国有企业必须彻底市场化

<正>混合所有制实际上是深化市场经济体制改革的一个方面,只有混合所有制才能淡化国企垄断、淡化市场地位,逐渐进一步深化改革。这是过渡性阶段的选择。现在用混合所有制替代现代企业制度或是股份制,实质上并没有变化,只不过用词新颖了,避免重蹈过去落入被动的思路。从基本经济学角度看,并没有变化。国有企业改革界定产权,这个概念有误区。现在的主要问题是合理比例问题。混合所有制提出后,强调控股权,那么,产权界定实际上不重要了。因为,混合所有制是一个主导权的问题。但是,在一个行业竞争,不应该再提到国有主体地位。否则一旦     

纵向网络产业的私有化政策

本文考察了网络产业的纵向结构并且探究了国有企业私有化的福利效果 ,这些国有企业在上游市场提供基本的网络并且与独立的私有企业竞争。本文证明 ,如果国有企业的私有化政策是在混合市场实行的 ,那么国有企业的竞争对手———那些独立的私有企业的成本效率优势可以增加社会福利。本文还将分析进行扩展 ,来讨论纵向网络产业的私有化中相关的现行政策问题。     

我国行政性垄断的危害与对策

改革开放以来,随着市场经济体制的建立,竞争与垄断成为关注的热点。尤其是80年代以后,西方产业经济理论的引入,为我国竞争与垄断问题的研究奠定了基础。但由于经济体制的不同,西方产业理论难以完全解释我国经济生活中存在的问题。我国大量的垄断行为并非发生在经济学意义上的垄断市场结构中,使得人们不得不另外寻求答案,即行政性垄断。近年来,经济环境的改变和我国的改革,尤其是国有企业的改革面临严重的困境,行政性垄断的弊端也越发突显,成为阻碍我国经济发展的一大障碍。所谓行政性垄断是指政府或政府部门为了获取垄断利润,凭借行政权力对     

反垄断目标指向:垄断势力抑或垄断份额——基于SCP-R框架的分析

垄断导致资源配置低效与社会福利净损失,已为西方经济学原理所论证,反垄断目标指向应该是垄断势力而不是垄断的市场份额,企业拥有足够大的市场份额,但只要不是凭借垄断地位,滥用市场的支配权力,随意操纵价格,剥夺消费者剩余,就不应该是反垄断所指的对象,反垄断目标指向应该是而且也只能是任意操纵市场价格与限制竞争的垄断势力。     

国有企业混合所有制改革推进障碍研究

随着经济的高速发展,为了增强国有企业的活力与创造力,国家出台了《国务院关于国有企业发展混合所有制经济的意见》等一系列政策文件,促进国有企业进行机制转换,打破行业垄断壁垒,使国有经济与非国有经济相互融合,实现以公有制为主体,多种所有制经济共同发展的混合所有制经济。但在国有企业进行混合所有制改革的道路上存在着诸多障碍,对国有企业混合所有制改革中的相关障碍和问题进行分析并提出相应的解决对策,势必会加快国有企业混合所有制改革的步伐。     

网络经济下垄断的动态效率探析

网络经济时代的市场结构发生了新的变化。主要表现为出现了以垄断和竞争双双强化为主要特征的竞争性垄断结构。这标志着传统产业组织理论中垄断低配置效率或静态无效率的论断在网络经济条件下已不再适用。基于此，本文从创新激励的角度出发，论证了网络经济条件下竞争性垄断市场的动态性。结论认为：企业暂时的垄断地位推动着技术创新的进化和演进．创新、竞争和垄断这三者在网络条件下的互动机制保证了竞争性垄断市场的动态效率。     

积极推动民营企业与国有垄断企业融合发展的混合所有制经济

民企与垄断国企的融合发展将成为中国经济发展的新动力和所有制关系的主要议题,这是由我国发展新阶段的制度演进与政策条件、提升垄断产业效率、拓展民营经济发展空间、应对国外自贸区"竞争中立"政策挑战、推进新型城镇化的迫切要求、达成两种发展思路的共识等多种因素决定的。融合发展主要包括建立混合所有制企业、公私合作伙伴关系(PPP)、民企独立进入垄断与竞争性业务部分、形成上下游产业链四种具体途径。应合理规划、分类融合,放松规制与强化规制相结合,进一步完善竞争、定价、产权交易、公司治理结构、运营机制、收益分配、法治条件等制度体系和社会主义市场经济体制,推动民营企业与国有垄断企业健康、可持续融合发展。     

