股权激励计划对公司会计政策选择的影响——基于资产减值会计视角的研究

文章以资产减值会计角度为基础,就股权激励计划对于公司会计政策选择方面所造成的影响进行研究,从中可知:基于盈余管理动机方面而言,股权激励对于公司会计政策的具体选择具有重要影响。将股权激励方案推出前期及后期,基于自身利益相应考量,开展权激励计划的公司管理层,通过对资产减值政策的利用,就会计盈余对股权激励相应行权条件的影响予以操纵。研究结果显示,一些开展股权激励计划公司管理层,运用资产减值政策,对会计盈余实施操纵,以此股权激励方案的顺利开展予以推动。     

制造业企业股权激励与盈余管理的实证研究

文章从制造业企业的股权激励强度,激励模式和业绩评价标准的严格程度三个方面对股权激励与盈余管理的关系进行了研究。把2014～2016年A股市场的制造业上市公司当作样本。通过实证研究发现:制造业企业的股权激励强度与盈余管理正相关。不同激励方式对盈余管理有不同的影响,与股票期权模型相比,限制性股票模式下企业盈余管理水平更高。股权激励业绩衡量标准的严重程度与盈余管理正相关。     

CEO任期、继任来源与管理层激励的动态调整

任期是识别经理人能力的重要标志。我们从CEO任期的角度探究了其与薪酬激励之间的动态调整关系,并考察了不同继任来源CEO之间的差异。研究发现,CEO任期与货币薪酬、股权激励及薪酬差距之间均呈倒U型关系:在货币薪酬方面,当任期达到8年时,CEO货币薪酬达到最大值;在薪酬差距方面,当任期5～7年时,管理层内部薪酬差距达到最大值;尽管继任来源对上述两方面不存在显著影响,但在股权激励方面,外部继任CEO达到最大值所需任期却远大于内部继任CEO。这些结论对管理层权力效应、认知效应和动态契约效应提供了有力的证明,但是对于职业生涯假设的支持并不显著。     

我国上市公司股权激励制度的个人所得税问题探析

股权激励是经过发达国家资本市场多年实践证明行之有效的长期激励方式,我国上市公司在进行完善公司治理结构改革中的一个重要措施,就是在管理层和骨干员工的薪酬计划中增加股权激励安排。本文探讨了我国上市公司在实施股权激励制度的过程中涉及到的个人所得税问题。     

CFO兼任董秘会抑制企业盈余管理吗?——基于声誉理论视角

文章选取2006—2019年沪深A股上市公司作为样本,基于声誉理论视角,研究CFO兼任董秘与应计盈余管理、真实盈余管理之间的关系。研究结果显示,CFO兼任董秘受声誉的激励约束会抑制公司的应计盈余管理,而真实盈余管理不受CFO兼任董秘的影响。进一步研究发现,CFO兼任董秘和董事强化了对应计盈余管理的抑制作用;与国有企业相比,CFO兼任董秘在非国有企业中与应计盈余管理的负相关关系更显著;董事会规模越大,CFO兼任董秘对应计盈余管理的抑制作用越弱。可见,我国资本市场应鼓励CFO兼任董秘的治理架构,并提高CFO及董秘在董事会中的地位。     

CEO和CFO任期交错对盈余管理的影响

以高阶梯队理论为基础,分析任期交错的影响,运用创业板上市公司2012-2014经验数据进行检验,结果表明CEO和CFO任期交错与盈余管理程度存在显著的负相关关系,因此CEO和CFO任期交错能够抑制公司的盈余行为,据此提出为提高上市公司会计信息披露质量,应避免CEO和CFO长期共事。     

CEO薪酬与公司绩效关系研究综述

CEO薪酬与公司绩效关系的研究在学术界与现实管理中吸引着越来越多的关注,主要原因在于该主题的研究一直未有统一定论。而国外由于资本市场较发达,股权激励推行的时间较长等原因,研究较我国而言系统而深入。论文通过对国内外文献进行梳理,认为大多数研究进行的是现金薪酬、股权、期权三方面各自的或综合的高管薪酬与公司绩效之间关系的探讨,并对此进行系统综述,文末对比国外研究,提出了国内未来研究应注意的问题,以期为后续研究提供有益的借鉴。     

上市公司高管股票期权激励存在的问题及对策

股票期权激励制度作为一种国际公认的有效激励方式,已经在我国的部分企业中实施,并发挥了显著作用。尽管我国绝大多数的上市公司已经完成了股权分置改革,但股权激励制度还不完善,目前还处于探索阶段。股权激励作为完善上市公司治理结构的有益补充,应该从恰当设计股权激励数量、科学确定行权期与行权价格、合理设置股权激励行权要件以及持续完善公司治理结构等方面完善我国上市公司股权激励,促进股权激励功能的发挥。     

