Competitive price-matching guarantees under imperfect store availability

This paper analyzes the role of verification of product availability in the context of competitive price-matching guarantees (PMGs). PMGs involve a retailer matching any lower price offered by competition for an identical item. Until now, researchers focused on the scenario where customers can receive the lower price with a simple proof (e.g., weekly flyers). However, in reality, retailers reserve the right to verify the availability at the competitor location; if the product is not available there, then the price-match request might be declined. We develop a price competition model to investigate the effects of verification of availability on price decisions and profit levels of competing retailers. In our model, demand is driven by the availability levels of retailers as well as the price-search cost and store-switching cost incurred by customers. Price-search cost leads to two customer segments: uninformed ones who have no knowledge about prices, and informed ones who are knowledgeable about prices. On the other hand, store-switching cost determines how many customers search for the product at an alternative location because of high price or unavailability at their preferred retailers. Our analysis reveals, among others, that the outcome of availability verification is linked to three factors: price-search cost, store-switching cost, and the reservation prices of customer segments. Verification of availability allows retailers to price discriminate customers who could not be discriminated otherwise, specifically those belonging to the informed customer segment. Furthermore, it is a significant profit-enhancing mechanism only if there are switching customers in the market. Interestingly, even though customers view the verification of availability as a hassle, it can actually result in them paying lower retail prices by increasing the level of retail price competition.     

Entry deterrence/accommodation with imperfect strategic thinking capability

Both through empirical research and laboratory experiments it has been shown that managers are heterogeneous in strategic thinking-i.e., not all the managers can accurately conjecture their competitors’ behavior and actions. In this paper, we examine the entry deterrence/accommodation strategy of an incumbent firm facing a potential entrant that may behave less strategically than the incumbent in the way of conjecturing competitors’ actions and beliefs. We adapt the Cognitive Hierarchy model to capture this heterogeneity among the managers of the entrant firm and the incumbent firm. Surprisingly, we show that the incumbent can deter entry by investing in expanding the market size and the competition may increase the incumbent’s incentive to invest in market expansion. If entry does occur, the market expansion in our model also benefits entrant comparing to the case without market expansion. This feature of our result sets it apart from the standard result in the entry deterrence literature, which tends to suggest that incumbent has to either over-invest in actions harmful to entrant if entry occurs. In our model investing in expanding the market size makes the entrant to update its belief about the incumbent’s strategic thinking capability downward and thus, decreases the entrant’s expected profitability, which in turn deters entry. Our research has important implications especially for emerging markets given that the lack of management talent is a particularly severe problem among local firms in emerging markets and multinational companies pioneer in the emerging markets with great market expansion opportunities have to face the potential entry of local companies.     

Signaling quality with new product preannouncements: Vaporware and the role of reference quality

This research develops a signaling game that captures the essential dynamics of new product preannouncements (preannouncement/launch/market feedback). New product preannouncements are preannouncing firms' formal efforts to inform their competitors and customers about the future availability, superior quality and introductory price of their upcoming new products. In a market, two firms compete (entrant preannounces and incumbent responds) across two periods. The entrant has private information about the true quality of a new product (the incumbent and customers do not know it), and this informational asymmetry provides the entrant with a preannouncement dilemma. Should the entrant preannounce and, if the entrant does, should the entrant tell the truth about quality? Preannouncements often get customers who might buy now from a competitor to wait for a higher quality to be available. Therefore, the entrant may have an incentive to bluff the quality of a new product in order to enhance the likelihood of customers' waiting. However, because the quality exaggeration is also likely to increase customers' quality expectations, the entrant may suffer a significant sales penalty if the entrant does not deliver the promised quality. Through the signaling game, this paper derives conditions under which such a bluff does/does not put the preannouncing firm at risk (i.e., this paper derives the separating/pooling equilibria that are the focus of signaling games).     

Capacity Constrained Firms and Expansion Subsidies: Should Governments Avoid Generous Subsidies?

