Antidumping as Strategic Trade Policy under Asymmetric Information

Trade liberalization under GATT/World Trade Organization (WTO) has been partly offset by an increase in antidumping protection, possibly due to the inclusion of sales below cost in the definition of dumping. This article investigates the domestic government's antidumping duty choice in an asymmetric information framework, in which the foreign firm's cost is observed by the domestic firm, but not by the government. We show that by designing a tariff schedule contingent on firms' cost reports and accompanied by a threat to collect additional information for report verification, the domestic government may not only be able to extract the true cost information, but also succeed in implementing the full‐information, governmental welfare‐maximizing duty. The antidumping framework within GATT/WTO may thus not only offer the means to pursue strategic trade policy disguised as fair trade policy, but it also helps overcome informational problems with regard to correctly determining the optimal strategic trade policy.     

Friendly Fire? The Impact of US Antidumping Enforcement on US Exporters

While there has been considerable interest in recent years in the role of macroeconomic determinants of antidumping actions by the United States and other traditional users, on the one hand, and the determinants of the growing global usage of this trade policy instrument, on the other, there has to date been no systematic exploration of the motivations for the significant number of foreign antidumping cases filed against US exporters. Several observers have remarked that the growing number of foreign users of antidumping might threaten US exporters, but the determinants of these actions have not been examined. That is the purpose of this study. We find that these actions are in part explained by macroeconomic forces and as a response to US export superiority in particular sectors, however a significant role (and larger than found for global antidumping more generally) is played by retaliation for US trade policy actions. JEL no.  F13     

Anti‐dumping Shock and the Productivity Response of Chinese Industries

This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the productivity effects of antidumping (AD) measures on Chinese industries. Industry‐year panel data and generalized method of moments estimators are used in the empirical analysis. Productivity indicators are calculated using data envelope analysis. The empirical results show that China's industrial total factor productivity has improved under the pressure of AD measures taken by developed countries, and the mechanism inspires technological progress but hurts technological efficiency. Developing countries' AD measures have no significant productivity effects on China's targeted industries, except for slightly positive effects on technological efficiency. These results indicate that China should pay more attention to technological innovation and take different counter‐measures for different cases of AD measures.     

Antidumping and foreign divestment: Japanese electronics multinationals in the EU

This paper explores the relationship between the closure of “antidumping jumping” manufacturing plants and the repeal of antidumping measures. Of 67 identified Japanese “antidumping jumping” production lines in the EU in 1990 only 31 remained in operation in 1999. Analysis of the probability of divestment for 209 Japanese plants in the broadly defined electronics industry shows that Japanese plants of manufacturing products for which antidumping duties had been repealed are significantly and substantially more likely to be divested. The results suggest that the potential positive effects of antidumping duties on host economies by inducing inward investment are in many cases short-lived and easily overestimated. JEL no. F23, F13, L11     

The Spread of Antidumping Regimes and the Role of Retaliation in Filings

Over the past decade, the worldwide use of antidumping has become very widespread—41 WTO-member countries initiated antidumping cases over the 1995-2003 period. From another perspective, U.S. exporters were subjected to 139 antidumping cases during this period, by enforcement agencies representing 20 countries. In this context, it is natural to consider whether antidumping filings may be motivated as retaliation against similar measures imposed on a country's exporters. This is the focus of our study, though we also control for the bilateral export flows involved and nonretaliatory impacts of past cases, with other motivations—macroeconomic, industry-specific, and political considerations—dealt with through fixed effects. Applying probit analysis to a WTO database on reported filings, we find strong evidence that retaliation was a significant motive in explaining the rise of antidumping filings over the past decade, though interesting differences emerge in the reactions to traditional and new users of antidumping.     

