relationship between concentrated ownership and firm financial performance in Asia. At the cross-national level of analysis, we find a small but significant positive association between both variables. This finding suggests that in regions with less than perfect legal protection of minority shareholders, ownership concentration is an efficient corporate governance strategy. Yet, a focus on this aggregate effect alone conceals the existence of true heterogeneity in the effect size distribution. We purposefully model this heterogeneity by exploring moderating effects at the levels of owner identity and national institutions. Regarding owner identity, we find that our focal relationship is stronger for foreign than for domestic owners, and that pure “market” investors outperform “stable” or “inside” owners whom are multiply tied to the firm. Regarding institutions, we find that a certain threshold level of institutional development is necessary to make concentrated ownership an effective corporate governance strategy. Yet we also find that strong legal protection of shareholders makes ownership concentration inconsequential and therefore redundant. Finally, in jurisdictions where owners can easily extract private benefits from the corporations they control, the focal relationship becomes weaker, presumably due to minority shareholder expropriation.

Are OECD-prescribed “good corporate governance practices” really good in an emerging economy?

This paper examines whether adopting OECD-prescribed corporate governance principles can solve the major corporate governance problem in an emerging economy—controlling-shareholder expropriation. We argue that “good governance practices” in OECD countries (e.g., an active board of directors, separation of chairperson and the CEO, significant presence of outside directors, and a two-tier board) cannot mitigate the negative effect of controlling-shareholder expropriation on corporate performance for two main reasons. First, most good governance practices are mainly designed to resolve conflicts between shareholders and the management but not conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders. Second, board directors are typically not independent to controlling shareholders, and supervisory directors often have low status and weak power in a firm. Using a panel of over 1,100 Chinese listed firms between 2001 and 2003, we find supportive evidence for our arguments. We discuss the implication of our study for public policy and strategies of investors.     

Corporate governance and Asian companies

While prominent differences in corporate governance exist across the Asia Pacific region, there are common concerns about controlling shareholders expropriating wealth from minority shareholders at the expense of overall wealth creation, as well as about the roles and qualifications of managers in Asian companies. The contributors to this Special Issue of the Asia Pacific Journal of Management address these concerns and provide new evidence on their empirical relevance, as well as the factors conditioning that relevance. They also provide cautionary insight into the merits of specific proposals to reform Asian corporate governance. An important theme emerging from this Special Issue is that one needs to understand the institutional framework in which organizations operate in order to understand the rationale for and consequences of specific corporate governance models, as well as the likelihood that specific governance reforms will be adopted and prove effective. In this context, informal institutions are often more important than formal institutions. In addition to advancing our understanding and appreciation of the linkages between formal and informal institutions, corporate behavior, and performance, as well as the prospects for corporate governance reform, the papers in this Special Issue also suggest challenging and potentially fruitful areas for future research.     

Extending the “P” perspective: An institutional account of management research in Australia

In commenting Meyer’s article “Asian management research needs more self-confidence” in APJM (2006), Yang and Terjesen (Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 24(4):497–507, 2007) described ground realities in Australia that may have inhibited the development of a robust management research community. As an Australia-trained and Australia-based Asian management scholar, I extend the “P” perspective by exploring how the formal and informal institutions interact in shaping Australia-based scholars’ publication strategies and research performance. Reflecting on my experience in Australia, I argue that like in any other businesses, institutions matter in our business of research and publication. They matter because they can shape the local “rule of the game” within which a country’s or a region’s scholars conduct and publish their research. A full institutional account of the current state of management research in the Asia Pacific region requires a deeper understanding of both formal and informal local institutions. From such an institutional perspective, this commentary concentrates on why Australian management research lags behind that in the US and Europe and yet leads the Asia Pacific region.

Beyond institutional voids and the middle-income trap: The emerging business angel market in Malaysia

Emerging economies are characterized by the presence of institutional voids which challenge and constrain the behavior of economic agents. In this paper we report on one set of agents, angel investors, in Malaysia, which investors fear is experiencing a middle-income trap whereby economic growth and new venture formation stalls due to persistent institutional voids. This research addresses this question through interviews with 19 Malaysian business angel investors in 2015, utilizing a mixed-methods approach. Results indicate that business angels in our sample generated strong returns, though they did find it a challenge to invest in and monitor new ventures in a highly uncertain and competitive environment where there is high political uncertainty, weak legal and financial support for investors and SMEs. In order to overcome weak institutional support, business angel investors develop informal institutions by co-investing and networking with family members and government officials. They also conduct careful due diligence before investing and closely monitor their investee companies after investing. This research provides several theory and practice contributions with respect to business-angel investing in emerging economies with weak formal institutional regimes.     

