基于内生视角的高管薪酬激励与公司资本投资研究

基于内生视角检验了高管薪酬激励机制与公司投资行为之间的交互关系。以我国上市公司高管薪酬制度为背景,选取2004~2010年上市公司数据研究发现:(1)公司投资强度越大导致高管薪酬水平显著降低。公司投资活动通过公司会计业绩显著地影响了高管薪酬水平。(2)基于会计业绩的高管薪酬契约无法对高管长期投资活动产生激励作用,提高高管薪酬水平显著地降低了公司投资强度。而基于股票和期权的激励机制能够显著地提高公司投资强度。(3)进一步研究表明,当期和滞后期的公司投资强度均对高管薪酬水平产生了负面效应,并且影响程度逐渐减弱。(4)研究还发现,高管薪酬业绩敏感性并没有对公司投资产生显著影响。研究结果说明,目前我国上市公司高管薪酬激励机制并没有对公司投资行为产生治理效应。     

经理市场、管理才能专用性与外聘高管规模--基于民营上市公司的经验证据

高管管理才能是企业经营不可或缺的专用性资产。公司治理目标不仅在于解决管理者道德风险,还在于挑选出优秀的管理者。文章考察管理才能专用性和经理人市场发育对企业外聘高管规模的影响,以及经理人市场发育是否会弱化管理才能专用性对外聘高管规模的影响程度。以2007-2013年间民营上市公司为样本的研究发现：管理才能专用性越强,企业更愿意聘用内部人为公司高管;经理人市场发育越好,企业聘用外部高管的比例越高;在经理人市场发育良好的地区,管理才能专用性对外聘高管规模的影响较弱;研究还发现,经理人市场发育对企业外聘高管规模的影响比对外部董事规模的影响更显著。文章丰富了资产专用性和高管聘用方面的研究成果。     

银行高管薪酬的权力诱因与风险后果研究北大核心CSSCISSCI

近年来,中国金融行业高管的天价薪酬引发舆论热议,国内外学者开始探究银行高管薪酬设计的合理性。鉴于学界和业界对银行业高管薪酬科学性的质疑,本文基于中国沪深上市银行2009—2012年的相关数据,探究银行业高管天价薪酬以及高管—员工薪酬差距的成因,并考察其对银行风险的影响。具体来说,本文首先研究了银行高管权力对高管薪酬的影响,在此基础上,探究了银行公司治理水平对高管权力与高管薪酬关系的调节效应。同时,还研究了银行高管薪酬及高管—员工薪酬差距对银行风险的影响。研究发现,在中国上市银行中,高管权力显著促进了高管薪酬水平的提升,而银行治理水平能够负向调节高管权力与高管薪酬的正相关关系,同时银行内部薪酬差距可以诱发银行风险。研究结论表明,中国银行业应当适度削弱高管权力,努力提高银行治理水平,以此确保高管薪酬设计的科学合理性,同时适当缩小高管—员工薪酬差距,以防范薪酬异常差距导致的银行风险。     

高质量审计如何影响高管薪酬业绩敏感度？

高管薪酬激励是缓解委托代理问题的重要治理机制，高管薪酬业绩敏感度影响着高管薪酬激励的效果。通过实证检验高质量审计影响高管薪酬业绩敏感度的作用渠道与影响机理，发现：高质量审计通过提高会计信息质量，显著增强了高管薪酬业绩敏感度；基于股权结构、市场竞争环境以及竞争战略的异质性检验发现：股权制衡、机构投资者持股、市场竞争地位、创新强度能够强化高质量审计对高管薪酬业绩敏感度的影响，而管理层持股、市场竞争程度、政府关系将弱化这种影响。研究结果丰富了高管薪酬激励影响因素领域、外部审计治理效应领域以及审计信号效用领域的研究，同时对优化高管薪酬激励具有现实指导意义。     

薪酬政策、经营业绩与国有上市公司高管薪酬——基于国有上市公司分类的实证研究

国有企业员工薪酬体系优化与员工激励机制建设一直是国企改革的重点。为此,对高管薪酬制度现状以及国有企业高管薪酬政策等相关文献进行系统分析,梳理影响国有上市公司高管薪酬的因素,建立面板数据分析模型,选取2010—2020年中国国有上市公司样本,探究不同类型的国有上市公司高管薪酬与经营业绩、薪酬政策的关系。研究发现,高管薪酬政策与经营业绩对两种类型的国有上市公司的高管薪酬具有显著的正向影响。基于研究结论,从政府薪酬管制、公司治理、增强高管薪酬的业绩敏感性、改进薪酬激励的方式等角度,分别对两类国有上市公司提出管理建议。     