1997—2008年中国对外反倾销成因及特征定量研究

文章在多方面总结了我国反倾销成因基础上,从反倾销总体特征、行业分布、结案方式、税率水平及结构等方面多角度分析了我国反倾销的总体特征。认为我国反倾销绝对数量增长较快但相对强度并不高;我国反倾销的对象以发达国家为主,在各种因素作用下反倾销已成为我国化工产业的长期战略工具;反倾销结案以征税为主,价格承诺比重低,实践上易导致低效保护及投资跨越;高税率及离散的关税结构易加剧对生产和贸易的扭曲。     

Trade Destruction and Trade Diversion: Evidence from China

Over the past three decades, we have seen a dramatic increase in the incidence of temporary trade barriers such as antidumping duties and countervailing duties. China has been at the receiving end of a large number of such measures. In this paper, we study how China's exports to its major trade partners have been affected when its major trade partners have used these measures either against China or against other countries. We find that Chinese exports to the country that imposed an antidumping duty decreased by approximately 35 percent. At the same time, an antidumping duty used by the importing country that was directed towards other countries but not against China led to an approximate 30‐percent increase in China's exports to the policy‐imposing country. These results remain robust across various specifications. Our findings have important policy implications. In particular, the magnitude of these effects highlights why it is important to curb the recent widespread use of these barriers.     

Why don’t foreign firms cooperate in US antidumping investigations? An empirical analysis

Foreign firms face punitive duties if they do not cooperate with the US Department of Commerce (DOC) in antidumping procedures. For example, 37% of all foreign firms involved in antidumping investigations in the US faced “facts available” margins for the 1995–2002 period, with average antidumping duties of 31% for cooperating foreign firms, compared to 87% for those who did not cooperate. The existing literature has focused on how DOC discretion has led to foreign firm non-cooperation. This paper instead examines individual foreign firm’s decisions about whether to cooperate during this same period. We find evidence that non-cooperation is consistent with a model of foreign firms rationally choosing not to cooperate, rather than solely as a result of investigating authority bias against imports.     

U.S. Antidumping Enforcement and Macroeconomic Indicators Revisited: Do Petitioners Learn?

We contribute to the literature on the political economy of U.S. antidumping enforcement through an analysis of the pattern—and macroeconomic determinants—of country-specific antidumping petitions filed by U.S. firms against 15 countries between 1981 and 1998 (examining quarterly data). We reconcile some seemingly inconsistent results from the prior literature by suggesting that “learning” by petitioners about the administration—in practice—of the U.S. trade laws has led to changes in the roles of the macroeconomic determinants over time. JEL no. F13     

Are Antidumping Duties for Sale? Case‐Level Evidence on the Grossman‐Helpman Protection for Sale Model

Do contributions to politicians affect trade policy? To examine this question, we have compiled a new, unique database containing information on political donations by the specific firms and labor organizations that have petitioned for antidumping protection from imports, as well as data on the outcomes of their requests. Using an empirical framework based on the 1994 “protection for sale” model, we examine the relationship between antidumping decisions and political activism. Our results indicate that money does matter. We find that politically active petitioners are more likely to receive protection and that antidumping duty rates tend to be higher for that group. In addition, the relationship between the import penetration ratio and duties imposed depends on whether or not petitioners are politically active—antidumping duties are positively correlated with the import penetration ratio for politically inactive petitioners but negatively correlated for politically active petitioners, consistent with the Grossman‐Helpman model's predictions.     

Does antidumping stimulate FDI? Evidence from Japanese firms in the UK

Does Antidumping Stimulate FDI? Evidence from Japanese Firms in the UK. — This paper explores which factors influence the number of Japanese firms in the UK and the level of employment and fixed assets in those firms, at a highly disaggregated sector level. We are interested in whether trade policy has had a role to play in the entry and expansion of Japanese firms. The results give some support to the hypothesis that antidumping action has acted as an incentive for Japanese direct investment in the UK. However, it has a relatively modest effect —antidumping cases can explain a maximum of 8 per cent of the expansion in employment by existing Japanese firms in the UK, while they appear to have no influence on the arrival of new firms.     

Antidumping and tariff Jumping: Japanese firms’ DFI in the European union and the United States

Antidumping and Tariff Jumping: Japanese Firms’ DFI in the European Union and the United States. — The relationship between EU and US antidumping measures and direct foreign investment (DFI) is examined through a micro-econometrical analysis of Japanese firms’ plant establishments in the electronics industry. After controlling for firm and industry capabilities, market size, transport cost, and product cycle effects, antidumping actions are found to have a substantial positive effect on Japanese DFL EU antidumping is roughly twice as likely to lead to tariffjumping DFI as US antidumping, which is ascribed to marked differences in antidumping procedures. Tariff jumping makes antidumping ineffective in combatting anticompetitive behaviour by foreign firms and may result in increased market concentration.     

