两部制许可契约下技术转移差异化和统一许可定价策略比较研究

针对技术转移过程中的差异化和统一许可定价问题，本文分别构建了两阶段差异化定价和统一定价博弈模型，讨论了两部制许可契约下的最优技术许可定价决策及社会效率配置问题。研究发现，相对于统一许可定价，差异化许可定价能够促进研发企业和生产企业一体化协调；差异化许可定价允许生产配置效率更高的企业生产更多的产量，进而提高了社会配置效率；差异化许可定价下，尽管研发企业可以降低对生产配置效率更高的企业的提成，但是可以向其收取较高的固定费用，进而可以缓解因过度的许可定价差异所引起的“水床效应”；当生产企业的产品替代性较强时，研发企业的统一许可定价更有利于改善社会福利，但加剧了市场竞争；除此之外，差异化许可定价更有利于改善社会福利。     

Two-Part Pricing with Costly Arbitrage

This paper considers the optimal two-part pricing strategy of a monopolist whose customers collude when they purchase the firm's product. In contrast to the sentiment in the existing price discrimination literature, I find that a monopolist's profit can actually increase when consumers share its good. When transaction costs for collusion are zero the firm can extract the full consumer surplus through two-part prices. When transaction costs are positive or there are a substantial number of consumers without access to resale, the firm may be hurt by arbitrage.     

Optimal Two‐Part Pricing in a Carbon Offset Market: A Comparison of Organizational Types

This article examines the optimal two‐part pricing by an intermediary in a carbon offset market. In addition to creating a framework for analyzing carbon offset pricing, this article makes two contributions to the theoretical literature. First, we provide an in‐depth examination of the roles played by the upstream inframarginal supply and participation elasticities and the downstream demand elasticity in determining the optimal two‐part pricing strategy. Second, we compare the pricing decisions of three different organizational types: a for‐profit firm, a public agency, and a producer association. The producer association problem, which has received little attention in the literature, yields counterintuitive results because a producer association must simultaneously reduce output and distribute all profits back to its members.     

Intrinsic quality improvements and network externalities

We analyze the optimal pricing choice of an incumbent firm that sells a good with network externalities and is threatened by the entry of a higher intrinsic quality variant. In the framework of a vertical differentiation model, we find a necessary and sufficient condition under which intrinsic quality improvement occurs as a result of this competition.     

Decentralization and Transfer Pricing Under Oligopoly

This paper presents a simple model of a partially decentralized multinational firm (MNF) in competition with a rival firm. It is shown that transfer pricing can be used as a rent-shifting device by the MNF to compete with the rival. This arises because the MNF headquarters uses the transfer price to manage different subsidiaries. The specific value of the transfer price chosen by the MNF depends on whether the rival firm produces the intermediate good, the final good, or both and whether the rival is integrated or not. In particular, both decentralization and competition with a fully integrated rival result in lower transfer prices.     

“Low-Balling” and Efficiency in a Two-Period Specialization Model of Auditing Competition*

This paper develops a simple, two-period specialization model to analyze the effect of start-up costs on auditing competition. Audit firms in the model make strategic specialization and pricing decisions. Through specialization, an audit firm achieves a comparative cost advantage over its competitors for all clients whose characteristics are closer to its area of specialization. This comparative cost advantage is further fortified by the presence of start-up costs. As a result, each audit firm obtains some market power and is able to price-discriminate across clients by offering “specialization-and-relationship-specific” audit fee schedules. This paper demonstrates that the practice of “low-balling” is a natural consequence of competition among audit firms. However, low-balling occurs only in a certain market segment where audit firms compete fiercely. This paper also shows that a policy of banning low-balling acts as a substitute for the commitment of the audit firms to partially collude their pricing policies and results in increased profits for audit firms and increased fees. However, it also results in audit firms choosing specializations in a more efficient way, thereby reducing total auditing costs.     

Joint product signals of quality

Summary The relationship between product quality, signals, and the firm's optimal pricing policy has been given much attention in economics. The literature is extended in this paper by considering the signaling problem of a firm that jointly produces two commodities—one of known quality to consumers (a search good) and one of unknown quality (an experience good). The model presented employs a stylized reputation function, a linear cost structure, and linear demand schedules to produce two interesting insights. First, the search good's price can potentially be used as a signal of the quality of the experience good. Second, the price of a search good will depend upon whether it is jointly produced with another search good or an experience good or whether it is produced in isolation by a single product firm. Furthermore, evidence from a paper on gasoline pricing seems to support this contention.     

Contingent trade policy and economic efficiency

Review of World Economics - This paper models the competition for a domestic market between one domestic and one foreign firm as a pricing game under incomplete cost information. As the foreign...     

Strategic Export Policy in a Differentiated Duopoly: A Note

The purpose of this paper is to further explore how optimal export policies are affected by the nature of oligopolistic competition and the structure of demand. It is shown that (1) the more cost-competitive the home firm is, the higher the optimal level of export intervention becomes; (2) as the goods become better complements, the optimal level of export intervention increases; (3) the nature of the effects of strategic export policies on foreign firms depends on both the mode of competition and the structure of demand.     

