A World Environmental Organisation: The Wrong Solution to the Wrong Problem

The starting point for a discussion of reform of the global environmental machinery should be an enquiry into the causes of the ineffectiveness of current arrangements. The argument made here is, firstly, that many of the criticisms made of the existing architecture by advocates of a WEO are misplaced, while ignoring other key faults. Secondly, that the suggested form of a WEO is problematic and may exacerbate existing problems, particularly for developing countries. I focus here more on the notion that a WEO should pursue the internalisation of environmental externalities. I argue that while this goal is worth pursuing, proposals for a deal‐brokering body are unlikely to make much progress in delivering it because of misplaced assumptions about the existing political order and the ability of a WEO to remedy current weaknesses.     

Reviewing Proposals for a World Environmental Organisation

Since the Earth Summit in Rio 1992, several calls have been made for a world environmental organisation (WEO), and only during the last year, in the run‐up to Rio+10, five more have been added. In total, we have found 17 proposals for a WEO. We review, compare, and briefly discuss rationales, models, tasks, organisational set‐up, relations to multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) and organisations such as UNEP and the WTO, as well as the role of principles, compliance and the interest of developing countries. We conclude that a majority of proposers is in favour of an autonomous coordinating agency, that is, a medium level of integration. Frequently the WTO is mentioned as a precursor agency on which a WEO should be based. We question the effectiveness of a ‘WTO for the environment’ and suggest that other models ought to be considered.     

论国际贸易中的环境关税

随着环保运动的兴起，越来越多的国家使用环境关税来保护本国环境，且征收环境关税符合WTO相关规则。与征收环境税相比，环境关税是一种次优的选择；用环境关税解决跨边界污染问题关键是实施环境关税的国家是否为贸易大国。     

An Internalisation‐based World Environmental Organisation

We evaluate the possibilities for a new World Environmental Organisation (WEO), with our discussion motivated both by recent calls for such an organisation in light of WTO trade and environment conflicts and the relative absence of internalisation of global externalities. We propose an organisation building upon the idea of facilitating Coasian deal on the global environment. We motivate the establishment of such an organisation by itemising the ways in which global environmental deals are presently restrained by various impediments, including free riding, property right ambiguities, and mechanisms for authentification and verification. We indicate how such a WEO might help in each of these areas, stressing the differences from the WTO which is a much narrower bargaining framework.     

World Environmental Organisation: A Latin American Perspective

This paper offers insight into environmental problems that Latin American countries are currently facing. It also looks at how their domestic and global spheres are intertwined, and subsequently outlines pending roblems that would need international support from a World Environmental Organistion (WEO). One of the hardest and most important tasks of such an Organisation would be to render the Northern and the Southern environmental agendas compatible. While opinions concur on what the principle environmental problems in Latin America are – eforestation and natural resources degradation – the perception of these problems is quite different between North and South. For the former, the most important impact of the situation is the reduction of CO2 capacity and the biodiversity loss, while the main concern in Latin America is the poverty stricken economy behind the deforestation process and the vulnerability of the population that results from such phenomenon. Advancing simultaneously on both these tracks seems essential for a genuine improvement in environmental performance in the region.     

Friends like this: The impact of the US–China trade war on global value chains

This paper considers the indirect impact the recent tariff increases between the United States and China can have on third countries through links in global supply chains. We combine data from input–output relationships, imports and tariffs, to calculate the impact of the tariff increases by both the United States and China on cumulative tariffs paid by third countries. We show that the tariff hikes increase cumulative tariffs for other countries and thus hurt trade partners further downstream in global supply chains. We also show that this is particularly important for tariff increases on Chinese imports in the United States. These are likely to be used as intermediates in production in the United States, which are then re-exported to third countries. The most heavily hit third countries are the closest trade partners, namely the EU, Canada and Mexico. We estimate that the tariffs impose an additional burden of around 500 million to 1 billion US dollars on these countries. China's tariffs on US imports have less of an effect.     

Tariffs and formation of free trade agreements networks

This paper examines the formation of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) on the basis of country heterogeneity in the tariff level. We demonstrate that a country's unilateral incentive to form an FTA depends on the relative magnitudes of the (negative) market concession effect and the (positive) market expansion effect, both of which are determined by the tariff levels of the two FTA partner countries. Global welfare is maximised when all country pairs form FTAs. Two countries in equilibrium are more likely to form an FTA when their tariff gap is smaller or when their tariff levels are neither very high nor very low. This finding is robust to several extensions of the model. Our preliminary empirical analysis provides some evidence for the finding.     

