Democracy and Durability: Empirical Analysis and a Causality Test

The current literature has failed to differentiate between the collapse of democratic and authoritarian rules or whether democratic regimes collapse for the same reasons as do authoritarian regimes. Therefore, the current literature is silent on whether democracies are more fragile or less susceptible to economic and political breakdowns. Using a multitude of political instability variables, this paper explores empirically, whether political freedom and civil liberty (a proxy for democracy) has any effect on the stability of the political order. The empirical results of the paper confirm the hypothesis that democracy is conducive to political stability; the higher the level of political freedom and civil liberty, the more stable countries are. The paper also presented a Granger-causality test of political instability and the level of political freedom and civil liberty. The test results indicate that the level of political freedom and civil liberty Granger-cause the level of political instability, while the level of political instability does not Granger-cause the level of political freedom and civil liberty. The test results indicate that Granger-causality runs one-way from political freedom and civil liberty to political instability and not the other way. A further comprehensive research is needed on the multi-layered and the complex relationship among democracy and the resilience of the political order.I would like to thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments that improved the quality of the paper. I would also like to thank the Research Council of Niagara University for their financial support.     

Model Uncertainty,Political Learning,and Institutions: A Broader View on Mancur Olson's Theory of Institutional Sclerosis

In his Rise and Decline of Nations, Mancur Olson argues that politically stable countries suffer from declining growth rates caused by the growing influence of distributional coalitions that accumulate over time. The empirical literature supports the notion of a negative relationship between a country's duration of political stability and its growth rates but finds only weak support for a negative influence of distributional coalitions on growth. This paper sketches a simple model of party competition under model uncertainty, which may explain this mixed empirical picture. It shows that politically stable democracies are less well equipped to adjust to shifts in their economic environment than democracies with a shorter history of political stability. In a further step, the paper relates the major theme of this theory and Olson's theory to the more recent literature on institutions and growth. Directions for further research are discussed.     

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN ZIMBABWE: THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL AND MACROECONOMIC FACTORS

The purpose of our research is to examine the impact of property rights on foreign direct investment (FDI) in Zimbabwe for the period 1964‐2005. While the macroeconomic determinants of FDI have been analysed to a considerable extent in past empirical work, the role of institutional factors such as the protection of property rights and the efficiency of the legal system has been underexplored. Using a multivariate cointegration framework, we use a newly constructed de jure property rights index for Zimbabwe to determine the impact of property rights on FDI. The empirical evidence shows that property rights are consistently an important explanatory variable of FDI in Zimbabwe, even after controlling for periods when there are no significant new foreign capital inflows. Other significant explanatory variables of FDI in Zimbabwe are the real gross domestic product (GDP), capital intensity, the external debt to GDP ratio, political instability as well as the educational levels.     

Political instability and economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa: Further evidence

After more than three decades of independence, many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have not yet developed stable political systems. Since the 1960s, when African countries began to achieve independence, many of them have encountered significant levels of institutional instability. In recent years, political violence has emerged as the most common method of governmental change. In this study, the effects of political violence on economic and human development in Sub-Saharan Africa are examined. It is seen that political instability is a significant constraint to the improvement of the human condition in the region.     

再议稳定我国房价增长速度的政策有效性——新“国十条”下的思考

近年来我国房价增长速度过快已成为影响经济健康持续发展的一个重要问题,政府进行多次政策调控其目的在于减少市场中的投机行为、稳定房价的增长速度、构建一个健康的房地产市场。文章通过构建投机者的效用函数并对影响投机的因素进行分析以提出减少房产交易中的投机行为政策措施,达到稳定房价增长速度的目的。     

Political instability, policy uncertainty, and economic growth: An empirical investigation

This paper elaborates upon the effect of political stability on economic growth using a novel approach. Unlike the literature on growth that emphasizes the turnover of decision makers, this paper focuses on the volatility of economic policies as the relevant indicator of stability. The literature on growth ignores the microeconomic instability associated with frequent changes of government policies. The empirical results of this paper indicate that the effect of political instability on economic growth is not conclusive. Most of the commonly used proxies for political instability have failed to explain growth differences across countries. The political instability indices have no significant effect on growth when a reasonable set of core variables is also included in the regression equation. The results also show that almost all of the policy uncertainty variables are significantly and negatively correlated with economic growth. However, the instability of economic policies has no significant impact on the accumulation of capital.     

Immunization in Developing Countries: Its Political and Organizational Determinants

The factors that most affect immunization coverage involve the global policy environment and contact with international agencies. Except in very poor countries, democracies have lower coverage rates than autocracies. The quality of a country’s institutions and its level of development are also strongly related to immunization rate coverage and vaccine adoption. There is no evidence that disease outbreaks or polio eradication campaigns affect immunization rates. In the current structure of immunization programs, coverage rates respond more to supply-side than demand effects.     

