银行业监管得到大力加强

2003年银监会成立后,重点加大对信用风险、市场风险和操作风险的监管力度,使银行业监管的规范化、专业化和有效性得到显著提高.     

我国中央银行监管职能的演变与金融业监管效率分析

银监会的成立标志着我国金融分业监管格局的最终形成,作为中央银行的中国人民银行从金融监管体系中淡出,本文从央行监管职能演变的制度变迁来探讨我国金融业监管的效率问题,并对影响监管效率提高的成本约束加以分析。     

我国互联网金融的风险

互联网金融业的快速扩张，从单纯的支付业务向转账汇款、跨境结算、小额信贷、现金管理、资产管理等传统银行业务领域渗透，已使商业银行倍感压力。但由于互联网金融业务创新速度过快，没有现成法规可循，往往游离于银监会和央行监管之外，加上互联网的开放性，潜在风险不客忽视。本文在分析了互联网金融存在的风险的基础上，探讨了我国目前互联网金融风险监管存在的问题，并就此提出了相应的的监管对策。     

银行监管职能从中央银行分离的利弊分析——兼谈我国央行体制改革的必然性与注意的问题

银行监管与货币政策一直都被视为中央银行的两项重要职责,但近年来许多国家都相继把银行监 管职能从中央银行分离出来。2003年3月我国的央行体制改革将银行监管职能与人民银行分离,由新成 立的银监会负责,这是我国金融体制市场化改革的重要步骤。     

成立银监会 加大央行独立性

早在2001,国务院发展研究中心课题组就提出了央行货币改革与银行监管职能适当分离的观点,魏加宁研究员是这个课题组核心成员之一。进入2003年之后,“成立银监会,分拆央行”的话題成为金融市场关注的焦点。为此本刊特约魏加宁研究员撰写了本文。     

金融

央行取消在银行间市场债券发行规模限制;银监会：从10个方面调整信贷监管政策;证监会派出机构将审核基金公司设立分支机构;保监会：今年起正式建立分类监管制度;     

中国金融监管体系改革初探

一个国家,金融监管体系模式的构建与完善与该国金融市场的发育程度密切相关。中国20世纪90年代后,形成了由央行、证监会、银监会和保监会并进的分业监管模式。当前中国的金融监管体系主要存在多部门监管导致部门间协调难度大,监管效率低,存在监管盲区等问题。借鉴美国经验,中国未来的金融监管模式,也应考虑与时俱进,相应改革。     

银行业监管得到大力加强

2003年银监会成立后,重点加大对信用风险、市场风险和操作风险的监管力度,使银行业监管的规范化、专业化和有效性得到显著提高。监管法规体系建设进一步完善。着力为银行业改革发展提供有效的规制平台和监管环境,始终是银监会加强监管法规建设、强化有效监管的根本宗旨和首要环节。适应银行业改革开放和市场发展的要求, 银监会已经颁布200多项监管法规规章和制度性文件,特别是2005年以来针对市场风险、操作风险的新情况和薄弱环节,及时出台了《商业银行市场风险管理指引》、《商业银行个人理财业务风险管理指引》以及加大防范操作风险工作力度的十三条措施,基本形成了涵盖信用风险、     

我国货币政策与银行监管关系研究——基于协调与互动关系的分析研究

探讨了我国银监会从央行分离后货币政策与银监会职能的协调与互动关系的必要性,并在此基础上提出了两者联动的一些建议。     

调控、监管的量与度

面对越来越强烈的放贷冲动和越来越放大的市场风险,作为宏观调控的央行和信贷监管的银监会,不会无动于衷,他们正密切关注着这一动态,并随时保持着高度的关注和警惕,一旦超出政策的限度,自然而然就祭起调控的大旗。     

The Moderating Effect of the Boundary Spanning Role on Perceived Supervisory Support: A Meta-Analytic Review

This article is a meta-analytic study examining the moderating effect the boundary spanning role has on the relationship between perceived supervisory support (PSS) and other important constructs within the marketing domain, including: job satisfaction, organizational commitment, performance, and turnover intentions. There was a positive relationship between PSS and every construct except turnover intentions, which was negative. Along with this, three out of the four relationships were stronger for boundary spanners as compared to non-boundary spanners. Overall, managers aimed at meeting organizational objectives (e.g. performance; turnover) should provide supervisory support to boundary spanning employees.     

