Gross worker flows and unemployment dynamics in Japan

This paper studies the dynamics of worker flows in Japan between 1980 and 2009. We construct gross worker flows data using the monthly Labor Force Survey. Our data enables us to examine the size and cyclical patterns of the flows and transition rates between employment, unemployment, and not being-in-the labor force. We find that the cyclical pattern of worker flows is similar to that found in other countries; however, worker flows in Japan are generally smaller than those in the US and European countries. We also decompose changes in unemployment into contributions from unemployment inflow and outflow rates. We find that both inflow and outflow rates significantly affect variations in unemployment.     

Aging labor,ICT capital,and productivity in Japan and Korea

This study examines how aging affects labor productivity using industry-level data of Japan and Korea. The analysis shows that, for both Japan and Korea, aging has positive effects on labor productivity when older workers are working in industries with a large share of information and communication technology (ICT) in the capital stock. We also find that, on average, older workers exert positive effects on labor productivity across all industries when they are low-educated in Japan and high-educated in Korea. In addition, a complementary effect between ICT capital and older workers is observed for both high- and low-educated workers in Japan but only for low-educated workers in Korea. The complementarity between ICT and old workers existed in both manufacturing and services industries of Korea and Japan.     

A theory of heterogeneous city growth

We consider an economy with three cities producing different outputs. Two cities produce intermediate goods, a type 1 city producing an intermediate “agricultural” good with capital and labor only, and a type 2 city producing an intermediate “industrial” good with capital, labor, and human capital. A type 3 city produces the final good which is obtained from the two intermediate goods and labor. The asymmetric introduction of human capital allows us to prove that the three cities experience, at equilibrium, heterogeneous endogenous growth rates which are proportional to the growth rate of human capital. We show that the “industrial” type 2 city is characterized by the larger growth rate while the “agricultural” type 1 city experiences the lower growth rate, and thus the type 3 city is characterized by a growth rate which is a convex combination of the two former growth rates. This implies that the relative size in terms of output of the “agricultural” city decreases over time. This property allows us to recover the empirical fact that most non‐agricultural production occurs in growing metropolitan areas. But, simultaneously, as we prove that total labor employed in each city is proportional to the total population, the relative population size distribution of cities is constant over time, as shown in empirical studies.     

Engel versus Baumol: Accounting for structural change using two centuries of U.S. data

In the last two centuries, the reallocation of labor out of agriculture has been a dominant feature of structural change and economic growth in the United States. This paper uses an accounting framework founded in economic theory to decompose this reallocation into three components: a demand-side effect due to the low income elasticity of demand for agricultural goods (Engel effect), and two supply-side effects, one due to differential sectoral productivity growth rates (Baumol effect), and the other to differential capital deepening. The results show that the Engel effect accounts for almost all labor reallocation until the 1950s, after which the Baumol effect becomes a key determinant. Our framework provides a unified account of long-run structural change, and demonstrates that historical interpretations and theoretical models that emphasize only one dimension of this process cannot properly account for the dramatic history of labor reallocation in the United States.     

The effects of globalization and technology on the elasticity of substitution

The elasticity of substitution between capital and labor (\(\sigma\)) is usually considered a “deep parameter”. This paper shows, in contrast, that \(\sigma\) is affected by both globalization and technology, and that different intensities in these drivers have different consequences for the OECD and the non-OECD economies. In the OECD, we find that the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is below unity; that it increases along with the degree of globalization; but it decreases with the level of technology. Although results for the non-OECD area are more heterogeneous, we find that technology enhances the substitutability between capital and labor. We also find evidence of a non-significant impact of the capital-output ratio on the labor share irrespective of the degree of globalization (which would be consistent with an average aggregate Cobb–Douglas technology). Given the relevance of \(\sigma\) for economic growth and the functional distribution of income, the intertwined linkage among globalization, technology and the elasticity of substitution should be taken into account in any policy makers’ objective function.     

