Conglomerate mergers and subsequent industry effects

The focus of most studies of conglomerate mergers has been on the effects on companies involved. Of more direct relevance to antitrust policy is the question of industry effects of this type of merger. This article looks at eleven cases of “large firm/leading firm” conglomerate mergers completed between 1958 and 1970 and examines census data to see if structure or performance of the acquired “leading firm's” market was altered due to the merger. The results suggest that industry structure is not significantly affected, but that there may be adverse performance effects when the acquired firm is a leader in an unconcentrated market with substantial entry barriers.     

Measuring market shares for the analysis of a consummated merger

This paper asks how market shares should be computed for analysis of a consummated merger. It is argued that pre-merger market shares adjusted for the direct effects of the merger should be used. The actual post merger market shares (which are available only for consummated mergers) should not form the basis of an analysis of the competitive effects of the merger because they may reflect confounding factors, such as entry, exit, or a change in capacity of third-party rivals, unrelated to the merger.     

The Entry-Inducing Effects of Horizontal Mergers: An Exploratory Analysis

Antitrust law presumes that entry normally prevents or reverses anticompetitive effects from horizontal mergers. But when sunk costs associated with entry are at levels suggested by prevailing market structure, the opportunity for entry created by an anticompetitive merger plausibly is too small to induce entry, even absent Stiglerian ‘barriers to entry.’ This is illustrated for Cournot and Bertrand models. Significant entry also makes otherwise profitable Bertrand mergers unprofitable, assuming no efficiency gains. Consequently, the entry issue can be collapsed into the efficiency issue: if a presumably profitable merger does not generate significant efficiencies, it cannot be expected to induce entry.     

ENTRY DETERRENCE BY NON‐HORIZONTAL MERGER*

We study when and how pure non‐horizontal mergers, whether cross‐product or vertical, can deter new entry. Organizational mergers implicitly commit firms to more aggressive price competition. Because heightened competition deters entry, mergers can occur in equilibrium even when, absent entry considerations, they do not. We show that, in order to prevent a flood of entrants, mergers arise even when a marginal merger costs incumbent firms more than does a marginal entrant.     

Battle on the Wrong Field? Entrant Type,Dominant Designs,and Technology Exit

Research summary : Startups often compete with diversifying entrants in the technology race to define dominant designs, which can be platform technology‐based or non‐platform technology‐based. However, little research has examined the relative risk of technological exits for startups vs. diversifying entrants in such “dominance battles.” We develop a contingency framework that links a firm's technology exit to its pre‐entry experience and the characteristics of the dominance battle. With a sample of 134 technologies involved in 31 dominance battles in the information technology industry from 1979 to 2007, we show that technologies of startups were more likely than those of diversifying entrants to exit from platform technology‐based dominance battles; however, this relationship did not exist in non‐platform technology‐based dominance battles, or after the emergence of dominant designs. Managerial summary : How can a startup that tries to create a dominant design strategize to survive the fierce technology race? This study demonstrates that choosing the right battlefield is of paramount importance. Two aspects of a battlefield are shown as relevant: the type of technology and the stage of industrial evolution. Our results show that technologies sponsored by startups tend to have higher exit rates than those sponsored by diversifying entrants in dominance battles characterized by platform technologies, but this penalty is not evident in dominance battles characterized by non‐platform technologies or after the emergence of dominant designs. Furthermore, our study suggests that lack of organizational legitimacy, complementary assets, and integrative capabilities may explain why startups have a higher risk of technology exit than diversifying entrants. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A New Perspective on Entry in Horizontal Merger Analysis

I analyze horizontal mergers in procurement settings in which sellers incur costs to participate. Considering existing sellers’ contest-level entry differs from antitrust authorities’ typical emphasis on new sellers’ market-level entry to counteract a merger’s anticompetitive harm. I show that profitable mergers can increase consumer and total surplus by inducing more and stronger contest-level entry by the merged seller, which echoes common claims from merging parties that their merger is beneficial because it creates a stronger competitor. This finding suggests caution by antitrust authorities: when contest-level entry costs matter, standard models that ignore those costs prescribe blocking procompetitive mergers.

     

Merger policy greatly simplified: Building on keyes

This comment urges a recognition of the fact that the main goal of antitrust, as revealed in a century of consequences, is not economic efficiency or consumer protection but the dispersion of power and decision-making in the business world. Building on Lucile S. Keyes' proposal for improving merger guidelines, it argues that the “true” aims of merger policy can be more efficiently pursued by disallowing all mergers involving very large firms that cannot be justified on efficiency grounds and ignoring mergers involving all other firms.     

