The BW 2 regime: an unstable disequilibrium bound to unravel

The paper presents a critical analysis of the Bretton Woods 2 (BW2) hypothesis. According to this view China, other Asian economies and other emerging market economies follow mercantilist policies of maintaining fixed pegs to the US dollar at undervalued levels as a way to pursue export-led growth. The view in the paper is that there is indeed a BW2 regime in some regions of the world. But it is argued that BW2 is different from the first Bretton Woods system: BW2 is structurally unstable and fragile and will unravel over the horizon of the next few years, not a decade or longer. This unraveling could lead to a sharp fall for the US dollar and the US bond market with high real collateral costs with a disorderly rebalancing of the global economy.     

China–Japan–United States integration amid global rebalancing: A computable general equilibrium analysis

Using a global general equilibrium trade model, this paper assesses the long-term implications of global rebalancing for Asian economies and explores the benefits of China–Japan–United States (US) integration. The analysis suggests that consumption evaporation, a growth slowdown in the US, and the consequent current account correction would force China, Japan, and other East Asian economies to undergo substantial structural adjustments. A combination of domestic reform aimed at boosting service sector productivity and external liberalization aimed at fostering broader economic integration will be critical for East Asian economies to facilitate their economic rebalancing and sustained growth. Our global computable general equilibrium (CGE) analysis suggests that China and Japan need to strengthen their economic ties with the US while at the same time bringing other East Asian economies into this integration process.     

Asia's contribution to global rebalancing

Developing Asia remains at the core of global payment imbalances. While the geographical concentration of current account imbalances is significant—with the People's Republic of China accounting for the lion's share of the region's current account surplus—how Asia contributes to global rebalancing also depends critically on the newly industrialising economies and larger Association of Southeast Asian Nations economies. Given the region's huge diversity, the necessary national macroeconomic and structural policies will vary significantly across Asia's emerging economies. Whereas near‐term rebalancing efforts will be driven primarily by macroeconomic and exchange rate policies, structural reforms are essential for boosting domestic and regional demand as sources of economic growth over medium to long‐term. We argue that regional rebalancing will depend critically on the adoption of deeper and more comprehensive structural reforms and further trade liberalisation to unlock the potential of strong domestic and regional spending—thus reducing Asia's high dependence on extra‐regional demand. Priority policies should include infrastructure spending, competition, trade, financial development, investment, immigration, and other social policies to reduce national savings.     

Rebalancing China's Economy: Domestic and International Implications

This paper considers interactions between China's domestic and external imbalances and their global implications. We present scenarios detailing how a rebalancing of China's growth pattern from investment‐driven growth towards more consumption‐driven growth may occur in practice. Using input–output tables for 2012, we illustrate the knife‐edged nature of Chinese rebalancing, the linkages between expenditure‐side and production‐side rebalancing, and how an internal rebalancing could exacerbate external imbalances. A policy implication for China is that for rebalancing to be fast, consumption must be exceptionally resilient and the efficiency of investment must increase sharply. If rebalancing is too slow, the capital‐to‐output ratio will rise to potentially unsustainable levels and consumption will fail to attain levels of contemporary upper middle‐income economies by 2030. Global input–output tables (1995–2011) suggest that the patterns of Chinese rebalancing considered in our scenarios may generate substantial headwinds for exports to China by its trading partners.     

China＇s Economy in 2007/2008： Coping with Problems of Runaway Growth

Fuelled by high domestic investment and rapid export expansion, China ＂s economy grew by ll.4 pereent in 2007, the highest increase since 1994 and the fifth eonseeutive year of double-digit growth. Such spectacular growth performance is unprecedented in the world＇s economic history. However, the Chinese Government is again worried about a possible ＂hard landing＂for the economy, as no economy can sustain very strong growth for extremely long period without overheating. Cracks in China ＂s economy are indeed emerging. The eonsumer priee index shot up to 6.9percent in November 2007, the highest level in a decade, with the annual inflation for 2007 rising to 4.S pereent, well above the government＇s ＂comfort level＂ of 3 percent. This prompted China＇s top leadership to declare that reducing economic overheating and curbing inflation would be the top poliey priorities for 2008. To contain such cost-push inflation, the government has to tackle its root causes, such as excessive liquidity, which is caused by the undervaluation of the renminbi, which in turn is attributable to China＇s chronic external and internal maeroeeonomie imbalances~ High growth is likely to continue in 2008, at around l O pereent, with inflation of S-6 pereent expected, despite the anticipated tighter maeroeeonomie control measures and the more troubled external economic environment （e.g. the expected US economic slowdown）. Regardless, China ＂s fundamental problems associated with runaway growth will largely remain. In addition, if the US economy slips into a serious recession, the Chinese economy will not be able to deeouple from it and escape unscathed.     