后危机时代的公司高管薪酬规制

后国际金融危机时代，上市公司高管人员的薪酬规制仍然是公司治理中的一个重要环节。在思考前危机时代高管薪酬规制失效原因的基础上，参照危机时代部分行之有效的临时规制措施，总结出一套在后危机时代对公司高管（特别是我国上市公司高管）的薪酬规制措施。     

CEO还是TMT——民营上市公司高管薪酬差距对于企业研发的影响

本文以手工收集的2012年中国民营上市公司高管薪酬数据为例,以行为理论、锦标赛理论以及堑壕理论为基础,以高管团队规模和控股股东为调节变量,实证分析了公司高管团队（TMT）薪酬差距对于企业研发的影响。本文研究发现,薪酬差距能够提升高管团队对于风险的接受水平,民营上市公司高管薪酬差距与公司的研发支出显著正相关,。此外,本文进一步的研究发现,高管薪酬差距对于企业研发的正向影响会受到高管团队规模以及控股股东持股比例的抑制,表明了锦标赛激励实施的局限性。本文的研究为理解民营企业高管薪酬差距与企业研发的关系提供了新的经验证据。     

上市公司激励机制对高管薪酬的影响

本文根据中国A股一千多家上市公司披露的2004-2006年度的数据．实证研究上市公司的高管持股激励对于高管薪酬和公司短期与长期绩效敏感性的不同影响。研究结果表明，高管持股制度没有显著提升高管薪酬对长期绩效的敏感性。本文提出了完善股权激励制度、完善绩效衡量指标、培育市场加强外部约束、健全公司治理结构等建议。     

同业参照比运气和才能更重要吗——高管薪酬影响因素的探索性研究

针对近年来我国上市公司存在的高管薪酬持续增长现象,文章以我国上市公司2008-2013年的数据为样本,探究了运气、才能、同业参照因素对高管薪酬的影响。研究发现：（1）同业参照对高管薪酬的影响远高于运气和才能因素,同业参照因素是高管薪酬最重要的影响因素;（2）在国有企业中,同业参照因素对高管薪酬的影响最大,其次是运气因素,最后是高管才能因素;（3）在非国有企业中,高管才能因素对高管薪酬的影响最大,其次是同业参照因素,最后是运气因素。本文的研究意义在于不仅找出谁是高管薪酬最重要影响因素,不同产权性质的企业具有何种表现,也为进一步推进我国高管薪酬制度改革提供理论与经验支持。     

高管团队稳定性与上市公司违规行为关系研究

以中国上市公司为研究对象,考察了高管团队稳定性对上市公司违规行为的影响机理。研究发现：（1）高管团队稳定性对公司违规行为有显著负向影响;（2）高管团队稳定性提高信息披露,进而影响公司违规行为;（3）媒体关注度对高管团队稳定性与公司违规行为关系具有正向调节作用;（4）当违规行为已成既定事实时,高管团队稳定性不利于违规稽查。相关结论对提升我国上市公司治理规范性、推动资本市场健康发展具有重要意义。     

Deferred Executive Compensation Policies in Chinese State-owned Enterprises

Since the commencement of industrial reform in China, most Chinese state‐owned enterprises have adopted a deferred executive compensation policy to provide incentives for their management teams. However, the effectiveness of such a policy needs to be evaluated. In this paper, we specify a model of deferred executive compensation policy, in which the compensation for executives is contingent on firms' future revenue. The model suggests that under deferred executive compensation policies, managers exhibit an increasing level of effort in every period. Furthermore, the deferred compensation policy encourages managers to make long‐term investments, which might generate revenue even after the termination of managerial contracts.     

Executive pay in Japan: the role of bank-appointed monitors and the Main Bank relationship

A feature of tournament models is that executive compensation is not independent of the wages paid at lower levels of the corporate hierarchy. Agency models show that compensation based on firm performance is a means by which incentives can be provided to executives once a promotion tournament has been resolved. In this paper, we combine elements of both models and show that the existence of an outsider who monitors the firm’s activities will lower the sensitivity of pay to firm performance for top executives and reduce the importance of tournament-based incentives. Using panel data for 55 Japanese electronics firms, we find support for the notion that bank-appointed Board members help monitor top executives and that tournament considerations are a particularly important feature of executive compensation in Japan.     

