当前股份制改造需要解决的几个问题

目前，股份制改造的总体态势是好的，但在推进过程中也存在一些问题。这里面既有认识上的问题，又有操作上和政策上的问题。笔认为，这些问题必须引起有关方面的重视，并认真予以解决，否则将影响我市股份制改造的进程。     

辨析农村城市化过程中的清产核资和审计

中国的问题归根结底是农民的问题，理性地推进农村城市化是中国社会发展的必然趋势。在我国社会经济发展的今天，农村城市化显然必须通过工业化来实现，农村集体企业为了增强市场竞争力和保障集体所有者的利益，必然要进行股份制改造。而清产核资工作则是股份制改造过程的前奏曲，是深化体制改革加强经济管理的一项重要的基础性工作，对于实现改革与发展的目标具有重要的作用。但是清产核资工作由于其特定目的使得其与审计的异同点成为会计师事务所在农村城市化过程中清产核资实务中必须关注的问题。本文拟从理论和实务两个层面上对其进行分析比较。     

企业员工培训:入世后的改革与创新

工商银行有必要实行股份制改造。从国家政策、资金市场、投资者购买股票、工商银行自身发展等方面来说 ,工商银行实行股份制改造是完全可能的。工商银行实行股份改造可分两步走 ,一是在产权制度上建立国家控股的股份制 ;在组织制度上 ,建立逐级控股基础上的公司制 ;在管理制度     

科技中介机构股份制改造的模式研究

科技中介服务机构的股份制改造以其特有的制度效益必将推动科技成果的转化,不失为一种制度创新。武汉市科技中介机构的股份制改造在探索投资主体多元化,建立股权激励机制,管理、技术入股、孵化企业方面进行了大胆实践。阐明了科技中介股份制改造的内涵和分类,结合武汉科技中介机构的实际分析科技中介的股份制改造,指出科技中介股份制改造中应注意的问题。     

关于企业股份制改造中一些问题的思考

关于企业股份制改造中一些问题的思考杨占辉目前，企业股份制改造作为建立现代企业制度的重要形式和途径，得到了迅速发展，其作用在不断发挥出来，但在改造过程中也出现了一些问题，必须认真分析研究，切实加以解决。一在充分肯定企业股份制改造成功方面的同时，也应看到...     

股份制改造中的误区

对国有企业进行股份制改造,已引起全国上下的注意。据不完全统计,全国目前有近4000多家。有的省份如海南省提出“三年内争取在企业结构中以股份制企业,为主体”,并于1993年4月份成立了省股份制企业协会。一般说,情况是好的。但是,也存在不少问题。尤其在股份制上存在一些误区,对股份制     

国企股份制改造中产权界定的理论思考

目前国有企业的股份制改造在产权界定上遇到许多问题 ,尤其是国有科技企业产权界定的问题更加突出。主要表现在国有科技企业中由技术管理作为一种生产要素的产权归属界限非常不清。这些问题已逐渐在国有科技企业股份制改造的实践中显现出来。本文根据科技企业的特点 ,通过一些案例 ,从理论上分析如何进行产权界定才能更好地理顺国有科技企业的产权关系。     

论金融企业股份制改造的途径

随着社会主义市场经济体制目标的确立，金融企业的股份制改造问题成为我国金融体制改革的一个重要组成部分。那么，如何对金融企业进行股份制改造呢？下面我们就股份制改造的内容、模式和相应的几个配套条件来论述一下这个问题。第一、金融企业股份制改造的内容我国金融企业的股份制改造，就是在金融企业资产评估、产权界定的基础上，明晰国有资产所有权的人格化代表，打破国有资产在金融系统的垄断地位和封闭状态，促进银行法人资产来源的多元化及其所有权与经营权的分离，从而构建以国有资产股权为主体、多元股权兼融共生的新型社会主义公…     

浅谈厦门特区企业股份制改造的形式选择

<正>自1992年6月厦门市推出第一批企业股份制改革试点以来,股份制这种有效的企业组织形式即在全市引起人们的关注。加快企业股份制改造步伐成为厦门特区深化企业改革的方向。一般认为,把企业改造成股份制企业,就是要把企业改造成为股份有限公司,也就是发行股票,上市交易。其实,这种理解是非常片面的。股份制企业包括两种具体的形式,一种是股份有限公司,有的企业的股票可以上市,但大部分企业股票是不上市的;另一种是有限责任公司,这种形式的企业并不发行股票。目前,在谈论企业股份制改造问题时,有限责任公司这种形式基本被忽视。事实上,有限责任公司才是厦门企业股份制改造应选择的主要形式。现在先比较一下股份有限公司及有限责任公司的异同。     