国资委：股权激励收益不得超薪酬40％

国资委日前公布的《关于规范国有控股上市公司实施股权激励有关问题的补充通知》指出，国有控股上市公司在实施股权激励时，需建立完善的业绩考核体系和考核办法：合理控制股权激励收益水平，实行股权激励收益与业绩指标增长挂钩浮动。其中，境内上市公司及境外H股公司激励对象股权激励收益原则上不得超过行权时薪酬总水平（含预期的期权或股权收益）的40％；境外红筹公司原则上不得超过50％。     

管理层股票期权激励的实施动因研究

文章从代理理论、金融结构、公司治理角度研究了我国管理层股票期权激励实施的影响因素,提出国有控股是解释目前股票期权激励决定因素实证结论相互矛盾的关键因素。文章以2006~2012年实施股票期权激励的上市公司作为研究样本,以同时期、同行业、同数量的未实施股票期权激励的上市公司作为控制样本,研究发现:国有上市公司规模、公司风险同股票期权激励实施正相关,民营上市公司公司规模、公司风险以及债务比重同股票期权激励实施负相关;流动性约束与股权集中度与股票期权激励实施不相关。     

Maintaining a Reputation for Consistently Beating Earnings Expectations and the Slippery Slope to Earnings Manipulation

This paper investigates whether maintaining a reputation for consistently beating analysts' earnings expectations can motivate executives to move from “within GAAP” earnings management to “outside of GAAP” earnings manipulation. We analyze firms subject to SEC enforcement actions and find that these firms consistently beat analysts' quarterly earnings forecasts in the three years prior to the manipulation period and continue to do so by smaller “beats” during the manipulation period. We find that manipulating firms beat expectations around 86 percent of the time in the 12 quarters prior to the manipulation period (versus 75 percent for control firms) and that manipulation often ends with a miss in expectations. We document that executives of manipulating firms face strong stock market and CEO pressure to perform. Prior to the manipulation period, these firms have high analyst optimism, growing institutional interest, and high market valuations, along with powerful CEOs. Further, we find that maintaining a reputation for beating expectations is more important than CEO overconfidence and is incremental to CEO equity incentives for explaining manipulation. Our results suggest that pressure to maintain a reputation for beating analysts' expectations can encourage aggressive accounting and, ultimately, earnings manipulation.     

The Relation between Strategy,CEO Selection,and Firm Performance

We examine whether a firm's strategic priorities influence its selection of a new CEO and what conditions enable such an appointment to add value to the firm. More specifically, this study investigates the value‐adding effect when prospector firms (i.e., those pursuing a prospector‐type strategy) select a CEO with high social capital. We argue that uncertainty, driven by a firm's strategy, will determine the decision to select a CEO with high social capital; such CEOs can use their networks to mitigate the uncertainty and thus can be valuable to the firm. However, prior research indicates that CEOs with high social capital can engage in behavior detrimental to firm value. To mitigate the potential for this to occur, we assess whether corporate governance can play a role in prospector firms who appoint CEOs with high social capital. Drawing on archival data of CEO successions over a 14‐year period, we find that prospector firms have greater incentives to appoint CEOs with high social capital. We also find that prospector firms who appoint a CEO with high social capital improve their performance. Furthermore, the value‐adding effect of this selection choice is stronger in prospector firms with good corporate governance.     

CEO Overconfidence and Stock Price Crash Risk

This study examines the association between chief executive officer (CEO) overconfidence and future stock price crash risk. Overconfident managers overestimate the returns to their investment projects and misperceive negative net present value (NPV) projects as value creating. They also tend to ignore or explain away privately observed negative feedback. As a result, negative NPV projects are kept for too long and their bad performance accumulates, which can lead to stock price crashes. Using a large sample of firms for the period 1993–2010, we find that firms with overconfident CEOs have higher stock price crash risk than firms with nonoverconfident CEOs. The impact of managerial overconfidence on crash risk is more pronounced when the CEO is more dominant in the top management team and when there are greater differences of opinion among investors. Finally, it appears that the effect of CEO overconfidence on crash risk is less pronounced for firms with more conservative accounting policies.     

