浅析影响管理者运用真实盈余管理与应计盈余管理两种方式的因素

盈余管理是管理当局在遵循会计准则的基础上,通过对企业对外报告的会计收益信息进行控制或调整,以达到主体自身利益最大化的行为。而盈余管理又有真实盈余管理与应计盈余管理之分。本文将重点讨论管理者如何在这两种方式中进行抉择,在什么情况下管理者会更倾向于使用真实盈余管理而何时又会较多的使用应计盈余管理。     

盈余操控方式对创业板上市公司IPO后业绩的影响

通过对创业板上市公司从应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理两个视角比较不同盈余操控方式对IPO后企业业绩的影响。实证分析结果表明,创业板公司IPO前后同时实施应计项目操控和真实活动操控两种盈余操控行为。其中真实盈余管理是IPO后企业业绩下滑的深层次原因,且不同盈余操控方式对IPO后3年业绩影响具有时间差异。     

上市公司公允价值变动损益的盈余管理行为 ——基于新会计准则视角的分析

本文研究了上市公司在新会计准则颁布后是否对公允价值变动损益进行了盈余管理。通过研究发现,我国沪市上市公司存在盈余管理行为,上市公司对可操控应计项目进行盈余管理的证据较为明显,但未发现上市公司对公允价值变动损益进行盈余管理的证据。     

浅析盈余管理的操纵手法及规范对策

作为投资者判断公司盈余的重要指标,会计盈余是由经营活动的现金流和应计利润构成,因现金流一般不容易被影响,应计利润则会被大量的职业判断所估计,这样就为公司管理当局留有空间控制或操纵对外报告的会计收益信息,以达到自身利益最大化。盈余管理常用的操纵手法为:股权投资、资产重组、关联交易、虚拟资产、操纵应计或费用项目等手段来实现公司的盈余管理。对于规范公司盈余管理的行为应分两步进行:首先要降低公司盈余管理的机会,完善会计准则和会计制度使各种会计行为有法可依;其次要削弱公司盈余管理的动力,完善公司治理结构,加强内外部监督力度,塑造良好的职业道德等。     

会计信息可比性与盈余管理的关系研究

文章通过会计信息可比性与盈余管理(应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理)的相互关系研究,认识到两者存在着密切的联系:会计信息可比性显著影响盈余管理,当会计信息可比性增强时,真实盈余管理相应增加,而应计盈余管理则逐渐减少;在其他因素恒定的前提下,公司采用的应计盈余管理活动和真实盈余管理活动降低了公司过去会计报告盈余与将来会计报告盈余的可比性,甚至影响公司与同类公司会计报告的可比性,从而对会计信息可比性产生负面影响。     

金融危机背景下上市公司应计质量的实证研究

文章采用我国沪深两市上市公司2004～2008年数据为样本,检验上市公司应计质量在金融危机爆发前后的改变情况,重点分析上市公司在危机中的盈余管理行为及危机对应计质量的内在影响。由于金融危机爆发,造成公司盈余普遍下降,管理层存在更强烈的盈余管理动机。实证结果表明,相比危机前我国上市公司的应计质量有显著下降。可能的解释有:为实现短期利益最大化而进行正向盈余管理,以及利用危机进行"洗大澡"。     

公允价值应用与盈余管理相关问题的思考

新会计准则全面引入公允价值计量属性，并在非货币性资产交换、债务重组和投资性房地产等方面均谨慎地采用了公允价值，在提高会计信息相关性的同时也给了企业盈余管理空间。本文在公允价值对盈余管理影响分析的基础上，为防范我国上市公司滥用公允价值，提出了公允价值应用下盈余管理的防范措施，尽可能达到规避管理者利用公允价值进行盈余管理的空间，从而更加可靠地反映企业的经营业绩，为公允价值在我国高质量的运行提供帮助。     

关于公司盈余管理行为分析及防范研究

在现代企业制度下,企业为实现自身利益的最大化,管理者在经营决策过程中会经常采用盈余管理.盈余管理的滥用使得上市公司财务信息的质量下降,经过粉饰的盈余信息无法公正的反映企业财务和经营状况,损害了广大社会信息使用者的利益,最终不利于社会资源的优化配置.本文通过对盈余管理的主要手段进行分析,提出一些防范过度盈余管理的建议.     

投资者是否被上市公司的盈余管理行为所误导?——来自配股融资的证据

为了获得配股资格和提高配股价格，上市公司具有通过调整异常应计利润来提升报告盈余的强烈动机。本文使用横截面修正的Jones模型研究了配股公司盈余管理的时间序列分布特征．并分析了异常应计利润与配股后运营业绩和股票长期收益的关系。研究结果表明，配股公司在配股前3个年度和配股当年都具有较高的异常应计利润，而配股后运营业绩和股票长期收益趋于下降，异常应计利润与配股后的股票长期收益具有显著的负相关关系。投资者由于没有能够及时“看穿”配股公司的盈余管理行为而暂时高估了股票价值，从而被上市公司的盈余管理行为所误导。     