国有商业银行股改须慎防道德风险

随着中国建设银行和中国银行股份制改造的全面启动，以及中国工商银行股改方案的获准通过，我国金融体制改革开始深入国有商业银行的产权层面，这对于完善国有商业银行公司治理结构，加速推进我国金融市场化进程具有极为重要的意义。但是，国有银行股份制改造是一项复杂的制度创新工程，必须高度重视股改过渡期内新旧制度衔接交替中的道德风险。     

Do Political Connections Promote Innovation in Environmentally Polluting Enterprises?

We use an unbalanced panel data analysis to examine the effect of political connections (PCs) in state‐owned enterprises (SOE) and non‐SOEs on the innovation of Chinese environmentally polluting enterprises listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2007 to 2016. Our sample consists of 792 firms and 4587 firm‐year observations. There are several interesting findings. First, SOEs that are politically linked to the central government promote more innovation in general and more environmental innovation than SOEs without these links. Second, privately‐owned enterprises (non‐SOEs) with PCs promote less environmental innovation than non‐SOEs without PCs. Third, environmental regulation does not affect the environmental innovation of SOEs but it drives non‐SOEs with PCs to become more environmentally innovative. Our results enable us to better understand how PCs and regulations affect environmental innovation.     

我国董事的专业性与政府背景分析

文章以1995-2009年沪深两市13815个A股上市公司样本为研究对象,实证研究了公司所有权类型、所在地区市场化的程度与董事的专业性、政府背景的关系。研究发现,当上市公司是国有企业,尤其是地方控股企业时,董事会中有专业知识的董事较少,但有政府背景的董事较多。当上市公司处在市场化程度较高的地区时,董事会成员中有专业知识的董事较多,有政府背景的董事较少。当董事会中有专业背景但没有政府背景的董事人数较多时,公司经营业绩越好;当有政府背景但不具有专业背景的人数较多时,公司经营业绩越差。本文的研究在丰富了公司治理文献的同时,对于了解我国董事会的构成以及决定因素提供重要的实证证据。     

Beyond privatization: Institutional innovation and growth in China's large state-owned enterprises

This article demonstrates that China's large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are not stagnant fossils waiting to die. Under economic reform policies this sector has undergone large change due to enhanced enterprise autonomy, the impact of market forces, rapid growth of domestic demand for upstream products, strategic integration with the world economy and the state's policy to promote large businesses. China's large SOEs are developing new institutional forms that do not neatly fit into existing patterns. China is experimentally changing its institutions through a combination of central policy, local initiative and interaction with international investment. This presents a challenge to the “transitional orthodoxy” and to ideas concerning property rights in development economics. There is not a universal model of property rights and government action that works best in all circumstances. China's experience with the reform of large SOEs shows the diverse possibilities for effective industrial institutions.     

地方政府财政政策与企业股权融资:理论与实证

论文通过建立连续时间动态讨价还价模型对地方政府与企业所有者之间的博弈关系进行了理论研究．并对双方策略选择关系进行了实证检验。理论研究的结果表明，如果博弈双方的时间偏好相同，剩余控制权（或者称之为相对讨价还价优势）的配置与博弈双方的福利水平无关：而时间偏好不相同时，剩余控制权的配置将影响双方的福利水平，这个研究结论与是否存在交易成本不必相关。通过实证研究，论文的研究结果表明：（1）地方政府追求预算外盈余的行为会导致其增加财政支出最终导致财政赤字持续增加，但这些财政赤字并没有为企业股权融资提供有效的支持；（2）地方政府的财政更愿意与企业在预算外的领域合作，而企业则更愿意与地方政府在预算内合作：（3）非国有企业较国有企业更愿意和地方政府在预算外合作，而地方政府也更愿意和非国有企业在预算外的领域合作。这些实证结果说明地方政府在时间偏好不一致的情况下拥有剩余控制权。     