Trade Creation and Diversion Effects of Regional Trade Agreements: A Product‐level Analysis

This paper examines the impacts of regional trade agreements (RTAs) on trade flows at product level, with a particular focus on trade creation and diversion. Based on estimation of the gravity equation, dealing with the zero trade flows and endogeneity bias problems, we analyse the impacts of various types of RTAs involving 67 countries for 20 products during the 1980–2006 period. We find that RTAs among developing countries tend to cause trade diversion compared with RTAs among developed countries. Taking the higher external tariff rates of developing countries compared with developed countries into consideration, our results suggest trade diversion is likely to be caused by remaining high tariffs on imports from non‐members. In addition, we find the trade creation effect for many products in the cases of Customs Unions and plurilateral RTAs. These results imply that trade creation would be caused by various factors besides the reduction in tariff rates. Based on these results, we draw a policy implication that external tariff rate reduction is an important factor in avoiding trade diversion in the formation of RTAs, in particular for RTAs among developing countries, while a large number of members and the common external tariff appear to be important for generating the trade creation effect.     

The effects of cross-regional free trade agreements under a vertical industry structure

This paper examines the effects of a cross-regional free trade agreement (FTA) on tariffs, welfare, and the incentives for multilateral free trade in a three-country model with a vertical industry structure. We show that the FTA induces member countries to reduce their tariffs on nonmember countries. On the other hand, a nonmember country lowers its tariff on final-good imports, but raises its tariff on intermediate-good imports. Also, the FTA makes member and nonmember countries better off. After the FTA is enacted, member and nonmember countries have an incentive to support multilateral free trade, so an FTA acts as a building block for multilateral trade liberalization.     

The Salmon-Agreement Between Norway and the European Union—A Welfare Economic Analysis

The relationship between tariff policy and anti-dumping use is empirically examined. Using a panel dataset of 56 countries over the period of 1995–2007, the effects of tariff liberalization on anti-dumping use are found to vary across world regions. For European countries, as well as developed North American and Latin American countries, a lower tariff rate appears to induce more use of anti-dumping measures, which emerge as a protection tool among trade liberalization regimes. In contrast, a reduction in a tariff rate leads to lower anti-dumping use in developing North American and Latin American countries and in developed Asian, African, and Middle Eastern countries. In terms of initiating anti-dumping action, developed countries are likely to be more sensitive than developing countries to tariff policy change in most regions of the world.     

Non‐Tariff Measures,Specific Trade Concerns and Tariff Reduction

This paper studies the determinants of the recent proliferation of Specific Trade Concerns raised at the WTO on non‐tariff trade measures (NTMs), with a focus on sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) and technical barriers to trade (TBTs). Even though NTMs are imposed de jure to protect consumers from unhealthy products, they increase trade costs de facto. So, when tariff protection lowers, NTMs become effective barriers to trade and the exporting countries can complain at the dedicated committee at the WTO (STCs). Therefore, we study whether STCs are raised by exporting countries as a consequence of tariff reductions in importing countries, that is when non‐tariff measures become barriers to trade. Using a recent database on STCs over the period 1996–2010, we find empirical evidence that SPS and TBT concerns are raised by exporting country as a consequence of importer's tariff cut.     

“碳关税”措施在GATT/WTO体制中的合法性研究

碳关税措施的规定是针对国内产品征收的碳税所进行的边境税调整,但国内碳税并不在WTO的边境税调整范围之内。碳关税不符合非歧视待遇原则中的国民待遇原则;由于各国环境政策和环保措施不同,碳关税也违反最惠国待遇原则。碳关税措施不符合GATT第20条(b)款与(g)款的规定,但专家组和上诉机构的解释可能对于碳关税措施符合GATT/WTO的相关规则具有积极的意义。考虑到碳关税对我国部分产业和对外贸易的影响,应该依据上述理由予以反对,驳斥欧美部分国家对于碳关税措施在GATT/WTO中具有合法性的观点。     

WTO在环境保护中的作用及环境谈判对我国的影响

尽管WTO不是环保组织,但WTO同贸易在三个层次上产生交集。WTO原则和规则对应对气候变化也非常重要。贸易与环境谈判是正在进行的WTO多哈回合多边贸易谈判中的一个重要内容,各成员正致力于削减或取消环保和服务的关税和非关税壁垒。目前关于削减环保产品的关税和非关税壁垒的方法是各方关注和争论的焦点。中国尽管作为发展中国家的一员,但却位列全球环境货物贸易大国之列。这种双重性决定了中国在贸易和环境谈判中的独特立场。     

Informality,tariffs and wealth

This article analyzes the interaction between changes in tariff protection, informality, inequality and aggregate income. First, we describe some new empirical evidence on informality, the formal/informal wage gap and trade openness in Latin American countries. Then we present a simple model characterized by three (empirically based) assumptions: (1) agents consume both formal and informal goods; (2) the government uses tariff revenues to purchase formal goods; (3) informality is a voluntary phenomenon. The model predicts that tariff reduction increases informality and wage inequality and that the maximization of income requires a positive level of tariff protection. The model's results are shown to be consistent with the empirical evidence concerning Latin American countries.     

