Is Being Stuck with a Five Percent Growth Rate a New Normal for Indonesia?

Indonesia’s economic growth over the past three years has been stuck at approximately 5% annually, despite a changing global environment and the Indonesian government’s efforts to boost growth. This paper asks whether this level of growth is a new normal for Indonesia—i.e. do government efforts and the global environment matter, or will the country’s economic growth remain at around 5% annually. If private consumption, the major component of GDP, continues to grow at its current level and inflation is controlled, this paper concludes that Indonesia might maintain its current annual growth rate of 5% for several more years. The probability of higher growth, however, is not promising. Lower growth seems more likely. To ensure the current level of economic growth will be sustained in the foreseeable future, this paper recommends stricter economic reforms to allow larger and more productive capital investments; more aggressive management of exchange rates to improve the country’s competitiveness; a more effective fiscal space to support improvements to needed infrastructure by developing innovation to increase revenue; a reduced energy subsidy; and a more flexible upper bound of deficit. Effective programs to improve the country’s human capital and innovation are crucial.     

Indonesian politics in 2013: the emergence of new leadership?

The rise of Joko Widodo (Jokowi) from small-town mayor to presidential frontrunner asks again whether new, alternative leaders could enter Indonesian politics in the 2014 elections. This article surveys Jokowi's impact on Indonesian politics over the past 12 months, and examines whether his election as Jakarta governor, and his evident popularity, has opened the way for alternative candidates at local level, or if it has changed parties’ calculations for the presidential election. The article concludes by considering whether a new leader could tackle some of the entrenched defects of democracy in Indonesia, given that he or she may have only minority support in the parliament. The article focuses in particular on corrupt law enforcement, the military and the rule of law, and violent religious intolerance.     

Survey of Recent Developments

Amid global economic uncertainty and tumbling world oil prices, Indonesia's economy faces pressure on its external balance and a continued growth slowdown. The government of President Joko Widodo (widely known as Jokowi) has set an agenda of reform, including simpler, faster investment licensing, historic cuts to fuel subsidies to generate fiscal savings, and increased spending on infrastructure. On the political side, Jokowi has had to deal with several political issues coming not only from parties in opposition but also from parties supporting his government, including during the formation of the new cabinet. We examine the consequences so far of the government's policy initiatives and of the policymaking process. While some initiatives have been implemented with success, some seem to have been launched without enough preparation, consultation, or empirical evidence, and many have been poorly communicated. Although inflation accelerated after the November fuel-price rise, efforts have been made to contain inflationary expectations and to mitigate the effects on poverty through social-assistance programs. The government took steps to cushion the impending impacts of higher fuel prices on vulnerable households by giving cash handouts of Rp 200,000 per month to 15.5 million disadvantaged families who receive the lowest level of welfare, and by promoting publicly funded education and health care. The partial removal of gasoline subsidies and the introduction of a fixed-subsidy policy for diesel in the revised 2015 budget reduce uncertainty about the fiscal position, although increases in government spending in infrastructure development were announced at the same time. The revised budget for 2015 increases spending on infrastructure development by 63% from the 2014 budget, mostly on projects to improve connectivity on land and at sea—such as the development of toll roads, railways, and ports—and to increase the performance of the agricultural sector. However, the recent drop in international oil prices forced the government to increase its target for tax revenue by 30% on last year's target, raising concerns about the effect of falling oil prices on the economy. Trade and investment policy reform is important in unlocking Indonesia's growth potential and improving the country's current external balance. Jokowi's administration, however, has been sending mixed signals about its position towards more open policies. The country has yet to recommence several trade negotiations that were postponed in 2014 and is still struggling to meet its commitments under the ASEAN Economic Community. Although improvement in investment procedures and licensing is currently underway, Indonesia needs to adopt a more positive attitude if it is to attract more investment.     