The impact of the liability–asset ratio on profitability in China's industrial state-owned enterprises

The liability–asset ratio of China's industrial state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has increased dramatically in the course of the economic reform period. Western observers point out the inherent dangers to enterprise solvency. Chinese policymakers view today's level as exceedingly detrimental to enterprise profitability and are introducing measures to reduce it. Yet the increase in the liability–asset ratio of industrial SOEs is the inevitable result of systemic changes; since the early 1990s, the liability–asset ratio has stabilized. The perceived negative impact of the current level of the liability–asset ratio on enterprise profitability does not hold up in regression analysis. It is true that low-profitability SOEs tend to have a high liability–asset ratio, perhaps due to government-ordained support through bank loans. However, once the endogeneity of the liability–asset ratio is controlled for, a high liability–asset ratio tends to imply a high level of profitability. This suggests that current industrial SOE reforms in China that focus on debt alleviation are misguided.     

Political economy of labor retrenchment: Evidence based on China's state-owned enterprises

This study examines the determinants behind the restructuring of China's SOEs in the late 1990s. We have reached two major findings. First, we find that the degree of labor retrenchment is negatively related to enterprise performance, suggesting that poor performance is a major force driving labor restructuring. Second, we offer evidence that decisions on labor retrenchment in traditional SOEs are related to the local government's fiscal position and to local reemployment conditions for laid-off workers. In contrast, labor decisions in corporatized SOEs are not related to these two variables. Our results suggest that corporatized SOEs with partial private ownership may enjoy higher autonomy in labor decisions.     

Long live China’s state-owned enterprises: deflating the myth of poor financial performance

China’s industrial state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are commonly perceived as performing poorly. This leads authors to conclude that SOE reform so far has been a failure, and to recommend all-out privatization. Industrial SOE profitability indeed declined drastically in the course of the reform period, and industrial SOEs are always less profitable than industrial non-SOEs. However, the gap between SOEs and non-SOEs can be explained by just two factors: SOEs face higher circulation tax rates than non-SOEs, and have a higher capital intensity. In as far as these are the result of government policies and historical factors discriminating against SOEs, privatization of SOEs may improve these enterprises’ profitability levels, but privatization is not a necessary condition. The decline in SOE profitability over time furthermore is well explained by economic transition factors; non-SOE profitability declined following a similar time pattern, and non-SOEs are no better suited to withstand shocks such as the 1989–1990 economic downturn.     

Energy prices and investment in energy efficiency: evidence from Chinese industry 1997–2004

The paper develops and implements a methodology for assessing the role of energy prices and new investment in reducing energy intensity in Chinese industry. Analysing a unique panel data set which reports firm-level energy consumption and price from 1997 to 2004, the paper finds: the energy prices, not only the current but also the past energy prices, are key factors that driving down firms' energy intensity for all three types of firms: state-owned enterprises (SOEs), domestic non-SOEs (NSOEs) and foreign-funded firms (FFEs); furthermore, SOEs exhibit a robust price-investment channel: responding to rising energy prices, SOEs tend to invest in new energy-efficient capital, through which SOEs reduce energy intensity; the same price-investment channels are less robust for non-SOEs or foreign-funded firms.     

Agency cost and the crisis of China's SOEs: A comment and further observations

This paper compares and contrasts our earlier principal–agent analysis of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) with that of Zhou and Wang [China Econ. Rev. 11 (2000) 297.]. We argue that the focal principal–agent relationship in these SOEs consists of the manager as the principal and the workers as the agents. In addition, the paper addresses the appropriate representation of the state as principal and the manager as agent when the two top levels of SOEs are the focus. The modeling of collusion in a multilevel organization is also discussed. Other aspects in representing these SOEs are presented.     

FDI行业间溢出与省区产业增长

基于2003-2008年中国省区工业细分产业数据,本文考察了FDI对内资产业增长率的影响。在控制了省区和行业的固定效应及产业间动态外部性的影响后,我们发现FDI对内资产业增长率具有显著的行业间溢出效应。但是所有制和地区的差别导致对溢出吸收效果的不同,非国有企业可以全面地吸收外资的行业间溢出;而国有企业不能利用FDI后向溢出促进自身发展。在直辖市和西藏以外的地区,FDI对国有企业的前向溢出甚至都不再显著。