人口红利贡献被高估了吗?——基于人力资本积累视角的研究

人口红利下降被认为是新常态下中国面临的重大挑战,然而劳动投入不仅包含劳动数量,还包含劳动质量,分别对应于人口红利与人力资本。由于在测量上忽视了高速城市化对人力资本积累的积极影响,在机制上忽视了人口红利和人力资本分布趋同的叠加影响,容易造成人口红利贡献高估且人口资本贡献低估。文章从人口迁移视角出发,参考拉姆齐无限期界模型建立人力资本积累方程,将城市化对人力资本积累的积极作用纳入分析,得出转换效应、迁移效应和共振效应,阐明人口红利和人力资本空间分布趋同的微观机制,得到检验人口红利和人力资本对经济增长贡献的一致性框架。以2013-2016年272个样本城市进行计量检验：固定效应回归分析和内生性检验表明人口红利和人力资本的增长弹性排序不确定,中介效应检验表明人力资本的增长贡献超过人口红利,分组检验进一步证实人力资本贡献超过人口红利,且存在相互叠加共同影响城市经济增长的共振效应。结论表明,若充分考虑城市化对人力资本的积极影响,则人口红利的贡献确实被高估,而人力资本的贡献被低估。由此得出政策建议,应持续推进城市化高质量发展,加速人力资本积累,构筑劳动质量替代劳动数量的机制,以更好地应对新常态下人口红利下降的负面冲击。     

Life-cycle search,match quality and Japan’s labor market

The Japanese labor market has been experiencing considerable transformations over the recent decades. We analyze the implications of some of these actual and potential transformations, whose impact may not be homogeneous across workers of different ages. We first develop a life-cycle search and matching model which incorporates random match quality as well as elements capturing important institutional features of the Japanese economy. Our model is consistent with the life-cycle properties of Japan’s labor market, namely that the job separation and unemployment rates are U-shaped, whereas the job finding rate declines with age. We then conduct three experiments that are relevant to Japan: a decline in productivity, a removal of the firing costs, and a decline in the population growth. In the first two experiments, we find substantial changes to these three rates, where young workers tend to be the most affected. We observe, however, a very small labor market impact in the third experiment.     

技术进步、效率变化、资本积累与我国地区服务业发展

本文用非参数生产前沿方法将我国1978—2007年服务业劳均产出增长分解为效率变化、技术进步和资本积累的贡献三个部分,并用方差分解方法估算了各部分对地区服务业劳均产出增长率差异的贡献,然后采用核密度分布方法分析了上述三个部分对地区服务业发展的影响。研究发现：（1）技术进步是促进各地区服务业增长的重要因素,其作用随资本积累的提高呈上升趋势;（2）效率虽然对服务业经济增长的平均贡献较小,但却是各地区服务业增长率差异的主要原因;（3）资本积累在不同时期对地区服务业增长的贡献差别很大,其作用随时间发展呈上升趋势。     

基于技能偏向性技术进步的经济增长动能分解

在传统Solow增长核算框架基础上引入异质性劳动投入以及技能偏向性技术进步，从而将经济增长分解为固定资本投入增长、劳动投入增长、技能结构深化、技能偏向性技术进步、中性技术进步及效率改进等五种动能。研究发现：第一，中国经济增长主要由固定资本投入以及全要素生产率增长共同驱动，其中资本投入对经济增长年均贡献率为61.64%，全要素生产率增长的年均贡献率则为35.66%，中国区别于其他中低收入国家的发展奇迹背后正是较快的全要素生产率增长；第二，即使对于高收入国家而言，资本投入仍然是主要的经济增长动能；第三，技能结构深化以及技能偏向性技术进步是全要素生产率的主要来源，二者对中国经济增长的年均贡献率分别为32.04%和21.27%；第四，资源配置效率变化是引起全要素生产率波动的主要因素，资源配置效率下降是导致2008年后中国以及大部分高收入国家全要素生产率增速放缓的主要原因。     

Call For Papers: The Eighth International Convention of the East Asian Economic Association

