The Simple Analytics of Sudden Stops

Currency crises in emerging and developing countries have often been characterized by “sudden stops” of capital flows. A variety of mechanisms have been adduced to explain the emergence of this phenomenon. This paper integrates these mechanisms into a simple and transparent analytical model in which currency mismatches, large current account deficits, and large stocks of short-term debt interact with low reserve stocks to generate dual equilibria. In this context, the “panic” equilibrium is characterized by a currency crisis, a sudden stop, and an output collapse. The potential for various policies to avoid this outcome is explored, as are the implications of the analysis for reserve accumulation.     

SHOULD THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES FORM A CURRENCY UNION?

This paper examines some of the factors related to the formation of a currency union in Southeast Asia. The main part of the paper presents the results of our examination of the correlation of shocks for the Southeast Asian countries using a structural vector autoregression. The shocks are identified using restrictions on the long‐run coefficient matrix as suggested by Blanchard and Quah (1989). The correlations of shocks for the EU and NAFTA countries are used for comparison. The Southeast Asian countries are shown to have more strongly correlated shocks than the EU countries. Compared with the NAFTA countries, external shocks are more closely correlated for the ASEAN countries, but the supply and demand shocks are less correlated. Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia, in particular, exhibit a high degree of correlation of shocks. Other criteria for monetary union, such as intra‐regional trade, openness of the economy, and similarity of monetary policy are also examined.     

Bailouts,Inflation, and Risk-Sharing in Monetary Unions

This paper presents a new rationalization for bailouts of sovereign debt in monetary unions, such as those observed during the recent Euro crisis. It introduces a model where member countries of the monetary union are ex-ante identical, and each derives utility from consumption and disutility from the union-wide inflation rate. The union’s central bank is utilitarian and lacks commitment. Countries borrow or save in a market for nominal sovereign debt in response to idiosyncratic income shocks, with countries that receive positive income shocks saving and countries that receive negative income shocks borrowing. Ex post, the monetary union’s central bank will attempt to devalue sovereign debt through surprise inflation, as this will redistribute income from rich creditor countries to poor debtor countries. Creditor countries choose to bailout debtor countries because bailouts will weaken the redistributive motives of the central bank and forestall surprise inflation. As bailouts in this environment constitute a payment from lucky creditor countries to unlucky debtor countries, they mimic a risk-sharing arrangement that insures against income shocks. The payments made by creditor countries are incentive-compatible due to the shared currency and inflation rate in the monetary union. This ability of countries to provide each other with incentive-compatible insurance constitutes a novel theory of optimal currency areas. This insurance benefit of the monetary union is largest for countries with negatively correlated income shocks, in contrast to the classic Mundell-Friedman optimal currency area criterion.

     

Is the proposed East African Monetary Union an optimal currency area? a structural vector autoregression analysis

This paper empirically assesses the suitability of the East African (EA) countries for a regional monetary union by testing for symmetry of the underlying structural shocks. The results indicate that supply and demand shocks are generally asymmetric, which does not lend strong support for forming a currency union in the EA region at the moment. However, the speed and magnitude of adjustment to shocks is similar across the countries. Therefore, further integration of the economies might lead to more favorable conditions for a monetary union. Although evidence in favor of linking an EA currency to an external anchor is weak, such support seems to favor the Euro.     

A suggested reformulation of the theory of optimal currency areas

In contrast to conventional analyses of monetary union between two particular countries or sets of countries, this paper treats the possible expansion of a given currency area as a continuous variable ranging from zero to one; zero if there is no expansion and one if all sources of imports and competition in trade are included in the union. The optimal order in which new members are admitted to the union then becomes a central aspect of the problem. Along with other advantages, this approach makes it easier to defend the argument that many nations are too small for form optimal currency areas. The demands upon the origin of the shocks, factor mobility, and political organization are smaller.     

