工资构成比例失衡及其对策

1985年试行工资总额与企业经济效益挂钩(简称“工效挂钩”)以后,工资构成发生了什么变化,有哪些成效与问题.如何进一步加以完善,是亟待研究和解决的问题。一、工资构成的现状与问题我国现行的工资形式,其主要构成有三个组成部分:一是基本工资(或标准工资),它采取计时工资和计件工资两种具体形式。计时工资是按工资标准和工作时间支付给个人的劳动报酬。计件工资是按计件单价支付的劳动报酬,依其性质可区分为计件标准工资和计件超额工资两个部分(后扦应归入奖金)。     

CEO还是TMT——民营上市公司高管薪酬差距对于企业研发的影响

本文以手工收集的2012年中国民营上市公司高管薪酬数据为例,以行为理论、锦标赛理论以及堑壕理论为基础,以高管团队规模和控股股东为调节变量,实证分析了公司高管团队（TMT）薪酬差距对于企业研发的影响。本文研究发现,薪酬差距能够提升高管团队对于风险的接受水平,民营上市公司高管薪酬差距与公司的研发支出显著正相关,。此外,本文进一步的研究发现,高管薪酬差距对于企业研发的正向影响会受到高管团队规模以及控股股东持股比例的抑制,表明了锦标赛激励实施的局限性。本文的研究为理解民营企业高管薪酬差距与企业研发的关系提供了新的经验证据。     

工资构成比例失衡及其对策

1985年试行工资总额与企业经济效益挂钩(简称“工效挂钩”)以后,工资构成发生了什么变化,有哪些成效与问题.如何进一步加以完善,是亟待研究和解决的问题。一、工资构成的现状与问题我国现行的工资形式,其主要构成有三个组成部分:一是基本工资(或标准工资),它采取计时工资和计件工资两种具体形式。计时工资是按工资标准和工作时间支付给个人的劳动报酬。计件工资是按计件单价支付的劳动报酬,依其性质可区分为计件标准工资和计件超额工资两个部分(后扦应归入奖金)。:二是奖     

浅谈医院奖金核算与对策

本文以M医院为例,分析了医院原有奖金核算方案存在的问题,提出了基于期望理论的医院奖金核算体系构建策略.要大幅度提高奖金发放水平;提高保底奖金,取消奖金封顶;打破平均主义的二级分配,拉开职工间奖金差距;细化奖金核算单元,增加核算指标;定期进行奖金分析,持续改进奖金核算方案;引导医疗行为,提高医院效益;规范医生行为,采用多元化的核算办法.     

收入分配与中国居民消费——理论和基于中国的实证研究

本文研究了城乡收入差距扩大对中国居民消费需求的影响.基于生命周期框架的理论研究表明,收入水平越高,居民平均消费倾向和边际消费倾向越低;收入差距越大,居民消费需求越低.文章使用1978—2008年我国28个省、市、自治区的面板数据对理论模型进行了实证检验.结果显示,收入水平提高10000元,居民平均消费倾向下降25.6%,边际消费倾向下降7%;城乡收入差距扩大1单位,居民消费率下降6.5个百分点.数值模拟结果表明,城乡收入差距扩大导致居民消费率在2000—2008年间下降了3.42个百分点,解释了这一期间居民消费率下降的30.8%     

高绩效人才团队标准的研究

具有高绩效的人才团队不仅吸收了各色技能互补的优秀人才,而且能够有效地平衡各种人才的优劣和劣势,使他们在团队合作中充分发挥出人才的潜能,提高企业的综合竞争能力.因此,各种组织争相打造高绩效人才团队.文章从高绩效人才团队的内涵出发.从团队目标、成员素质、团队管理、团队价值这4个方面深入探究了高绩效人才团队的应当具备的具体标准.并揭示了打造高绩效人才团队的现实意义.     

内外资企业合作对FDI技术溢出影响的实证研究

本文通过对内外资企业生产及研发合作中技术溢出效应的实证分析,发现内外资企业间的生产与研发合作,是影响FDI技术溢出大小的重要因素之一:在不进行合作研发的条件下,内资企业技术吸收能力的大小会对FDI的技术溢出和行业产量产生影响;而在合作研发条件下,内外资企业合作生产所产生的FDI技术溢出量和行业产量,均比不进行合作生产时要大.在内外资企业生产及研发合作时,外资企业为追求更高收益,会选择与其技术差距更大的内资企业合作,而内资企业则希望通过缩小技术差距获益.因此,可以采取相应措施,促进内外资企业的生产与研发合作,以提高FDI的技术溢出水平.     

