Accounting Comparability and Economic Outcomes of Mandatory IFRS Adoption

This study examines the associations between four economic outcomes of the 2005 mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and concurrent changes in two important accounting constructs, accounting comparability and reporting quality. My primary purpose is to evaluate the relative importance of cross‐country accounting comparability and firm‐specific reporting quality in explaining previously documented increases in Tobin's Q, stock liquidity, analyst forecast accuracy, and analyst forecast agreement following IFRS adoption. Given that improvements in both comparability and reporting quality are primary stated objectives of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), it is important to understand their relative roles in shaping the information environment of financial statement users following IFRS adoption. Using 1,861 first‐time adopters in 23 countries, I find that firms with a larger improvement in comparability have larger increases in Q, liquidity, forecast accuracy, and forecast agreement following adoption, relative to other adopters. In contrast, improvements in reporting quality around adoption appear to have only a second‐order effect that is generally limited to Q effects among those adopters with concurrent improvements in comparability. These results are robust to alternative design and variable specifications. Finally, I continue to find these results for samples restricted to countries with weaker pre‐adoption institutional environments and countries that did not initiate proactive financial statement reviews, indicating that strong institutions and regulatory improvements are not driving the results. Overall, my results suggest that improvements in cross‐country accounting comparability played an important role in the previously documented economic benefits that accrued to 2005 mandatory IFRS adopters.     

INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION/DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS AND INDONESIA

This study examines the industrialization performance of Indonesia through a comparative evaluation with other East Asian economies. While neighboring countries actively formulated international production/distribution networks, Indonesia fell behind in utilizing the benefits of globalizing corporate activities. International production/distribution networks are supported by new economic thought such as fragmentation, agglomeration, and theories about corporate firm; and a policy package of development strategies should be designed to utilize such opportunities. The design of Indonesia's development strategies and “institutions”, however, does not conform to the globalizing world because the presence of network‐forming foreign companies is not large enough to make them influential “actors”. This author argues that the traditional comparative advantage argument for Indonesia's economic development is possibly misleading. Rather, Indonesia must learn the experience of its neighboring countries and introduce foreign companies as new actors to break the old “structure”.     

Monitoring in Multiagent Organizations*

This paper studies how to assign “monitors” to productive agents in order to generate signals about the agents' performance that are most useful from a contracting perspective. We show that if signals generated by the same monitor are negatively (positively) correlated, then the optimal monitoring assignment will be “focused” (“dispersed”). This holds because dispersed monitoring allows the firm to better utilize relative performance evaluation. On the other hand, if each monitor communicates only an aggregated signal to the principal, then focused monitoring is always optimal since aggregation undermines relative performance evaluation. We also study team‐based compensation and randomized monitoring assignments. In particular, we show that the firm can gain from randomizing the monitoring assignment, compared with the optimal linear deterministic contract. Furthermore, under randomization, the conditional expected utility for the agent is higher when the agent is not monitored compared with the case where the agent is monitored. That is, the chance of being monitored serves as a “stick” rather than a “carrot”.     

Sequential Solutions to Capacity‐Planning and Pricing Decisions*

Ideally, firms should jointly solve capacity‐planning and product‐pricing problems. In practice, informational limitations and cognitive bounds may force firms to sequentially solve the two problems. For example, a firm may plan capacity using limited demand information, and update prices subsequently once additional demand information becomes available. In a simple setting, we characterize the economic loss due to such sequential planning. We use simulation experiments to assess the extent of this loss in more complex settings. We find a relatively low loss if the firm plans for capacity using limited demand information and subsequently adjusts product prices to reflect realized market conditions. However, even “reasonable” restrictions on the subsequent price adjustment (e.g., constraining adjusted prices to always exceed full cost) lead to significant economic loss.     

Do Institutional Investors Prefer Near‐Term Earnings over Long‐Run Value?*

This paper examines whether institutional investors exhibit preferences for near‐term earnings over long‐run value and whether such preferences have implications for firms' stock prices. First, I find that the level of ownership by institutions with short investment horizons (e.g., “transient” institutions) and by institutions held to stringent fiduciary standards (e.g., banks) is positively (negatively) associated with the amount of firm value in expected nearterm (long‐term) earnings. This evidence raises the question of whether such institutions myopically price firms, overweighting short‐term earnings potential and underweighting long‐term earnings potential. Evidence of such myopic pricing would establish a link through which institutional investors could pressure managers into a short‐term focus. The results provide no evidence that high levels of ownership by banks translate into myopic mispricing. However, high levels of transient ownership are associated with an over‐ (under‐) weighting of near‐term (long‐term) expected earnings, and a trading strategy based on this finding generates significant abnormal returns. This finding supports the concerns that many corporate managers have about the adverse effects of an ownership base dominated by short‐term‐focused institutional investors.     

