Private Information Production,Public Disclosure,and the Cost of Capital: Theory and Implications*

Both private information production by market traders and public disclosure by firms contribute to dissemination of financial information in the capital market. However, the motives and economic consequences of the two are quite different. In general, private information production is intended by investors to increase their trading profit, which has the effect of widening the information gap between informed and uninformed investors and increasing the firm's cost of capital. On the other hand, public disclosure can be used to narrow this information gap and to lower the cost of capital. This paper provides a theoretical model to examine the economic incentives behind these two forms of information dissemination and their consequences on the cost of capital. By simultaneously considering the firm's and the information traders' decisions, the paper derives an equilibrium in which the amount of private information production, the level of public disclosure, and the cost of capital are all linked to specific characteristics of the firm, of information traders, and of the market. In contrast to conventional beliefs, the paper predicts that, across firms, the cost of capital can be either positively or negatively related to the firm's disclosure level, depending on the specific factors that cause the variation within a particular sample. Similarly, the extent to which investors follow a firm and the firm's disclosure level can be either positively or negatively related to each other. Implications for empirical research are discussed.     

Earnings Quality and the Equity Risk Premium: A Benchmark Model*

This paper solves a model that links earnings quality to the equity risk premium in an infinite‐horizon consumption capital asset pricing model (CAPM) economy. In the model, risk‐averse traders hold diversified portfolios consisting of risk‐free bonds and shares of many risky firms. When constructing their portfolios, traders rely on noisy reported earnings and dividend payments for information about the risky firms. The main new element of the model is an explicit representation of earnings quality that includes hidden accrual errors that reverse in subsequent periods. The model demonstrates that earnings quality magnifies fundamental risk. Absent fundamental risk, poor earnings quality cannot affect the equity risk premium. Moreover, only the systematic (undiversified) component of earnings‐quality risk contributes to the equity risk premium. In contrast, all components of earnings‐quality risk affect earnings capitalization factors. The model ties together consumption CAPM and accounting‐based valuation research into one price formula linking earnings quality to the equity risk premium and earnings capitalization factors.     

Equity‐Based Compensation of Outside Directors and Corporate Disclosure Quality

We examine the relationship between a firm's disclosure quality and equity‐based compensation of independent members of the board of directors. The dimensions of disclosure quality we focus on are management's earnings guidance and information flowthrough financial analysts. Using both levels and changes specifications, we find the average ratio of equity‐based pay to total pay of independent board members to be positively related to a firm's disclosure quality. Our findings are robust to the inclusion of management's equity‐based compensation, other governance measures, and financial controls, and robust to instrumental variable tests of endogeneity. Furthermore, we find directors’ equity‐based compensation to be negatively associated with the firm's cost of equity capital. Our results are consistent with equity‐based compensation providing incentives to independent directors to push for better disclosure quality.     

The role of information sharing in trade credit distribution: evidence from Thailand

Prior research has shown that information sharing among lenders facilitates bank credit allocation and reduces default rates. We examine the role of information sharing in trade credit allocation using a sample of publicly traded firms in Thailand over the 1994–2005 period. Taking the establishment of a private credit bureau in 1999 as signalling improvement in information sharing among lenders, we obtain three main results in the improved information sharing period: (1) Thai firms have become less dependent on supplier credit; (2) financially constrained firms redistribute more funds via trade credit; and (3) the relationships between the use of trade credit and firm‐specific factors such as liquidity, free cash flow, tangible assets, interest cost ratio, and firm size weaken as information sharing improves. Our results are consistent with the view that better information sharing facilitates credit allocation. Hence, policies aiming at facilitating information exchange among financial intermediaries should be supported. We also find support for the view that bank credit substitutes for trade credit. This substitution lowers firms' cost of capital, given that trade credit is assumed to be more costly than bank loans.     

The Stock Market,Monetary Policy,and Economic Development

In this article, we examine the impact of financial market development on the level of economic development. In particular, we explore this issue in a setting where individuals face idiosyncratic risk. Incomplete information also provides a transaction role for money so that monetary policy can be studied. While an active banking sector promotes risk sharing, we incorporate a market for equity by allowing individuals to trade capital across generations. In this manner, each asset and financial market in our model fulfills a distinct economic function. Consistent with recent empirical work, we find that the impact of access to a stock market may be indeterminate—the economy may respond with significant gains in capital accumulation and risk sharing, or there may be relatively little impact. We also show that the effects of monetary policy vary across the level of financial development. In economies with small stock markets, increasing the amount of liquidity will cause capital accumulation to decline. By comparison, in advanced economies, capital accumulation improves.     