Corporate Governance and Firm Capabilities: A Comparison of Managerial, Alliance, and Personal Capitalisms

Incentive structures embodied in different systems of corporate governance produce firms with inclinations towards the development of particular capabilities and strategic assets and disinclinations towards the development of others. To the extent that there is an excessive dependence upon any particular type of governance, an economy as a whole will be endowed with both its benefits and costs. As such, governance reform in East Asian economies may be better aimed at cultivating alternative governance institutions alongside existing relational institutions, rather than in converting these governance systems into facsimiles of the so-called Anglo-American model.     

Are family ownership and control in large firms good,bad, or irrelevant?

Family ownership and control play an important role in large firms in Asia. There is a puzzle regarding the relationship between concentrated family ownership and control on the one hand and firm performance on the other hand. Three positions suggest that such concentration may be good, bad, or irrelevant for firm performance. This article reports two studies to shed further light on this puzzle. Study 1 uses 744 publicly listed large family firms in eight Asian countries (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand) to test competing hypotheses on the impact of family ownership and control on firm performance. On a country-by-country basis, our findings support all three positions. On an aggregate, pooled sample basis, the results support the “irrelevant” position. Using 688 firms in the same eight countries, Study 2 endeavors to answer why Study 1 obtains different results for different countries. We theorize and document that Study 1 findings may be systematically associated with the level of (minority) shareholder protection afforded by legal and regulatory institutions. Study 2 thus provides critical insights on a cross-country, institution-based theory of corporate governance.     

Institutional framework,corporate ownership structure,and R&D investment: an international analysis

We combine agency theory with the law and finance approach to analyze how the legal protection of investors and the corporate ownership structure affect corporate investment in research and development (R&D). We use information from 956 firms from the five most R&D-intensive industries in 19 developed countries. Our results show that better protection of investors’ rights by the institutional environment has a positive influence on corporate R&D. We also find that corporate ownership concentration works as a substitute for legal protection. This finding means that R&D investment of the firms in the countries with poor legal protection increases as ownership becomes more concentrated. Our results also show that the identity of shareholders has a relevant effect: Whereas banks and nonfinancial institutions as shareholders result in lower R&D, institutional investors as shareholders increase corporate investment in R&D.     

Examining institutional effects on B2B relationships through the lens of transitioning economies

Our study addresses the limited attention paid to the role of indigenous institutional environments in framing the legitimate forms of governance used to shape buyer-supplier exchanges. Drawing on institutional theory and marketing channel literature, the study suggests that the emphasis in buyer-supplier exchanges on communication modalities and norms has much to do with the effectiveness of legal systems in a buyer's country. Three contexts for legitimacy are conceptualized from an examination of exchanges in developed economies with strong formal institutions and transitioning economies with underdeveloped institutions. Using surveys of US buyers to represent strong formal institutional environments, we conclude that buyers heavily influenced by regulative enforcement place a relatively greater emphasis on formal information sharing in their partnership efforts to build trust and enhance supplier performance. From surveys of buyers in India and China, we conclude that buyers place a relatively greater emphasis on informal information sharing when their legitimacy derives from the endogenously enforced moral codes of their private networks. Finally, surveys administered in Brazil and Russia revealed that buyers in environments pressured by the familial loyalty practices of their private networks place a relatively greater emphasis on the norm of solidarity to build trust in their suppliers.     

Effects of governance on investment decisions and perceptions of reporting credibility: Investment experience of Taiwanese individual investors

This paper examines the effects of governance strength on individual investors’ investment decisions and their perceptions of the credibility of financial reporting by Taiwanese companies. It also examines whether the investment experience of individual investors influences their perceptions and decisions. Our experimental results show that governance strength enhances the price that individual investors are willing to pay for stocks, along with the perceived credibility of firm reporting. Furthermore, the associations are moderated by the investment experience of individual investors, suggesting that more-experienced individual investors are better able to incorporate governance strength into their judgment than less-experienced individual investors. Additionally, investment experience is positively related to the emphasis that individual investors give to corporate governance information in making investment decisions.     