Fiscal Consolidation and the Public Sector Balance Sheet in South Africa

Between 1994 and 2008 the South African government reduced its debt/GDP ratio from almost 50% to 27%. Unfortunately this reduction was accompanied by a significant decrease in government's fixed capital/GDP ratio from 90% to 55% – fiscal sustainability might have been restored, but government's balance sheet did not improve. A similar story can be told for State Owned Enterprises. Since the Great Recession the fiscal situation worsened markedly – the public debt ratio again approaches 50%. To restore fiscal sustainability this article suggests that the government faces two options: (1) to create room for future countercyclical policy, the government must cut current expenditure and reduce the public debt/GDP ratio to its pre‐crisis level, or (2) substitute much‐needed infrastructure capital expenditure for current expenditure while stabilising the debt/GDP ratio at its post‐crisis level. Given that the much lower fixed capital/GDP ratio inhibits economic growth, the latter option might be more sensible.     

A note on policies for the oil and gas sector

Production of oil and gas in Indonesia has fallen steadily during the last decade, owing to a combination of reduced exploration efforts and natural decline in currently producing fields. To counter-balance declining reserves in mature oil fields and a lack of expansion of known natural gas reserves, policy makers are now pursuing exploration initiatives more energetically. However, producers have expressed deep concern about the prospects for fair cost-recovery rules, and about the legal and regulatory environment more generally. Three issues are particularly relevant to the investment climate: resource nationalism; the anti-corruption drive; and decentralisation. Steps that the government could take include stemming the erosion of fiscal terms in contracts and ensuring contract sanctity. And although economic nationalists will find it hard to accept, maximising the benefits to the Indonesian people of exploiting the nation's hydrocarbon resources will require the presence of the world's most efficient operators.     

Addressing Indonesia’s Infrastructure Deficit

Between September 2015 and February 2016, the government of President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) unveiled 10 economic policy packages in an effort to promote deregulation and support investment in key sectors. Foreign investors, at whom many of these measures are directed, have viewed the packages with a mix of cautious optimism and healthy scepticism. Investors have often heard Jokowi announce that Indonesia welcomes foreign capital, only to see these commitments countermanded by the actions of ministers and officials wanting more restrictive regulations and practices. It therefore remains uncertain whether these announcements and policy packages will lead to actual reform.

One area in which the government is showing both intent and progress is infrastructure. Decades of under-investment and poor asset management have left Indonesia with a major infrastructure deficit, the economic and social costs of which are substantial. There are encouraging signs, however. Jokowi’s administration is continuing its agenda of fiscal reform, shifting budget allocations away from energy subsidies and towards capital spending; investment approvals in infrastructure are rising fast; and the country’s four largest construction firms have reported a large jump in the value of government-awarded contracts. Recent months have also seen the completion of the Makassar–Parepare segment of the Trans-Sulawesi railway and the first stage of the New Priok Port at Tanjung Priok, while the long-awaited Umbulan Springs project, which will supply water to Surabaya and surrounding areas, has been awarded to a preferred bidder.

Demonstrating rapid progress in delivering infrastructure is clearly important to the Jokowi administration, but longer-term challenges remain. For one, Indonesia’s inefficient planning and delivery model for national roads needs to be overhauled if the country is to safeguard its economic growth. The government has yet to fully tackle this and other long-term reforms; it has, however, recently introduced regulations that augur well for new flows of private investment, such as reinstating the role of such investment in the water sector and allowing for a more realistic risk allocation in public–private partnerships.     

Covid-19, Economic Growth and South African Fiscal Policy

Following years of fast-rising debt levels, we show that the Covid-19 crisis worsened an already deteriorating fiscal position in South Africa. To restore fiscal sustainability in the aftermath of the crisis some commentators argue that higher government expenditure will grow GDP sufficiently to stabilise the debt/GDP ratio. We reject this, showing that although a real increase in expenditure stimulates economic growth (a short-run, once-off effect), the public expenditure/GDP ratio exceeds the level at which an increase in the ratio positively impacts growth. We then explore the past efforts of government to maintain or restore fiscal sustainability by estimating a fiscal reaction function using a Markov-switching model. Following the impact of the Covid-19 crisis on the budget, we subsequently establish the deficit, expenditure and revenue adjustments that the government will have to make to restore fiscal sustainability. Finally, we consider the merits of introducing a debt ceiling.     