The Commitment to Income-Decreasing Accounting Choices as a Credible Signal to Reducing Information Asymmetry: The Case of Asset Revaluations*

Bagnoli and Watts (2005) proposed that a manager could reduce information asymmetry by choosing an income-decreasing accounting choice that signals the firm's relatively good future prospects. A limitation in testing this theory is that most income-decreasing accounting choices over time reverse such that aggregated earnings would be the same, regardless of the choice. One income-decreasing accounting choice that never reverses is the choice of upward asset revaluation, where the resulting gains are recognized through other comprehensive income and reduce future earnings by increasing future depreciation expense. In the United Kingdom, prior to FRS15, firms had the option to upwardly revalue on a one-time basis. FRS15, and subsequently International Financial Reporting Standards, however, require those firms that upwardly revalue precommit to revalue on a consistent basis. This precommitment sacrifices future reporting discretion, which, according to the aforementioned study, serves as a costly signal of a firm's relatively good future prospects that reduces information asymmetry. The choice not to upwardly revalue, therefore, serves as a signal of a firm's relatively poor future prospects and also reduces information asymmetry, but this choice does not require precommitment such that the reduction in information asymmetry would be less than the choice to precommit to upward revaluations. Using a propensity-score matched-pair design on a sample of United Kingdom firms to test our predictions during the period requiring precommitment, we find lower forecast dispersion, lower return volatility, and a lower cost of capital for firms that precommit to upward asset revaluations, relative to those firms that choose not to upwardly revalue their operating assets. Keywords: upward asset revaluations, income-decreasing accounting choice, information asymmetry, precommitment     

Resource Allocation Effects of Price Reactions to Disclosures*

Capital market participants collectively may possess information about the valuation implications of a firm's change in strategy not known by the management of the firm proposing the change. We ask whether a firm's management can exploit the capital market's information in deciding either whether to proceed with a contemplated strategy change or whether to continue with a previously initiated strategy change. In the case of a proposed strategy change, we show that managers can extract the capital market's information by announcing a potential new strategy, and then conditioning the decision to implement the new strategy on the size of the market's price reaction to the announcement. Under this arrangement, we show that a necessary condition to implement all and only positive net present value strategy changes is that managers proceed to implement some strategies that garner negative price reactions upon their announcement. In the case of deciding whether to continue with a previously implemented strategy change, we show that it may be optimal for the firm to predicate its abandonment/continuation decision on the magnitude of the costs it has already incurred. Thus, what looks like “sunk‐cost” behavior may in fact be optimal. Both demonstrations show that, in addition to performing their usual role of anticipating future cash flows generated by a manager's actions, capital market prices can also be used to direct a manager's actions. It follows that, in contrast to the usual depiction of the information flows between capital markets and firms as being one way — from firms to the capital markets — information also flows from capital markets to firms.     

Global value chains,firms, and wage inequality: Evidence from China

How does participating or moving to more upstream in the global value chains (GVCs) affect the premium paid to skilled compared to unskilled labor within firms? In this paper, we develop a model of heterogeneous firms with intermediate trade and two skill inputs, in which we apply the fair wage hypothesis to predict the wage premium changes according to firms' GVCs activities. The model predicts that firms' backward GVC participation, as measured by the share of foreign value-added content in exports (FVAR), has an ambiguous impact on wage inequality of skills, which depends on the relative importance of “FVAR-labor substitution effect” and “FVAR-profit effect.” However, moving to upstream sectors in GVCs, as measured by the export varieties' upstreamness (or average distance from final use), raises a firm's wage premium. Using detailed Chinese firm-level data from 2000 to 2006, we develop a Mincer-type empirical model to study the wage premium changes associated with FVAR and upstreamness. We find robust empirical evidence that the rise of wage inequality in China mainly arises from moving to more upstream sectors rather than changing GVC participation.     

Incentive Contracts,Market Risk,and Cost of Capital

Should incentive contracts expose the agent to market‐wide shocks? Counterintuitively, I show that market risk cannot be filtered out from the compensation and managed independently by the agent. Under plausible risk preferences, the principal should offer a contract in which performance pay increases following a favorable market shock. In the aggregate, however, the effect of market risk on individual contracts diversifies away and the agency problem does not directly affect the cost of capital. The analysis suggests caution in interpreting changes in cost of capital in terms of the stewardship role of accounting information.     

Why Do Large Firms' Prices Anticipate Earnings Earlier than Small Firms' Prices?*

This paper presents evidence that the positive association between firm size and price leads of earnings is not solely a function of private search incentives for firm‐specific information. Specifically, we find that small‐firm prices also lag large‐firm prices with respect to industry‐wide information. Our empirical analysis extends Collins, Kothari, and Rayburn 1987 and Freeman 1987, who document that security‐price leads of earnings are positively associated with market capitalization. In particular, we examine the association between firm size and the timing of security returns for two components of annual earnings changes: the average change for a firm's industry and the firm's idiosyncratic change. We find that large firms' prices have a longer lead than small firms' prices with respect to both components. Large firms' early lead on industry‐wide earnings suggests that returns of large firms predict returns of same‐industry small firms. To test this implication, we construct a portfolio of long (short) positions in small firms when the prior month's returns of large firms in their industry are above (below) average for large firms in other industries. This zero investment portfolio earns 4.5 percent over 12 months.     