The building up of new imbalances in China: the dilemma with ‘rebalancing’

This paper offers a theoretical basis for the concept of rebalancing and applies it to China, where it is currently a topical issue. Rebalancing here means the correction of economic and social imbalances built up during industrialization. This correction is accompanied by a structural transformation towards a more inward- and consumption-driven growth path, associated with growth slowdown. Attempts to mitigate this growth slowdown by either retarding this structural reform process or by using expansionary stimulus programmes as done over the past decade in China create new imbalances that have to be corrected (rebalanced) again. Managing these multiple rebalancing tasks together is a tremendous undertaking, as this paper shows.     

Growth Slowdown in China since 2008: Will There Be a Hard Landing in the Near Future?

China has witnessed an unprecedented great leap forward in investment since the 2008 global financial crisis, and at the same time real GDP growth has undergone a significant slowdown. This paper examines China's growth slowdown since 2008 up to 2013 using a growth accounting model in a systematic way. It is found that China's growth slowdown since 2008 almost completely comes from a sharp slowdown in total factor productivity growth. During this period, the positive effect on growth from expanding investment has been completely offset by the negative effect of the slowdown in total factor productivity growth. Currently, China's economy has slid into the Solow downward path. Under these circumstances, a soft landing is completely infeasible. Unless the Chinese Government implements substantial rebalancing and comprehensive and in‐depth market‐oriented reform, accompanied by large‐scale de‐investment (decreasing in the ratio of investment in GDP) and massive employment adjustment, China will be unable to avoid the Solow downward path, and a hard landing in investment will be inevitable in the near future.     

Survey of Recent Developments

Following the remarkably successful 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections in Indonesia, attention now turns to the new president and his agenda for the next five years. President Joko Widodo, known as Jokowi, has emphasised the importance of strong economic growth and rising living standards. But he faces significant, broad-ranging economic challenges and, perhaps not surprisingly, serious discussion of these issues did not feature during the election campaigns. In many respects the economy is at a crossroads, facing the choice between a business-asusual scenario of no reform and consequently sluggish economic growth, and a politically difficult reform agenda that would set it on a higher growth path. Economic policymakers regard the events of 2013 as a mini economic crisis, and they feel vindicated in their explicit preference for stability over growth—that is, for slowing the economy through tighter fiscal and monetary policy and letting the currency decline. For now, the economy is slowing but holding up quite well, especially by comparative international norms and considering foreign and domestic headwinds, including possible macroeconomic and financial fragilities. Here we examine these headwinds—from global economic volatility and declining commodity prices, particularly in the wake of the so-called Bernanke shock of May 2013, to the continuing policy drift at home. We investigate whether there is evidence of an emerging adjustment from the commodity-driven growth of the past decade to some of the traditional tradables sectors, especially manufacturing. While the commodity boom is almost certainly a thing of the past—at least at levels witnessed since 2005—the country's political narratives and the government's microeconomic policies appear to be still premised on an era of plenty funded by a disappearing boom. We speculate on likely options and directions for what in all likelihood will be a ‘Jokowi decade’.     

Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on China： Empirical Evidence and Policy Implications

This paper applies a structural vector autoregression analysis to quantify the impact of the global financial crisis on China. It is found that the impact is indeed sizeable： a 1-percent decline in economic growth in the USA, the EU and Japan is likely to lead to a0. 73-percent decline in growth in China. The article discusses whether the current measures of fiscal stimulus are adequate to offset the sharp decline in external demand Although there is little doubt that the massive fiscal stimulus will largely offset the significant shortfalls in external demand, the current growth pattern in China will be increasingly unsustainable in the long term. China ＂s reform cycles suggest that external shocks are often opportunities for structural reforms. Therefore, the crisis could also be a catulyst for rebalancing China ＇s economic structure so as to return the economy to a sustainable path.     