Survey of recent developments

Two major factors, one internal and one external, shaped developments through the middle of 2004. The internal factor was the national election process, which led to a realignment of political power among the parties in the legislative elections in April, and offered the prospect of even greater changes in the presidential election to follow. The external factor was foreign capital, which readily flowed into Indonesia in the early months of 2004, reflected in a series of record highs in the Jakarta Stock Exchange index, but then seemed to waver in May, perhaps because of the growing threat of higher US interest rates, uncertainty about the election, or concern about inflation. Sharp declines in the value of the rupiah and local stocks mirrored similar though less severe developments throughout Southeast Asia and around the globe.

The imminent first-ever election of an Indonesian president through a direct vote by the public raised hopes of change for the better, particularly with respect to governance and the performance of the economy. However, the structural factors that have held back economic growth in Indonesia since the crisis of 1997–98 will not change overnight. The new president could have a popular mandate, but will have to assemble a coalition in a parliament in which power will be more fragmented than ever.

As the presidential election approached, polls showed the electorate's top priorities to be an improved economy and reduced corruption. However, recent months have witnessed several steps backward, as interventions in domestic trade and the escalation of fuel subsidies have created costly inefficiencies and new opportunities for corruption. A recent proposal to establish a vast new social security system monopolised by the government is also problematic in an environment in which governance remains weak. Personal income tax changes being considered by the Ministry of Finance could significantly reduce government revenues, an outcome the government can ill afford.

Despite enactment of a host of new laws in the last six years in such areas as anti-monopoly, bankruptcy and anti-corruption, as well as the initiation of a long-term judicial reform process, recent events have shown that the legal system remains a major source of uncertainty in the business environment.     

Indonesian Politics in 2014: Democracy’s Close Call

Indonesian democracy experienced a near miss in 2014, when Jakarta governor Joko Widodo (Jokowi) defeated former general Prabowo Subianto by a margin of 6.3% in the presidential election. Both candidates were populists who rose to prominence in the context of public disillusionment with incumbent president Yudhoyono; Prabowo, however, condemned Indonesia's democratic system and promised to take Indonesia in a more authoritarian direction. We trace democracy's close call through five phases: the dying months of Yudhoyono's presidency, the rise of populist alternatives, the parliamentary elections of April 2014, the July presidential campaign, and the aftermath. We attribute the strength of Prabowo's campaign to superior organisational and financial support, while Jokowi's victory rested upon strong identification with him among poor and rural voters. Also determining the outcome was the fact that public satisfaction with democracy remained strong, undermining the effectiveness of Prabowo's authoritarian-populist message. Nevertheless, democracy's future remains uncertain, given that Prabowo and his supporters now control a sufficiently large number of parliamentary seats to continue promoting a rollback of democratic reforms.     

Survey of recent developments

Little has happened to dispel concern that reform momentum is dissipating. New National Economic and Innovation Committees to help accelerate development will probably achieve little: resolving many key economic policy issues is straightforward technically, so the real obstacle to doing so is lack of political will and leadership.