Is European antidumping protection against Central Europe too high?

Is European Antidumping Protection against Central Europe Too High? —In this paper, the author finds that the average level of European antidumping protection against Central Europe in 1985-1990 was by 14 to 20 percentage points too high. Her simulation results on the Central European antidumping cases show only ‘de minimis’ injury margins. Hence, the European Commission would have dismissed all European antidumping complaints against Central European imports and no antidumping measures would have been imposed. In view of these results, the author feels that European antidumping legislation and its implementation seriously undermine the credibility of the Association Agreements recently signed between the European Union and the countries of Central Europe.     

The trade depressing and trade diversion effects of antidumping actions: The case of China

China is by far the main target of antidumping (AD) litigation for most of its major trading partners. Recently, however, China itself has started using AD instrument intensively and was, in fact, the third leading country in initiating AD investigations between 2002 and 2004. This paper empirically investigates the impact of China's AD activities on trade by employing the system GMM estimator. The empirical results show that AD protection has significant trade depressing and trade diversion effects. These findings are consistent with Prusa [Prusa, T.A., 2001. On the Spread and Impact of Antidumping, Canadian Journal of Economics 34, 591–611.] and Brenton [Brenton, P., 2001. Anti-dumping policies in the EU and trade diversion, European Journal of Political Economy 17, 593–607] that investigate the trade effects of AD actions in the US and EU, respectively.     

Macro Economic Determinants of Antidumping: A Comparative Analysis of Developed and Developing Countries

This study examines how macro factors influence the use of antidumping in developed and developing countries. A panel data analysis of 99 countries over 1980–2000 reinforces the view that the primary jurisdiction for the antidumping law is really more political than economic. Furthermore, it suggests that once the WTO is fully enforced, the use of antidumping will spread among developing countries not only due to greater liberalization pressures but also as many countries would like to create an antidumping ability so as to counter its use against them. This may reverse the trade gains that liberalization may ensure to them. This paper thus calls for the granting of the special and differential treatment to developing countries in this provision. Finally, based on its findings, the paper argues that future negotiations should be directed toward revising safeguard rules and replacing antidumping by this new clause.     

Trade Effects of US Antidumping Actions against China*

Using data on US imports, classified at the 10‐digit Harmonized System commodity level, we study the effects of all antidumping investigations initiated by the USA against China between 1998 and 2006. We find that antidumping actions cause a reduction in the volume and value of imports from China as well as an increase in the price of those goods in the US market. Critically, however, we find that these effects are short‐lived and dissipate approximately 2 years after the antidumping decision. Furthermore, antidumping actions against China prompt a substitution effect as they increase US imports from other countries. In general, our results cast doubt on the effectiveness of antidumping actions against China as mechanisms for protecting US producers.     

The ec antidumping regulations: A first economic appraisal, 1980–85

Zusammenfassung Die Antidumpingregeln der EG: Eine erste Bewertung für die Jahre {dy1980} bis 1985. - Der Aufsatz enth?lt systematische Belege dafür, da\ die gegenw?rtigen GATT-konformen Antidumpinggesetze wie z. B. die entsprechenden EG-Bestimmungen einen stark protektionistischen Inhalt haben. Die Antidumpingma\nahmen, die einem durchschnittlichen Wertzoll von ungef?hr 23 vH entsprechen, vermindern die Importmengen um 40 vH. Die dadurch hervorgerufenen Renten erscheinen Firmen in Industriel?ndern als hoch, Firmen in Entwicklungs- und Schwellenl?ndern aber als niedrig. Einige Absprachen zwischen EG-Unternehmen scheinen „effizient” zu sein, wenn es darum geht, Protektion zu erlangen oder Marktstrukturen zu gestalten. Als Ergebnis ist festzuhalten, da\ L?nder, die eine Protektionspolitik verfolgen, anstelle von „freiwilligen Exportbeschr?nkungen” Antidumpingma\nahmen vorziehen sollten.

