论代理票据签章行为及其法律效力

票据上记载的多个票据债务人承担票据责任的基本外在表现就是签章;各种票据行为中最重要的形式要件也是签章,任何一种票据行为都要由行为人在票据上签章。签章成为票据交易和票据法规制中最基本和最核心的问题。在实践中,经常会发生票据签章行为由他人代理作出的情形。虽然我国《票据法》对该问题有简单规定,但代理票据签章行为必须将民法的基本理论和票据制度结合起来去梳理。     

论代理权授予行为的独立性与无因性

代理授权行为的性质,一直是存有争议较多的一个问题.本文试从理论结合我国的立法上分析之.     

论代理权授予行为的独立性与无因性

代理授权行为的性质,一直是存有争议较多的一个问题。本文试从理论结合我国的立法上分析之。     

物权行为独立性与无因性理论之肯定

物权行为理论的无因性与独立性是物权行为理论中至关重要的一部分,自其产生以来,学术界就从未停止过对其的研究和争议。但对物权行为无因性和独立性理论的争议不能成为否定物权行为理论的依据。笔者认为物权行为的无因性和独立性不仅存在,而且具有极其重要的理论和实践价值。     

论审计的独立性

审计部门的独立性,无外乎两个方面:一是精神独立,审计人员要有对国家利益高度负责的责任心和对违法违纪行为嫉恶如仇的良知,以及对自己所从事的审计事业的忠诚与敬重;二是从组织地位上保证审计机构的独立性,机构设置要保证审计机关在领导和被领导的关系中,不存在和被审计单位有经济和行政上的联系.     

论票据无因性票据法律制度的完善

票据法21条之规定,与第10条之规定类似,并无存在之必要,同时退一步讲,如果涉及当事人以诈骗手段骗取钱财,则是由其他相关法律规范进行调整.当基础关系无效时,票据债务人不得以不当得利请求免除债务并涂销签名或返还票据,或以他方不当得利为由拒绝履行票据义务.     

论票据的无因性

现代票据的产生主要是为了满足商业交易活动中的便捷需求．票据无因性理论的确立是对这一现实需求的最好体现和维护。但我国《票据法》第十条第一款中关于票据行为“有因性”的规定．不仅违背票据无因性的应有之义,也与当前世界各国通行的做法格格不入。由此,我们认为应当对《票据法》相关内容予以修改。     

论票据无因性

票据关系与基础关系之相互关系,由票据无因性原则可见,一般来说,两者关系应为相互分离,但是法律出于特殊之考量,于特殊情形下亦规定其有联系之存在.     

论提高我国中央银行的独立性

加强中央银行独立性是世界性的潮流,也是各国银行立法的大趋势。改革开放以来,我国中央银行的独立性是不断增强的,但也存在许多问题,银监会的成立将改变这一状况。当前应以此为契机,采取措施提高我国中央银行独立性。     

论独立董事的独立性

独立性是独立董事的生命力,独立董事的独立性包括形式上的独立和实质上的独立。聘任、报酬等因素都会影响其独立性。国外对独立董事的任职资格都制定了严格的标准以保证其独立性。我国独立董事的独立性不高,难以对内部人进行有效的监督制约。应当借鉴国外经验,提高独立董事的独立性,以保证独立董事作用的发挥。     

The Path Dependence and Target of the Innovation of Chinese Bill Market

The current social and economic background of China and the development of Chinese financial market decide that, the system innovation of bill market must choose reasonable path, perfect the system arrangement of bill market, innovate the financing instruments of bills, control the market risk, raise the efficiency of market operation, bring the market function of bills into full play, make the bill market really become the effective instrument for the financial institutions and enterprises to finance, and become the carrier for the monetary policy to conduct and promote the standardized and healthy development.     

Independence in Appearance and in Fact: An Experimental Investigation*

In this study, we use experimental markets to assess the effect of the Security and Exchange Commission's (SEC's) new independence rule on investors' perceptions of independence, investors' payoff distributions, and market prices. The new rule requires client firms to disclose in their annual proxy statements the amount of nonaudit fees paid to their auditors. The new disclosure is intended to inform investors of auditors' incentives to compromise their independence. Our experimental design is a 2 3 between‐subjects design, where we control the presence (unbiased reports) or absence of auditor independence in fact (biased reports). While independence in fact was not immediately observable to investors, we controlled for independence in appearance by varying the public disclosure of the extent of nonaudit services provided by the auditor to the client. In one market setting, investors were not given any information about whether the auditor provided such nonaudit services; in a second setting, investors were explicitly informed that the auditor did not provide any non‐audit services; and in a third setting, investors were told that the auditor provided nonaudit services that could be perceived to have an adverse effect on independence in fact. We found that disclosures of nonaudit services reduced the accuracy of investors' beliefs of auditors' independence in fact when independence in appearance was inconsistent with independence in fact. This then caused prices of assets to deviate more from their economic predictions (lower market efficiency) in the inconsistent settings relative to the no‐disclosure and consistent settings. Thus, disclosures of fees for nonaudit services could reduce the efficiency of capital markets if such disclosures result in investors forming inaccurate beliefs of auditor independence in fact ‐ that is, auditors appear independent but they are not independent in fact, or vice versa. The latter is the maintained position of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), which argued against the new rule. Further research is needed to assess the degree of correspondence between independence in fact and independence in appearance.     