It appears that economic growth has stabilised rather than continuing to accelerate. Investment is still strong, but fiscal policy is no longer providing a stimulus. Soeharto-era attachment to small budget deficits remains evident in the 2011 budget, which persists in spending heavily on subsidies at the expense of investment in sorely needed infrastructure. The demand for net exports had temporarily constrained growth, but by Q2 2010 this was no longer the case. Manufacturing has been in the doldrums, partly because of surging export commodity prices and volumes, but its recent growth seems more promising. International reserves continue to accumulate because of the commitment of Bank Indonesia (BI) to avoiding rupiah appreciation, which makes monetary policy difficult and costly to implement. BI has responded by allowing some appreciation, an acceleration of inflation and a small increase in the interest rate on its certificates of deposit, and by forcing banks to place more funds with it at low or zero interest. At last it has begun to tighten monetary policy, but this is likely to increase capital inflow, despite the introduction of a new capital control. The incompatibility of BI's monetary and exchange rate policies will therefore continue to cause problems. Rapid rice price inflation, however, is not the fault of the central bank, but a consequence of the policy of preventing Indonesia from participating more fully in the world rice market.

Official indicators suggest that the banking sector is in good condition. One concern is that interest margins are too high, which seems to be attributable to inefficiency in government-owned banks. If pressure to prevent or roll back increased foreign ownership of Indonesian banks is successful, this is likely to make the banking system even less efficient. Indonesia continues to have difficulty competing for foreign investment with comparator countries such as Thailand, Vietnam and Brazil: much remains to be done to improve the climate for doing business. The government appears to be pondering more serious approaches to tackling the problem of Jakarta's congestion, although conflicting signals on this have emerged. Solutions are seen in expansion of transport infrastructure and improvement of its management, and in the introduction of electronic tolling on main roads.     

Survey of Recent Developments

Following the remarkably successful 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections in Indonesia, attention now turns to the new president and his agenda for the next five years. President Joko Widodo, known as Jokowi, has emphasised the importance of strong economic growth and rising living standards. But he faces significant, broad-ranging economic challenges and, perhaps not surprisingly, serious discussion of these issues did not feature during the election campaigns. In many respects the economy is at a crossroads, facing the choice between a business-asusual scenario of no reform and consequently sluggish economic growth, and a politically difficult reform agenda that would set it on a higher growth path. Economic policymakers regard the events of 2013 as a mini economic crisis, and they feel vindicated in their explicit preference for stability over growth—that is, for slowing the economy through tighter fiscal and monetary policy and letting the currency decline. For now, the economy is slowing but holding up quite well, especially by comparative international norms and considering foreign and domestic headwinds, including possible macroeconomic and financial fragilities. Here we examine these headwinds—from global economic volatility and declining commodity prices, particularly in the wake of the so-called Bernanke shock of May 2013, to the continuing policy drift at home. We investigate whether there is evidence of an emerging adjustment from the commodity-driven growth of the past decade to some of the traditional tradables sectors, especially manufacturing. While the commodity boom is almost certainly a thing of the past—at least at levels witnessed since 2005—the country's political narratives and the government's microeconomic policies appear to be still premised on an era of plenty funded by a disappearing boom. We speculate on likely options and directions for what in all likelihood will be a ‘Jokowi decade’.     

市场压力、财政补贴与上市高新技术企业双元创新投资

探讨上市高新技术企业如何利用财政补贴资源实施双元创新投资,并进一步分析市场压力对财政补贴激励双元创新投资的调节作用。研究发现：(1)财政补贴对企业创新投资具有激励效应,相对开发式创新投资,财政补贴对企业探索式创新投资具有更强的激励效应;(2)资本市场业绩预期压力的增加会显著促进财政补贴对企业开发式创新投资的激励效应;(3)当企业面临产品市场竞争与资本市场业绩预期双重压力时,财政补贴对企业开发式创新投资的激励效应更明显。研究结论对于引导企业合理分配财政补贴资源、减少创新投资的短视行为、提升企业自主创新能力和竞争优势具有一定的理论与现实意义。     

Survey of recent developments

Despite a turbulent global economy and expectations that declining exports would cause an economic slowdown, the Indonesian economy grew at 6.5% in 2011. The growth rate was supported by high consumer confidence – the result of lower inflation of just 3.8% in 2011. Nevertheless, there were indications that the global financial crisis had had an impact on Indonesia in the last quarter of 2011, notably on the growth of exports and imports.