This paper examines entry deterrence and signaling when an incumbent firm experiences capacity constraints. Our results show that if the costs that constrained and unconstrained incumbents incur when expanding their facilities are substantially different, separating equilibria can be supported under large parameter values whereby information is perfectly transmitted to the entrant. If, in contrast, both types of incumbent face similar expansion costs, subsidies that reduce expansion costs can help move the industry from a pooling to a separating equilibrium with associated efficient entry. Nonetheless, our results demonstrate that if subsidies are very generous entry patterns remain unaffected, suggesting a potential disadvantage of policies that significantly reduce firms’ expansion costs.     

South African Complaint Forums in the Retail Industry: a Survey of Literature and Some Lessons from the EU

South African consumers receiving poor service in the retail industry want to complain, but have limited or no knowledge of the available consumer complaint forums. The consumer complaint forums in the retail industry can generally be divided into those established in terms of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 and other complaint forums. Before consumers can decide which forum they want to lodge their complaint with, they first need to identify possible complaint forums and then measure each forum according to certain factors. This study made a unique contribution by identifying possible factors which a consumer can refer to in this regard. In developing these factors, guidance was taken from the EU Consumer ADR Directive and the ODR Regulation. The factors suggested in this study included the following: the cost of and time spent on lodging a complaint, the effective functioning of the complaint forum, transparency in the operation of the complaint forum, the relief that a consumer may obtain from the complaint forum, and the user-friendliness of the complaint process. The National Consumer Tribunal, the National Consumer Commission, the Consumer Goods and Services Ombud, and ordinary civil courts were assessed using the above factors. A limitation of this study was that not all complaint forums could be assessed in terms of these factors, due to the lack of publicly available information. This study found that even though South Africans now have more complaint forums at their disposal, this does not translate into positive outcomes for aggrieved consumers. The strength of these forums lies in the buy-in received from both consumers and retailers. True consumer power arises through collective action after careful investigation, and resolving individual complaints may not result in the change of consumer policy which is actually what is required in the long run.     

The timing of version releases: A dynamic duopoly model

In many R&D-intensive consumer product categories, firms deliver value to consumers through the quality enhancements provided by new and improved versions of existing products. Therefore, important marketing decisions relate to a firm’s strategy for developing quality enhancements and releasing new versions. This paper explores this type of product development using a dynamic duopoly model that endogenizes each firm’s decisions over how much to invest in R&D and when to release new versions. Specifically, I explore how two key industry fundamentals—the degree of horizontal differentiation and the cost of releasing a new version—affect firms’ product development strategies and, accordingly, the evolution of industry structure. I find that varying the degree of horizontal differentiation gives rise to three distinctly different types of competitive dynamics: preemption races when the degree of horizontal differentiation is low; phases of accommodation when it is moderate; and asymmetric R&D wars when it is high. Furthermore, I find that an increase in the cost of releasing a new version can induce firms to compete more aggressively for the lead and, in doing so, release new versions more frequently despite the higher cost.     

Free in-network pricing as an entry-deterrence strategy

This paper analyzes the entry-deterring power of free in-network pricing with multiple incumbents. Free in-network pricing may deter entry since it creates network externality that intensifies competition. One may expect that a particular entry-deterrent strategy adopted by all incumbents would have more entry-deterring power than when it is adopted by some incumbents only. However, we show that when free-in network plan has entry-deterrence power with two incumbent firms, sometimes one incumbent offering free in-network plan may have more entry deterrence power than both firms offering free in-network plans. In other words, we find that an asymmetric adoption of entry-deterrence strategies by the incumbent firms may be the best for entry deterrence. This result highlights the importance of the strategic choice of the pricing plan as a function of not only the likelihood/cost of entry but also of the plan choices of other firms, and may partially explain the asymmetric strategies used by competing firms.     