Comparing Exchange Market Pressure across Five African Countries

This paper compares the credibility of exchange rate arrangements for the five African countries which are members of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries and will be referred to as Afro-Luso. Our working hypothesis is that credibility necessarily implies low mean exchange market pressure (EMP), low EMP conditional volatility and low-severity EMP crises under financial-market integration. In addition, economic fundamentals must account for EMP dynamics. We also seek evidence of a risk–return relationship for mean EMP and of “bad news” (negative shocks) having a greater impact on EMP volatility than “good news” (positive shocks). Using our econometric models, we are able to rank Afro-Luso countries’ conditional volatility in ordinal terms. Our main conclusion is that countries with currency pegs, such as Guinea-Bissau (GB) and Cape Verde (CV), clearly have lower volatility when compared to those with managed floats and are therefore more credible. Moreover, EMP crises episodes under pegs are much less severe. We find that economic fundamentals correctly account for mean EMP in all countries and that the risk–return relationship is much more favourable for investors under currency pegs, as the increase in volatility is lower for the same rate of return. The exception to this finding is Mozambique (MOZ), which apparently has a risk–return profile akin to that enjoyed by countries with pegs. A plausible reason is that MOZ has the only managed float in our sample implementing monetary and exchange rate policy within the confines of an IMF framework, which establishes floors for international reserves and ceilings for the central bank’s net domestic assets. This intuition needs to be tested, however. EMP conditional volatility, meanwhile, is generally driven by changes in domestic credit (lowers it) and foreign reserve changes (raises it). The first effect is more pronounced under currency pegs, but also under MOZ’s managed float. “Bad news” increases volatility more that “good news” only in the case of CV’s currency peg, which we take to be another sign of its credibility. A few striking cross-country comparisons also emerge in our analysis. Among countries with managed floats, Angola (ANG) has the most severe EMP crises, MOZ the least severe and São Tomé &; Príncipe (STP) lies between the two extremes but closer to MOZ.     

Comments on S. Edwards: “Monetary unions, external shocks and economic performance: a Latin American perspective”

I discuss Sebastian Edwards’ most recent paper with great pleasure. As so much of the work of this distinguished economist, this paper provides new insights on a burning issue in international economics. Here Edwards provides empirical evidence on the resilience to external shocks of countries that lack a national currency (“monetary-union” or MU countries). The paper starts by reviewing the issues and literature relevant on exchange-rate regimes, dollarization, and MU in Latin America, with an emphasis on the question if countries in the region satisfy key optimal currency area criteria. Then the paper provides extensive new evidence on economic performance in MU countries, in comparison to countries with a national currency, using a large world panel sample. Performance tests are conducted for the comparative likelihood of MU countries of sudden stops in capital flows (SS) and large current (deficit) reversals (CAR), as well as their ability to absorb terms-of-trade shocks, SS, and CAR. The results are generally negative and significant for the comparative performance of MU countries. To set the stage, I start my comments by documenting first how country selection of exchange-rate and monetary regimes is quickly evolving in the world during the last decades, discussing subsequently how economists’ views follow suit (Section 1). Then I discuss some aspects of Edwards’ paper, focusing in particular on the data and model specification (Section 2). I end with brief implications for exchange-rate and monetary regime choice in Latin America.     

Why do Estimates of the EMU Effect on Trade Vary so Much?

Larger data sets, with more countries and a longer span of time, exhibit systematically larger effects of European monetary union on trade. I establish this stylized fact with meta-analysis and confirm it by estimating a plain-vanilla gravity model. I then explain this finding by examining systematic biases in “multilateral resistance to trade” manifest in time-varying country fixed effects; bias grows as the sample is truncated by dropping small poor countries.     

Welfare Implications of Currency Integration: Labor Mobility and Pricing-to-Market

In this paper, we examine the welfare cost of renouncing monetary policy autonomy in a model that includes labor mobility and pricing-to-market (PTM) behavior in firms. We find that renouncing monetary policy autonomy becomes a cost of currency integration when the consumption basket weights differ between candidate countries and when country-specific total factor productivity (TFP) shocks hit economies, even when the union fulfills the classic optimum currency area theory of labor mobility. We also found that a firm's PTM behavior has a significant effect on the welfare implications of currency integration combined with labor mobility. For instance, currency integration does not produce greater welfare losses in the PTM case (where the labor input weights differ across member countries and asymmetric labor disutility shocks occur), although greater welfare losses arise in the case of producer currency pricing.     