Executive Gender Pay Gaps: The Roles of Female Risk Aversion and Board Representation

Using a large sample of executives in S&P 1500 firms over 1996–2010, we document significant salary and total compensation gaps between female and male executives and explore two possible explanations for the gaps. We find support for greater female risk aversion as one contributing factor. Female executives hold significantly lower equity incentives and demand larger salary premiums for bearing a given level of compensation risk. These results suggest that females’ risk aversion contributes to the observed lower pay levels through its effect on ex ante compensation structures. We also find evidence that the lack of gender diversity on corporate boards affects the size of the gaps. In firms with a higher proportion of female directors on the board, the gaps in salary and total pay levels are lower. Together, these findings suggest that female higher risk aversion may act as a barrier to full pay convergence, despite the mitigating effect from greater gender diversity on the board.     

上市金融企业高管薪酬体系及其监管制度催生

以我国上市金融企业为样本,采用实证研究的方法分析金融企业高管薪酬与绩效的相关性及其影响因素。研究发现,我国上市金融企业高管薪酬与公司绩效之间没有明显的相关性,高管的固定薪酬在整体薪酬中仍然占有较大比重并且相对稳定,其整体薪酬受到市场绩效指标影响的程度比财务绩效指标的程度高。这说明我国上市金融企业薪酬结构设计存在基本薪酬过于稳定且在整体薪酬中占比较高;薪酬设计缺乏弹性;对高管的薪酬激励主要以短期为主,缺乏与绩效挂钩的中长期激励等问题。须结合我国国情,对我国上市金融企业高管薪酬进行制度设计。     

Are stronger executive incentives associated with cross-listing? Evidence from China

This study examines whether firms incorporated in mainland China benefit from cross-listing in Hong Kong, China. The Hong Kong Stock Market has more stringent rules regarding corporate governance and a better system of investor protection than the mainland market. Hong Kong companies generally provide strong incentives to executives via equity-based compensation. Have cross-listed companies learned from Hong Kong firms about adopting these strong executive incentives? The evidence from this study suggests that changes in top executive compensation are more sensitive to sales growth in cross-listed firms than they are in mainland firms without cross-listing. However, compared to Hong Kong firms, cross-listed firms are less sensitive to stock returns. Further, this study shows that it is necessary to differentiate between state-owned companies and private companies, as cross-listing may have a greater impact on executive incentives in state-owned companies than it does in private companies.     

经营环境、高管薪酬与会计信息质量

将我国转型时期企业外部经营环境和内部治理相结合,以2007—2014年沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,实证检验了经营环境对高管薪酬之于会计信息质量的影响。研究发现,经营环境越好,高管薪酬越高;企业经营环境对于高管薪酬之于会计信息质量具有显著的抑制作用;进一步回归结果表明,经营环境对民营企业高管薪酬之于会计信息质量的抑制作用比国有企业更强;另外,经营环境对保护性行业高管薪酬之于会计信息质量的影响明显小于竞争性行业。该研究结果丰富了会计信息质量影响因素的相关文献,不仅为宏观经营环境对微观企业的影响提供了经验证据,也为企业薪酬契约的设计提供参考依据。     

Long‐Run Trends in Australian Executive Remuneration: BHP, 1887–2012

Outside the United States, little is known of long‐run trends in executive compensation. We fill this gap by studying BHP Billiton, a resources giant that has long been one of the largest companies on the Australian stock market. From 1887 to 2012, trends in CEO and director remuneration (relative to average earnings) follow a U‐shape. This matches the pattern for US executive compensation, Australian top incomes, and (for the past two decades) average trends in executive compensation in top Australian firms. Like the United States, Australia experienced a post‐war ‘great compression’ prior to the recent ‘great divergence’.     

我国上市公司业绩与高管薪酬相关性研究——基于高管持股视角

本文选取2010年度沪深两市去除金融企业,pt,st企业以及未公布财务报告的1645家上市公司为样本。按照样本公司高管持股比例的不同,将样本分为了两组。分别对两个样本进行线性与非线性的回归,并设置了股权集中度,公司规模等控制变量,用来检验货币型报酬与高管持股与上市公司业绩的相关性。发现相对于货币性报酬,高管持股比例在一定范围内,与上市公司业绩呈正相关,且相关程度超过货币性报酬,但超过一定的范围,则与上市公司业绩呈负相关的关系。     

Post‐IFRS Revaluation Adjustments and Executive Compensation

International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) allow firms to record adjustments (gains or losses) from the revaluation of investment properties in their income statements. After Hong Kong adopted IFRS in 2005, property companies were required to move their revaluation gains and losses (RGL) from equity to income. We find RGL to be a significant determinant of executive compensation in these firms after 2005, but not before. We further find evidence that the RGL‐compensation association is driven by firms with relative weak corporate governance structure, such as firms in which the controlling shareholders own a relatively small percentage of shares, firms in which the controlling shareholders have control rights that exceed ownership rights, and firms that are no longer run by their founders.