Simulating Hospital Merger Simulations*

We perform a Monte Carlo experiment to assess the performance of three hospital merger simulation methods. Our analysis proceeds as follows: (i) specify a theoretical model of hospital markets and use it to generate “true” price effects for many simulated mergers; (ii) for each simulated merger, generate data of the kind commonly available in real-world merger analysis and apply the simulation methods to those data; and (iii) compare the predictions of the simulation methods to the true price effects. All three simulation methods perform reasonably well. We also develop a method for predicting price effects that extends Garmon [2017].     

Exploring the incremental merger value from multimarket and technology arguments

We address the question through which channels mergers create incremental value to merging firms and consider various product market and technological arguments. Based on the pairwise stable allocation concept, we estimate firms’ pair-specific (incremental) merger value functions. Our results show that technological arguments contribute to the majority of added merger value. We also find that market power arguments across multiple markets contribute to explaining incremental post-merger value. In contrast, multimarket strategic effects do not add merger value. Our estimated match values are aligned with the merging firms’ post-merger stock market performance.     

Price asymmetries and the path dependence of market power: Evidence from the U.S. airline industry

This paper uncovers price asymmetries across oligopolistic and monopolistic markets that are seemingly identical in structure but different in competitive history. This is done by identifying “quiet life” markets that have not (yet) experienced a change in structure, and “non-quiet life” markets that have been disrupted by firm entry and/or exit. Using a long panel dataset from the U.S. airline industry, we find that quiet life duopolies price significantly higher than duopolies that come about by entry in monopoly, and that quiet life monopolies price significantly lower than monopolies that come about by exit in duopoly. We show that the path towards a particular market structure matters for the determination of prices and explore several mechanisms that likely explain the price asymmetries, including engagement in anticompetitive behaviour, adjustment behaviour to market structure changes, and the cost heterogeneity of competing firms.     

Does competition increase quality? Evidence from the US airline industry

This paper studies the impact of competition on quality provision in the US airline industry exploiting a novel source of exogenous variation in competition. While mergers among market incumbents may stifle competition, a merger may increase the probability of entry if the merging airlines were not operating prior to merger in the market but each of them had presence at different route endpoints. We find non-merging incumbent airlines increase their flight frequency upon entry threat and accommodate entry of the newly merged airline by lowering flight frequency upon entry. While non-merging incumbents reduced arrival delays only upon entry of the newly merged airline, we find that incumbents decrease their cancelation rates and departure delays both upon merger announcement and entry of the newly merged airline. Our evidence suggests an increase in competition may increase consumer surplus, because non-merging incumbents increase quality and convenience, while keeping their prices unchanged.     

Efficiency gains and myopic antitrust authority in a dynamic merger game

This paper models a sequential merger formation game with endogenous efficiency gains in which every merger has to be submitted for approval to the Antitrust Authority (AA). Two different types of AA are studied: first, a myopic AA, which judges a given merger without considering that subsequent mergers may occur; and, second, a forward looking AA, which anticipates the ultimate market structure a given merger will lead to. By contrasting the decisions of these two types of AA, merger policy implications can be drawn. In particular, the efficiency offence argument does not find any justification under a forward looking AA.     

Firm-specific time preferences and postmerger firm performance

This study investigates the role of firm-level discount factors in evaluating the impact of mergers on market outcomes. Discount factors reflect time preferences for future cash flows and are used to determine the present value of investment projects such as mergers. Firm-specific discount factors imply that firms may attach different present values to mergers. We elicit firm-specific time preferences and identify firms’ discount factors using firm-specific production data while building on the existence of learning-by-doing in the semiconductor industry. Our estimation results show that firm-specific discount factors explain firms’ production decisions. We also find that firms’ discount factors and merger acquisition strategies explain heterogeneous merger outcomes. Our results show that acquiring firms characterized by low discount factors (impatient firms) are highly efficient and merge with highly efficient and innovative firms. Impatient acquirers achieve relatively higher efficiency gains in the short run than patient acquirers and adopt acquisition strategies that put more weight on achieving instant efficiency gains. In contrast, patient acquirers are least efficient and merge with firms that are larger than themselves. Patient acquirers place more value on achieving efficiency gains in the more distant future.     