既要效率,也求均等:20世纪60年代半计件工资制的实施

如何在工资的制度设计中充分体现效率与均等,新中国成立后的政策制定者们进行了艰巨探索。计件工资制被认为能够起到更好的生产激励效果,是一种与生产绩效挂钩、体现"效率"的工资制度。但是,计件工资制强调多劳多得,容易造成工人收入的差距拉大,且在工资定额的技术管理水平较低的情况下,无法准确反映工人的实际劳动成果,在分配过程中难以体现"公平"与"均等"原则。为了规避相关问题,在"大跃进"之后的经济调整时期(1962—1965年),一些企业管理者总结了先前计件制扩大实施与全面叫停的经验,对计件工资制进行改良,试行"半计件工资制",取得了较好的效果。本文将对"半计件工资制"的产生背景、实施过程和各方反映进行揭示与分析,并对中国与苏联计件工资制的实行情况加以对比,探讨产生制度差异的核心因素。     

移动互联网中的“我”与“我们”

《微信思维》作者:谢晓萍(主编)出版:羊城晚报出报社微信不只是平台,更是思维;微信为合作伙伴提供了基础的连接能力,而最终使它开花结果倚靠的则是合作伙伴的智慧。本书更像一本故事书,汇集了15家合作企业通过微信进行探索与创新的点点滴滴。同时,微信团队也希望这本书能够对更多的合作伙伴有所启发。《知乎金融选修课:金钱有术》作者:知乎(编著)出版:中信出版社本书是一本分享知识、分享阅历、分享思维方式的金融书。它替一个不懂金融的读者开启了由浅入深了解金融和财务管理的大门。     

风险感知、认知偏差与激励合约的分选决策

基于行为经济学视角,通过现场实验观察了具有异质性偏好的代理人对不同激励合约的选择决策,旨在探讨风险感知、认知偏差与激励合约选择决策的关系.研究发现,在具有相同激励强度的两种可变激励合约下,个体生产力水平并没有显著差异,影响激励合约选择决策的重要因素是对风险的感知,激励合约用于调节不同主体间的主观感知风险配置.结果显示,感知自己是高生产力的代理人倾向于避免与搭便车者合作而带来的损失,而感知自己是低能力的代理人则倾向于选择与高能力者合作的激励合约而增加个体收益;而无论是高能力者还是低能力者,当面对环境的不确定性对收益的巨大扰动时,都不约而同的选择了团队激励合约,这种对合作的偏好会随着扰动的增大而增强.同时,实验进一步证明了,人们对搭便车风险的主观感知与真实的搭便车风险之间存在一定的认知偏差,且该对个人生产力抱持乐观态度的代理人更倾向于选择个体计件激励合约.当企业因面对绩效工具的准确性不高,或绩效结果不确定性较大而不得不采用团队计件时,可以通过调节认知偏差的方式来改变代理人的主观预期,从而强化激励合约的自选择.     

Managerial Discretion and Task Interdependence in Teams

This study investigates whether task interdependence in teams alters the effectiveness of managerial discretion in motivating team performance. Teams are particularly useful when employees' tasks are interdependent—that is, when the degree to which the increase in team performance resulting from a team member's effort depends on the effort and skills of the other team members. The reason is that the more interdependent tasks are, the more employees need to coordinate their actions and help one another to achieve their objectives. Prior research analyzing settings where task interdependence is absent suggests that providing managers with discretion over team bonus allocation can improve team performance relative to equal team bonus allocations because it strengthens the link between contributions to team output and rewards. Economic theory suggests that managerial discretion will also improve team performance when task interdependence is present and information is efficiently used. However, we use behavioral theory to predict that managerial discretion is less effective in the presence of task interdependence, because managers do not fully incorporate all relevant information into bonus decisions and because managerial discretion hurts coordination and helping, which is particularly problematic under task interdependence. We find that while discretion over compensation has a positive effect on team performance relative to equal bonus allocation when task interdependence is absent, it has a negative effect when task interdependence is present. Additional analyses provide support for our underlying theory. Results of our study contribute to both theory and practice by suggesting that, ironically, managerial discretion may be most useful when the potential benefits of employing teams are lowest and least useful when the potential benefits are highest. Our results help explain why firms often grant managers only partial or no discretion over team members' compensation.     

Learning and Estimation of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve Models

The extant literature is split on the best measure of marginal cost in the New Keynesian Philips Curve, with the output gap and the labor share being the most commonly advocated proxy measures. Which one is the best measure? In this article, I assume that agents update their understanding and expectation period by period, a learning process. In terms of econometrics, I use a recursive Vector Autoregression approach and conduct a forecasting exercise that considers updating of information sets used for formation of expectation. I find that the traditional output gap measure is a more significant variable explaining the dynamics of the U.S. inflation rate, as compared with a measure of the labor income share. Furthermore, the role of the output gap cannot be replaced using lagged values of inflation. Instead, both the output gap and lags of the actual inflation rate are important determinants of inflation.     

An Empirical Observation on Central Bank Independence and Real Output

This note reviews the relation between central bank independence and real output for the 1970s and 1980s. A new statistic, based on the total amount of real output available in a decade, is proposed in order to broaden the analysis of the impact of central bank independence on real output. The results show that, although there is no correlation between central bank independence and average growth, central bank independence had a significantly negative impact on the sum of real output during the 1980s. For the 1970s, central bank independence had no influence on the total quantity of real output.     