Is Per Capita Growth in Africa Hampered by Poor Governance and Weak Institutions? An Empirical Study on the ECOWAS Countries

Abstract: This paper proposes an empirical study of the links between poor governance, weak institutions and the growth of per capita income in the countries that belong to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). We estimate a conditional beta‐convergence model using panel data. We find that variables such as the rule of law, property rights, the regulatory burden, political violence, and government ineffectiveness hinder growth in these countries. An interesting question is then the following: what can the countries do to improve their situations? To answer this question, we give several examples (Ghana, Nigeria and the NEPAD) of measures that are undertaken in order to strengthen the institutions and improve governance.     

国际竞争视角下的产权制度与大国兴衰——一个新古典政治经济学的分析框架

本文试图为解释大国兴衰提出一个基于非中性产权制度的新古典政治经济学分析框架。经济学现有的国家兴衰模型大都是内生增长模型。我们将国际竞争环境这一关键的外部变量引入到理论框架中。本文的分析假定:在开放条件下,民族国家为基本竞争单位,长期经济增长是实现国家利益的首要目标,大国兴衰在很大程度上得益或受制于外部环境。我们尝试从商人集团与统治集团的合作方式入手,阐释大国在国际竞争中的得失。本文认为,以长期增长为核心的国际竞争,其实质是大国非中性产权制度之间的竞争。在开放世界中,特别在大国经济"起飞"阶段,商人集团和统治集团之间形成"收买型"合作,并由此建立倾向于生产性集团的非中性产权保护制度对大国崛起至关重要。     

改制对中小国有企业和乡镇企业发展的理论分析与路径选择

改制是使国有中小企业摆脱低速和持续衰退的重要途径;企业制度是为了确保企业利益相关者分享企业持续发展的权益,尽可能调动一切积极因素促进企业发展,这是企业改制的动力所在,企业发展是企业改制的结果。初始产权的明晰是企业发展的必要条件,但不是充分条件。诱致性的企业制度演进可以修正初始产权缺陷。产权适度集中、产权过于集中或过于分散都不利于企业发展。中小企业发展的制度路径:一是在创办时中小企业设计初始企业制度要充分考虑企业持续发展的要求,初始产权明晰并适度集中,正确对待家族制;二是在发展中的中小企业要实行产权制度和治理结构的诱致性变迁。产权多元化是中小企业持续发展中走向现代企业制度的一个重要步骤,更是企业利益相关者对持续发展的要求。治理结构的核心是要保证中小企业吸收优秀的企业家和核心员工的人力资本的目标下解决所有权与经营权分离后投资者和代理人都关注企业持续发展。为此,建立企业利益相关者组成的共同治理结构,尊重核心员工的人力资本的产权要求。     

城市化中失地农民权益保障的反思与印证

城市化是广大发展中国家的必然宿命,也是一个国家经济发展水平的重要标志。城市化过程中,失地农民成为一种必然的现象,但是由于制度的不完善和其他原因,失地农民的权益得不到有效的保障,部分失地农民徘徊在城市的边缘,从产权到个人医疗,从子女教育到进城身份认同都存在问题,都没有完善的制度和措施来解决,他们成为又一个弱势群体,在城市化过程中必须以制度为依托,以法律为手段采取措施保护他们的利益,以维护社会的公平和稳定。     

Assessor Incentives and Property Assessment

While typically not a formulator of policy, property assessors are likely sensitive to political incentives, since they are either directly elected to their office or appointed by another elected official. This article estimates a model that is motivated by the assumption that assessors seek to maximize political support in a manner that affects the assessment‐to‐sales price ratio. With panel data from a 2001 to 2006 series of sales price ratio studies in Virginia cities and counties, a fixed effects variance‐decomposition regression reveals a variety of socioeconomic and political variables that bias the assessed value away from fair market value. In addition to finding influential socioeconomic factors, the results indicate that elected assessors underassess more than appointed assessors. Furthermore, it appears assessors try to export the property tax onto commercial property, and assessors in districts with higher measures of local government fiscal stress tend to give higher assessments.     

Foreign direct investment and country risk: Further empirical evidence

Global political and economic changes over the last decade have resulted into massive capital inflows to developing countries, most of these flows are foreign direct investments. In light of threats of political instability in the forms of civil wars, illegal capital flight, financial market instability, and political corruption, etc., further assessment of country risk is warranted. We examine the relationship between FDI and political and economic risks for 26 countries for the years 1992, 1993, and 1994 by using regression analysis and cross section data. The results indicate a significant relationship between FDI and these risks. This study provides more reliable estimates by using a current and eclectic measurement of risks represented by Euromoney indexes of political and economic risks. In the previous studies the perception of risk was narrowly defined and also political instability events were mistakenly interpreted as political risks.     