Optimal Exit Policy with Uncertain Demand*

In a framework where entrants must make sunk investment decisions with uncertain returns and have private demand information, we show that the relationship between innovation and exit value is non-monotone and features an inverted U-shaped pattern. Consumer surplus is maximised at the lowest exit value that incentivises the investment. These insights are applied to optimal merger policy. An entrant is more willing to innovate to be acquired afterwards, even if it has no bargaining power. This innovation-for-buyout effect implies that an entrant is less likely to leave the market under a lenient than a strict merger policy.     

An econometric analysis of the European Commission's merger decisions

Using a sample of 96 mergers notified to the European Commission and logit regression techniques, we analyse the Commission's decision process. We find that the probability of a phase-2 investigation and of a prohibition of the merger increases with the parties' market shares. The probabilities increase also when the Commission finds high entry barriers or that the post-merger market structure is conducive to collusion. We do not find significant effects of “political” variables, such as the nationality of the merging firms.     

Fifty is the New Forty: EU Merger Policy Permits Higher Market Shares After the 2004 Reform

I analyze empirically all of the European Commission’s decisions regarding “unilateral effects” aspects of horizontal mergers before and after the 2004 reform, which introduced the “significant impediment to effective competition” test in merger policy. I find that, after the reform, the Commission did not change its stance toward mergers to monopoly or quasi-monopoly (almost always challenged) and mergers in un-concentrated markets (almost never). The new test produced more frequent challenges when the combined entity is not the largest firm, but these cases remain rare. The Commission’s stance toward mergers that fall between these polar opposites appears to have been tougher pre-reform ceteris paribus.     

Merger efficiency gains: Evidence from a large transport merger in france

Many industries are seeing an increase in concentration, leading to a discussion on the effectiveness of horizontal merger enforcement. The policy debate shows that one of the key arguments put forward when supporting potential mergers is the possibility of realization of merger efficiency gains, specifically in the transport industry. Yet, there exists little empirical evidence on the actual effects of realized mergers on cost efficiencies. We exploit a large and highly debated merger that took place in the French transport industry to evaluate whether a merger between two major transport groups may give rise to merger efficiency gains. We exploit the industry setting to employ a difference-in-differences methodology evaluating the effect of the merger on operating costs of merging transport groups. Our results show that, no matter the specification considered, we cannot conclude that the merger resulted in any merger specific efficiency gains for the merging parties. Our study relies on the use of several control groups and is robust to a great number of robustness checks as well as to the introduction of heterogeneous treatment effects, depending on the identity of the merging party, as well as the closeness of competition of local operators. Overall, our study contributes to a growing number of case studies undertaken by economists that can help determine whether horizontal merger policy is being properly enforced.     

Upward pricing pressure in two-sided markets: Incorporating rebalancing effects

In two-sided markets it is important to consider rebalancing effects following a merger, i.e. the impact of a change in margin on one side of the market, either due to a price change or to efficiency gains, on the pricing incentives on the other side. We propose modified versions for the indices of pricing pressure (UPP and GUPPI) that take this into account. We show that in two-sided markets where the cross-group externalities are positive the upward pricing pressure will typically be overstated if the rebalancing effect is ignored. Our approach explains why competition agencies should look at both sides of the market when assessing platform mergers.     

Mergers with future rivals can boost prices,bar entry,and intensify market concentration

It is theoretically shown that mergers between incumbents and future rivals can boost prices and harm consumers. But in the absence of empirical evidence, no merger has been litigated on this basis. To offer empirical insights, I study the acquisition case of a promising future rival by a large incumbent pharmaceutical firm. First, there is strong and causal evidence that the merger has enabled higher prices for the incumbent. Mergers with future rivals are practically unregulated and, if wisely exploited, they can circumvent antitrust enforcement and serve as entry barriers. Second, in contrast to the mainstream prediction that mergers with future rivals do not alter market concentration, I report a large post-merger increase in the market concentration. I introduce advertisement expenditure as a possible channel of effect between the merger and market concentration. Third, I document spillover effect of the merger on the incumbent's immediate rivals without affecting its distant rivals.     

Comment on Dewey's “Merger Policy Greatly Simplified/Building on Keyes”

Professor Dewey's mock proposal for a new merger policy differs from Keyes' serious proposal in at least two important respects. First, the Dewey plan would accord different treatment to mergers which result in the growth of “large” industrial companies as compared with mergers which do not. No such size discrimination is recommended by Keyes. Second, the Dewey plan would allow even the former class of mergers to go forward after passing a purely procedural “test”. No genuine “efficiencies defense” would be required.