Sovereign Debt Restructuring: The Judge,the Vultures and Creditor Rights

What role did the US courts play in the Argentine debt swap of 2005? What implications does this have for the future of creditor rights in sovereign bond markets? The Judge in the Argentine case has, it appears, deftly exploited creditor heterogeneity – between ‘holdouts’ seeking capital gains and institutional investors wanting a settlement – to promote a swap with a supermajority of creditors. Our analysis of Argentine debt litigation reveals a ‘Judge‐mediated’ sovereign debt restructuring which resolves key issues of Transition and Aggregation – two of the tasks envisaged for the IMF's stillborn Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism. For the future, we discuss how Judge‐mediated sovereign debt restructuring (together with creditor committees) could complement Collective Action Clauses in sovereign bond contracts.     

The European Constitutional Settlement

This paper argues first that a synthesis of the theories of endogenous policy formation, non‐coercive interstate bargaining theory, and international regime theory provides a plausible account of the path of European integration, with little role for explanations stressing geopolitical or ideological factors, international mediation, or political entrepreneurship. Moreover, these theories – which embrace economic fundamentals as driving factors – help explain the ‘sequencing’ of the European Union, especially in regard to successive enlargements. However, the paper concludes that the process of European integration appears to have reached an ‘institutional plateau’, for which incremental change based on the current ‘constitutional compromise’ appears to be the only plausible equilibrium.     

External Public Debt,Trade Linkages and Contagion During the Eurozone Crisis

Against the backdrop of the contagion literature, the paper analyses the impact of financial and trade linkages on sovereign bond spreads in the Eurozone crisis. Using quarterly data for a sample of EMU countries during the period 2000–13, we estimate fixed‐effect panel models with Driscoll and Kraay standard errors that are robust to general forms of spatial and temporal dependence. Our main results can be summarised as follows: first, we suggest that the ‘sudden stop’ of capital inflow towards the peripheral sovereign debt triggered a re‐segmentation of financial markets and economic systems along national borders, with negative implications for risk‐sharing and the efficient allocation of capital. The ‘home bias’ effect – that is the increase in the share of sovereign debt held by domestic banks – worsened the country‐specific risk because the twin crisis (sovereign and banking) began to be conceived as more closely intertwined within countries than before. Second, the structure of international trade helps to account for the geographic scope of contagion, even after controlling for macroeconomic and fiscal vulnerabilities. Finally, the ‘substitution effect’ of public debt securities of stand‐alone emerging countries has affected more the sovereign spreads in the core than in the periphery.     

Institutional quality and sovereign credit default swap spreads

We examine how the quality of political, legal, and regulatory institutions impacts sovereign risk premia. An improvement in institutional quality significantly lowers a country's sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spread, even after controlling for domestic and global macroeconomic factors. The incremental effect of institutional quality may also be economically important in explaining the variations in the level of sovereign CDS spreads. The basic results are robust to alternative model specifications, samples, control variables, measures of institutional quality, estimation methods, and controls for endogeneity. Overall, the evidence suggests that institutional quality may play a significant role in explaining sovereign CDS spreads.     

Is the US Dollar a Suitable Anchor for the Newly Proposed GCC Currency?

Responses of inflation and non‐oil output growth from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries to monetary policy shocks from the United States (US) were estimated to determine whether there is evidence to support the US dollar as the anchor for the proposed unified currency. A structural vector autoregression identified with short‐run restrictions was employed for each country with Fed funds rate as the US monetary policy instrument, non‐oil output growth and inflation. The main results suggest that for inflation, the GCC countries show synchronised responses to monetary policy shocks from the US which are similar to inflation in the US, and for non‐oil output growth, there is no clear indication that US monetary policy can be as effective for the GCC countries as it is domestically. Consequently, importing US monetary policy via a dollar peg may guarantee only stable inflation for the GCC countries – not necessarily stable non‐oil output growth. If the non‐oil output response is made conscientiously – and there are concerns over the dollar’s ability to perform its role as a store of value – a basket peg with both the US dollar and the euro may be a sound alternative as confirmed by the variance decomposition analysis of our augmented SVAR with a proxy for the European short‐term interest rate.     