垄断企业的拆分可以改善社会福利吗?——基于一个熊彼特增长框架的分析

关于现实经济中大的垄断企业是否需要拆分一直是一个争议较大的问题。一种观点认为,拆分可以消除垄断,加强竞争,从而促进创新,这将最终有利于提高社会福利。另一种观点认为,拆分使得垄断利润减少,消除规模效应,这可能不利于创新,因而拆分对社会福利的影响是坏的。基于Aghion和Howitt(1992)的熊彼特增长模型,本文考察了拆分对创新、经济增长和社会福利的影响。拆分对研发投资规模和经济增长具有阻碍作用,企业拆分越多,研发投资规模越小,经济增长率越低;拆分对社会福利的影响是不确定的,从社会福利水平极大化的角度出发,垄断企业是否需要拆分取决于竞争性均衡经济中研发投资规模与社会最优经济中研发投资规模的对比。本文旨在运用内生经济增长框架,从社会福利水平极大化的角度出发,为垄断企业的拆分提供一些理论依据。     

知识、垄断与产业发展

在人类进入知识经济社会之后，知识要素对于产业发展、产业结构重组等产生重大影响。一个显著的现象就是，在知识产业领域，主要的企业形态是垄断性企业，而不是竞争性企业，这明显不同于长期以来的经济发展实践。不仅如此，这一显著现象还向传统的经济学理论提出了挑战。传统经济学理论认为，垄断有损效率，但在知识产业领域，恰恰是垄断提升效率，而打破垄断倒有可能损害效率。     

简述PC客户端网络游戏企业的经营策略对市场垄断化的影响

当前网络游戏产业的垄断化趋势日益严重,为了维持产业的健康发展,迎合国家"十三五规划"中明确发展文化产业的战略需求,文章以在网络游戏市场中占主体地位的PC网游企业为研究对象,通过案例分析、数据分析、文献分析等方法对PC网游企业所展开的经营策略进行深入研究,调查发现:当前我国的PC网游市场趋向于寡头垄断市场,企业之间为追求利润最大化所展开的经营策略是导致垄断的根本原因,在垄断市场形成后,垄断企业为了维持自身的垄断地位或进一步攫取利润也会展开合作与竞争,同时,采取有效的合作也是避免市场垄断的手段。     

Long live China’s state-owned enterprises: deflating the myth of poor financial performance

China’s industrial state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are commonly perceived as performing poorly. This leads authors to conclude that SOE reform so far has been a failure, and to recommend all-out privatization. Industrial SOE profitability indeed declined drastically in the course of the reform period, and industrial SOEs are always less profitable than industrial non-SOEs. However, the gap between SOEs and non-SOEs can be explained by just two factors: SOEs face higher circulation tax rates than non-SOEs, and have a higher capital intensity. In as far as these are the result of government policies and historical factors discriminating against SOEs, privatization of SOEs may improve these enterprises’ profitability levels, but privatization is not a necessary condition. The decline in SOE profitability over time furthermore is well explained by economic transition factors; non-SOE profitability declined following a similar time pattern, and non-SOEs are no better suited to withstand shocks such as the 1989–1990 economic downturn.     

Profitability and productivity of Chinese industrial firms: Measurement and ownership implications

This paper assesses the reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) by examining the effect of ownership on the profitability and productivity of Chinese industrial firms. Several methodological issues concerning profit measurements of enterprises under different ownership structures are identified and discussed. Test results based on a panel data set provide evidence that capital structures, taxes, and welfare burdens have a significant effect on the financial performance of Chinese enterprises. After adjusting for these effects, SOEs still show poor financial performance, which, we show, is attributable to the effect of “soft loans.” Although SOEs grew faster in productive efficiency during 1996–1998, their growth rate in profitability lagged behind that of firms with other ownership structures.     

Entry deterrence when the potential entrant is your competitor in a different market

In this article, we present a two‐period model in which one firm operates in two markets: a monopoly and a duopoly. Assuming that this firm has private information on the cross‐price elasticity of demand between the products sold in both markets, it limits its quantity supplied in the monopoly market in order to make its rival in the other market believe that entry into the monopolized market is unprofitable. As a result of this strategy, the average prices observed in both markets increase. This result suggests that the detrimental effects of entry deterrence on consumers' welfare are stronger than those predicted by previous literature.     

双循环格局下的竞争中性与国企改革——来自国有资本差异化功能的证据

本文在一般均衡框架下构建理论模型,从微观视角考察国有资本功能在国有、民营两部门中的差异,讨论"双循环"战略下如何有效配置国有资本,推动竞争中性框架的建立。研究表明:国有资本在理论上具有正向的经济效率并促进企业积极承担社会责任,但经验证据显示其经济效率偏低,且在国有和民营部门有较大差异。在国有部门中,国有资本的经济效率显著低于民营企业,且在低市场竞争度、高行政进入壁垒行业中尤为突出,证实了国企的垄断经营和不公平竞争;尽管在下游竞争性行业表现了较高效率,但主要是因为挤占了私营部门的投资空间。在民营部门中,国有资本具有积极的经济效率和社会责任。但主要是通过降低其税负、缓解融资约束并对企业捐赠等承担社会责任的行为形成补偿和激励等行为提高了其经济效率,而非国有资本理论上的市场化收益性功能。国有资本在国有和私营部门差异化的功能和经济效率验证了民营企业仍处于非中性的竞争环境,双循环格局可在上游垄断性部门引入民营资本和竞争机制,在下游竞争性行业则深化混合所有制改革以提高国企效率,释放出因国有部门过度举债挤占的私营部门投资空间,健全国有资本要素的市场化配置,给予民营企业竞争中性的平等国民待遇。     