基于霍特林模型的双寡头银行贷款竞价博弈

文章以银行利润最大化为目标,通过建立霍特林博弈模型研究了在我国利率市场化进程中,在线性市场情况以及完全信息情况下,不同规模、不同成本结构的双寡头银行各自的最优贷款定价与贷款风险水平选择。研究发现,当两银行贷款成本相差不大时,规模越大的商业银行的最优贷款定价越高,贷款平均风险水平也越高;此外,加强存款人对商业银行的市场约束力,可以有效降低所有银行的贷款定价水平和贷款风险水平。     

Pricing to market, firm heterogeneity and the role of quality

We build a pricing-to-market (PTM) model with firm heterogeneity, which allows for imperfect competition and market segmentation in the presence of flexible exchange rates, horizontal and vertical differentiation and different tastes of consumers in destination markets. We derive firm’s pricing behaviour in response to price and quality competition shocks. We show that there is PTM heterogeneity across firms if quality has a role. We empirically assess the main predictions of our theoretical framework on Italian firm-level data. We document that export-domestic price margins are significantly affected by price and quality competitiveness factors even controlling for foreign demand conditions, size, export intensity, destination markets and unobservables. Finally, we provide evidence of strong heterogeneity across firms in their reaction to price and quality competitiveness.     

我国信用评级业结构、竞争及绩效探析

信用评级具有辅助资产定价、揭示市场风险、提高金融监管效率等作用,是成熟金融体制的重要组成部分。本文从产业组织理论出发,考察我国信用评级行业的结构、竞争、绩效等方面,对行业发展现状有更深入的认识,并借鉴发达国家信用评级业发展经验,为行业今后持续、健康发展提出政策建议。     

Spatial Monopoly with Product Differentiation

Most theoretical work on the behavior of spatial monopoly focuses on the single-product case, while, in reality, a firm usually produces (or sells) many differentiated products. In this paper, 1 introduce a new model of spatial monopoly with a multiple-product firm where the firm chooses both the measure of product varieties and the price of each variety to maximize its profit. I also examine the monopolist's optimal decision and its economic effects on the spatial economy with a fixed and variable market fringe, respectively. For a class of preferences to product differentiation, I find that both the quantities produced and the consumer surpluses vary across three different spatial pricing policies. This finding is in contrast to the literature on a single-product spatial monopoly where those results are invariant across different pricing policies.     

PRICE‐SETTING BEHAVIOR IN TURKISH INDUSTRIES: EVIDENCE FROM SURVEY DATA

This study investigates the price‐setting behavior of Turkish industries based on the results of a survey that was conducted by the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey. The results show that, under normal conditions, the majority of the firms follow a time‐dependent pricing rule but when significant events occur a substantial fraction of them alter their behavior to state‐dependent reviewing. The median Turkish firm reviews its prices every month, but changes its prices four times a year. Price reviews and changes are affected by: the market share, price discrimination, customer type, firm size, and the existence of regulated prices.     

R&D subsidy,intellectual property rights protection,and North–South trade: How good is the TRIPS agreement?

This paper investigates the competition in technology and production between a firm in the North (developed country) and a firm in the South (developing country), and how such competition may be affected by the North’s subsidy on technology improvement and the South’s intellectual property rights (IPR) protection level. It is argued that allowing the North to choose the policy first could bring Pareto improvement. This paper also shows that requiring only the South to tighten its IPR protection (as required by the TRIPS agreement) without putting similar pressure on the North to provide more R&D hurts the South. A more rewarding outcome exists if both the IPR protection level and the technology subsidy rate are chosen optimally. We point out that maximizing world welfare does not consequently hurt the South, or require a tightening of IPR protection in the South.     

垂直产品差异、外国企业纵向控制与研发政策

在Spencer和Brander(1983)模型的基础上,本文引入产品纵向控制因素,考虑生产高质量产品的非一体化企业与另一国生产低质量产品的一体化企业进行市场竞争时,政府的最优研发政策。在企业进行Cournot竞争的情形下,若产品质量差异较大(小),非一体化企业所在国政府的最优研发政策为征税(补贴),而在企业进行Bertrand竞争的情形下,非一体化企业所在国政府的最优研发策略则是征税。     

Competitiveness and Subsidy or Tax Policy for New Technology Adoption in Duopoly

We consider a problem of subsidy or tax policy for new technology adoption by duopolistic firms. The technology is developed in and transferred by a foreign country to the domestic country. It is free but each firm must expend some fixed set-up cost for education of its staff to adopt and use it. Assuming that each firm maximizes the weighted average of absolute and relative profits, we examine the relationship between competitiveness and subsidy or tax policies for technology adoption, and show that when firm behavior is not competitive (the weight on the relative profit is small), the optimal policy of the government may be taxation; when firm behavior is competitive (the weight on the relative profit is large), the optimal policy is subsidization or inaction and not taxation. However, if firm behavior is extremely competitive (close to perfect competition), taxation case re-emerges.     

Economic consequences of VIE when consumers are constrained

This paper, using a Bertrand model of duopoly competition, shows that voluntary import expansion (VIE) forced on consumers, instead of on a producer, is also significantly anticompetitive. VIE causes a higher price as well as higher average cost of supply. When firms can use non-linear pricing, VIE forces marginal cost pricing by the disadvantaged firm, so that it loses incentive for cost-reduction.     

Competition in telecommunications

This paper discusses the scope for competition in the telecommunicationsindustry, taking into account the features of natural monopoly,network externalities, and customer inertia. Recent policy towardscompetition in the industry in the UK is surveyed, with an emphasison access pricing and interconnection. Finally, recent theoreticaldevelopments in the economics of access pricing and interconnectionare discussed and shown to lend some support for aspects ofcurrent policy in the UK.