In October 2011, President Yudhoyono reshuffled his cabinet, citing a need to improve its performance in the administration's remaining three years. The reshuffle showed that the president is still subject to political party pressures. Moreover, the governing coalition of parties remains weak. Agreements made within coalition meetings are often broken in the parliament, and coalition parties are frequently distracted by media polemics. The case of former Democrat Party treasurer Nazaruddin, arrested in Colombia following a two-month manhunt, has revealed the magnitude of the money politics surrounding the Democrat Party, whose ratings are declining rapidly.

Indonesia enters 2012 bolstered by the restoration of its investment-grade credit rating. This will expose Indonesia to increased capital flows, since many funds are permitted to invest only in investment-grade countries. The effects on foreign direct investment (FDI) are not automatic, however. These investors evaluate the wider business climate and economic governance in making their investment decisions.

The fuel subsidy remains a challenge for Indonesia in 2011/12. Parliament rejected a proposal to limit fuel consumption from April 2012 over doubts about the government's readiness to handle the policy's technical complexity. Now the government is again considering a fuel price increase, and will have to seek parliamentary approval soon.

Indonesia faces a long-term problem of regional inequality. After four decades of economic development there is little variation in the shares of GDP across regions, but GDP per capita in some regions is slipping behind that of Java. Regional development policy needs to generate more economic activities in the outer islands, and to learn from the mistakes of past initiatives to promote economic development and growth centres in the regions. It is important to align policies with the current decentralisation arrangements.

The government is revising Law 33/2004 on Intergovernmental Finance with the aim of improving some dimensions of decentralisation in Indonesia. Revenue certainty is to be enhanced in part through changes to the general allocation grant (DAU) formula and the disbursement mechanism for intergovernmental transfers. The planned revision has not, however, addressed sufficiently the problem of inefficiency in regional spending. In fact, some of the proposed solutions may well create further spending inefficiency.

The main barrier to increased FDI is infrastructure development, whose progress has been slowed by land procurement problems. Unfortunately, Law 2/2012 on Land Procurement for Public Purposes seems unlikely to deliver a clear solution to the key problem of determining fair prices for land compensation. What is needed is the creation of more independent price-setting committees, with sufficient capacity to disentangle the problems of land acquisition.     

PUBLIC ENVIRONMENTAL EXPENDITURES IN INDONESIA

The economic justification for public expenditure is especially strong in the case of environmental management. Yet expenditures on environmental management have received little attention in public expenditure reviews by the World Bank and other international development organisations. An initial analysis of environmental expenditures in the Indonesian government budget between FY1994/95 and FY1998/99 yields four basic findings. First, most spending in the nominal environmental sector, sector 10 (Environment and Spatial Planning), is on non-environmental activities, and much environmental expenditure occurs in other budget sectors. Second, environmental expenditures fell sharply in real terms during the economic crisis, to levels far below those in FY94/95. Third, they also fell sharply relative to the budget and to GDP. Finally, environmental expenditures declined more in Indonesia during the economic crisis than in Malaysia, Thailand and Korea, relative to both the budget and GDP.     

Indonesia's Investment Negative List: an evaluation for selected services sectors

In March 2007, Indonesia's parliament approved a landmark new law on investment. Law 25/2007 replaces separate laws on foreign and domestic investment from 1967 and 1968, and provides a single legislative framework for domestic and foreign investment. The law states that all business sectors are open to investment, including foreign investment, unless specified in a presidential regulation containing Indonesia's Investment Negative List (DNI). This paper summarises the results of four sector studies undertaken to review implementation of the investment law. The purpose of the DNI is to provide certainty to investors by documenting restrictions in a single list, thereby eliminating the power of ministries to set their own rules. This paper finds that, in practice, considerable uncertainty remains, arising particularly from the law's implementing regulations. Furthermore, new ministerial decrees and laws appear to bypass the list and may reflect a trend towards greater restriction of foreign investment in Indonesia.     

