Bank dependence and financial constraints on investment: Evidence from the corporate bond market paralysis in Japan

This paper investigates whether firms are able to substitute bank loans for public debt when the latter become less available to firms. To do so, this paper utilizes the 2008 financial crisis and its impact on Japanese markets as a natural experiment. Because the Japanese banking sector remained functional while the corporate bond markets were paralyzed, the data from Japan during this period provide us with an ideal environment to examine this hypothesis. I specifically examined whether firms with large holdings of corporate bonds maturing in FY2008 were financially constrained, by comparing the changes in their capital investment expenditures and borrowing conditions with those of bank-dependent firms. The main empirical results indicate that (1) firms with large holdings of corporate bonds maturing in FY2008 did not reduce investment expenditures; (2) instead, they exhibited higher increments in bank loans; and (3) firms that maintained relatively close bank-firm relationships had greater access to bank loans with low borrowing costs. These findings demonstrate that Japanese firms were able to substitute bank loans for public debt during the crisis and imply that the Japanese banking sector worked efficiently to replace public debt markets during the crisis.     

Demand for Bank Loans and Investment under Borrowing Constraints: A Panel Study of Japanese Firm Data

We estimate a corporate demand model for bank loans on the basis of panel data set of Japanese corporations. What is novel is an explicit treatment of borrowing constraints in the estimation, which is formulated as a function of the land asset of the firms. The model is estimated by employing the econometric technique used for analyzing the disequilibrium model. The virtue of our approach is to separate firms into constrained and unconstrained groups endogenously. We find that land plays a significant role as collateral in mitigating the borrowing constraints. We also compare the investment behavior between the constrained firms and the unconstrained firms. Cash flow as well as land plays a far more vital role in the investment decision for the borrowing-constrained firms. J. Japan. Int. Econ., March 2000, 14(1), pp. 1–21. Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, 6-1 Mihogaoka, Ibaraki 567-0047, Japan; Department of Commerce, Meiji University, 1-1 Kanda Surugadai, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 101-8301, Japan. Copyright 2000 Academic Press.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G32.     

A 50-year history of “zombie firms” in Japan: How banks and shareholders have been involved in corporate bailouts?

We review long-term changes in “zombie firms” in Japan over this half-century using listed firm data with a framework in which the concept of “zombie firms” includes possible efficient bailouts. The first wave of zombie firms occurred during the period of main banks (hereinafter MBs). MBs were able to actively choose which firms would receive bailouts at the time. However, commonly held beliefs about MBs’ monitoring power and the special role of corporate groups and long-term credit banks for bailouts are not supported. In the largest wave of the lost decade, we find the zombie firm problem in the manufacturing sector was just as serious as the non-manufacturing in terms of firm count. Moreover, the pathological phenomena such as unwilling concentration of loans to MBs were also rather typical in the manufacturing. Soft budget constraints have continued in the manufacturing even after the resolution of banks’ non-performing loans since the bubble burst came to an end, leading to the manufacturing-centered third wave of zombie firms following the Global Financial Crisis.     

The Effectiveness of Public Credit Guarantees in the Japanese Loan Market

This paper examines the effectiveness of public credit guarantee programs in not only increasing the availability of loans to small and medium enterprises (SMEs), but in also improving the ex-post performance of borrowing firms. Using a unique panel data set, we identify the effects of a massive credit guarantee program implemented by the Japanese government from 1998 to 2001. While we do find that the availability of loans increased for program participants, when loans were provided by undercapitalized banks the increased liquidity persisted for only a few years. Further, the ex-post performance of program participants, with the exception of firms with sizable net worth, deteriorated relative to their non-participating counterparts.     

The new main bank system

We develop a main bank model where the main bank decides whether or not to raise additional funds from the capital market to continue to invest in a borrowing firm when nonmain banks withdraw funds. We show that the threat of withdrawal of nonmain banks is more likely to force the main bank to perform efficiently in handling troubled loans, thereby preventing problems with zombie firms, if the potential cash flow (liquidation value) of the firm decreases (increases) relative to the amount funded by nonmain banks. The theoretical results provide both efficiency evaluations for the renewal of the main bank relation in Japan after the end of the 1990s and empirical implications for the renewed main bank system.     

