Assessment of Local Public Finance Performance in China When Undesirable Fiscal Phenomena are Taken into Account

Making use of the data envelopment analysis (DEA) technique and taking undesirable fiscal phenomena into account, this paper comprehensively quantifies the public finance performance of local governments in China during the course of fiscal decentralization reform. The introduction of undesirable fiscal outcomes into this assessment makes it possible to identify meaningful and informative characteristics of local public finance performance in China. When reforms are first implemented, local public financial performance improves because undesirable fiscal phenomena have not yet become too serious. The tax sharing system reform did not work well in its early stages, and negatively impacted public expenditure efficiency. The reform started to play a substantial role between 2001 and 2005, when local governments experienced better public finance performance. Corresponding to the deterioration of the financial sector in recent years, local public financial performance worsened after 2007. Further reform of the current fiscal and taxation system is necessary in China, to ensure a brighter future for the nation.     

财政分权对我国城市房价的影响——以杭州市为例

2016年,中国的房地产市场依旧火热,房价增长迅速,热点频出,当然,房价的疯狂上涨也带来了很多难以解决的问题。研究财政分权,土地财政和房地产价格三者之间的关联,并通过对杭州市的相关数据进行实证分析,运用格兰杰检验分析杭州市的财政分权,土地财政和房地产价格,得出如下结论：财政分权使地方政府寻求更多的收入来源,加剧了地方政府对房地产业的扶持,并且导致了土地财政,从而正面影响了房地产价格。     

中国地方政府公共卫生支出行为实证分析

公共卫生支出属于财政支出的重要组成部分。合理界定公共卫生支出占财政支出的比重是公共财政体制的重要内容。文章对2004-2010年间全国31省、市、自治区面板数据进行实证分析研究了影响地方财政公共卫生支出的因素及效应。研究表明:人口规模、经济发展水平、城市化程度和与财政公共卫生支出之间存在一定的相关性。财政分权对公共卫生支出具有很小的负面影响,政府规模的膨胀程度、人口结构与财政公共卫生支出并没有必然的因果关系。     

Fiscal Decentralization or Centralization: Diverging Paths of Chinese Cities

If fiscal decentralization promotes growth, why do some regions decentralize more than others? This article identifies the growing divergence of fiscal centralization among Chinese cities and explains it in a public finance framework. It argues that fiscal decentralization and its economy‐liberalizing effect entail significant short‐term fiscal risk. The more a locality relies on uncompetitive business ownership for fiscal revenue, the less likely fiscal decentralization is to occur. This article compiles a dataset of 20 provincial capitals between 1999 and 2016 to test for the connection between a city's tax base and its fiscal centralization level. It then pairs two “most similar” cities to trace how fiscal security concerns drove their fiscal and economic policies apart. This article adds a micro‐level perspective to the literature on fiscal federalism. By pointing out the fiscal constraints confronting local governments, it offers a new angle to understand the different growth paths of Chinese cities.     

Indonesian Local Government Spending,Taxing and Saving: An Explanation of Pre‐ and Post‐decentralization Fiscal Outcomes*

As a result of Indonesia's decentralization program, local governments have gained significantly more responsibility for service delivery, considerably larger fiscal resources, and much greater authority over the use of those resources than before. The present paper develops a simple budget model to describe and explain the substantial differences in pre‐ and post‐decentralization local government fiscal behavior related to spending, taxing and saving. During the post‐decentralization period special attention is paid to the fiscal behavior of natural resource rich regions. Among other things, the evidence suggests that: post‐decentralization local government spending is partly responsive to increasing needs and partly the subject of elite capture; local government taxation has become more aggressive under decentralization and appears to be mostly driven by local bureaucratic expectations related to routine overhead budgets; and the increased savings of local governments during the post‐decentralization period is determined to a large degree by delayed central government transfer payments.     

财政分权、空间外溢与区域经济增长

分税制改革以后,税收体系被划分为中央与地方两大部分,正式建立起以分税制为中心的财政分权体制。各地区的财政分权程度不仅对本地经济增长有直接影响,还对其他地区的经济增长有间接影响,即存在空间溢出效应。利用我国2005年至2018年31个省（市、自治区）的面板数据,运用空间面板模型,估计和检验财政分权对经济增长的空间效应。研究结果表明：各地区的财政分权不仅促进本地经济增长,还对其他地区的经济增长有显著正向溢出效应。     

财政分权、经济增长与外贸依存度——基于1978～2007年改革开放30年数据的实证分析

本文以我国1978～2007年的数据,运用协整、Granger因果检验、脉冲响应函数研究了我国财政分权、经济增长对外贸依存度的动态影响。研究发现:长期内,财政分权会推进外贸依存度的提高,而短期内财政分权对外贸依存度的作用不显著;以人均GDP衡量的经济增长,在短期内可提高外贸依存度水平,而在长期中却会降低外贸依存度。分析表明,财政分权引致的地方政府为经济增长而产生的对FDI和出口的激励,以及贸易升级、产业结构调整、内需导向型经济增长模式,是财政分权、经济增长和外贸依存度之间动态关系产生的内在逻辑。     