This paper provides empirical estimates of total factor productivity (TFP) trends in a sample of 17 APEC countries over the period 1975 to 1996. TFP growth is an important measure of an economy's performance and if measured correctly it can provide valuable guidance on issues related to the assessment of sustainable growth trends. We use the Malmquist index to measure TFP growth and decompose it into an efficiency change and a technical change component. This decomposition provides extra insight on assessing sustainable growth trends. The measurement technique itself is regarded as a significant improvement over previous conventional measures of TFP growth. The results are very interesting. Japan, Thailand and primarily Indonesia and Malaysia are identified as countries exhibiting on average negative TFP growth rates in the 1975-1990 period. In all these countries as well as in South Korea and Taiwan the main cause of low TFP growth is a poor (negative) efficiency record. The average TFP growth rate for Japan and Malaysia is positive in the 1975-1996 period but the efficiency change component remains negative. In all these countries the main contributor to labour productivity growth is capital accumulation. Unlike previous studies we find no evidence of a poor TFP growth performance for Singapore. Furthermore, we estimate that most of Singapore's labour productivity growth is driven by efficiency change. Estimates of rates of convergence towards the frontier economy that is estimated (not assumed as in other studies) to be the US, are also reported.     

What happened to the world's potential growth after the 2008–2009 global financial crisis?

This paper provides estimates of potential growth for 52 economies in 2000–2018. We follow Borio et al.’s (2014, 2017) methodology, which takes into account the relationship between financial factors and the output gap. We find that the world's potential growth declined from an average of 3.0% in 2000–2007 to 2.6% in 2010–2018. Potential growth peaked before the crisis at 3.4% in 2006. The trough was in 2009 at 2.3%. Potential growth started recovering in 2010 and reached 2.9% in 2018. Decomposing the 0.4 percentage points decline between 2000–2007 and 2010–2018 by economy, we find that high-income Europe contributed 0.34 percentage points. The decline in potential growth in the United States contributed 0.24 percentage points, while the decline in Japan contributed just 0.07 percentage points. China's potential growth and that of Asia and the Pacific also fell, but their contributions to the change in the world's potential growth were positive, 0.33 percentage points and 0.11 percentage points, respectively. The other economies contributed 0.19 percentage points to the decline. Decomposing the sources of the decline into the contributions of labor force growth and labor productivity growth, the former declined by 0.55 percentage points, while labor productivity growth increased by 0.15 percentage points.     

Information technology and the Japanese economy

In this paper we compare sources of economic growth in Japan and the United States from 1975 through 2003, focusing on the role of information technology (IT). We have adjusted Japanese data to conform to US definitions in order to provide a rigorous comparison between the two economies. The adjusted data show that the share of the Japanese gross domestic product devoted to investment in computers, telecommunications equipment, and software rose sharply after 1995. The contribution of total factor productivity growth from the IT sector in Japan also increased, while the contributions of labor input and productivity growth from the non-IT sector lagged far behind the United States. Our projection of potential economic growth in Japan from for the next decade is substantially below that in the United States, mainly due to slower growth of labor input. Our projections of labor productivity growth in the two economies are much more similar. J. Japanese Int. Economies 19 (4) (2005) 460–481.     

Business cycle accounting for the Japanese economy

We conducted business cycle accounting (BCA) using the method developed by Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (Chari, V.V., P.J. Kehoe, E.R. McGrattan, 2002a. Accounting for the Great Depression. Am. Econ. Rev. 92 (2), 22–27) on data from the 1980s to 1990s in Japan and from the interwar period in Japan and the United States. The contribution of this paper is two-fold. First, we find that labor wedges may have been a major contributor to the decade-long recession in the 1990s in Japan. Assuming exogenous variations in the share of labor, we find that the deterioration in the labor wedge started around 1990, which coincides with the onset of the recession. Second, we performed an alternative BCA exercise using the capital wedge instead of the investment wedge to check the robustness of BCA implications for financial frictions. The accounting results with the capital wedge imply that financial frictions may have had a large depressive effect during the 1930s in the United States. This implication is the opposite of that from the original BCA findings.     

Black-white wage differential: The relative importance of human capital and labor market structure

This article uses the decomposition analysis developed by Neumark and the 1987 CPS data to investigate the relative importance of human capital and labor market structure in explaining the observed wage differential between white males and blacks (both male and female). We find that labor market structure, as opposed to differences in human capital, explains a relatively large portion of the wage gap between white males and blacks. In addition to blacks and whites being paid different wages for the same work, they are also given unequal opportunities. This means that narrowing the human capital gap between the races will not be enough to close the wage gap, as argued by human capital theorists. It is equally important to pursue policies that provide access to higher paying jobs and industries for blacks.     