A simple model of an oil based global savings glut—the “China factor”and the OPEC cartel

The purpose of this contribution is to illustrate the interaction between oil prices and the global savings equilibrium which can invert the usual IS type relationship between growth and interest rates. Higher growth is usually associated with higher interest rates. But higher growth leads to also to higher oil prices and hence to higher savings by oil producers. This mechanism might explain the ‘conundrum’ noted by Bernanke that during the last expansion global interest rates remained relatively low despite robust growth. Moreover, it has interesting implications for how one views the huge US current account deficit and how the emergence of China’s savings surplus and oil supply shocks impact the global economy. We show that the new equilibrium is not only located at a lower interest rate but also at a lower growth rate than without the China effect. Finally, we argue that the lower real interest rates resulting from excess OPEC savings have facilitated the adjustment to the subprime crisis.     

China Spillovers: New Evidence from Time-Varying Estimates

The recent “rebalancing” of China’s economy has raised concerns that the country’s growth slowdown may have large global implications. This note looks at this issue by analyzing the effects of China’s growth shocks on the output of other countries and how these effects have changed over time. Estimates indicate that the magnitude of China’s spillovers has steadily increased during the last two decades, but remains yet limited. Spillovers are larger in neighboring (Asian) countries and in emerging markets and developing economies. Trade linkages remain main transmission channels. In addition, a negative shock in China has (marginal) positive effects for net commodity importers while negative for net commodity exporters.     

An alternative benchmark for the validity of China’s GDP growth statistics

The veracity of China’s official statistics on GDP growth rates is a matter of debate in both the popular media and academic literature. Given the level of institutional development, its size, complexity and fast pace of change as an emerging economy, there are good reasons to expect that producing reliable and consistent estimates for GDP is difficult. An alternative benchmark would therefore be useful. We propose a benchmark index for the nominal GDP growth constructed bottom-up from publically available and audited total Revenue numbers of 150 major Chinese listed companies covering 19 industry sectors. This benchmark index closely tracks the official statistics, but with some interesting deviations. Validation by using Gross Margin numbers for our Chinese sample and US data produced similar results. The methodology also allowed us to produce estimates of growth at the industry level, which highlights some important changes underway in the structure growth patterns of the Chinese economy.     

Industrial Structural Change and Economic Growth in China, 1987–2008

The present paper studies the sources of economic growth and the nature of structural change in the Chinese economy from 1987 to 2008. Using a methodology that evaluates the contribution of an industry to economic growth, the present paper shows that the post‐2000 subperiod marked an increased reliance on the services sector as a source of growth in the Chinese economy. Much of the acceleration in real GDP or aggregate labor productivity growth in China in the post‐2000 subperiod compared to the pre‐2000 period can be traced to an increased contribution from service‐producing and high‐technology exporting manufacturing industries. The evidence indicates that the Chinese economy has been rebalancing toward domestic consumption and shifting its export sector toward high‐technology manufacturing industries.     

中国的影子银行会成为另一个次债?

最近几年中国的影子银行或信托融资业务快速发展,反映了利率市场化的实际表现,不过这些业务的潜在风险也引发了对中国经济增长硬着陆的担忧。向公众销售理财产品的信托融资和由金融机构作为中介的委托贷款两种融资方式具有较大的潜在风险。尽管个别违约可能会引发广泛的赎回,但中国的信托融资尚不致形成"资产价格下跌—不断恶化的资产负债表—被迫抛售资产"之间的恶性循环。中国的影子银行也还不会导致系统性金融风险,但完善影子银行业务的监管已经成为一项紧迫的任务。     

当前国内外经济形势的若干判断及对策探索

金融危机的爆发改变了世界经济的发展趋势以及世界经济格局等基本经济形势。如今,虽然全球经济呈现出复苏迹象,但是定调反转依然为时过早。此外,低碳经济成为不可逆转的发展趋势,对华国际贸易摩擦进入高发期,中美人民币汇率问题将持续胶着等情况亦与之交互形成了不容乐观的外围经济环境。我国必须从国际国内两大层面多方位采取措施寻求突破,以实现经济发展模式和产业结构的成功调整和升级。     