The Political Economy of Chinese-Style Privatization: Motives and Constraints

The paper examines how the privatization of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) can be successfully triggered and completed. By identifying the motives of local government leaders and the constraints that face them during transition, we conclude that: first, whether local governments are motivated to privatize their SOEs, depends on if the ownership transfer is expected to stimulate sufficiently high growth of local tax revenues without sacrificing the bureaucrats private control benefits. Second, a specific privatization program can succeed only if it manages to satisfy the managerial cooperation constraint, the workers compensation constraint, and the bank-debt-servicing constraint. The motives-cum-constraints political economy approach offers an important explanation for the pace and scope of the ongoing Chinese-style privatization.     

The Roles of Corporatization and Stock Market Listing in Reforming China’s State Industry

This article provides an overview of China’s on-going efforts to reform its industrial state-owned enterprises (SOEs) through corporatization and stock market listing, and assesses the effects on the performance of these SOEs. It highlights changes, though limited, in both ownership pattern and corporate governance on the one hand, and rapid increase in concentration on the other as a result of these reform measures. It also explores the reasons why these changes have failed to significantly improve the performance of the SOEs, but have nevertheless paved the way for more complete privatization. The practical implications of these findings are also discussed.     

State‐Owned Enterprises,Competition, and Disclosure

We develop a mixed‐duopoly model in which a private firm competes against a state‐owned enterprise (SOE) who cares about social welfare and is privately informed about market demand. When the SOE's social concerns are sufficiently important and when the market competitiveness is sufficiently low, the SOE commits to fully disclose its private information. Otherwise, the SOE commits to withhold its private information. When the disclosure equilibrium prevails, the private firm can be more profitable competing against an SOE than against another private firm. In this mixed‐duopoly setting, the equilibrium social welfare is maximized when the SOE puts a positive weight on both social welfare and its own profit. Our analysis has further implications for both mandatory disclosure and market entry.     

关于分配与所有制关系若干问题的思考

共同富裕,消除两极分化是社会主义改革区别于资本主义改革的试金石,也是邓小平的社会主义改革理论中的一个根本问题。正确评估中国贫富差距扩大的形势,促进分配关系的调整和社会公平是经济研究者的职责所在。贫富差距扩大最根本原因在所有制结构的变化,即所有制结构的"公降私升"已经达到影响公有制为主体的临界点,造成这种状况是干扰"公有制经济为主体"的"私有化"倾向。本文认为毫不动摇地发展包括私有经济在内的非公有经济,要以坚持公有制经济为主体、国有经济为主导作为前提,即实行两个毫不动摇,齐头并进,才能保证我国社会主义基本经济制度的巩固发展,永远立于不败之地。     

Why privatize or why not? Empirical evidence from China's SOEs reform

Using a firm-level panel dataset which covers over 50,000 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) across China for the years 1998 to 2003, we attempt to answer the question of why some SOEs are privatized while others remain under state control. By applying a Heckman two-stage procedure, we investigate the causes that determine SOE privatization outcome. We find that the factors most conducive for privatization are the rise of competition, the increase of FDI concentration of both industries and provinces, and the hardening of SOEs' budget constraints. Moreover, it is shown that relatively better performing SOEs, measured by per employee value-added, profitability, and export propensity, are more prone to privatization. However, we should be careful in interpreting this result, due to the problem of selection bias. Results of the first-stage selection equation suggest that many small and non-performing SOEs dropped out of the sample, possibility due to privatization. What we can conclude is that, among the remainders, the better performing SOEs are more likely to be privatized.     

普京新政与俄罗斯经济政策走向

第三次当选总统的普京将立足于新型工业化道路,通过产业政策主导经济发展,大型国有企业与金融机构仍将成为关键性力量,国家垄断资本主义政策仍将延续,国有制将长期存在于自然垄断、军事工业与原材料产业。同时,普京也将试图通过减少管制和私有化来降低风险。再工业化定位、消除财政赤字的压力、欧美债务危机的警示、中产阶级的快速崛起,决定了普京政府的民粹主义色彩将不得不有所淡化,政策重点将主要围绕培育人力资本与发展高科技产业而展开。经济政策能否推动创新发展与结构转型,取决于一系列条件,其中最为重要的,是政治制度能否顺利实现转型。