External adjustments and coordinated exchange rate policy in Asia

In this paper, we estimate structural VAR models with contemporaneous restrictions based on neo-classical and Keynesian theories to investigate whether the cause of current account surpluses for East Asian economies is a “saving glut” or undervalued currencies. Analytical results show that the major determinant of the current account is the real effective exchange rate for all East Asian countries with the exception of China for which the major determinant is domestic GDP. Accordingly, the recently requested revaluation of the Chinese yuan may not be an effective policy for reducing the Chinese current account surplus, and may affect other Asian current accounts. We also investigate whether a Chinese currency revaluation would contribute to the improvement of current account imbalances in East Asia and find that a revaluation would, indeed, improve the current accounts of Japan, Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand. Since the trade structures of major East Asian countries are substitutes with that of China, a Chinese currency revaluation might not lead to a decrease in East Asian current account surpluses. Coordination of currency policy among East Asian countries is, therefore, needed to solve the global current account imbalance.     

Estimation of the East African Community's trade benefits from promoting intra‐regional trade

In the literature on economic integration, the optimum currency area (OCA) theory says that there should be a high degree of trade between potential members of a monetary union for them to benefit from the use of a single currency. This study uses an augmented gravity model of trade to estimate the East African Community's (EAC) trade effects, as this community decided to participate in a monetary union by 2024. The study uses the fixed effect filter (FEF) estimator, which follows a two‐step approach and outperforms the standard fixed effects (FE) estimator. The results indicate that EAC has the potential to increase trade among partner states by 122% more than expected from the normal trade levels. The study, therefore, supports the ongoing East African Monetary Union process. However, to improve the likelihood of creating a more sustainable monetary union, the study recommends these countries to primarily focus on the full implementation of the customs union and common market steps. The main contribution of this study is that it provides robust estimates of the EAC's effects on intra‐regional trade using more recent data and updated econometric techniques.     

Optimum Currency Areas Under Inflation Targeting

Several countries face the choice between targeting inflation independently and entering a monetary union that targets inflation. The present paper extends the theory of optimum currency areas to deal with this choice. In contrast to the conventional theory, countries might form more of an optimum currency area the more asymmetric supply shocks are.     

On the choice of an anchor for the GCC currency: does the symmetry of shocks extend to both the oil and the non-oil sectors?

This paper assesses the costs of forming a monetary union among the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries by looking at economic linkages within the GCC, and between the GCC and the potential anchors (the US, and major European countries such as France, Germany and Italy) for their proposed new currency. We investigate the importance of the US dollar compared to the Euro by focusing on aggregate demand (AD) and aggregate supply (AS) shock symmetry across these countries. We differentiated between oil and non-oil sector by estimating structural vector autoregression (SVAR) models with a combination of variables: oil output, non-oil output, total output, nominal/real price of oil and overall price level. One set of models was identified with the long-run restrictions of Blanchard and Quah (Am Econ Rev 79(4):655–673, 1989), whereas the set that assesses the robustness of the findings was estimated with the short-run restrictions of Sims (Eur Econ Rev 36(5):975–1000, 1992). We find overwhelming support for AD shock symmetry across the GCC countries and between the GCC and the US, but none for the major European countries with the GCC. Non-oil AS shocks are mostly asymmetric, but oil AS shocks are mostly symmetric when the real price of oil is included. This agrees with the view that GCC countries are subjected to common oil shocks. It also suggests that previous VAR models estimated to pass judgment on the feasibility of monetary union across GCC countries may have suffered from problems of mis-specification if the real price of oil was not considered. We surmise that the US dollar is a better anchor candidate for anchoring the new GCC currency than the Euro, since US monetary policy can at least help smooth demand shocks in these countries.     

Regional currency arrangements: insights from Europe

This paper focuses on the requirements and features of a successful monetary union on the basis of the optimum currency area theory, the “logical roadmap” for integration as proposed by Balassa as well as the economic and institutional framework of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The analysis suggests that monetary union is contingent upon high economic integration and strong political commitment. However, political union is not an ex-ante requirement. Outside factors such as systemic shocks and globalization seem to speed up the pooling of sovereignty in the economic domain. A firm commitment to stability-oriented monetary and fiscal policies is a precondition for gaining credibility and trust within and outside a monetary union. Last, but not least, convergence criteria, fiscal rules and strong institutions are necessary to help ensure and monitor the participants’ compliance. However, the European experience is not a blueprint for regional integration that can be directly and entirely applied to other regions.     