Financial Resource Base of Sub‐national Governments and Fiscal Decentralization in Ghana

Abstract: The past two decades have witnessed numerous attempts in developing countries at institutionalizing decentralization. Political leaders tended, before then, to believe that centralized planning was the key to economic growth and development. Ghana has not been excluded from this wave towards the transfer of power, competences, resources and functions from the centre to local levels of government. While Ghana has achieved significant political and administrative decentralization as well as decentralized planning, fiscal decentralization has been the unyielding component of the process. This paper examines the desirability, or otherwise, of fiscal decentralization in the context of funding arrangements. It uses the funding regime model as a basis for analysing how regulatory provisions, political and economic factors and practices, determine financial capacity of sub‐national governments. Evidence in the paper leads to the conclusion that sub‐national governments in Ghana do not support fiscal autonomy. They, instead, prefer being served and financed by the central government.     

我国地方财政面临的问题与改革思路

财政改革以来,地方财政的理财主体地位得到了加强,但仍然存在着地方税体系不够健全、财政级次较多、县乡财政困难、地区间财力状况差异较大等一系列问题。改革的基本思路是：深化财政改革,从简化财政级次、建立地方转移支付制度和地方税体系、农村公共财政体制建设、化解地方财政风险等方面采取应对措施。     

Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth in China, 1994–2002

The question of whether fiscal decentralization has affected economic growth since the 1994 fiscal reform in China is interesting to both policy makers and economists. Using a simple model of endogenous growth that incorporates spending by different levels of government, and a panel data set for 30 provinces for the period of 1994–2002, this paper finds that fiscal decentralization contributes significantly to economic growth. This finding is consistent with the theoretical prediction that fiscal decentralization can increase economic efficiency. In addition, this paper attempts to investigate how the relationship between fiscal decentralization and provincial growth differs in the different regions considered. For this purpose, the 30 Chinese provinces and regions are categorized into three conventional economic belts that comprise the eastern, central, and western areas. This study finds that the effects of fiscal decentralization on economic growth vary among these three regions.     

POST‐DECENTRALIZATION REGIONAL ECONOMIES AND ACTORS: PUTTING THE CAPACITY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO THE TEST

Decentralization in Indonesia was introduced institutionally in 2001, with a democratization drive promoted by international donors and by the intention of the new government to clear away the centralistic image of Soeharto. Decentralization has had some effects on regional economies and on local government administration. Compared to the period before decentralization, the share of GRDP and local government finance has increased in Java, though investment and bank borrowing have expanded to the outer islands. In qualitative aspects, decentralization has transferred not only administrative authority but also many new vested interests from the center to regions. Local governments have become more extensive economic actors in regional economies. Regional economic actors now compete actively for such vested interests and have missed the opportunity to create market‐friendly regional economies. The government sector should not be a mere rent‐seeking economic actor, but should play a role as a facilitator promoting private sector activities in regional economies.     

地方政府联动治理农业面源污染的行为博弈

农村面源污染的污染源分散,污染过程复杂,危害后果广泛,治理难度大。所以,它的治理始终是各级政府最为关注的问题。在政府分权改革进程中,地方政府成为相对独立的经济利益主体,自然成为农村环境保护的责任主体。目前国内外的学者多集中研究地方政府如何治理本地区的农村环境问题,对于各级地方政府联合治理污染的研究多集中在流域污染的治理。从地方政府综合效用视角分析地方政府联合治理农村面源污染的研究还鲜有所见。通过地方政府在治理农村面源污染的行为特征分析,运用博弈论方法导出农村面源污染的有效治理必须是各级地方政府联动,准确确定地方政府联动治理的范围,达成联动治理的集体决定,建立维持机制。     

财政分权的绿色经济增长效应研究

财政分权作为调控央地资源的重要手段,对地方绿色经济增长具有重要的影响.首先通过构建环境污染综合指数计算绿色GDP,再构建系统GM M模型,运用2007—2017年中国30个省(市、自治区)的数据,实证分析财政分权与绿色经济增长之间的内在关系.研究结果显示:财政分权对绿色经济增长有显著的促进作用;东部地区的财政分权对刺激绿色经济增长的效果要优于中西部地区.因此,为实现全国经济可持续发展,应持续推进财政分权改革,因地制宜地推动地区经济高质量发展.     