The Spillover Effect of SEC Comment Letters on Qualitative Corporate Disclosure: Evidence from the Risk Factor Disclosure

In this study we use the recently mandated risk factor disclosure to examine the spillover effect of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) review of qualitative corporate disclosure. We find that firms not receiving any comment letter (“No‐letter Firms”) modify their subsequent year's disclosures to a larger extent if the SEC has commented on the risk factor disclosure of (i) the industry leader, (ii) a close rival, or (iii) numerous industry peers. We refer to this effect as “spillover.” Further, we find that after SEC comments on the industry leader's disclosure, No‐letter Firms also provide more firm‐specific disclosures in the subsequent year. The increased disclosure specificity reduces these firms’ likelihood of receiving SEC risk disclosure comments on their new filings. Our evidence suggests an indirect effect of the SEC review of qualitative disclosure.     

Are Related Party Transactions Red Flags?

This study investigates whether or not related party transactions serve as “red flags” that warn of potential financial misstatement. We hand‐collect related party transactions for S&P 1500 firms in 2001, 2004, and 2007 and find a positive correlation between these transactions and future restatements, suggesting restatements are more likely when a firm engages in related party transactions. The association is concentrated among transactions that appear to reflect “tone at the top” rather than arguably more necessary business transactions. We also find RPT firms pay lower audit fees. However, “tone RPT” firms that subsequently restate pay higher audit fees, providing evidence that auditors recognize the individual restatement risks of these firms. Our results suggest that tone‐based RPTs serve as signals of higher risk of material misstatement.     

Nonaudit Services and Earnings Conservatism: Is Auditor Independence Impaired?*

We examine whether the provision of nonaudit services (NAS) by incumbent auditors is associated with a reduction in the extent to which earnings reflect bad news on a timely basis (that is, news‐based conservatism). Reduced conservatism is expected to occur if relatively high levels of NAS result in reduced auditor independence and, ultimately, lower‐quality auditing. Because client‐specific demand for NAS is expected to vary, our proxy for the auditor‐client economic bond is the extent to which NAS purchases (relative to audit fees) are greater or less than expected. Using several different methods for identifying news‐based conservatism, we consistently find that higher than expected levels of NAS are not associated with reduced conservatism. This result is robust to allowing for endogenous NAS demand, as well as several explicit factors that may be associated with differences in conservatism. Similar conclusions arise from tests that use alternative measures of the economic bond between auditors and their clients, as well as in tests confined to either the Big 6 or non‐Big 6 audit firms. Our results are consistent with factors such as market‐based incentives, the threat of litigation, and alternative governance mechanisms offsetting any expected benefits to the audit firm from reducing its independence. We therefore conclude that recent legislative intervention aimed at restricting the supply of NAS is unlikely to result in increased independence in fact, although independence in appearance may be improved.     

Mandatory IFRS Adoption and the Role of Accounting Earnings in CEO Turnover

We study whether mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) is associated with changes in the sensitivity of CEO turnover to accounting earnings and how the impact of IFRS adoption varies with country‐level institutions and firm‐level incentives. We find that CEO turnover responds more to a firm's accounting performance after adoption. This increase in turnover‐to‐earnings sensitivity is concentrated in countries with stronger enforcement of financial reporting and is more prominent for mandatory adopters that have strong firm‐level compliance incentives. In addition, we link the change in turnover‐to‐earnings sensitivity directly to accounting changes due to IFRS adoption and find a stronger adoption effect when firms report large overall accounting changes and large de‐recognition of loss provisions upon adoption. Some of the above findings are sensitive to the exclusion of UK firms, which account for more than half of our sample.     

Audit Firm Tenure,Bank Complexity,and Financial Reporting Quality

Theory from organizations and economics research posits that in an inter‐organizational relationship, both parties invest in relationship‐specific knowledge, which in turn facilitates the effectiveness of the relationship while strengthening the attachment between the parties. In complex settings where there are more opportunities for knowledge creation, the investments will be larger and the attachment stronger. Because banks are complex institutions that present unique challenges to auditors, we suggest that effective audits critically depend on the accumulation of significant investments in client‐specific expertise through a long association with the client. We find a positive association between audit firm tenure and financial reporting quality, and this association is particularly strong in banks that are more complex. Also, contrary to recent research we find that benefits of audit firm tenure for complex banks accrue even for long tenure and are not limited to medium tenure. Our findings largely support the notion that a long relationship with the client reflects the underlying demand for expertise, which is critical for high‐quality audits of complex organizations. Imposing short‐term limits on audit firms would adversely affect the investments in client‐specific expertise especially in the cases where this expertise is needed the most. Our findings do not support calls for mandatory audit firm rotation for large complex institutions.     