金融发展与增长源泉：要素积累、技术进步与效率改善

本文通过基于DEA的经济增长核算框架将中国28个省市的劳均GDP增长分解为了劳均资本积累、技术进步和技术效率改善三个部分的贡献,然后采用GMM动态面板回归技术分别检验了在1994—2003年间金融发展对这三者的影响,研究发现,金融发展显著加速了劳均资本的积累,但其却阻碍了技术进步和技术效率的改善。本文的研究为理解中国金融发展与经济增长问的关系提供了新的视角和经验证据,金融发展通过不同的机制对经济增长产生了不同的效应可以解释为何“金融引导经济增长”这一命题在中国难以成立。     

Human capital,trade, and economic growth

Human Capital, Trade, and Economic Growth. — Human capital, because of its special role in innovative activity and technological progress, has formed the bedrock of the new theories of endogenous growth. However, it not only serves as an engine of growth but also as a productive input along with labor and physical capital. In this study, the authors find evidence of the importance of both roles of human capital. They also find that the relationship between growth and the external effects of human capital vary according to trade regime. When literacy rates are relatively high, open economies grow about 0.65 to 1.75 percentage points more than closed economies.     

Monetary policy,capital regulation and bank risk-taking：Evidence from China

This paper investigates the monetary policy’s risk-taking channel in China’s banking sector and reveals how capital buffer affects this channel in both theoretical and empirical analyses. We find that well-capitalized banks undertake less risk than those under-capitalized, which is opposite to the empirical evidence from the US. After comparing previous related theories, we point out the pattern of risk-shifting effect in China is different from that in the US. Meanwhile, we provide more substantial comparison between different types of banks. First, in the face of falling interest rates, state-owned commercial banks will undertake more risk than others. Second, the deterring effect of capital on risk varies little between banks. Third, banks short of capital can significantly reduce their risk-taking by replenishing capital through several channels.     

Losing the future: Household wealth from urban housing demolition and children's human capital in China

Some literature observes the negative but not very significant effect of household wealth growth on children's educational outcomes. This surprising finding is not easily reconciled with the traditional explanation that relaxed economic constraints caused by wealth growth can promote human capital accumulation. This paper proposes an alternative explanation for the causal relationship between wealth growth and human capital, which could be negative: individuals tend to reduce human capital investment following the decline in their labor supply induced by wealth growth, given that investing in human capital is mainly for employment competitiveness. This explanation is supported by evidence from the case of urban housing demolition in China, in which affected households could obtain substantial wealth growth by considerable demolition compensation thanks to the real estate boom in China. Specifically, using two nationally representative datasets, we find that Chinese households that have experienced demolition relatively have more wealth, less labor supply, lower propensity to accumulate children's human capital, and consequently, have children with lower educational achievement. These results suggest that China's economy may be losing its momentum because of the decline in labor supply and human capital accumulation brought about by the ongoing large-scale urban housing demolition.     

对我国资本-劳动力-能源投入和科技进步的贡献率的非参数测算

本文以扩展的“索洛余值”模型为基础,利用多元非参数模型的局部线性估计,研究了改革开放以来我国经济技术进步率的变化以及资本、劳动力、能源投入和全要素生产率在经济增长中的贡献。得出结论,我国经济增长中劳动力的贡献率逐渐降低,能源的贡献率基本不变,而投资和技术进步在产出中起着越来越重要的作用。     

The current account as a dynamic portfolio choice problem

The current account can be understood as the outcome of investment decisions made by domestic and foreign investors. These decisions can be decomposed into portfolio rebalancing and portfolio growth components, as highlighted by theoretical models. The empirical literature draws attention to the relative importance of portfolio rebalancing to explain fluctuations in capital flows, although they do not shed light on the mechanisms behind these rebalancing effects. In this paper, we provide empirical evidence of the importance of portfolio rebalancing driven by changes in investment opportunities for the dynamics of the current account. In particular, we evaluate the predictions of a partial-equilibrium model of the current account with dynamic portfolio choices, in which portfolio rebalancing is driven by changes in expected asset returns. Focusing on the dynamics of the current account between Japan and the US, we find evidence supporting innovations in investment opportunities as an important mechanism to explain international capital flows.