Fiscal policy independence in a European Monetary Union

Do plans for a monetary union in Europe call for limits on the freedom of the country members of the union to use fiscal policy? In order to provide a tentative answer, we simulate the IMF model MULTIMOD, given various shocks, in the case of a European Monetary Union consisting only of France and Germany. The results clearly indicate the possible value of allowing unfettered use of fiscal policy in both countries. The reasons lie partly in differences in the initial position of the two, partly in differences in their preferences. We also examine the change in the policy significance of the current account in the monetary union. Current account imbalances clearly cease to have the same significance in a monetary union; but they do not therefore become irrelevant.     

Optimal Currency Area: A twentieth Century Idea for the twenty-first Century?

We take stock of the history of the European Monetary Union and pegged exchange-rate regimes in recent decades. The post-Bretton Woods greater financial integration and under-regulated financial intermediation have increased the cost of sustaining a currency area and other forms of fixed exchange-rate regimes. Financial crises illustrated that fast-moving asymmetric financial shocks interacting with real distortions pose a grave threat to the stability of currency areas and fixed exchange-rate regimes. Members of a currency union with closer financial links may accumulate asymmetric balance-sheet exposure over time, becoming more susceptible to sudden-stop crises. In a phase of deepening financial ties, countries may end up with more correlated business cycles. Down the road, debtor countries that rely on financial inflows to fund structural imbalances may be exposed to devastating sudden-stop crises, subsequently reducing the correlation of business cycles between currency area’s members, possibly ceasing the gains from membership in a currency union. A currency union of developing countries anchored to a leading global currency stabilizes inflation at a cost of inhibiting the use of monetary policy to deal with real and financial shocks. Currency unions with low financial depth and low financial integration of its members may be more stable at a cost of inhibiting the growth of sectors depending on bank funding.     

A Stochastic Simulation Model of an Optimum Currency Area

In this paper, we develop a two-country stochastic simulation model based on the theory of optimum currency areas, which studies the desirability of a monetary union. Extending the general equilibrium model of Ricci (1995), we introduce the intertemporal dimension, which allows to deal more accurately with labor mobility and shock dynamics. We analyse the importance of shocks asymmetries and investigate the role of labor mobility. Furthermore, we illustrate the influence of trade openness and the impact of a fiscal federalism system, assuming a specific transfer allocation rule based on the relative evolution of unemployment between the two countries.     

Regional currency arrangements in North America

Choosing an exchange-rate regime is largely a matter of choosing the variables that will bear the brunt of adjustment to shocks and disturbances. Floating rates, supported by inflation-targeting regimes of varying degrees of transparency, have dominated currency arrangements in North America, especially after the peso crisis of 1994. Although the member countries have pursued their policy goals without formal coordination, their objectives have been very similar. Meanwhile, de facto integration of the three economies has continued, especially in the realm of cross-border production sharing. The result has been reduction of asymmetries and convergence of business cycles, as well as changes in balance of payments behavior and in the sensitivity of trade to the exchange rate. This paper explores the implications for monetary union.     

Joining the European Monetary Union—Comparing First and Second Generation Open Economy Models

We log-linearise the Dellas and Tavlas (DT) model of monetary union and solve it analytically. We find that the intuition of optimal currency area analysis of DT’s second generation open economy model is essentially the same as that of first generation models. Monetary union results in no welfare loss if its member states are symmetric. However, asymmetry causes loss in welfare both due to the failure of the union policy to deal suitably with a country’s asymmetric shocks and due to an active monetary policy by the union in pursuit of its distinct objectives. The asymmetry in DT is largely due to the differing wage rigidities across countries. JEL Classification Numbers: F41, F42, E4     

Endogenous Symmetry of Shocks in a Monetary Union

The monetary union issue, when assessed with the traditional inferences for optimal currency areas, misses an important dimension. Increased specialisation induced by reduced transaction costs, suggested by Krugman's lessons of Massachusetts, is only a part of the story. Even if agglomeration and inter-industry trade may occur as a result of reduced transaction costs, this tendency may be counteracted by the elimination of uncertainty associated with bilateral exchange rate variability within the monetary union.Thus, in contradiction to what is generally assumed on the basis of the reduction in transaction costs only, the European Monetary Union (EMU) is likely to foster intra-industry trade in Europe, leading to more symmetric shocks between member states. The monetary union will endogenously create the conditions of its success. Empirical evidence is provided for EU countries' bilateral trade over the period 1980–1994, using disaggregated trade data.