Determinants of Managerial Earnings Guidance Prior to Regulation Fair Disclosure and Bias in Analysts' Earnings Forecasts*

Prior to Regulation Fair Disclosure (“Reg FD”), some management privately guided analyst earnings estimates, often through detailed reviews of analysts' earnings models. In this paper I use proprietary survey data from the National Investor Relations Institute to identify firms that reviewed analysts' earnings models prior to Reg FD and those that did not. Under the maintained assumption that firms conducting reviews guided analysts' earnings forecasts, I document firm characteristics associated with the decision to provide private earnings guidance. Then I document the characteristics of “guided” versus “unguided” analyst earnings forecasts. Findings demonstrate an association between several firm characteristics and guidance practices: managers are more likely to review analyst earnings models when the firm's stock is highly followed by analysts and largely held by institutions, when the firm's market‐to‐book ratio is high, and its earnings are important to valuation but hard to predict because its business is complex. A comparison of guided and unguided quarterly forecasts indicates that guided analyst estimates are more accurate, but also more frequently pessimistic. An examination of analysts' annual earnings forecasts over the fiscal year does not distinguish between guidance and no‐guidance firms; both experience a “walk‐down” in annual estimates. To distinguish between guidance and no‐guidance firms, one must examine quarterly earnings news: unguided analysts walk down their annual estimates when the majority of the quarterly earnings news is negative; guided analysts walk down their annual estimates even though the majority of the quarterly earnings news is positive.     

Market Performance Implications of the Transfer Price Rule

The “transfer price rule” (TPR) defines a vertical price squeeze as an input price, output price combination set by a vertically‐integrated firm monopoly producer of an essential input that would not allow the firm's downstream unit to earn at least a normal rate of return on investment in the “as‐if” case that it had to purchase the input at the price charged independent firms. In its 2009 linkLine decision, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the TPR for the purpose of enforcing the anti‐monopolization prohibition of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. In contrast, a vertical price squeeze, defined by a TPR‐like standard, is an abuse of a dominant position under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. In this article, we model the impact of the TPR on market performance. We find that the TPR increases consumer surplus and net social welfare if all firms remain active in the downstream market. It sometimes induces the upstream firm to refuse to supply the downstream firm, and in such cases, consumer surplus and net social welfare are reduced. The impact of the TPR on market performance thus depends on whether or not an upstream firm can refuse to supply downstream firms on terms that would offer it at least a normal rate of return on investment.     

Art of the Deal: The Merger Settlement Process at the Federal Trade Commission

This paper models the modern merger review process in which an enforcement agency, here the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), interacts with the acquiring firm to determine the outcome of antitrust regulation. Our empirical implementation of a game theoretic analysis tests whether decisions are driven by the costs and benefits of the proposed enforcement initiative as well as whether firms' responses are colored by competitive and institutional considerations. With respect to firms, the results suggest that mergers are driven by the opportunity to capture efficiencies, In contrast, the structural (anticompetitive) characteristics of mergers do not seem to impact firms' litigation decisions. Firms, however, are deterred from fighting the FTC by the potential negative impact on their reputations. In addition, “hostage effects” associated with the size of the noncontroversial portion of acquisitions held up by the FTC's competitive concerns also affect firm decisions.     

PCAOB Inspections: Public Accounting Firms on “Trial”

The objective of our article is to obtain a better understanding of how auditors anticipate the potential for PCAOB inspection, experience the inspection, cope with the consequences of the inspection, and understand the PCAOB's influence within the context of professionalism. We use a qualitative approach that uses both surveys (55) and interviews (20) of auditors (of varying rank and firm) across a five‐year period (2012–2017). Respondents suggest that PCAOB inspectors are powerful, representing the “prosecution,” “judge,” and “jury” of the auditing profession. We therefore use a structural metaphor of the PCAOB inspection as a judicial “trial.” By controlling the criteria used to evaluate performance, inspectors have the power to repeatedly “subpoena,” “interrogate,” and return a “verdict” on the firm (auditor); those judged as “guilty” require supervised “probation.” This process is perceived as having improved audit quality but at a cost. Passing an inspection is so important that auditors (firms) have resorted to impression management strategies and “functionally stupid” work practices (e.g., excessive documentation, a decrease in critical thinking as a result of a “box ticking” approach to auditing). Furthermore, some respondents believe that being a good auditor has come at the expense of being a good accountant; the emphasis on audit process and concurrent de‐emphasis on technical accounting could ultimately lead to audits themselves falling short. In addition, it is evident that inspectors and auditors differ in their perceptions of risk, likely manifesting because inspectors are standards‐focused while auditors (firms) are methodology‐focused. Finally, the inspection process has created excessive stress and tension, beyond budget and fee pressures, which some auditors perceive as affecting the pool of talented auditors that firms may be able to attract and retain in the future.     