On the Credibility Determinants of a Quality Label: a Quasi-Natural Experiment Using the Example of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Stiftung Warentest</Emphasis>

In 2013, Stiftung Warentest, which is one of the most important consumer organizations in Germany, tested hazelnut chocolate for their leading magazine called test. The hazelnut chocolate of Ritter Sport, which is a high-quality producer of chocolate in Germany, failed the test and received the grade “unsatisfactory.” Stiftung Warentest accused Ritter Sport of labelling an artificial flavouring as a natural flavouring. Ritter Sport rejected the accusation, went to court, and won the trial. Stiftung Warentest had to withdraw the issue in question of test magazine. The affair received broad media coverage from December 2013 to September 2014. Using the case Ritter Sport versus Stiftung Warentest, it is analysed whether negative headlines really undermine the credibility of a quality label by examining Stiftung Warentest and their quality label called test. In addition, it is examined what can be done to restore or, more generally, increase the credibility of a quality label. Based on a quasi-natural experiment, it is found that the negative headlines regarding Stiftung Warentest have undermined the credibility of the test label. It is also found that the credibility of the test label can be increased by providing reference values to the tests, strengthening the independence of Stiftung Warentest, and using laboratory methods for the tests. For the most part, the same holds true for any quality label. High-quality producers, quality-conscious consumers, and the awarding organization of the quality label can benefit from an increased credibility of a quality label.     

Opening the OTC drug market: The effect of deregulation on retail pharmacy’s performance

Governments in many countries have deregulated the retail pharmacy market to offer easier and broader access to pharmacy services. Such deregulation has spurred the competition by allowing the entry of new drug distribution channels. Current research leverages the Pharmaceutical Affairs Law revision introduced in South Korea in November 2012. The policy change allowed 24-hour convenience stores to sell 13 first-aid drugs directly to patients. This research investigates the causal effect of new retailers’ entry on incumbent pharmacies’ financial performance in terms of pricing, revenue, and market exit. The findings, based on the panel data of 2,795 pharmacies in a 36-month period from 2011 to 2013, suggest deregulation posed a significant competitive threat to incumbent pharmacies, resulting in lower average prices for the deregulated drugs, significant drops in revenue and accelerated financial failures. A significant heterogeneity in the treatment effect is found across pharmacies. Pharmacies with less loyal customers and poorer financial performance suffered more after deregulation. Our findings suggest that although such deregulation is intended to enhance consumers’ access to health care, opening the OTC drug market to new retailers may hamper consumers’ access to pharmacy services because of the exit from the market of underperforming incumbents.     

Local competition, entry, and agglomeration

This paper analyzes competition between two spatially differentiated multi-product retailers who encounter entry from a low-cost discounter. We assess how entry affects the pricing of the incumbent stores and the role played by the location of the entrant. Our primary objective is to identify how traditional retailers respond to new forms of low-cost retailing. Results show that post entry, the prices for some products are higher than the pre entry. However, which product prices increase depends on the incumbent’s location. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that the store closer to the entrant is better off compared to the incumbent located further away. We empirically demonstrate the main workings of our theory using sales data from several grocery stores that saw entry by discount stores in their trading areas.     

Tie-in contracts with downstream competition

A tie-in contract has frequently come under scrutiny for its role as an exclusionary device. A firm that is a monopolist in a primary market can utilize such contracts to exclude a more efficient rival in a secondary market. When the firms sell through competing retailers, the leveraging firm may offer tie-in contracts to the retailers inducing them to purchase both primary and secondary products entirely from it such that the rival is excluded. We examine whether such tie-in contracts are profitable for an incumbent firm under different conditions of (i) the ability to commit to prices by the upstream firms and (ii) downstream competition among the retailers. We show that when retailers compete in prices, then regardless of whether the entrant is able to commit to its own prices, an exclusionary tie-in strategy is profitable (not profitable) for the incumbent when it is able (unable) to commit to prices. However, when retailers compete in quantities, the entrant’s commitment ability does matter. Specifically, an exclusionary tie-in strategy (i) may be unprofitable for an incumbent when both upstream firms are able to commit to their prices, depending on the degree of cost advantage of the entrant; (ii) is always profitable when it alone can commit to its price; and (iii) is unprofitable when both upstream firms cannot commit to their prices. Our results extend to situations where the products are complementary or substitutes and where the retailers may be asymmetric in nature.     