Hong Kong's growth synchronization with China and the US: A trend and cycle analysis

This paper investigates the synchronization of Hong Kong's economic growth with mainland China and the US. We identify trends of economic growth based on the permanent income hypothesis. Specifically, we first confirm whether real consumption in Hong Kong and mainland China satisfies the permanent income hypothesis, at least in a weak form. We then identify the permanent and transitory components of income of each economy using a simple state-space model. We use structural vector autoregression models to analyze how permanent and transitory shocks originating from mainland China and the US affect the Hong Kong economy, and how such influences evolve over time. Our main findings suggest that transitory shocks from the US remain a major driving force behind Hong Kong's business cycle fluctuations. On the other hand, permanent shocks from mainland China have a larger impact on Hong Kong's trend growth.     

The current account as a dynamic portfolio choice problem

The current account can be understood as the outcome of investment decisions made by domestic and foreign investors. These decisions can be decomposed into portfolio rebalancing and portfolio growth components, as highlighted by theoretical models. The empirical literature draws attention to the relative importance of portfolio rebalancing to explain fluctuations in capital flows, although they do not shed light on the mechanisms behind these rebalancing effects. In this paper, we provide empirical evidence of the importance of portfolio rebalancing driven by changes in investment opportunities for the dynamics of the current account. In particular, we evaluate the predictions of a partial-equilibrium model of the current account with dynamic portfolio choices, in which portfolio rebalancing is driven by changes in expected asset returns. Focusing on the dynamics of the current account between Japan and the US, we find evidence supporting innovations in investment opportunities as an important mechanism to explain international capital flows.     

跨太平洋伙伴关系协定:中国崛起过程中的重大挑战

跨太平洋伙伴关系协定(TPP)是美国"回归亚太"战略的重要组成部分,其动机既有经济又有政治方面的考虑,其中遏制中国崛起是一个不容否认的目标。以2011年亚太经合组织(APEC)峰会为标志,TPP已进入实质性谈判阶段。其未来的发展前景很大程度上将取决于日本及其他东亚国家的立场,至于美国所宣称的亚太自由贸易区协定(FTAAP)现阶段基本上是一个没有实际意义的符号。一旦TPP成为现实,APEC首当其冲将可能会被架空。对中国而言,被排除在TPP之外不仅意味着将受到"排他性效应"的冲击,而且过去十年中国所致力推动的东亚区域经济合作进程有可能因此而发生逆转,这将是中国崛起过程中面临的一次重大挑战。     

后危机时期的全球公共债务危机和中国面临的挑战

为克服危机而推行的扩张性财政政策导致了公共债务危机的恶化。美联储推出的量化宽松II不但难以消除美国过度负债的一系列后果,且对全球经济、金融稳定的副作用巨大。在新的一年,中国将面临来自实体经济和金融两方面的冲击:在出口增速下降、大宗商品价格上涨、贸易顺差减少的同时,热钱的冲击将导致资产价格和物价上涨压力的增加。中国现有外汇储备的实际价值也将遭受美国国债价格下降和美元贬值的双重打击。     

COVID-19 and trade: Simulated asymmetric loss

This paper uses 2018 data as a benchmark to build a numerical 26-country global general equilibrium model with trade cost and an endogenous trade imbalance structure. We assume that COVID-19 will increase the trade cost between countries and decrease labor supply in production. We use China’s trade data from January to April in 2020 to calibrate the influence level parameters and then simulate the trade effects of COVID-19 in China, the EU, the US, and the world. Our simulation results find that all countries’ trade and exports will be significantly hurt by the pandemic. Due to the trade diversion effect and the price growth effect, some countries will see an increase in import trade. Comparatively, the pandemic has the most negative impact on global trade, followed by the EU, the US, and China. As the pandemic deepens, the negative impact on trade will increase. The worldwide pandemic has the most significant impact on US trade, with an effect about 1.5 times that of the average world effect.