An Economic Analysis of Audit and Nonaudit Services: The Trade‐off between Competition Crossovers and Knowledge Spillovers*

In this paper, I present a model in which both markets for audit services and nonaudit services (NAS) are oligopolistic. Accounting firms providing both audit services and NAS will employ oligopolistic competition in each of these markets. In addition to auditors' gaining “knowledge spillovers” from auditing to consulting or vice versa, oligopolistic competition in one market will influence the counterpart in the other market ‐ what I call “competition crossovers”. Although scope economies due to knowledge spillovers (for example, cost savings) are always beneficial to auditors, such benefits can entice accounting firms to adopt strategies (for example, price reductions) to compete aggressively in the audit market so that some, or all, firms become worse off. A trade‐off arises between these two economic forces in the two oligopolistic markets. Given the trade‐off between competition crossovers and knowledge spillovers, accounting firms may not reduce their audit prices, even though supplying NAS enables firms to decrease auditing costs — a nontrivial impact of oligopolistic competition in two markets on audit pricing. The empirical implication of my results is that because of competition‐crossover effects between the auditing and consulting service markets, finding empirical evidence for knowledge‐spillover benefits is likely to be difficult. Control variables for “audit‐market concentration” concerned with competition‐crossover effects and “auditor expertise” concerned with knowledge‐spillover benefits should be included in audit‐fee regressions to increase the power of empirical tests. With regard to policy implications, my analyses help explain the impact of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act on “market segmentation” and, hence, the profitability of accounting firms.     

高技术企业研发团队组织租金分享研究

传统“剩余”概念不能完全囊括剩余索取权的“剩余”,为此,本文在分析“剩余”的真实内涵基础上,提出用组织租金来代替传统的“剩余”概念。分享组织租金是企业参与者(尤其是人力资本投入者)资本权利的重要体现,也是对企业参与者的一种强有效的根本激励手段。本文在分析影响研发团队谈判力的人力资本属性和谈判环境基础上,构建了高技术企业中研发团队分享组织租金的谈判模型。     

A choice‐theoretic analysis of a corporate tax holiday versus a subsidy

This paper attempts to compare the effect of a corporate tax holiday with that of a subsidy on the behaviour of the individual firm. Assuming the subsidy equals the amount of tax paid by a firm operating under the subsidy system, we find that the firm's net profit will be greater under the tax holiday than under the subsidy regime. Similarly, if the subsidy exceeds the tax by an amount that would equalize the profits made by the (“marginal”) firm under the two regimes, then it is found that firms with higher than “average” unit costs would opt for the subsidy system; conversely, firms with a low cost structure would maximize profits by selecting the tax holiday. Finally, a multiperiod analysis of the particular choice facing prospective manufacturers in Ciskei, shows that the firm would normally choose the subsidy system except if the current tax exceeded the subsidy at the output level representing maximum profit under the tax holiday.     

Should I stay or should I go? Foreign direct investment,employment protection and domestic anchorage

This paper examines theoretically and empirically how employment protection legislation affects location decisions of multinationals. We depart from the “conventional wisdom” by examining not only the effect of protection on inward foreign direct investment (FDI), but also a country’s ability to “anchor” potential outward investment. Based on our simple theoretical framework, we estimate an empirical model, using data on bilateral FDI and employment protection indices for OECD countries, and controlling for other labour market institutions and investment costs. We find that, while an “unfavourable” employment protection differential between a domestic and a foreign location is inimical to FDI, a high domestic level of employment protection tends to discourage outward FDI. The results are in line with our conjecture that strict employment protection in the firm’s home country makes firms reluctant to relocate abroad and keeps them “anchored” at home.     

Conservative Accounting and Linear Information Valuation Models*

Prior research using the residual income valuation model and linear information models has generally found that estimates of firm value are negatively biased. We argue that this could result from the way in which accounting conservatism effects are reflected in such models. We build on the conservative accounting model of Feltham and Ohlson 1995 and the Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan 1999 (DHS) methodology to propose a valuation model that includes a conservatism‐correction term, based on the properties of past realizations of residual income and “other information”. “Other information” is measured using analyst‐forecast‐based predictions of residual income. We use data comparable to the DHS sample to compare the bias and inaccuracy of value estimates from our model and from models similar to those used by DHS and Myers 1999. Valuation biases are substantially less negative for our model, but valuation inaccuracy is not markedly reduced.     

What＇s So Special about China＇s Exports？ A Comment

Dani Rodrik argues that China's exports are unusually sophisticated for a country at its income level. He also claims that China's export sophistication reflects the government's successful industrial policy and has been instrumental in the recent acceleration of its economic growth. Although Rodrik's interpretation of China's economic growth is broadly correct, the accuracy of his empirical analysis is questionable. This note identifies several problems regarding the “export sophistication” index used in his empirical work and casts doubt on his analysis.