Non-preferential trading clubs

This paper examines the welfare implications of non-discriminatory tariff reforms by a subset of countries, which we term a non-preferential trading club. We show that there exist coordinated tariff reforms, accompanied by appropriate income transfers between the member countries, that unambiguously increase the welfare of these countries while leaving the welfare of non-members unaltered. In terms of economic policy implications, our results show that there exist regional, MFN-consistent arrangements that lead to Pareto improvements in world welfare.     

Third‐country Effects of Regional Trade Agreements

Does regionalism negatively impact non‐members? To answer this question, we examine the effect of regional trade agreements (RTAs) on imports from non‐members and the tariffs that they face. Using data from six RTAs in Latin America and Europe, we do not find evidence that implementation of the regional agreements is associated with trade diversion from third countries to regional members. Using detailed industry data on preference margins and most‐favoured nation (MFN) tariffs for three trade agreements in Latin America over 12 years, we find that greater preference margins do not significantly reduce imports from third countries. We also look at the effect of preferences on external tariffs. We find evidence that preferential tariff reduction tends to precede the reduction of external MFN tariffs in a given sector, offering evidence of tariff complementarity. Overall, the results suggest that regionalism does not significantly harm non‐members.     

International capital mobility and commercial policy in an economic region

If two small countries are linked by capital movements then, at low tariff levels, any increase in capital flows induced by the commercial policy of either country will harm that country and benefit the other country, while at low levels of international investment a tariff increase always harms the country levying the tariff. Nevertheless, an increase in one country's tariff could benefit both countries by alleviating regional distortions in factor allocation. If the countries liberalize factor movements within a customs union, then conflicts must arise in choosing the level of the common external tariff.     

AGOA and Apparel: Who Captures the Tariff Rent in the Presence of Preferential Market Access?

The United States grants preferential (tariff‐ and quota‐free) market access to a list of products from eligible countries in sub‐Saharan Africa through the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). We analyse the increase in prices received by apparel exporters who benefited from AGOA preferences. In the presence of competitive markets, export prices should increase as much as the tariff which was previously collected by the US government. We refer to this price increase as the ‘tariff preference rent’ since exporters receive this income as the rent for their preferential status. The results show that exporters receive only one‐third of this rent and smaller exporters receive less than larger and established ones. We then provide evidence that suggests this may be due to the degree of market power enjoyed by US importers when facing African exporters.     

Trade protection and tax evasion: Evidence from Kenya,Mauritius, and Nigeria

We examine the effect of trade protection rates on evasion in three African countries Kenya, Mauritius, and Nigeria. In capturing the effect of trade protection on tariff evasion, we use a much improved measure of trade protection (MAcMap-HS6 2001 and 2004). For two of these countries, this dataset allows the novelty of using variation in trade protection across product, time, and trading partners leading to significantly refined estimates of evasion elasticity relative to existing studies on tariff evasion. We find a robust evidence for positive elasticity of evasion with respect to tariffs in Kenya and Nigeria with relatively weaker evidence for Mauritius. Our results match the rankings of countries in institutional quality. Greater responsiveness of evasion to the level of tariffs is established in Nigeria (comparatively weak institutional quality) vis-à-vis Kenya, and in Kenya vis-à-vis Mauritius (comparatively good institutional quality). This pattern is preserved even when focusing on same set of trading partners and same set of imported products for the three countries. This result is robust to controlling for protection on related products (that creates incentives/ opportunities for evasion) and also for degree of differentiation of the product and some other characteristics.     

论适度保护关税税率

面对日益加速的经济全球化进程,各国仍然在普遍使用关税措施来保护本国产业的发展.在这方面,发展中国家需要解决的问题是设定一个适度的保护关税税率,以让国内产业既有生存和发展的空间,同时又有足够的竞争压力来提高效率.根据国内与国际平均生产成本的差异来确定保护关税的税率是一个可行的办法.进一步削减关税是我国加入WTO后需要承担的义务,应当按照适度保护关税的原则把平均关税的税率稳定在一个合理的水平上,并根据国内不同产业的发展状况,提供必要而有效的保护.