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Resumen El reglamento antidumping de las CC.EE.: una primera evaluación económica del período 1980–85. - Este trabajo provee evidencia sistemática que demuestra que los reglamentos antidumping actuates consistentes con el GATT, como el de las CC.EE., tienen un fuerte contenido proteccionista. Las medidas antidumping que representan un arancel ad valorem medio equivalente a aproximadamente un 23 por ciento redujeron las cantidades importadas en un 40 por ciento. Las rentas creadas parecen ser substanciales para empresas de los países industrializados, mas modestas para empresas de países en desarrollo o de los NICs. Algunas coaliciones de empresas de las CC.EE. parecen ser “eficientes” en cuanto a la obtención de protection y de influencia sobre las estructuras de los mercados. Como consecuencia, los países en búsqueda de protección prodrían preferir medidas antidumping en vez de “contingentes voluntarios de exportation”.

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Résumé Les règlements antidumping de la CE: Une première évaluation économique, 1980-85. - Cette étude fournit l’évidence systématique que les antidumping lois actuelles qui sont conformes aux règles de GATT telles que les règlements de la CE ont un contenu très protectioniste. Les mesures antidumping qui représentent un ad valorem équivalent de 23 pour cent en moyenne réduisent les importations (en volume) par 40 pour cent. Les profits créés sont hauts pour les entreprises aux pays industrialisés, mais modérés pour les entreprises aux PVD et aux NPI. Quelques coalitions des entreprises de la CE semblent être efficientes si elles veulent obtenir une protection et former la structure d’un marché. Le résultat est que les pays en faveur du protectionisme devraient préférer des actions antidumping aux restrictions volontaires à l’exportation.

     

Antidumping jumping: Reciprocal antidumping and industrial location

Antidumping Jumping: Reciprocal Antidumping and Industrial Location. — Antidumping policies are often justified as legitimate actions by governments in their efforts to protect domestic producers from unfair foreign competition. The authors investigate the impact of antidumping rules on firms’ production decisions as to how much and where to produce. Antidumping measures may have unforeseen effects if they induce direct foreign investment and consequently increase domestic competition. The authors therefore focus on location choice and consider the strategies of national governments attempting to advance the interests of their citizens through antidumping legislation. The analysis also has implications for the effects of market integration policies, such as Europe 1992.     

An analysis of ITC decisions in antidumping,countervailing duty and safeguard cases

An Analysis of ITC Decisions in Antidumping, Countervailing Duty and Safeguard Cases. — This paper investigates the economic factors that best explain the decisions of the International Trade Commission in administering the injury provisions of U.S. antidumping, countervailing duty, and safeguard laws during the 1980s. Utilizing the economic data collected by the Commission for each investigation, it attempts to ascertain through regression analysis how strictly the commissioners have been interpreting these laws in recent years in terms of the economic conditions required for finding that an industry has been injured and for establishing a casual relationship between imports and this injury.     

Resource allocation: A hayekian paradigm for maritime conglomerates

Conclusion This article provides a new synthesis between the strategic management literature and Austrian capital theory. The resource allocation process plays out in the context of differing subunit preferences, potentially resulting in tension and periodic conflict that may lead to dysfunctional relationships over time. Absent clearly understood and effective operational rules, the potential for heightened dysfunctional internal relationships will lead a conglomerate organization to have a diminished resource base for achieving its future strategic goals. This article presents a set of resource-allocation rules based on the Hayekian theory of production. By developing an effective resource-allocation paradigm based on economic theory, the organization can gain market share resulting in increased profitability and continued success in the marketplace. The Hayekian triangle offers firms an objective measure reflecting environmental shifts by tracking interest-rate changes that affect consumer and production demand. Organizations can gain “first-mover advantages” essential to provide the competitive advantage vis-à-vis their rivals while maintaining harmonious relationships among subunits. Entrepreneurial innovation can also be exercised by “second movers” who imitate the “first movers,” perhaps taking advantage of lessons learned. This kind of innovative imitation may well provide the greatest scope for entrepreneurial activity. The authors remain responsible for any errors or omissions.