Fiscal stress and the formation of zombie firms: Evidence from China

We investigate the causality between government fiscal stress and the formation of zombie firms. We use the province-managing-county reform recently initiated in China to exogenously identify the change in financial pressures of local governments. Matching industrial firm data and county economic data from 1999 to 2013, we carry out difference-in-differences estimation and find that the possibility of zombie firms' formation significantly decreases after the reform. Specifically, the suppression effect is more pronounced in counties with low level of initial economic development, more debt stocks, poor financial situations, and high employment pressures. Further, the mechanism analysis shows that the reform improves firms' performance, such as productivity and profitability, through the decline of tax burden, which inhibits the formation of zombie firms. Our study contributes to a profound understanding of the causes of zombie firms in a large transition economy.     

Financial constraints on investments and credit policy in Korea

The Korean financial system has been characterised by government interference and a chronic shortage of funds. Since the 1960s the government has promoted the financing of large, chaebol-affiliated firms. Towards the end of the 1980s, the government changed its focus from large firms to small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). This study assesses the impact of this change in government policy on the financing constraints of different types of Korean firms. Using data on 198 Korean firms for the period 1991–1997, we estimate several specifications of a dynamic investment model to assess the financing constraints of Korean firms. We find that Korean firms suffered from informational asymmetries and severe financing constraints during this period, and that these imperfections differ across firms. Our findings suggest that the government’s change in focus towards SMEs has been successful in the sense that it has reduced financing constraints for these type of firms. We also find some evidence that firms with concentrated ownership are more financially constrained than firms with dispersed ownership.     

Determinants and effects of the use of COVID-19 business support programs in Japan

Using a survey of and financial data for Japanese small- and medium-enterprises (SMEs), this paper examines the determinants of firms’ use of the business support programs provided by the Japanese government during the COVID-19 pandemic and their effect. With respect to the determinants, we obtain the following three findings: First, firms were more likely to have obtained subsidized loans, grants, or subsidies the more their sales had fallen during the pandemic, suggesting that funds flowed to firms that were adversely affected by the pandemic. Second, the likelihood that firms obtained funds was higher if their credit scores were lower or if they were classified as “zombies” and/or “low-return borrowers” before the pandemic, suggesting that the government programs also helped firms that had been under-performing before the pandemic. Third, firms were more likely to receive funds if they had a stronger relationship with their main bank before, suggesting that bank relationships play an important role in firms’ access to government programs. Regarding the causal effects, we obtain the following three findings: First, except for the subsidies for employment adjustment, the support programs increased the cash holdings of user firms. Second, subsidized loans from private financial institutions lowered exit rates, while none of the programs had a significantly positive effect on employment relative to non-users (or in absolute terms). Third, the credit scores and profit-to-sales ratio of firms that used the support programs decreased and the likelihood of such firms being a zombie and/or a low-return borrower increased. Overall, our findings provide a cautionary tale in that the business support programs produced mixed results in that they may have prevented business failures but have also helped to prop up firms that are not viable in the long run.     

Foreign bank lending and information asymmetries in China: Empirical evidence from the syndicated loan market

This paper considers whether information asymmetries affect the willingness of foreign banks to participate in syndicated loans to corporate borrowers in China. We analyze how ownership concentration, which influences information asymmetries in the relationship between the borrower and the lender, exerts an impact on the participation of foreign banks in syndicated loans granted to Chinese borrowers in the period 2004–2009. We observe that greater ownership concentration of the borrowing firm does not positively influence participation of foreign banks in the loan syndicate. We conclude that information asymmetries are not exacerbated for foreign banks relative to local banks in China.     

Zombie firms and over-capacity in Chinese manufacturing

The problems of over-capacity and zombie firms in China's manufacturing attract all aspects of attention, but academic analysis is still absent. Using firm-level data of Chinese manufacturing, this study first documents the problems of over-capacity and zombie firms during 2011–2013. We find that the over-capacity problem is much more severe in the northeastern and western regions of China, in heavy chemical industries, and in state-owned sector. The distribution of zombie firms is in a similar manner across region, industry and ownership. We also empirically test the relationship between zombie firms and over-capacity, finding that zombie firms cause and worsen over-capacity by crowding out healthy firms.     

Unfinished business: Zombie firms among SME in Japan’s lost decades

The “soft budget problem,” by which banks loosen their lending stances toward long-term client firms despite worsening business conditions, has been widely discussed in the field of financial studies. In Japan, this problem has attracted attention particularly in connection to so-called “zombie firms,” financially weak firms sustained by discounted interest rates and evergreen lending which have become a major research and political interest in recent years. In this article, we focus on zombie firms among small and medium-sized enterprises (SME), a corporate category that has hitherto received less consideration in the discussion about Japan’s zombie firms. We find that: (1) many zombie firms exist among SME and that the zombie firm ratio increases as firm size decreases; and (2) some zombie firms eventually emerge from zombie status among SME. In other words, zombie firms are likely problematic from the view of the efficiency of the industries to which they belong. But when one considers that many zombie firms achieve revival, it would seem inappropriate to uniformly promote their elimination. Since ending zombie status seems to directly imply market exit for many SME, it is important to conduct preliminary screening to prevent the creation of zombie firms in the first place.     