利益集团影响下的中美知识产权贸易摩擦的诱发机制

文章首先分析了中美知识产权摩擦的现状,然后从利益集团的视角分析了知识产权保护政策的需求和供给的形成过程,并在此基础上剖析了中美之间两种不同类型的知识产权贸易摩擦的诱发机制。研究结论认为：中国和美国的产业利益集团从自身的经济利益出发形成了不同的知识产权保护需求,政府从政治捐赠和总福利水平效用最大化的角度出发形成了知识产权保护政策的供给,形成了制度层面和产品层面的知识产权贸易摩擦的诱发机制。     

Political instability, investment and economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa

This paper explores the relationship between political instabilityand economic growth in Sub-Saharan African nations. A more comprehensivemeasure of political instability than has previously been developedis used in combination with a simultaneous equations model anddynamic panel estimation approach to produce several interestinginferences. First, the statistically significant inverse relationshipbetween political instability and economic growth identifiedby earlier studies is confirmed by the estimates presented here.Second, the estimated system of equations indicates that economicgrowth and political instability are jointly endogenous. Third,in addition to the direct impact that political instabilityhas upon growth, estimates confirm the hypothesis that politicalinstability indirectly decreases economic growth by decreasinglong-run capital accumulation. Fourth, failure to account forthe dynamic nature of growth equations as well as the endogeneityof explanatory variables may produce biased effects of politicalinstability on growth. Fifth, the broad measure of politicalinstability we use in this study can better capture the effectsof political instability on economic growth than 'elite' instabilitythat has been used by earlier researchers. Finally, principalcomponents estimation is used to develop a measure of politicalinstability that can serve as an alternative to the arbitraryweighting scheme used in previous research.     

Bureaucrats in business: The roles of privatization versus corporatization in state-owned enterprise reform

This article provides evidence from a sample of 12 developing countries that countries which improved state-owned enterprise performance the most followed a comprehensive strategy of reforms, including a combination of privatization and corporatization. Further evidence that corporatization works better in combination with ownership and other reforms is provided through an analysis of government contracts with public managers, private managers and private owners. Contracts with private managers and owners did better than contracts with public managers in part because the property rights of the former gave them a larger stake in the outcomes. The article analyzes the political economy of state enterprise reform and finds that privatization and corporation have similar political costs and tend to succeed or fail together. Where reform was politically desirable, politically feasible, and credible, countries privatized and corporatized successfully. When countries were not politically ready to reform, alternative ownership strategies were not successful in improving performance.     

Beyond privatization: Institutional innovation and growth in China's large state-owned enterprises

This article demonstrates that China's large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are not stagnant fossils waiting to die. Under economic reform policies this sector has undergone large change due to enhanced enterprise autonomy, the impact of market forces, rapid growth of domestic demand for upstream products, strategic integration with the world economy and the state's policy to promote large businesses. China's large SOEs are developing new institutional forms that do not neatly fit into existing patterns. China is experimentally changing its institutions through a combination of central policy, local initiative and interaction with international investment. This presents a challenge to the “transitional orthodoxy” and to ideas concerning property rights in development economics. There is not a universal model of property rights and government action that works best in all circumstances. China's experience with the reform of large SOEs shows the diverse possibilities for effective industrial institutions.     

How Can Chinese Farmers' Property Income Be Improved? A Population–Land Coupling Urbanization Mechanism

Balancing urban and rural development is an important political goal in China. The failure of rural land privatization has led to a low level of rural economic development and a vast property income gap between citizens and farmers. This paper illustrates the reasons for property income inequality from the perspective of the land tenure system and the dualistic household registration system. After evaluating the segmentation of the rural land market and the rigid nature of rural land assets, a population–land coupling urbanization mechanism is proposed. The paper argues that China's land property system has externalized a high degree of geospatial and social urban and rural intertwinement. Major reform of the rural land property rights system is required to correct the situation (further development of the social security system and stable urbanization) and to increase property income potential for farmers.     

从财政分权看我国地方政府发行公债的必要性

举债权是规范的分税制赋予地方政府应有的财权。在财政分权的框架下,一级政权,一级事权,一级财权是题中之义。本文首先从财政分权理论出发,指出发行市政债是地方融资平台的替代措施。     

The Viability of Fixed Exchange Rate Commitments: Does Politics Matter? A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation

This article studies the connection between political instability and the sustainability of an exchange rate regime. A model based on the credibility of monetary policy shows that political unrest should be correlated with the adoption of flexible exchange rates. That intuition is tested using various measures of political instability on a panel of 125 countries between 1980 and 1994.