Toll-free numbers: Demand,property rights,and public policy

The demand for Toll Free Numbers (TFNs) languished from 2000 to 2008; however recent growth in demand caused the FCC to open a new toll-free code (855) with the possibility of new code openings in the next three years. The analysis here indicates the demand for TFNs is highly inelastic (the coefficient for own price elasticity for TFNs is approximately −0.04). This has implications for concerns regarding future exhaust of toll-free codes and the price structure for recovery of SMS/800's costs. This article considers the effects of the limited property rights for TFN, and welfare implications of gray markets for vanity TFNs. The FCC's allocation mechanism for new 855 codes is considered and whether other allocation mechanisms, such as auctions, could be welfare superior.     

Competition in Turkish mobile telecommunications markets: Price elasticities and network substitution

This paper estimates demand elasticities for Turkish mobile telecommunications markets. In contrast to most other studies, firm-level data is used to estimate dynamic panel data models including instrumental variable techniques. Both short- and long-run elasticities are calculated, yielding a long-run price elasticity of −0.72 for the post-paid market and of −0.33 for the pre-paid market. The short-run price elasticity is estimated to be −0.36 for the post-paid market and −0.20 for the pre-paid market. In addition, there is evidence of fixed-to-mobile traffic substitution for consumers who use pre-paid cards.     

Microsoft's Pricing of Windows and the Economics of Derived Demand Monopoly

The economic experts in the Microsoft case debated whether Microsoft's pricing of Windows was consistent with Microsoft having a monopoly over personal computer (PC) operating systems. In this debate, PCs were treated as a single homogeneous commodity. This paper demonstrates that PC heterogeneity is likely to reduce substantially the monopoly price of Windows. The reason is that low-end PCs, which surely have the more elastic demand, are of disproportionate importance in determining the elasticity of derived demand for Windows.     

Residual demand estimation for market delineation: Complications and limitations

To shed some light on market delineation in an antitrust context, many economists are turning to estimates of residual demand elasticities. Recent papers have drawn attention to the importance of demand curve in market delineation and explained how they can be estimated. This paper shows that there are many complications and limitations of the approach. The relationship between the residual demand elasticity and the scope of the relevant market is complicated and depends on behavioral assumptions. The residual demand elasticity that can be estimated is not the one on which market delineation turns. The estimation of residual demand elasticities can be very difficult because of the complex dynamics of consumer behavior. Finally, residual demand estimators are likely to have a high variance because of instrument problems and this is likely to lead to widely varying estimates depending on specification choices.     

Measuring the Efficiency Cost of Rent Control

This paper estimates the burden of lost producer surplus imposed on landlords by rent control. The approach employed measures the reduction in Marshallian quasi-rent from the side of the derived demand for factors rather than the short-run supply of housing.
A constant elasticity of substitution production function is employed to derive the input demand equation. The equation is estimated using post-war rent control data from five major New York State cities. It turns out that rent control reduced quasi-rent about 15%. The deadweight loss is estimated at 1.5% of gross rental payments or about 5% of net income before debt charges.     

The consumer loss of the minimum duration for mobile telephone calls

This article estimates price elasticities of demand for the duration of mobile telephone calls for Portugal, as well as the monetary loss per consumer of the existence of a minimum duration of calls. The demand for the duration of calls is estimated using a Tobit model for panel data with individual random effects. The elasticity of demand is found to be small and to vary across firms. At current prices, the average duration of calls ranges between 101 and 109 s, while the estimated average length of calls without minimum duration ranges between 63 and 66 s. Hence, the existence of a minimum duration for calls results in a monetary loss of 35–40% of the average invoice.     

Merger Simulation in the Presence of Large Choice Sets and Consumer Stockpiling: The Case of the Bottled Juice Industry

We simulate the price effects of several hypothetical mergers in the shelf-stable bottled juice industry. In doing so, we highlight the effects of consumer stockpiling on demand elasticity estimates and subsequent merger simulations. This task is complicated by a large number of choice alternatives within the bottled juice category. To address this challenge we employ a demand model based on the Distance Metric (DM) approach of Pinkse et al. (Econometrica 70:1111–1153, 2002). We find that merger simulations that do not account for consumer stockpiling behavior underestimate the permanent price changes that are likely to occur due to a merger.      

Product Innovation,Process Innovation,and Size

We test the hypothesis that large firms devote a higher proportion of their research and development (R & D) expenditure on process innovation thansmaller firms. According to the estimates, process- and product R & D expenditure rise less than in proportion to size. The size effect is somewhat stronger for process R & D but the difference to product R & D is in no way dramatic. This difference with regard to size elasticity of process- and product R & D is somewhat more pronounced when accounting for possible interrelationships between expenditure on process- and product R & D but remains statistically non-significant.     

Elasticity of demand and behaviour-based price discrimination

Behaviour-based price discrimination (BBPD) is typically analysed in a framework characterised by perfectly inelastic demand. This paper provides a first assessment of the role of demand elasticity on the profit, consumer and welfare effects of BBPD. We show that the demand expansion effect, that is obviously overlooked by the standard framework with unit demand, plays a relevant role. In comparison to uniform pricing, we show that firms are worse off under BBPD, however, as demand elasticity increases the negative impact of BBPD on profits gets smaller. Despite a possible slight increase in the average prices charged over the two periods in comparison to uniform pricing, we show that BBPD boosts consumer surplus and that this benefit is independent of elasticity. In contrast to the welfare results derived under the unit demand assumption, where BBPD is always bad for welfare, the paper shows that BBPD can be welfare enhancing if demand elasticity is sufficiently high.     

The welfare effects of cooperative R&D in oligopoly with spillovers

This paper provides a more complete characterization of the welfare effects of cooperative cost-reducing R&D investments in Cournot oligopoly with spillovers. I show that R&D cooperation reduces both R&D spending and social surplus when the spillover rate in R&D is neither sufficiently high nor sufficiently low. As the elasticity of the slope of the inverse demand function increases, however, the set of spillover rates over which cooperative R&D reduces social welfare shrinks, and in the limit, cooperative R&D is socially beneficial for all spillover rates.