财政分权、地方财政支出偏好与城市用地规模扩张——以长三角地区为例

摘要：文章通过利用1996-2010年长三角地区16个核心城市的面板数据,实证考察了财政分权、地方财政支出与城市用地规模扩张之间的关系。研究表明：财政务权和地方政府竞争体制使得地方政府在财政支出上存在着明显的偏向,三者均是城市用地规模扩张的主要推动因素;不同城市用地规模扩张的速度存在差异;体制因素是城市用地规模盲目扩张的深层次原因。为了从根本土改变地方政府的行为为鼓励,需立足中国实际,完善现有的财政体制,规范中央和地方的财政收支;改革现行的政绩考核体制,保持官员任期的连续性和稳定性;要深化我国的户籍制度改革,打破居民迁移的体制壁垒。实现”用脚投票”的机制．     

Has Fiscal Federalism Worked for Macroeconomic Purposes？ The Chinese Experience 1994-2003

China＇s central government undertook major tax regime reform in 1994 that was characterized by fiscal federalism. In hindsight, this reform might be viewed as being more emphatic towards the revenue side than the expenditure side. The reform has resulted in certain success both for revenue shifting and inflation fighting purposes. However, the reform and its subsequent follow-ups have not addressed some fundamental issues pertaining to China＇s government finance system, such as the overhauling of the function of government finance and redrawing lines between the central and regional governments with regard to their fiscal responsibilities and duties. Moreover, fiscal federalism might have actually increased fiscal burden on the economy, especially on domestic sectors of the economy. However, coupled with enhanced policy support for China＇ s external development, fiscal federalism might have helped to further accelerate resource shifts toward the external sector, thus resulting in an unprecedented rapid expansion in China＇ s exports since the mid1990s.     

当前地方政府融资存在的问题及其治理

文章认为,由于财政分权改革导致地方政府事权与财权不相匹配,使得地方各级政府的财源不能满足现时的地方发展的需求,导致巨额财政赤字。而目前的经济发展模式和中央对地方政府考核以及官员晋升激励模式,使得这一问题更加严重,同时地方政府融资渠道狭窄,导致地方各级政府融资偏离财政监督,宏观调控艰难;地方政府融投资平台开始泛滥,监管体系不健全,导致目前地方政府债务失控;地方政府信息披露机制尚未建立,地方政府融投资信息不透明,使得地方政府的融资风险也难以宏观调控。基于此分析,文章提出了完善法律体系、改革财政分配关系、建立管理机制、完善融资体系和信息披露制度等对策。     

Bureaucratic integration and regional specialization in China

Fiscal decentralization introduced as part of China's economic reform since 1979 has unleashed strong incentives for China's local governments to pursue economic development, but the same incentives have also led to local protectionist policies inhibiting the process of regional specialization. This paper focuses on the constraints or freedom with which local governments can implement their protectionist policies. Using a panel data of 29 China's regions over the time period of 1985–1997, we find that China's political system of bureaucratic integration (specifically, concurrent appointment of local government officials in the central government) imposes constraints on the local governments from practicing protectionism. We also find that the effectiveness of local protectionist policies is limited by market competition, specifically, competition from foreign-invested firms operating in China and foreign imports. Our results on the role of local protectionism remain robust to controls for the regional variations in the size of the economy and the stage of economic development.     

Does local governments’ budget deficit push up housing prices in China?

Budget deficit has been a common fiscal pressure facing Chinese cities since the 1994 fiscal reform. Meanwhile, land lease sales have become a significant off-budgetary revenue to local governments since 2003. This paper investigates whether financing budget deficit is an important driving force of the recent soaring housing prices when local governments function as the monopoly supplier of urban land. A conceptual framework is developed to illustrate a transmission mechanism from budget deficit to housing prices. This leads to an empirical model consisting of two simultaneous structural equations for housing prices and land prices. Using data for the 35 major Chinese cities from 2003 to 2011, an empirical exercise shows that although budget deficit has a positive effect on land prices, it is the factors from demand side, such as amenities, income and the user cost of housing capital, that have been pulling up the housing prices.     

日本财政分权与经济增长

本文利用计量经济模型及其相关数据分析了日本财政分权与经济增长之间的关系。模型中引入了财政分权水平、地区收入自主水平、地区相对富裕度、国库支出金与全部财政支出的比值等因素作为重要的解释变量,通过相关系数的计算、拟合误差对比检验,来探究它们与经济增长之间的关系。研究结果表明:财政支出分权在一定程度上促进了经济的增长,而地区收入自主水平以及国库支出金占全部财政支出的比值则阻碍了经济的增长。     

分权式改革对经济增长影响的实证研究

中国的分权式改革是财政分权、行政分权和经济分权的三重分权过程,仅仅选择单一维度的分权指标,无法准确确认分权的经济增长效应。通过构建分权的多维衡量指标体系,并以1998-2011年省级面板数据为样本,全面分析了分权式改革对经济增长的影响。实证结果显示:分权整体上促进了地方经济增长,但不同维度的分权对经济增长的影响效应并不相同。此外,分权对经济增长的影响还存在显著的地区差异,东部地区分权的经济增长优势高于中西部地区。