Dollar illiquidity and central bank swap arrangements during the global financial crisis

While the global financial crisis was centered in the United States, it led to a surprising appreciation in the dollar, suggesting global dollar illiquidity. In response, the Federal Reserve partnered with other central banks to inject dollars into the international financial system. Empirical studies of the success of these efforts have yielded mixed results, in part because their timing is likely to be endogenous. In this paper, we examine the cross-sectional impact of these interventions. Theory consistent with dollar appreciation in the crisis suggests that their impact should be greater for countries that have greater exposure to the United States through trade and financial channels, less transparent holdings of dollar assets, and greater illiquidity difficulties. We examine these predictions for observed cross-sectional changes in CDS spreads, using a new proxy for innovations in perceived changes in sovereign risk based upon Google-search data. We find robust evidence that auctions of dollar assets by foreign central banks disproportionately benefited countries that were more exposed to the United States through either trade linkages or asset exposure. We obtain weaker results for differences in asset transparency or illiquidity. However, several of the important announcements concerning the international swap programs disproportionately benefited countries exhibiting greater asset opaqueness.     

Capital Controls Re‐examined: The Case for ‘Smart’ Controls

The global financial crisis which began in east Asia in 1997 is not over, neither is the inquest into its implications for adjustment policy. In the wake of this crisis, we focus here on the role of capital controls, which formed a much publicised part of the crisis‐coping strategy in one country (Malaysia) and, less openly, were also deployed by other crisis‐afflicted countries. Evaluation so far has examined different target variables with different estimation methods, generally concentrating on efficiency and stability indicators and ignoring equity measures; it has also typically treated ‘control’ as a one‐zero dummy variable, ignoring the ‘quality’ of intervention and in particular the extent to which efficiency gains are obtained in exchange for controls. Partly because of these limitations, the literature has reached no consensus on the impact of controls; however, it is moving over towards acknowledging that the quality and type of controls is important, as well as their intensity. We propose an approach in which the government plays off short‐term political security against long‐term economic gain; the more insecure its political footing, the greater the weight it gives to political survival, which is likely to increase the probability of controls being imposed. The modelling of this approach generates a governmental ‘policy reaction function’ and an impact function for controls, which are estimated by simultaneous panel‐data methods across a sample of thirty developing and transitional countries between 1980–2003, using, for the period since 1996, the ‘new’ IMF dataset which differentiates between controls by type. We find that controls appear to cause increases in income equality, and are significantly associated with political insecurity and relatively low levels of openness to trade. They do not, in our analysis, materially influence the level of whole‐economy productivity or GDP across the sample of countries examined, although they do influence productivity in particular sectors. But the dispersion around this central finding is wide: the tendency for controls to depress productivity by encouraging rent‐seeking sometimes is, and sometimes is not, counteracted by purposive government policy actions to maintain competitiveness. Whether or not this happens is vital, on both efficiency and equity grounds. We make the case for ‘smart’ capital controls – controls which are time‐limited and contain an inbuilt incentive to increased productivity.     