The palette that stands out: Color compositions of online curated visual UGC that attracts higher consumer interaction

Photos posted by consumers on social media, like Instagram, often include brands. Despite the substantial increase in such photos, there have been few investigations into how prospective consumers respond to this visual UGC. We begin to address this gap by investigating the role of the color compositions of visual UGC in consumer response. Consumer response is operationalized as the click-rate for a photo by a consumer when it is curated on the online site of the brand that it includes. This is the proportion of visitors who click on it for an enlarged view. Composition is operationalized as the specific combination of levels of the photo’s color attributes: hue, chroma, and brightness. Our goal is to identify the color compositions of photos, ceteris paribus, which get more clicks when they are curated. Data for our investigation comes from clicks over a one-year period on photos posted on Instagram curated by fifteen brands in six product categories on their sites. We assume Beta distributed proportions and calibrate a Beta regression using MCMC methods for our investigation.We find that click-rates are higher for photos that include higher proportions of green and lower proportions of red and cyan. We also find that chroma of red and blue are higher in photos with higher click-rates. Findings from our research led the sponsoring firm to modify its proprietary curation algorithm for client brands. The firm informed us that, post-modification, there has been a substantial increase in click-rates of curated photos for brands in several categories.     

The Mismeasure of Psychopathy: A Commentary on Boddy’s PM-MRV

Boddy and his colleagues have published several articles on “corporate psychopathy” using what they refer to as a Psychopathy Measure—Management Research Version (PM-MRV). They based this measure on the items that comprise the Interpersonal and Affective dimensions (Factor 1) of the Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R), a widely used copyrighted and controlled instrument. The PM-MRV not only misspecifies the construct of psychopathy, but also serves as an example of the problems associated with an attempt to form a “new” scale by adapting items from a proprietary scale. The PCL-R measures a superordinate construct underpinned by four correlated dimensions or first-order factors, not just the two in the PM-MRV. The other two dimensions are Lifestyle and Antisocial, which together form Factor 2 of the PCL-R. As defined by the PCL-R, psychopathy requires high scores on both Factor 1 and Factor 2. Lack of validity aside, even if the PM-MRV were to be a useful measure of Factor 1, it would not discriminate between psychopathy and other “dark personalities,” such as Machiavellianism and narcissism, which, along with psychopathy, form the Dark Triad. This lack of discrimination stems from the fact that each of these personalities shares features measured by Factor 1 and, by implication, by the PM-MRV. Research findings based on the PM-MRV may have some meaning with respect to dark personalities in general, but their relevance to psychopathy, as measured with the PCL-R, is tenuous at best.     

The Prametric-Based GDM Procedure Under Fuzzy Environment

The prametric is an ‘almost metric’ which does not necessarily satisfy the triangle inequality but able to describe the consensus intransitivity in group decision making (GDM) such as Tom and Jack have preferences in common, also Jack and John have preferences in common, but, Tom and John do not necessarily have preferences in common. A prametric-based consensus formation procedure for GDM was presented in a literature. This paper considers the procedure under fuzzy environment where the individuals’ preferences are provided as fuzzy numbers. The Yager defuzzification method is used for constructing the preference sequence matrix where the (i, j)-th entry indicates the alternative i’s position(s) assigned by individual j. An illustrative example for application is also included.     

Investor Reactions to Concurrent Positive and Negative Stakeholder News

This paper examines the impact on firm value created by investor reaction to same day news of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate social irresponsibility (CSiR) activities. First, using trading volume, the authors establish that the perceived value of moral capital generated by news involving institutional (e.g., environmental and community) stakeholders is less clear to investors than that of the news involving technical (e.g., customers and employees) stakeholders. Subsequently, the authors analyze abnormal returns from 565 unique firm events—each comprising at least one positive and one negative stakeholder news item. Using signaling theory, the authors demonstrate that news of the number of CSR activities involving institutional groups counteracts the effects of same day CSiR news in an inverted U-shaped fashion. In contrast, they find that news of the number of CSR activities involving technical groups mitigates the effects of same day CSiR news in a U-shaped fashion.     