我国上市公司盈余管理程度与公司治理结构的实证研究

文章选取了我国2003年被出具了非标准审计意见的公司为样本，对其反映盈余管理程度的可操纵性应计利润进行测度。同时从董事会结构、股权结构两个方面提出了14个反映公司治理结构的解释变量，构建了一个系统的研究盈余管理与公司治理结构关系研究的概念框架，以探讨导致我国上市公司进行盈余管理的公司治理结构诱因。     

How Are Earnings Managed? An Examination of Specific Accruals*

There is relatively little evidence on the specific accruals used to manage earnings. This paper examines this issue by considering the use of specific accruals in three earnings‐management contexts: equity offerings, management buyouts, and firms avoiding earnings decreases. We argue that the costs of managing earnings through different income statement items vary and that the benefits of earnings management through each of these items depend on the context. We thus make differential predictions regarding which specific accrual will be used to manage earnings in each of the three contexts we consider. To measure earnings management for specific accruals, we develop performance‐matched measures to capture the unexpected component of accounts receivable, inventory, accounts payable, accrued liabilities, depreciation expense, and special items. Consistent with our predictions, we find that firms issuing equity appear to prefer managing earnings upward by accelerating revenue recognition. Specifically, we find that accounts receivable for these firms are unexpectedly high. Conversely, for the management buyout context, we predict and find unexpected accounts receivable to be negative. For firms trying to avoid reporting an earnings decrease, we expect firms to be less concerned with earnings persistence and therefore more likely to use more transitory, and less costly, items to achieve their goal. We find that special items are significantly more positive for this group. This paper provides a further step toward understanding how the incentives behind earnings management affect the method used to achieve earnings goals, and it illustrates the usefulness of examining individual accruals in specific contexts.     

盈余管理的原因、动机及测度方法前沿研究综述

盈余管理已经成为公司金融领域最活跃的研究热点问题之一,受到学者们的广泛关注。本文对20世纪80年代中后期以来关于盈余管理理论发展和实证研究的主要脉络进行全面回顾,并总结了国外最新的研究成果。本文的综述主要集中在三个方面:(1)基于“契约磨擦”与“沟通阻滞”分析了盈余管理产生的内在机理;(2)分别从资本市场动机、契约动机和政治成本动机总结了关于盈余管理的实证研究成果;(3)对应计利润分离模型、特定应计利润模型和频率分布模型三种盈余管理检验方法的具体应用进行了分析,并对其优点和不足之处进行了评价。     

Last‐Chance Earnings Management: Using the Tax Expense to Meet Analysts' Forecasts*

We assert that the tax expense is a powerful context in which to study earnings management, because it is one of the last accounts closed prior to earnings announcements. Although many pre‐tax accruals must be posted in the year‐end general ledger, managers estimate and negotiate tax expense with their auditors immediately prior to earnings announcements. We hypothesize that changes from third‐ to fourth‐quarter effective tax rates (ETRs) are negatively related to whether and how much a firm's earnings absent tax expense management miss analysts' consensus forecast, a proxy for target earnings. We measure earnings absent tax expense management as actual pre‐tax earnings adjusted for the annual ETR reported at the third quarter. We provide robust evidence that firms lower their projected ETRs when they miss the consensus forecast, which is consistent with firms decreasing their tax expense if non‐tax sources of earnings management are insufficient to achieve targets. We also find that firms that exceed earnings targets increase their ETR, but this effect is less significant. By studying the tax expense in total, rather than narrow components of deferred tax expense, our results provide general evidence that reported taxes are used to manage earnings.     

The Relation Between Earnings Management and Non‐GAAP Reporting

Managers have a variety of tools at their disposal to influence stakeholder perceptions. Earnings management and the strategic reporting of non‐GAAP earnings are just two of the available menu choices. We explore how real earnings management and accruals management influence the probability that a company will disclose a non‐GAAP adjusted earnings metric in its earnings press release and the likelihood that it will do so aggressively. We first investigate situations where managers already meet analysts’ expectations either based on strong operating performance or after employing real and accruals management. We find that when solid operating performance alone allows firms to meet expectations, managers do not employ earnings management or non‐GAAP reporting. However, when managers meet expectations using real and accruals management, they are significantly less likely to report a non‐GAAP earnings metric. Next, we explore scenarios where companies fall short of expectations. We find that when they just miss expectations after managing GAAP earnings, they are significantly more likely to employ non‐GAAP reporting, suggesting that the timing and relatively costless nature of non‐GAAP reporting allows managers to appear to meet expectations on a non‐GAAP basis when managed GAAP earnings fall short. Moreover, we find that companies are more likely to report non‐GAAP earnings (and to do so aggressively) when (i) they are unable to use real or accruals earnings management, (ii) are constrained by prior‐period accruals management, and (iii) their operating performance is poor. Taken together, our results are consistent with a substitute relation between non‐GAAP reporting and both real and accruals management.     