Depressed access to formal finance and the use of credit card debt in Chinese SMEs

SMEs (small and micro enterprises) in developing countries are in general financially depressed; business owners thus resort to other financial instruments (here, personal credit cards) when access to bank loans is prohibited. By investigating two different types of SMEs (namely, informal businesses and formal SMEs) in China, we find that SMEs turn to credit card debt as a substitute when they fail to obtain bank loans. Specifically, we find that households with informal businesses are more likely to use credit cards when their businesses are financially constrained. We also find that when financially constrained, formal SMEs are more likely to carry credit card debt and are also carrying more. This relationship persists after selection issues are addressed. However, credit card debt and bank loans are hardly perfect substitutes as these two instruments may function differently. Consistently, we find that even with bank loans, formal SMEs still carry substantial credit card debt. Additionally, compared to those with no fund need and thus no bank loan, formal SMEs with bank loans are carrying more credit card debt.     

Zombie Firms and Debt Accumulation: A Theoretical Framework and Chinese Experience

In recent years, as China has grappled with rising debt and broad economic restructure, the prevalence of zombie firms has become a critical problem. This paper provides a theoretical framework illustrating the rationale behind the occurrence of zombie firms from the perspective of banks. We develop differential equations to model a bank's expectation and the ex ante estimate that underlies its decision to refinance an insolvent borrower. An optimistic expectation is essential in zombie lending and is intrinsic to the countercyclical pattern of zombie firms. Our model also predicts that debt can build up to an unsustainable level if recovery of profitability is sluggish or the initial debt burden is too high. Examining the Chinese experience of zombie firms over 2007–2017, this paper highlights two findings. First, the share of zombie firms among Shanghai and Shenzhen A‐share listed companies demonstrates a countercyclical pattern. Second, the positive correlation between zombie share and debt accumulation across manufacturing sectors sheds light on the link between zombie firms and the rising corporate debt in China. To deal with the “zombie” problem, the government should carefully weigh its policies to avoid further distortions because the occurrence of zombie firms may be inevitable and impossible to eliminate.     

Loan interest rate pass-through and changes after the financial crisis: Japan’s evidence

We estimate interest rate pass-through in the loan market using an individual bank-based panel dataset from Japan. Previous studies using data from European countries have presented a number of common findings, including that banks with a high proportion of relationship lending tend to set lower pass-through. In this respect, we have obtained similar results using a dataset for Japan going back to the early 2000s. We further examine the influence of borrowing firms’ balance sheet characteristics on loan interest rate pass-through, and find that these additional factors are also important determinants for pass-through dispersion. However, after the recent global financial crisis, even banks with a high proportion of relationship lending have largely lowered loan interest rates by raising pass-through, and pass-through has not necessarily been determined in accordance with borrowing firms’ balance sheet characteristics. These results differ from those of recent studies on European countries. Possible background factors explaining this change are that (i) pressure to lower loan interest rates has risen due to extensive monetary easing and greater lending competition among banks, while Japan’s banking system as a whole has maintained its resilience in the post-crisis period; (ii) demand for bank loans has increased substantially due to disruptions in the market for alternative funding sources, such as commercial paper and corporate bonds; and (iii) public measures to increase bank loans have been broadly introduced in Japan.     

External debt and commitment mechanisms: Danish borrowing in Holland, 1763–1825

External borrowing constituted an important part of sovereign finances in early modern Europe. As payments could not be enforced through third parties, sovereigns had to convince lenders of their commitment to service their loans. Although the literature has dealt with this problem extensively, little is known about what supported lending in early modern Europe. This article therefore asks whether and how commitment mechanisms identified in the sovereign borrowing literature made external borrowing safer in early modern Europe. It attempts to answer this question by analysing the loans that a small and peripheral state (Denmark) issued in Europe's foremost international investment hub (eighteenth‐century Holland). Primary sources demonstrate that Denmark inspired confidence in investors and serviced its loans well; a new dataset with securities prices reveals yields to maturity in accordance with this. Economic spillovers (domestic economic damage) and reputation (loss of access to external loans) are identified as the mechanisms that kept the Danish sovereigns committed to honouring their debts. The Danish case shows, however, that these commitment mechanisms could only be adopted after the growth and integration of northern Europe's economies. This suggests that commitment mechanisms are not as universally applicable as the literature often seems to claim.     