Governance and Globalisation

Unlike the large literature on ‘democracy and trade’, there is a much smaller literature on the effect of the level of democracy in a nation on the level of its foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow. These few studies reveal mixed empirical results, and surprisingly only one study has examined bilateral FDI flows. Moreover, few of these studies use multiple governance indicators separating the ‘pluralism’ effect of democratic institutions from the ‘good governance’ effect, there are no studies on democratic institutions’ various effects on the level of FDI relative to trade, and there are no studies of democratic institutions’ various effects on the selection of countries into FDI. We focus on three contributions. First, we examine the simultaneous effects of the World Bank's (six) Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs) – which allow separating the effects of pluralism from those of five other good governance measures – on bilateral trade, FDI and FDI relative to trade using state‐of‐the‐art gravity specifications. Second, we find strong evidence that – after accounting for host governments’ effectiveness in various roles of good governance – a higher level of pluralism as measured by the WGIs’ Voice and Accountability Index reduces trade levels, likely by increasing the ‘voice’ of more protectionist less‐skilled workers, but not FDI levels. Moreover, we find qualitatively different effects of other WGIs – such as political stability – on trade versus FDI flows. Third, we account for firm heterogeneity alongside a large number of zeros in bilateral FDI flows using recent advances in gravity modelling. We distinguish between the (country) intensive and extensive margins and show that pluralism affects FDI inflows negatively at the intensive margin, but positively at the extensive margin.     

Negotiating Transfer Prices

We consider a team-investment setting in which transfer prices between two divisions are negotiable. Investments are made independently and simultaneously after the bargaining stage, i.e. with a given transfer price ‘on the table’. Both divisions’ investments jointly affect the sales price of the final product and total revenue. We analyze two transfer-pricing schemes and their corresponding bargaining problems. Both bargaining settings exhibit non-transferable utility because the transfer price not only allocates corporate profit but also affects corporate profit through the incentives it creates for the divisions’ investment and quantity decisions. In particular, we discuss how concepts from bargaining theory can be use used to determine a ‘fair’ agreement concerning the transfer price.     

Multilateralising Regionalism: Spaghetti Bowls as Building Blocs on the Path to Global Free Trade

This paper addresses the final steps to global free trade – what they might look like, what sort of political economy forces might drive them, and what the WTO might do to help. Two facts form the point of departure: (1) Regionalism is here to stay; world trade is regulated by a motley assortment of unilateral, bilateral and multilateral trade agreements; (2) this motley assortment is not the best way to organise world trade. Moving to global duty‐free trade will require a multilateralisation of regionalism. This paper presents the political economy logic of trade liberalisation and uses it to structure a narrative of world trade liberalisation since 1947. The logic is then used to project the world tariff map in 2010, arguing that the pattern will be marked by fractals – fuzzy, leaky trade blocs made up of fuzzy, leaky sub‐blocs (fuzzy since the proliferation of FTAs makes it impossible to draw sharp lines around the Big‐3 trade blocs, and leaky since some FTAs create free trade ‘canals’ linking the Big‐3 blocs). The paper then presents a novel political economy mechanism – spaghetti bowls as building blocs – whereby offshoring creates a force that encourages the multilateralisation of regionalism. Finally, the paper suggests three things the WTO might do to help multilateralise regionalism.     

Synchronised Business Cycles in East Asia and Fluctuations in the Yen/Dollar Exchange Rate

Because many authors have proposed stimulating the ailing Japanese economy by monetary expansion and yen depreciation, we explore the repercussions of depreciating the yen against the dollar on the other East Asian economies – which largely peg to the dollar. Since 1980, economic integration among Japan's neighbours – China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand – has intensified and (except for China and Singapore) their business cycles have been highly synchronised. These cycles have been closely linked to fluctuations in the yen/dollar exchange rate – through changes in the export competitiveness, inflows of foreign direct investment and intra‐Asian income effects. We show that a major yen devaluation would have a negative impact on incomes in other East Asian economies and that it is not a sensible policy option for Japan.     

Sovereign Ratings and Oil‐Exporting Countries: The Effect of High Oil Prices on Ratings

We investigate how high and rising oil prices in the 2003–2008 period affected the sovereign ratings of oil‐exporting countries, after controlling for fundamentals. Based on a large dataset of countries from Standard and Poor's and Moody's, we find strong statistical evidence of a large ratings premium – nearly two notches – for those oil‐exporting countries with a large share of net oil revenue to gross domestic product, relative to countries with similar economic fundamentals. We have some limited forecast information from the rating agencies and the effect increases when we include this information, providing further evidence that this ratings premium is not driven by expected improvements in fundamentals. This finding has implications for asset prices in oil‐exporting countries and highlights the risk that in the event of a sharp unanticipated drop in oil prices, sovereign rating downgrades of oil‐exporting countries could be sharper than the deterioration in their economic fundamentals.     