基础设施建设支出、结构性减税与最优政策选择

财政政策的最优政策选择问题对于国家宏观调控政策的出台具有指导意义。既往的研究忽略了利用动态一般均衡的方法探求具有双重外部性的基础设施建设支出与结构性减税支出的政策选择问题。本文利用引入基础设施建设支出和结构性减税的新凯恩斯DSGE模型,测算比较基建支出和结构性减税的政策福利效应。研究表明：具有双重外部性的基础设施建设支出不仅可以通过提高生产效率的方式促进产出,还可以通过挤入居民消费的方式加强政策福利效应。经过测算,短期的基建支出乘数大于结构性减税的政策乘数。同时,基建支出长期平均产出乘数小于结构性减税的平均产出乘数。与结构性减税政策相比,增加基建支出对于财政资金有限的政府是短期内更加有效的产出刺激政策,但在长期中,结构性减税政策不仅具有较高的政策效应,还可以从消费、劳动、投资等角度实现结构性政策目标。进一步研究发现,地区经济发展水平的不同会导致各地区的最优政策选择存在差异性：发达地区可以通过结构性税收政策解决结构性问题的同时实现长期经济增长;而欠发达地区则更应该注重运用基础设施建设为主的支出政策以促进经济增长;但随着人口逐渐从欠发达地区流出,提高欠发达地区的基建支出是否是可行之策,还需要考虑区域协调发展等诸多因素。     

Indonesian politics in 2010: the perils of stagnation

In the first year after President Yudhoyono's re-election, Indonesian politics continued to evolve in largely familiar patterns. Contrary to the expectations of some observers, Yudhoyono's strong popular mandate and his Democratic Party's newly won parliamentary plurality did not result in significant changes to the president's cautious style of governing or the fickle nature of president–parliament relations. Most political parties also opted for continuity over change, electing or re-electing established figures as leaders despite high levels of public dissatisfaction with their performance. The fact that the 2009 election failed to generate any new momentum for reform does not augur well for the remainder of Yudhoyono's second term. Although the basic parameters of Indonesia's democracy remain intact, political developments during 2010 have also confirmed a pattern of stagnation that is likely to see Indonesia barely muddle through as a reasonably stable yet low-quality democracy.     

AN ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA

This paper analyses long‐term trends in the development of South Africa's economic infrastructure and discusses their relationship with the country's long‐term economic growth. A database covering national accounts data, railways, roads, ports, air travel, phone lines and electricity was established for this purpose, and may facilitate further quantitative research. PSS (Pesaran, Shin and Smith, 1996, 2001) F‐tests are used to identify directions of association between economic infrastructure and economic growth. These indicate long‐run forcing relationships from public‐sector economic infrastructure investment and fixed capital stock to gross domestic product (GDP), from roads to GDP, and from GDP to a range of other types of infrastructure. There is also evidence of potential simultaneity between specific types of infrastructure and GDP. The evidence suggests three main findings. Firstly, the relationship between economic infrastructure and economic growth appears to run in both directions. Inadequate investment in infrastructure could create bottlenecks, and opportunities for promoting economic growth could be missed. Secondly, South Africa's stock of economic infrastructure has developed in phases. Policymakers should focus on choosing or encouraging the right type of infrastructure at the right time. Thirdly, the need for investment in economic infrastructure never goes away. The maintenance and expansion of infrastructure are important dimensions of supporting economic activity in a growing economy, provided that individual projects are chosen on the basis of appropriate cost‐benefit analyses.     