Audit Strategies and Multiple Fraud Opportunities of Misreporting and Defalcation*

We examine how an auditor assesses the risk of fraud and formulates an audit plan when the auditee has the opportunity to commit various types of fraud. Unlike previous studies, the audi‐tee can misappropriate assets (defalcation), misreport financial information (fraudulent financial reporting), or misreport financial information in combination with defalcation. Our results identify four possible equilibria whose characteristics depend on the auditee's relative rewards and penalties from the various types of fraud, the cost of audit effort, and expectations about the auditee‐firm's performance. When the cost of audit effort is sufficiently small, fraud risk assessment depends on the auditee's rewards and penalties associated with each type of fraud, but not on the auditor's beliefs about firm performance. The auditor develops an audit plan that focuses on the type of fraud the auditee is most motivated to commit, and in turn, the audit plan deters all other types of fraud.     

The Relation between Strategy,CEO Selection,and Firm Performance

We examine whether a firm's strategic priorities influence its selection of a new CEO and what conditions enable such an appointment to add value to the firm. More specifically, this study investigates the value‐adding effect when prospector firms (i.e., those pursuing a prospector‐type strategy) select a CEO with high social capital. We argue that uncertainty, driven by a firm's strategy, will determine the decision to select a CEO with high social capital; such CEOs can use their networks to mitigate the uncertainty and thus can be valuable to the firm. However, prior research indicates that CEOs with high social capital can engage in behavior detrimental to firm value. To mitigate the potential for this to occur, we assess whether corporate governance can play a role in prospector firms who appoint CEOs with high social capital. Drawing on archival data of CEO successions over a 14‐year period, we find that prospector firms have greater incentives to appoint CEOs with high social capital. We also find that prospector firms who appoint a CEO with high social capital improve their performance. Furthermore, the value‐adding effect of this selection choice is stronger in prospector firms with good corporate governance.     

Fiscal risks and their impact on banks' capital buffers in South Africa

South Africa's fiscal balances have deteriorated significantly over the last decade, although the economy has been recording disappointing economic growth rates even prior to the COVID-19 crisis. In this paper, we estimate a series of equations to test how sovereign risk premia affect capital buffers, while controlling for variables identified in the literature, such as size of banks and the economic cycle. Unlike other studies, we use actual capital buffers. We show that these are substantively different to the proxy buffers calculated using the common approach in the literature, indicating that results based on proxy measures should be interpreted with caution. Our overall results show a positive relationship between the sovereign risk premium and capital buffers. This suggests that banks are accumulating capital to mitigate against fiscal and other domestic policy risks. It is likely that this is contributing to higher lending rates.     

The Effect of Environmental Risk on the Efficiency of Negotiated Transfer Prices

This study investigates whether environmental risk affects the efficiency of negotiated transfer prices. We analyze a setting where the buyer faces environmental risk but the seller does not. From the risk‐neutral firm's perspective, the transfer should be made in our setting because the expected value of the buyer's profit is greater than the certain opportunity cost of the seller from the transfer. We develop hypotheses to predict that, as environmental risk increases, it becomes more difficult for buyers and sellers to reach agreement. Such difficulty reduces efficiency in terms of both firm profit and negotiation time. We test our hypotheses via an experiment in which buyer and seller dyads negotiate over the transfer of a resource at six levels of environmental risk. Results show that, as predicted, environmental risk decreases efficiency. Specifically, as environmental risk increases, the frequency of agreement decreases, thereby reducing expected firm profit. Further, environmental risk increases negotiation time for those dyads that are able to reach an agreement. Data suggest that the cause of the decreased efficiency is that buyers and sellers use different reference points for determining a fair transfer price and environmental risk exacerbates the effects of such differences.     

Intra‐Industry Information Transfers and the Post‐Earnings Announcement Drift

This study examines the role of intra‐industry information transfers in the analyst forecast‐based post‐earnings announcement drift. I find that subsequent same‐industry‐peer earnings announcements influence a firm's post‐earnings announcement drift if these subsequent announcements confirm the firm's initial earnings surprise and the firm's industry exhibits ex ante positive (common effect) intra‐industry information transfers. The results suggest that underreaction to industry‐specific information contributes to analyst forecast‐based post‐earnings announcement drift.     