Ambiguous framings of political consumerism: means or end,product or process orientation?

For dealing with various societal problems, ‘political’/‘ethical’/‘responsible’ consumerism is often discussed as an effective democratic and participatory tool. However, political consumerism – along with its tools, such as product labelling – is often conceived and discussed in oversimplified ways. Instead, the tension between scientific complexity, knowledge uncertainty and a codified, standardized label involves extensive political strategy, interest conflicts and simplified framings of the consumers’ roles as political decision makers. The purpose of this paper is to analyse how criteria for organic food labelling have been simplified, or framed, within various versions of political consumerism in policy debates. The more general purpose is to examine variations of what consumerism may entail theoretically and practically. Examples are chosen of organic food labelling in the US. The analysis is based on framing theory. The first distinction is made between framings surrounding the extrinsic and intrinsic values of consumerism (i.e. consumer empowerment towards an external goal, or as an overriding principle of democracy). The second distinction is between product‐ and process‐oriented consumerism (i.e. consumer empowerment with regard to the purchased goods or concerning the ‘invisible’ production and disposal processes). These distinctions may facilitate critical examinations of criteria, processes and communication of consumer‐related policies.     

Does the More Risk‐Averse Investor hold a Less Risky Portfolio?*

We study the suitability of using absolute risk aversion as a measure of willingness to take risk in the Arrow–Debreu portfolio framework. We define a global measure of risk for the Arrow–Debreu portfolio, which is measured by the sensitivity of an individual's Arrow–Debreu portfolio payoff to the change in the market return. We call this measure ‘conservatism’ and show that the concept of ‘more conservative’ is stronger than that of ‘more risk‐averse.’ A higher absolute risk aversion is only necessary but not sufficient to induce a less risky Arrow–Debreu portfolio. Our results not only challenge the well‐accepted notion that a more risk‐averse investor holds a less risky portfolio, but also suggest a stronger measure – conservatism – for evaluating the riskiness of portfolio.     

Those Current Account Imbalances: A Sceptical View1

The international current account imbalances, where the United States has a vast deficit, and several countries, notably Japan, China, Germany and the oil exporters have corresponding surpluses, are usually seen as problems. The argument here is that current account imbalances simply indicate intertemporal trade – the exchange of goods and services for claims. There are likely to be gains from trade of that kind as from ordinary trade. What, then, are the problems? This paper considers five scenarios, notably one where net savings of the surplus countries decline so that the world real interest rate rises, and another where the US fiscal deficit is reduced, so that the world real interest rate falls and there could be a worldwide aggregate demand problem, essentially caused by the high net savings of the surplus countries. The paper reviews the reasons for the large surpluses in terms of savings and investment ratios (especially China) and also discusses the long‐term problem for the United States. While four of the scenarios involve a decline in the dollar, they do not necessarily imply a sudden – and even ‘disruptive’– dollar crisis.     

Promoting sustainability through social marketing: examples from New Zealand

This paper investigates the social marketing of sustainability in New Zealand and examines the usefulness of advertising campaigns to enlist and empower people, as both consumers and citizens, towards environmental care. It draws on discussions about ‘citizen‐consumer subjectivities’ and the model of the ‘political economic person’, which link sustainability and consumption through asserting people’s capacities as reflecting citizens. Printed advertisements by local and national government agencies about air pollution, fuel dependency and energy consumption are analysed to see whether advertising campaigns can operate on multiple levels for a range of audiences – desirable for broadening understanding of sustainable consumption and dealing with the complexity and experiential aspects of ‘doing’ sustainability. The advertisements analysed have an authoritative dimension that downplays this complexity and variability. The paper concludes that these advertisements do not go far enough to involve individuals in processes of co‐producing knowledge about sustainability, and to vest them with expertise in exercising sustainability in their daily lives. The implications are that advertising campaigns that engage with the complexity surrounding consumption in people’s modern lives, and with variability in meanings of sustainability, have the possibility of inciting citizen‐consumer political subjectivities.     