Survey of recent developments

Recent political developments are slowing reforms. The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and the finance ministry find themselves entrapped in legal inquiries and political wrangling that seem intended to weaken their reforming zeal. KPK's effectiveness has been undermined by legislative changes and the arrests of three of its commissioners. Meanwhile, the costly bail-out of a small bank has provided an opportunity for attacks on leading reformers – Vice President Boediono and the Minister of Finance, Sri Mulyani Indrawati. The president's diffident stance in both instances has played into the hands of the opposition and, although key reformers are likely to remain in office, the political imbroglio has nonetheless eroded confidence in the government.

Year-on-year GDP growth recovered strongly to 5.4% in the fourth quarter of 2009. Government spending has been the key driver, while household spending slowed and investment remained low. Both exports and imports have returned to modest growth. Although 2009 ended with low inflation, Bank Indonesia (BI) has set its target inflation rate for 2010 at double the rate it achieved in November. BI is likely to bow to populist demands to lower nominal interest rates rather than raising them somewhat to prevent inflation accelerating, even though its real policy rate has been consistent with significant acceleration of GDP growth. The 2009 budget outcomes confirm that the fiscal stimulus in response to the global financial crisis has been less than hoped for. As for 2010, high world oil prices will imply huge subsidies, given that the government is unwilling to increase domestic fuel and electricity prices commensurately.

The president announced that virtually all the government's ‘first 100 days’ program targets have been met. However, half of the ‘action plans’ amounted to nothing more than issuing or announcing new regulations, plans, blueprints, guidelines, recommendations or policies, or simply preparing drafts of these. No real progress has been made in relation to the most urgent reforms, particularly on energy subsidies and labour market regulation. Realising that the whole population would benefit in net terms, the previous government signed the ASEAN–China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) in November 2004. But just when the agreement was to take effect, strong resistance from business and parliamentarians emerged, leading to the government's decision to re-negotiate many tariffs with China. This is disappointing: failing to uphold its commitments under this long-standing agreement makes Indonesia appear unreliable as an economic partner.     

SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Summary Apart from the peaceful December elections in Aceh, many major recent news stories from Indonesia have been about disasters of some kind: the sinking of an interisland ferry, the crash of a commercial plane, the continuing misery caused by a seemingly unstoppable mud flow in East Java, and severe flooding in and around Jakarta. The largely symbolic dissolution of the Consultative Group on Indonesia in January has helped neutralise economic nationalist criticism of the president.

The rate of output growth rose to 6.1% in the December quarter, driven by a sudden surge in investment spending. Inflation was modest, at 6.3% in the year to January 2007; the exchange rate has been steady; and the Jakarta Stock Exchange has been booming. The budget deficit is well under control, and public debt continues to decline relative to GDP. At the same time, it is a concern that exchange rate and monetary policies have increasingly come to resemble those in the months preceding the 1997–98 crisis.

Recent surveys confirm that Indonesia's investment climate remains poorer than those of its neighbours. The problem is exemplified by the uncertainty facing new investment in the oil and mining sectors: oil exploration has been sluggish, causing output to fall well below Indonesia's OPEC quota and, although mining operations have been highly profitable in recent years, spending on exploration and new mine development has declined steadily. Meanwhile, the government's hopes of improving infrastructure through public–private partnerships were met with a wait-and-see attitude by private sector participants attending a second infrastructure summit in November.

Non-oil manufacturing grew more slowly than GDP in 2006, reversing the outcome for 2005. Non-oil manufactured exports grew steadily over 2004–06, but there seems little prospect of a resumption of the double-digit growth of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Aside from the poor investment climate and infrastructure shortcomings, the constraints on manufactured export growth include strong competition from China and Vietnam and declining competitiveness resulting from big increases in regulation-driven labour costs.

In March 2006 the poverty rate stood at 17.8%, up from 16.0% in February 2005. A World Bank study has attributed this to the large increase in rice prices caused by the ban on rice imports. It argues that the Unconditional Cash Transfer program, which provided direct cash transfers to 19.2 million poor and near-poor households, more than offset the impact of the steep fuel price increases in 2005, although these findings have been the subject of vigorous debate.