Compensation negotiation and corporate governance: the evidence from China

This paper examines CEO pay dispersion for the listed companies in China. We apply a two-tier stochastic frontier model to the CEO compensation framework where asymmetric information generates a surplus between the minimum wage that CEOs accept and the maximum payment that firms offer. This surplus leads to CEO pay dispersion coming from the negotiation power between the CEO and the firm. We generate the surplus extracted by each CEO-firm pair and analyze how corporate governance affects them. An empirical analysis finds that: (1) On average, CEOs are paid 23.26% more than the benchmark; (2) additionally, we examine the bargaining power in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs). We find that CEOs in SOEs have less bargaining power due to compensation regulations. We then examine compensation for new CEOs hired externally and find that CEOs hired externally have less bargaining power on average; and (3) corporate governance has a significant effect on the salary bargaining power of each agent. More specifically, the CEO-Chairman dummy has a significant positive effect on the bargaining power of firms and CEOs, but the latter is larger. Board size has a negative effect on both. Independent directors help improve the bargaining power of the firms and board meeting times help enhance the bargaining power of the CEOs. Equity concentration has a significant negative effect on both sides.     

Mandatory IFRS Adoption and the Role of Accounting Earnings in CEO Turnover

We study whether mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) is associated with changes in the sensitivity of CEO turnover to accounting earnings and how the impact of IFRS adoption varies with country‐level institutions and firm‐level incentives. We find that CEO turnover responds more to a firm's accounting performance after adoption. This increase in turnover‐to‐earnings sensitivity is concentrated in countries with stronger enforcement of financial reporting and is more prominent for mandatory adopters that have strong firm‐level compliance incentives. In addition, we link the change in turnover‐to‐earnings sensitivity directly to accounting changes due to IFRS adoption and find a stronger adoption effect when firms report large overall accounting changes and large de‐recognition of loss provisions upon adoption. Some of the above findings are sensitive to the exclusion of UK firms, which account for more than half of our sample.     

Female CEOs on Japanese corporate boards and firm performance

This paper examines the effects of female chief executive officers (CEOs) on firm performance. Using data on nonfinancial listed firms in Japan, we show that only 0.8% of some 42,000 firm-year observations have female CEOs. There is also little evidence that firms appoint more females as CEOs during our sample period. While the stock market reacts positively to the introduction of a firm's first female CEO, the relationship between CEO gender and firm accounting performance is generally not strong. However, when we classify the type of female CEO, the estimated coefficient for a founder female CEO and Tobin's Q is positive and significant.     

股权激励视角的管理层自利性财务重述研究

文章从股权激励视角出发,选取了2008年深沪两市发布更正公告的上市公司为研究样本,实证检验股权激励与财务重述的关系。研究结果表明,股权激励与财务重述有着显著的正相关关系。这为我国上市公司财务重述的报酬契约动因提供了进一步的证据。即在实施股权激励的情况下,由于会计业绩指标的固有局限性、股票市场的弱有效性、上市公司治理结构缺位等,股权激励很有可能引发更正类的、坏消息类的财务重述。关键词：财务重述;年报补丁：股权激励     

Career Concerns and Management Earnings Guidance

This study provides evidence that managers' career concerns affect their earnings guidance decisions. We hypothesize that CEOs who are relatively more concerned about assessments of their abilities have stronger incentives to guide the market expectations of earnings downwards to increase the likelihood of meeting or beating the expectations. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that (i) short‐tenured CEOs, CEOs promoted from inside the firm, and nonfounder CEOs are more likely to provide downward earnings guidance when they have bad news, and (ii) their downward guidance tends to be more conservative. In response, analysts revise earnings forecasts less for the downward guidance provided by more career‐concerned CEOs. This indicates that analysts rationally incorporate these CEOs' stronger incentives to be conservative in their earnings guidance. Consequently, we find that CEOs with greater career concerns are not more likely to beat the market expectations, even when they provide more conservative downward guidance.     

盈余管理、CEO特征与碳信息披露——来自中国高碳排放行业上市公司的证据

在全球气候变化不断加剧的背景下,碳密集型行业正面临着日益增长的公众压力。此种情况下,推动绿色低碳经济已然成为实现可持续发展的必然选择。选取2012—2020年中国高碳排放行业上市公司为研究对象,探究盈余管理对碳信息披露的影响,以及CEO特征对碳信息披露和盈余管理的调节作用。结果显示,盈余管理程度越大,碳信息披露越少;CEO性别为女性、CEO教育背景越高、CEO任期越长、CEO财务背景越强,盈余管理对碳信息披露的反向促进作用会得到加强;CEO年龄越大,盈余管理对碳信息披露的反向促进作用会得到削弱。     

新会计准则对企业长效激励机制的影响研究

股权激励计划是上市公司高管人员的一项长效激励机制，在我国是一个新生事物，公众对其不甚了解，但在我国一些上市公司已经施行。本文从理论和实证两个方面分析了《企业会计准则第11号——股份支付》实施后对于上市公司盈余管理、股权行权条件、长效激励机制设计和方式选择等所产生的影响。