Supply Chain Transparency as a Consumer or Corporate Tool: The Case of Nudie Jeans Co

Outsourcing has led both to the embedding of questionable sustainability practices in opaque supply chains and to anti-sweatshop challenges demanding more transparent supply chains. Previous research has argued that supply chain transparency can be both a consumer tool empowering consumers to pressure disclosing firms to improve sustainability conditions and a corporate tool for increasing revenues. Based on a study of the transparency project of Swedish company Nudie Jeans, the authors demonstrate that consumers do not leverage transparency but that transparency improves consumer willingness to buy. In doing this, the authors contribute to the literature in two important ways. First, the authors provide one of the first, if not the first, studies of whether consumers in practice leverage increased supply chain transparency, challenging the previous research claim that supply chain transparency is a useful consumer tool. Second, the authors move beyond studies of purchasing intentions and willingness to buy in experimental settings and confirm that supply chain transparency is a useful corporate tool in practice. The authors conclude by discussing the policy implications of companies being able to use transparency to increase sales without subjecting themselves to increased consumer pressure.     

A Temporary Federal Discount Program to Stimulate Consumer Spending

In this paper, we evaluate a new proposal to stimulate recovery from the current recession: a temporary federal price discount on consumer goods. An attractive feature of the temporary federal discount program is that it gives consumers a price incentive to purchase more rather than simply giving consumers more disposable income, which they might choose to either spend or to save. According to our simulations with the Fair macro-econometric model, a temporary 20 percent federal discount on all consumer goods in a severe recession would significantly reduce the unemployment rate while causing only a small increase in federal debt as a percentage of GDP.     

Understanding the Interplay Among Regulatory Self-Efficacy,Moral Disengagement,and Academic Cheating Behaviour During Vocational Education: A Three-Wave Study

This study uses a quasi-experimental design to investigate what happens to individual socially responsible attitudes when they are exposed to group dynamics. Findings show that group engagement increases individual attitudes toward social responsibility. We also found that individuals with low attitudes toward social responsibility are more likely to change their opinions when group members show more positive attitudes toward social responsibility. Conversely, individuals with high attitudes do not change much, independent of group characteristics. To better analyze the effect of group dynamics, the study proposes to split social responsibility into relative and absolute components. Findings show that relative social responsibility is correlated with but different from absolute social responsibility although the latter is more susceptible than the former to group dynamics.     

Who Buys Overpackaged Grocery Products and Why? Understanding Consumers’ Reactions to Overpackaging in the Food Sector

While most studies dealing with waste reduction at the consumer level focus on recycling, this paper rather concentrates on precycling strategies and purchasing behaviors in order to understand how to promote waste reduction at the source. More specifically, the purpose of this work is to grasp consumers’ perceptions of overpackaging and understand the mechanisms underlying their choice of overpackaged versus non-overpackaged food products. Based on the different themes that emerged from a qualitative study (study 1, n = 11), a quantitative research was conducted among French interviewees (study 2, n = 327) in order to identify relevant groups of consumers. Five profiles emerged from the cluster analysis: the supporters, the self-sacrificing, the detractors, the indifferent, and the self-centered. Finally, an experiment was conducted (study 3, n = 808) that highlights the influence of range positioning and salience of non-overpackaging on consumer choice. Implications for public policy makers and companies are discussed.     

Entry mode selection and its impact on an incumbent supply chain coordination

This paper considers a supply chain where a manufacturer sells its product through a retailer. In such a market, a potential entrant can make a substitute product by imitating the incumbent's product and then sells it to the common market with one of three alternative entry modes: (i) selling through the incumbent's retailer, (ii) selling through another independent retailer, or (iii) selling directly to consumers. Faced with the entrant's entry, the manufacturer has managed to offer a value-added service to add to its product's value at a cost. We investigate the entrant's optimal entry mode when the manufacturer offers profit-sharing contracts to the retailer and when it does not, and discuss the impact of the potential invader's entry on the incumbent firms' performances. The results show that: (1) the entrant sells directly to consumers when faced with weak value competition, and sells through another retailer against fierce value competition. (2) If the value competition is relatively fierce and the efficiency of the value-added service is relatively high as well, the incumbent firms can benefit from the new entry. (3) A profit-sharing contract, as a coordination policy, can fully coordinate the incumbent supply chain no matter whether there exists a potential entrant or not, yet the entry can affect the distribution of the profits between the incumbent manufacturer and retailer.