Microeconomic adjustments in Chile during 1977–1981: The importance of being a grupo

This paper uses the financial statements of industrial firms to provide an integrated firm level view of the changes in the Chilean economy during 1977–1981. Both real side and financial shocks had major effects on the performance of some types of firms. Exportable goods producers did relatively poorly in ‘real’ activities, for reasons probably tied to Chile's real prolonged exchange rate appreciation. Import-competing firms that began the period with high protection did even worse, apparently reflecting the larger change in their output prices as protection was dismantled. The reforms thus shifted demand away from industries least in line with the country's comparative advantage, but they also hurt exportables — the very sector authorities intended to promote.On the financial side, the highly positive real cost of peso borrowing reduced industrial profits considerably. A handful of powerful conglomerates (grupos) generated large (but presumably unrealized) capital gains by investing in the securities of related enterprises. Such activities allowed them to offset relatively poor returns on real operations; and their ownership of the country's major banks allowed them to consolidate control of a large volume of assets with debt finance. These two results explain why the grupos were suddenly in considerable financial difficulty when the Chilean boom ended in 1982.     

Zombie Firms and Soft Budget Constraints in the Chinese Stock Market*

The growth of zombie firms has caused increasing concern. The present study seeks to understand why zombie firms have been emerging in recent 10 years and to further explore the mechanisms of their formation. Based on a dataset of Chinese listed companies from 2012 to 2016 and empirical analysis, the present study ascribes the prevalence of zombie firms to soft budget constraints. After using a modified identification model in the Chinese context, we concluded that zombie firms have access to some external resources such as credit support from banks and governmental subsidies, substantiating soft budget constraints among zombie firms. To explain this phenomenon, further analysis reveals that zombie firms bear a heavier policy burden by hiring excess employees, which will bring them more subsidies and a stronger relationship with government in return. This result indicates that policy burden is the reason for soft budget constraints, which exacerbates the zombie firm problems in China.     

Trade credit behavior of Korean small and medium sized enterprises during the 1997 financial crisis

This paper investigates the effect of the 1997 Korean financial crisis on the trade credit behavior of Korean small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) using a unique panel dataset for the period 1994 to 1999. I uncover new evidence supporting the substitution and redistribution hypotheses, which contradicts earlier studies. Specifically, the results show that liquid SMEs provided more trade credit to their client firms during the credit contraction, while financially constrained SMEs received more trade credit from their suppliers. Further, I find evidence that SMEs in financially distressed regions relied more on trade credit than their counterparts in financially healthier regions.     

Taxes and the Financial Structure of German Inward FDI

The paper analyses the financial structure of German inward FDI. Intra-company loans granted by the parent should be all the more strongly preferred over equity the lower the tax rate of the parent and the higher the tax rate of the German affiliate. We find that the corporate tax rate of the foreign parent has no significant impact on the financial structure of a German subsidiary. However, among subsidiaries that are directly held by a foreign investor those firms that on average are profitable react more strongly to changes in the German corporate tax rate than this is the case for less profitable firms. This gives support to the frequent concern that high German taxes are partly responsible for the high levels of intra-company loans. Taxation, however, does not fully explain the high levels of intra-company borrowing. Roughly 60 per cent of the cross-border intra-company loans turn out to be held by firms that are running losses. JEL no. F23, H25     

Causes of the Long Stagnation of Japan during the 1990s: Financial or Real?

Corporate investment is the most important factor to explain the long stagnation of Japan during the 1990s. Using the Bank of Japan diffusion indices of “real profitability” and “banks' willingness to lend,” we estimate investment functions for four groups of firms: large/small and manufacturing/non-manufacturing. Our results suggest that for large firms, financing constraints are not significant whereas the converse is true for small firms. A fall of investment during 1992–94 is largely explained by real factors. However, the credit crunch occurred beginning 1997 and it lowered the growth rate of GDP by 1.6%. J. Japan. Int. Econ., September 1999, 13,(3), pp. 181–200. Faculty of Economics, Nagasaki University, 4-2-1 Katafuchi, Nagasaki 850-8506, Japan; and Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo, 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-0033, Japan. Copyright 1999 Academic Press.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E22, E30, G21, N15.