Economic Roots of Political Conflict: The Case of Sri Lanka

The escalation of political conflicts in many developing countries and their impact on economic development have been topical issues in recent development literature. The overwhelming emphasis on ‘ethnic conflicts’ in the literature has, however, precluded analysts from looking at political conflicts beyond their ethnic dimension, in the wider context of the development process. In particular, because of the preoccupation with ethnic roots as the prime source of these conflicts, reverse causation, running from economic policy to political conflict, has been virtually ignored in the debate. The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap through an in‐depth case study of the ‘twin political conflict’ in Sri Lanka – the Tamil separatist war in the North and the Sinhala youth uprising in the South – with emphasis on its economic roots. The findings suggest that fundamental contradictions in the national development policy in the restrictive trade regime of Sri Lanka were at the heart of the country's twin political conflict.     

EVOLUTION IN IMPERFECT COMMITMENT BARGAINING—STRATEGIC VERSUS IGNORANT TYPES

To commit in bargaining is crucial: in the ultimatum game with its one‐sided commitment power the ‘proposer’ (almost) receives the whole pie while the ‘responder’ is left with (almost) nothing. When bargaining parties commit simultaneously the symmetric Nash (Econometrica, 1950, vol. 18, pp. 155–162) bargaining solution predicts equal shares. Continuously connecting these two games yields a one‐parameter family of games ( Fischer et al. , Experimental Economics, 2006, vol. 9, pp. 17–33) for which we distinguish two behavioral dispositions, namely (1) neglecting commitment power and (2) reacting to it strategically. Their pay‐off implications define the evolutionary set‐up for which we derive the evolutionarily stable behavioral disposition. Our analysis sheds light on the hypothesis that in experiments participants neglect strategic aspects such as commitment power.     

Do collective bargaining institutions crowd out discussion and implementation of firm‐related training programs? Evidence from Japan

The paper empirically examines labor‐management communication concerning in‐house training programs and its relation to the actual on‐ and off‐the‐job training policy and wage structure. Using governmental datasets from Japan, we study how different labor‐management communication institutions may affect the training interests of employers and employees differently. We classify these institutions in terms of whether they have a legal (i.e. statutory) foundation (‘de jure’) or not (‘de facto’). We find that collective bargaining, with legal grounds, may crowd out employees’ willingness to communicate about training. However, the existence of ‘de facto’ communication channels such as joint labor‐management councils or shop floor committees is positively correlated with both on‐ and off‐the‐job of training. At the same time, the existence of unions is positively correlated with the steepness of wage profiles for mid‐career workers, which is consistent with the fact that employers and employees assume a long‐term relationship. Thus, we show that a multi‐tiered structure of labor‐management communication, together with a long‐term orientation toward the employment relationship, contributes to strengthen employees’ voice in training matters.     

MODELING SOVEREIGN RISKS: FROM A HYBRID MODEL TO THE GENERALIZED DENSITY APPROACH

Motivated by the European sovereign debt crisis, we propose a hybrid sovereign default model that combines an accessible part taking into account the evolution of the sovereign solvency and the impact of critical political events, and a totally inaccessible part for the idiosyncratic credit risk. We obtain closed‐form formulas for the probability that the default occurs at critical political dates in a Markovian setting. Moreover, we introduce a generalized density framework for the hybrid default time and deduce the compensator process of default. Finally, we apply the hybrid model and the generalized density to the valuation of sovereign bonds and explain the significant jumps in long‐term government bond yields during the sovereign crisis.