上市公司治理结构对信息性盈余管理的影响研究

为了有效监督公司内部利害关系各方的行为,有效降低基于各种委托代理关系的代理成本,在阐述国内外盈余管理文献的基础上,假设拥有健全公司治理结构的上市公司管理者更愿意进行信息性盈余管理,通过构建合理的并可度量的信息性盈余管理衡量方法,使用沪、深两市全部A股上市公司2014—2016年公司季度财务数据,实证研究了信息性盈余管理视角下公司治理对盈余管理的影响。结果表明,市场监管者和投资者需要关注两种不同的盈余管理行为,投机性盈余管理更倾向于误导投资者,信息性盈余管理则是通过盈余管理的手段向投资者传递有用的内部信息。股权制衡对上市公司的信息性盈余管理行为具有明显促进作用,促使管理层进行信息性盈余管理,就要优化股权结构,形成产权多样化的股东制衡机制,实现股权结构的合理优化。拥有健全公司治理结构的上市公司管理者更愿意进行信息性盈余管理,公司治理结构对管理者进行信息性盈余管理具有积极的影响,健全的公司治理结构能够提高财务报告透明度和盈余信息含量。因此,保障财务报告的真实性和可靠性,以信息性盈余管理为动机探究公司治理对盈余管理的影响具有现实意义。     

The use of favors by emerging market managers: Facilitator or inhibitor of international expansion?

This article explores the use of favors by emerging market managers, the impact of using favors on their firms’ growth, legitimacy, and reputation in a variety of business environments, and how the use of favors affects firms’ paths to international expansion. We discuss the concept of favors, and to illustrate the process of favors, we look at culturally rooted examples of their use by managers from the BRIC countries of Brazil, Russia, India, and China. Utilizing neo-institutional theory, we create a typology of four types of environments in which managers and firms from emerging markets conduct business with various relational entities (e.g., governments, customers, suppliers, competitors, alliance partners). We posit that the use of favors by managers compensates for the relatively weak legitimacy of formal institutions in emerging market environments, with favors illustrating the resulting reliance upon informal cultural-cognitive institutions. We develop propositions regarding the impact of the use of favors on the organizational outcomes of growth, legitimacy, and reputation of emerging market firms doing business in each of the four environments. This leads to further propositions regarding how the use of favors can influence their firms’ internationalization growth paths. We conclude that the impact of favors on international growth paths results from the fit or non-fit of their use with the level of legitimacy of the formal institutional environment of the focal relational entity in various business transactions.     

National corporate governance institutions and post‐acquisition target reorganization

We examine the characteristics of national systems of corporate governance to theorize about the nature of the shareholders' and employees' interests when it comes to reorganization, under the assumption that the firm is coalitional in nature. We argue that corporate governance institutions prevalent in both the host and the target country of the merging firms enable or constrain the ability of the acquirer to reorganize the target. Using a cross‐national dataset of corporate acquisitions and post‐acquisition reorganization, we found support for our predictions that stronger legal protection of shareholder rights in the acquirer country compared to the target country increases the acquirer's ability to restructure the target's assets and leverage the target's resources, while the protection of employee rights in the target country restricts the acquirer's ability to restructure the target's assets and redeploy resources to and from the target. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

可转换债券:融资工具还是制度安排——基于贝恩资本投资国美电器可转换债券的案例研究

本文通过梳理可转换债券的理论研究文献,并结合机构投资者投资可转换债券的实践,提出了基于机构投资者视角的可转换债券理论分析框架。本文以贝恩资本投资国美电器可转换债券案例为研究对象,对上述理论框架进行了检验。研究发现,可转换债券不仅是一种融资工具,更是一种制度安排,具备公司治理功能,使得机构投资者能够参与发行企业的公司治理实践。而且,机构投资者投资可转换债券使发行企业不仅面临价值变动风险,还面临控制权转移风险。本文拓展了可转换债券研究的理论框架,也为企业设计和发行可转换债券提供了现实启示。     