Ownership Structure,Business Group Affiliation,Listing Status,and Earnings Management: Evidence from Korea*

Using a large sample of both publicly traded and privately held firms in South Korea (hereafter “Korea”), we investigate whether, and how, the deviation of controlling shareholders' control from ownership, business group affiliation, and listing status differentially affect the extent of earnings management. Our study yields three major findings. First, we find that as the control‐ownership disparity becomes larger, controlling shareholders tend to engage more in opportunistic earnings management to hide their behavior and avoid adverse consequences such as disciplinary action. The result of our full‐model regression reveals that an increase in the control‐ownership wedge by 1 percent leads to an increase in the magnitude of (unsigned) discretionary accruals by 1.3 percent of lagged total assets, ceteris paribus. Second, we find that for our full‐model regression, the magnitude of (unsigned) discretionary accruals is greater for group‐affiliated firms than for nonaffiliated firms by 0.8 percent of lagged total assets. This result suggests that business group affiliation provides controlling shareholders with more incentives and opportunities for earnings management. Finally, we find that for our full‐model regression, the magnitude of (unsigned) discretionary accruals is greater for publicly traded firms than for privately held firms by 1.2 percent of lagged total assets. This result supports the notion that stock markets create incentives for public firms to manage reported earnings to satisfy the expectations of various market participants that are often expressed in earnings numbers.     

Determinants of the Time Series of Earnings and Implications for Earnings Quality*

This paper examines whether differences in accrual accounting methods across balance sheet accounts influence the time‐series process of earnings. We define earnings quality as the responsiveness of earnings to shifts in permanent earnings and predict that responsiveness will increase in a firm's use of variable rate debt, where accruals move directly with shifts in interest rates. We also predict that responsiveness will decrease in a firm's investment in property plant and equipment because depreciation is largely predetermined and does not respond to shifts in opportunity costs. </P><P>To test these hypotheses, we regress earnings on lagged earnings and a proxy for permanent earnings (that is, the implied dividend annuity in lagged equity value). Within the context of an adjustment cost model, this regression captures the responsiveness of earnings by the coefficient on lagged price and by one minus the coefficient on lagged earnings. Consistent with this framework, we find the unconstrained estimated coefficients on these two variables to be negatively correlated. Furthermore, consistent with our hypotheses, we find that the coefficient on lagged earnings (lagged price) is positively (negatively) associated with the relative magnitude and life of fixed assets on the balance sheet and negatively (positively) associated with the relative magnitude of variable rate debt on the balance sheet.</P>     

The Effect of Audit Quality on Earnings Management*

This study examines the relation between audit quality and earnings management. Consistent with prior research, we treat audit quality as a dichotomous variable and assume that Big Six auditors are of higher quality than non-Big Six auditors. Earnings management is captured by discretionary accruals that are estimated using a cross-sectional version of the Jones 1991 model. Prior literature suggests that auditors are more likely to object to management's accounting choices that increase earnings (as opposed to decrease earnings) and that auditors are more likely to be sued when they are associated with financial statements that overstate earnings (as compared to understate earnings). Therefore, we hypothesize that clients of non-Big Six auditors report discretionary accruals that increase income relatively more than the discretionary accruals reported by clients of Big Six auditors. This hypothesis is supported by evidence from a sample of 10,379 Big Six and 2,179 non-Big Six firm years. Specifically, clients of non-Big Six auditors report discretionary accruals that are, on average, 1.5-2.1 percent of total assets higher than the discretionary accruals reported by clients of Big Six auditors. Also, consistent with earnings management, we find that the mean and median of the absolute value of discretionary accruals are greater for firms with non-Big Six auditors. This result also indicates that lower audit quality is associated with more “accounting flexibility”.     

Potential Errors in Detecting Earnings Management: Reexamining Studies Investigating the AMT of 1986*

In this paper we seek to document errors that could affect studies of earnings management. The book income adjustment (BIA) of the alternative minimum tax (AMT) created apparently strong incentives to manage book income downward in 1987. Five earlier papers using different methodologies and samples all conclude that earnings were reduced in response to the BIA. This consensus of findings offers an opportunity to investigate our speculation that methodological biases are more likely when there appear to be clear incentives for earnings management. A reexamination of these studies uncovers potential biases related to a variety of factors, including choices of scaling variables, selection of affected and control samples, and measurement error in estimated discretionary accruals. A reexamination of the argument underlying these studies also suggests that the incentives to manage earnings are less powerful than initially predicted, and are partially mitigated by tax and non‐tax factors. As a result, we believe that the extent of earnings management that occurred in 1987 in response to the BIA remains an unresolved issue.     

Auditor Conservatism,Asymmetric Monitoring,and Earnings Management*

In this paper, we investigate whether, and how, audit effectiveness differentiation between Big 6 and non‐Big 6 auditors is influenced by a conflict or convergence of reporting incentives faced by corporate managers and external auditors. In so doing, we incorporate into our analysis the possibility that managers self‐select both external auditors and discretionary accruals, using the two stage “treatment effects” model. Our results show that only when managers have incentives to prefer income‐increasing accrual choices are Big 6 auditors more effective than non‐Big 6 auditors in deterring/monitoring opportunistic earnings management. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find Big 6 auditors are less effective than non‐Big 6 auditors when both managers and auditors have incentives to prefer income‐decreasing accrual choices and thus no conflict of reporting incentives exists between the two parties. The above findings are robust to different proxies for opportunistic earnings management and different proxies for the direction of earnings management incentives.