转轨经济中中央银行的独立性

中央银行独立性包括法定独立性和真实独立性两个方面的内容,还存在若干其他的分类。中央银行独立性和通货膨胀之间关系的研究一直是中央银行独立性研究的核心内容之一。实证研究表明,转轨经济中中央银行独立性与通货膨胀之间并不存在显著的相关性。但增强中央银行独立性对于转轨中国家而言,仍具有十分重要的意义。     

Central Bank Independence,Speed of Disinflation and the Sacrifice Ratio

Using a theoretical model in which the degree of central bank independence affects the degree of inflation persistence and therefore the speed of disinflation, this paper suggests that sacrifice ratios are lower when central bank independence is higher. Empirical tests, using estimates of sacrifice ratios based on disinflation episodes for 18 OECD countries during the 1960–90 period, show that this result also holds empirically. This finding seems to be consistent with the credibility hypothesis by pointing out that an independent central bank may produce a credibility bonus.     

An Empirical Observation on Central Bank Independence and Real Output

This note reviews the relation between central bank independence and real output for the 1970s and 1980s. A new statistic, based on the total amount of real output available in a decade, is proposed in order to broaden the analysis of the impact of central bank independence on real output. The results show that, although there is no correlation between central bank independence and average growth, central bank independence had a significantly negative impact on the sum of real output during the 1980s. For the 1970s, central bank independence had no influence on the total quantity of real output.     

The Sacrifice Ratio and Central Bank Independence Revisited

Several recent studies make use of cross-country data to examine the relationship between a country's sacrifice ratio and the extent to which its central bank is insulated from political influence. These studies report a positive correlation between these two variables. However, these studies employ econometric methodologies that do not account for the measurement error which contaminates their proxies for central bank independence. This paper makes use of an alternative econometric methodology, one that does account for this measurement error, and finds a strong negative relationship between the sacrifice ratio and Central Bank independence.     

Central Bank Independence and Budget Constraints for a Stable Euro

This paper looks at what economic theory and empirical evidence have to offer about the institutional conditions that are most likely to lead to a stable currency. Both theory and evidence suggest that an independent central bank with the explicit mandate to pursue price stability provides an effective solution to the time-inconsistency problem. The EMU institutional set-up is well-equipped to support a stability-oriented monetary policy. The ECB appears to be the most independent central bank in the world. An added protection of monetary policy from the influence of unsound budgetary policies enhances the prospects of price stability. The Maastricht Treaty and the Pact for Stability and Growth provide effective constraints against excessive deficits and encourage an environment of balanced budgets. The argument that both strong institutional arrangements and sound economic policy-making stem from a conservative attitude of the public is not dismissed altogether in this paper. We note, however, that this hypothesis is not formulated in a testable form and has ambiguous practical consequences. The hypothesis, nonetheless, serves as a useful reminder that the ECB should endeavor to draw its legitimacy not only from the text of the Treaty, but also from society as a whole.     

加强中央银行独立性的重要意义--以日本为实例的分析

以日本为实例的分析表明,如果一国的中央银行缺乏应有的独立性,一般说来并不会像“时间非一致性”理论所分析的那样,会促使政府反反复复地背弃维护物价稳定的承诺,去有意制造通货膨胀,也不会像政治商业周期理论所分析的那样,会引发政府为谋求连任而周期性地运用货币政策愚弄选民。部分西方学者以通货膨胀率的讷氏来分析是否应该加强中央银行独立性的观点是极其片面的。为了使货币政策选择免受个别政治家或某届政府不合理的干预,避免国际压力对货币政策运营产生错误影响,使货币政策真正起到稳定经济运行的作用,必须赋予中央银行以充分的独立性。     

Independence and Architecture of Financial Supervision: With Focus on the Effects on Banking Stability

Abstract

Empirical work on the performances of supervisory governance and architecture is scarce relative to the intensifying debates on related institutional arrangements. Using an expansive panel data-set, this paper is a first attempt to explore the effects of governance, architecture and their interactions on banking stability. Empirical analyses reveal that independence matters, as a major governance factor, and the two critical architecture factors, the integration of authorities and the central bank' involvement undermine banking stability. Also, in spite of the interaction between independence and architecture, its effect appears to be limited.