资本市场对公司治理的作用机理及若干实证检验

本文从资本市场与公司治理的关系入手研究资本市场对公司治理的作用。资本市场的融资机制，使投资者有权选择投资的对象，从而改善和提高公司的治理结构；资本市场的价格机制，可使出资者了解公司经营信息，降低了股东对管理层的监控信息成本，降低了公司治理的成本；资本市场的并购机制，可以强制性纠正公司治理的低效率。本文还用中国上市公司的实际情况验证了资本市场对公司治理的作用机理及其有效性。     

Recognizing and fostering creativity in technological design education

The importance of creativity in technological design education is now clearly recognized, both in everyday understanding and also in formal curriculum guidelines. Design offers special opportunities for creativity because of the “openness” of problems (ill-defined problems, the existence of a variety of pathways to the solution, the absence of pre-specified “correct” solutions). However, teachers are still confronted by the question of how to specify which designs are creative and why, how to identify where the creative strengths of designs lie so that students can build on these, and what advice to give on how to change designs to make them more creative. There are also still open questions concerning design pedagogy. A “functional” model of creativity offers guidelines for making plain to students what they are expected to achieve with their designs and for diagnosing the creativity of the designs they offer. These yield, in turn, guidelines for design pedagogy.     

终极控制人 两权分离度与盈余质量

本文以盈余-回报模型为基础,使用Stata软件研究我国A股上市公司2009年到2010年的数据,得到结论:股权分置改革完成后,国有控股股东的性质对企业盈余质量有正向影响的作用,而两权分离度与盈余质量负相关。本研究依此为进一步改善我国企业的公司治理、提升会计盈余质量和优化资本市场的成长提出些许对策和政策性建议,研究结果有很强的现实指导意义。     

工作—家庭平衡的企业制度安排

工作已经通过网络渗入家庭,员工面临严重的工作—家庭冲突,影响组织绩效和生活质量。工作—家庭平衡作为企业家庭伦理理论的核心问题已成为制度设计的中心问题。对工作—家庭平衡制度安排的理论与实证研究发现,工作—家庭平衡还没有成为政府、企业和员工的共享信念,制度设计失去社会价值观基础;弹性工作制是有效的正式企业制度;家庭照顾福利是无效的正式企业制度;经理须持之以恒支持员工平衡工作—家庭需要、控制因享用工作—家庭平衡福利而带来的负面职业生涯后果。两者是有效的非正式制度安排。据此提出的政策建议是:政府要在全社会倡导、培育以工作—家庭平衡为核心的企业家庭伦理管理哲学、提供家庭照顾福利作为公共制度供给;企业进行系统的组织文化改造;员工培育照顾家庭的应得权利感。     

Markets Linked by Rising Marginal Costs: Implications for Multimarket Contact,Recoupment, and Retaliatory Entry

This paper studies the effects on prices and welfare of multimarket contact when firms serve multiple markets from a single facility with rising marginal costs. Here a link is created between markets, even with independent demands: greater output in one market leads to a higher marginal cost and lower output in other markets; and multimarket contact can indeed lower welfare. Variations of the model can explain two other puzzling phenomena: “recoupment” – lower prices in one market “paid for” by higher prices in other markets; and “retaliatory entry” – the credible threat to enter a rival’s market if it enters yours.     

The effects of ownership concentration and corporate debt on corporate divestitures in Chinese listed firms

This study examines how ownership concentration and corporate debt impact corporate divestitures in China. Corporate divestitures reduce the asset base of a company and the opportunity for expropriation by majority shareholders. In emerging economies, weak legal institutions, combined with equity ownership concentration and high corporate debt, allow majority shareholders to avoid such disciplines. Consequently, the relationship between these governance mechanisms and divestiture activity exhibits a pattern that is different from that in developed economies. Using archival data collected from 1,210 Chinese listed companies during 1999–2003, we found that ownership concentration by the largest shareholder depressed corporate divestitures both in state-controlled and in non-state-controlled firms. The negative effect of corporate debt on divestitures only existed for state-controlled firms. Our finding provides corroborating evidence for principal–principal conflicts in emerging economies. It suggests that corporate strategy in these countries can be better explained by taking into account the unique agency problems that are prevalent in these economies.