Asymétrie d'information,Litiges et Bien‐être social dans le cadre d'un contrat de Partenariat Public/Privé: Le cas de la construction d'infrastructures d'intérêt public en Afrique

Résumé: Dans cet article, nous analysons la structure des contrats optimaux de partenariat Public/Privé concernant la construction d'infrastructures d'intérêt public. Nous considérons une forme générale de contrat incitatif comportant un paiement ex‐post qui dépend du coût du projet observé et d'un prix fixe. Lorsque l'opérateur du projet peut influencer le résultat ex‐post par une action non observable par le partenaire public, il existe un risque de litiges concernant le coût observé ex‐post. On montre que, le contrat optimal réalise un arbitrage entre deux effets: aléa moral et partage du risque. Les mécanismes réalisables en présence ou en absence de litiges sont caractérisés. En cas de litige, le contrat à prix fixe peut être inférieur à un contrat à remboursement de coût. Ce résultat entre en contradiction avec le résultat bien connu selon lequel, en incitant l'agent à exercer un effort de réduction du coût, un contrat à prix fixe domine le contrat à remboursement du coût. Abstract: In this article, we analyzes the optimal structure of public/private partnership agreements, in cases where these contracts concern the construction of economic infrastructure. We consider a form of incentive contract stipulating rules of payment based on the ex post value, which are calculated based on the observed costs of the project and a fixed price. In cases where a private contractor can influence the final cost of a project by an action unobservable by the principal, there is a risk that a dispute will arise concerning the project's observable cost. We show that, the optimal contract establish a balance between moral hazard and risk sharing. We derive the feasible mechanisms, either in the presence or absence of litigation. In litigation contest, a fixed‐price contract may be inferior to a cost‐plus contract. This result stands in contrast to the well‐established finding that, in providing incentive for the agent to engage in cost‐reducing effort, a fixed‐price contract dominates a cost‐plus contract.     

The Influence of Firms' Emissions Management Strategy Disclosures on Investors' Valuation Judgments

Recent accounting research indicates that capital markets price firms' greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and that disclosed emissions levels are negatively associated with firms' market values. The departure point for this study is to investigate whether investors value firms differently based on the strategies firms use to mitigate GHG emissions. These strategies include making operational changes, which reduces emissions attributable to the firm, and purchasing offsets, which reduces emissions unattributable to the firm. Using an experiment, we hold constant a firm's financial performance, investment in emissions mitigation, and net emissions, and find evidence that nonprofessional investors perceive the firm to be more valuable when it primarily uses an operational change strategy versus an offsets strategy. However, consistent with theory, this result only occurs when the firm's prior sustainability performance is below the industry average and not when it is above the industry average. This difference in firm value is consistent with the notion that nonprofessional investors believe information about a firm's emissions management strategy is material. Supplemental exploratory analyses reveal that our results are mediated by investors' perception that an operational change strategy is more socially and environmentally responsible than an offsets strategy for below industry average firms. Implications for our findings on theory and practice are discussed.     

Firm Efficiency in Cambodia's Garment Industry on the Eve of the Multi‐Fiber Arrangement Termination

Applying a frontier analysis to 2004 firm‐level data, the present paper investigates firm efficiency and its determinants for Cambodia's garment industry. The study finds that firm experience and remuneration are crucial for improving scale efficiency and overall technical efficiency, while effective use of capital and adequate labor‐skill development are important for enhancing a firm's technical capabilities. Foreign‐owned enterprises with a relatively larger share of foreign labor outperform local firms. However, the present study does not reveal evidence of any advantages of a cluster‐type concentration in Phnom Penh and export markets, nor of any positive impacts of product specialization. The findings imply a need to support skill development for workers and local managers at the middle management level, and to streamline foreign direct investment measures to attract greater numbers of efficient foreign enterprises, so as to promote the development of the garment industry as a whole.     

公司信息披露质量对投资者交易行为的影响——基于对深圳上市公司的经验分析

本文在控制样本自选择偏误的基础上.实证分析了我国上市公司的信息披露质量差异对投资者交易行为的影响.研究发现,投资者在关于股票价格和风险的交易决策时对不同信息披露质量的公司具有行为差异,高披露质量的公司有较低的信息成本和市场风险;但是,公司信息披露质量高低对投资者的股票交易数量、交易速率的影响尚不显著,且不知情者"跟随"交易现象明显,市场投机氛围重,表明我国证券市场的有效程度尚待提高.本研究为规范和引导我国上市公司的信息披露行为及健全证券市场制度提供了经验证据.     

Discussion of “The Effect of Information on Uncertainty and the Cost of Capital”

Johnstone (2016) provides a theoretical analysis of how information might increase uncertainty and a firm's cost of equity capital (COEC). The author's analysis serves to highlight outcomes that he suggests receive limited attention in prior studies. He focuses on how more information might result in greater, rather than less, uncertainty and whether a decrease in uncertainty leads to a lower COEC. I discuss how his study provides an incremental contribution to the theoretical literature and ways in which future work in this area might provide a richer framework for empirical studies.