Equity,efficiency, and labor-market reforms in urban China: the impact of bonus wages on the distribution of earnings

Economic reforms in China have led to a shift in emphasis away from equity towards greater efficiency with a consequent increase in income inequality. In this paper, we focus on the causes of the rising inequality of individual earnings and the link with the reform program by analyzing the components of individual earnings (i.e. standard and bonus wages) separately. Increasing inequality is seen to reflect a rising share and inequality of bonus wages. This, in turn, predominantly reflects the unequal distribution of enterprise profitability combined with labor immobility across enterprises, rather than increasing returns to personal characteristics, such as human capital or gender. Based on these results, we argue that the future evolution of earnings inequality will be determined by the sequence of reforms in, for example, capital and labor markets.     

Coordinating Effort under Team‐Based and Individual Incentives: An Experimental Analysis*

This paper explores the behavior of workers in an environment where it is efficient to engage in the mutual exchange of help. Experimental data show that output and workers' payoffs are greater under team‐based incentives than under individual incentives in an environment where coordination is difficult. However, when the environment is more conducive to coordination (that is, a setting where agents interact repeatedly), output and payoffs are greater under individual incentives. Manipulation of the amount of mutually observable information provides evidence that team‐based incentives, relative to individual incentives, create a more difficult coordination problem for workers and that cooperation requires a richer informational environment.     

试论股份合作制企业产权的明晰化界定

城市化带动了深圳人口和产业的转型,随着市场经济发展和改革开放的深化,原无偿划分给原居民的合作股和留作公共积累的集体股的产权不清和股权难定矛盾日益凸显,产权主体的人格化、多元化是明晰企业产权的基础,只有基于多元的产权主体,才能建立规范的法人治理结构。明确确定合作股分配办法的合法性、合作股的有偿购买,明确规定股东一股一票的按股投票权利、集体股的股东代表及分红权利。     

基于资源位的产业模块化下企业应对战略研究

文章从模块化厂商的分工基础——各厂商占据资源位差别出发,研究了产业模块化对于产业结构的影响,各厂商资源位的差别导致了竞争地位不同,在产业总价值中获取份额不同,并且促进了不同层次厂商间合作,企业应通过业务聚焦战略和企业内部模块化融入到模块化生产网络中。提出了中国企业发展的建议,可以先从低资源位的一般模块商进入模块化网络,然后逐渐提升自己资源位,通过品牌优势构建转入系统集成商或者通过技术能力培养转入关键模块商。     

Compensation in the Post‐FIN 48 Period: The Case of Contracting on Tax Performance and Uncertainty

Academic and anecdotal evidence indicates that incentive systems often provide short‐term payouts without regard for long‐term consequences. New detailed disclosures mandated by FIN No. 48, Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes, enable us to use a tax setting to investigate whether boards adjust performance‐based pay for uncertainty. We find managers’ bonus payouts are positively associated with tax performance; however, bonus payouts are lower when measures of ex ante tax uncertainty are higher. Our results are robust to tests of alternative explanations including financial reporting aggressiveness, overall firm risk, and other forms of compensation. Further, we document that the relation between bonus compensation and tax performance has changed in the post‐FIN No. 48 period. Specifically, we identify a significant association between bonus payout and GAAP ETR only in the pre‐FIN No. 48 period and a significant association between bonus payout and cash ETR only in the post‐FIN No. 48 period, suggesting that the relation between compensation and tax avoidance should be examined carefully with particular attention to the post‐FIN No. 48 period.     

Strategic Incentives in Teams: Implications of Returns to Scale

This article demonstrates the critical relationship between the characteristics of the production function and the strategic incentives in a team. Equilibrium effort increases in team size when substitutability is low relative to returns to scale. Effort levels are actually strategic complements when returns to scale exceed the substitutability of members' effort. Moreover, even with equal shares the well‐known problem is determined by returns to scale and becomes worse as returns increase. While a target scheme can support the optimal output level as an equilibrium, it does not completely deter free riding. A team member will accommodate shirking by increasing their own effort within a remarkably large “accommodation zone” where the additional effort cost is less than the bonus. This accommodation of shirking by others exists for different returns to scale and even for very low levels of substitutability.     

Macroeconomic and Sectoral Effects of International Trade: A Vector Error-Correction Study

This study examines various claims that in the U.S., international trade has contributed to a loss of manufacturing base, an increased gap between unskilled and skilled wages, lower employment, and a loss of productivity. Cointegration tests indicate that in the long run and at the macro level, the ratio of trade to output and FDI to output are correlated with the manufacturing share of output, the ratio of unskilled to skilled wages, labor productivity, and the employment rate. However, Granger causality tests reveal that, with one exception, causation does not run from trade to the domestic variables, the only exception being that FDI Granger causes productivity. When the focus is shifted to the manufacturing sector, the results support the proposition that openness to trade has had adverse effects on this sector.A slightly different version of this paper was presented at the Fifty-sixth International Atlantic Economic Conference, October 16–19, 2003 in Quebec City, Canada. The research reported in this paper is partially funded by a grant from the Institute for Global Economic Affairs at Marquette University.