Code of Conduct for Non-Executive and Supervisory Directors

After the corporate scandals at the beginning of the new millennium, corporate governance codes were drafted and implemented in national laws and regulations. Unfortunately, due to an ongoing supply of new financial scandals and societal deceptions, our society increasingly distrusts executive directors, non-executive directors and supervisory board members, as they often appeared to play a significant role in these scandals. Non-executive directors (NEDs) and supervisory directors (SDs) are often accused of having overlooked the important issues in their supervising role or having failed to intervene in company decision making. Previous research has shown that many NEDs and SDs operate on the basis of their own unwritten rules, which may very well be different from those of their colleagues. In this article we examine whether and how a code of conduct or code of ethics might help to further clarify how NEDs/SDs should act. We also investigated the views of NEDs/SDs themselves. It appears that current corporate governance codes are not sufficient to guide directors on behavioral aspects of their supervisory role. This article shows that a code of conduct could provide this guidance to NEDs/SDs on several issues. First, a code of conduct would compel the Supervisory Board to reflect on its own values. Second, it would compel NEDs/SDs to verbalize their unwritten rules. The results may be applied internationally and could have relevance to the experience of executive directors in addition. This article may serve as a discussion document for other jurisdictions in addition.     

监事会、审计委员会与内部审计:功能定位与职责划分

随着审计委员会制度的引入 ,其与我国上市公司原有的内部监督机制———监事会、内部审计之间的关系处理问题已引起了人们的普遍关注。按照我国当前法律法规的规定 ,三者的职责存在着相似甚至重叠。因此 ,应依据委托—代理理论 ,对监事会、审计委员会和内部审计机构进行功能定位 ,并按照不同监督机制的层次和特点 ,对它们各自的具体职责进行重新划分。     

节能监管的两种机制及其效率的比较分析

不对称性信息下如何诱导企业如实申报自身履行节能义务的状况,减少政府的监管成本,增加社会的福利,是节能监管机制设计的目标。从监管成本的视角出发,运用博弈论建立随机稽查机制和自行申报机制的数学模型,比较分析两种节能监管机制的成本和效率。结果表明,当执行成本无明显差距时,节能自行申报机制较随机稽查机制更能有效减少监管成本、社会成本和企业的稽查成本,提高执行效率。     

提高我国银行业监管有效性的对策研究

在大多数经济体中,银行一直是最主要的金融中介。近年来,不断发展的金融市场和不断出现的风险使银行业监管面临新的挑战。根据对制约银行业监管有效性的因素分析,寻求提高监管效能的路径,其目的是实现确保银行体系安全和稳健运行,加快银行业监管专业化和国际化进程。     

基于因特网的监控录像系统的实现

介绍了一种基于因特网的监控录像系统，详细介绍了本系统的建模和软硬件模型，并阐述了本系统的软硬件实现方法。     

中日两国监事会信息监控制度的比较分析

信息披露制度包括外部监管和内部监控两方面。在信息内部监控的机制中,监事会的地位是非常重要的。目前我国的监事会信息监控制度很不完善,影响了信息披露制度和公司内部治理结构的运转,是造成虚假信息大量泛滥的主要原因之一。对日本商法相关规定进行比较分析,以期获得如何加强我国监事会信息监控职能的有益启示。     

承销商声誉与IPO抑价的实证分析——基于我国股票发行监管制度改革

通过以我国沪深两市793个A股为样本,建立回归模型,检验承销商声誉与IPO抑价的关系发现,随着股票发行监管制度变迁,承销商逐渐开始注重声誉建设和维护;另外,由于我国股票发行定价制度的非完全市场化,整体上承销商声誉与IPO抑价成正相关关系。这一结论说明了我国股票发行监管制度改革是有效的,强化了承销商的责任和风险防范,有利于加快承销商间的优胜劣汰,有利于承销商声誉机制的形成,促进了我国证券市场承销商对声誉的建设与维护。     

From Distributed Supervisory Control to Enterprise Integration: Coordination Support for Operational Environments

Enterprise integration research focuses on the development and integration of models with the goal of analysis and improvement of an enterprise. Cognitive engineering research focuses on the problem solving requirements of humans in complex systems with the goal of designing more effective systems. This paper presents a particular approach to cognitive engineering - model-based intelligent support - and draws implications to the design and development of enterprise models and tools. Specifically, we discuss the realm of distributed supervisory control, propose a knowledge architecture and theory of human - machine interaction to support cooperative problem solving, and link this to current enterprise integration research. Examples are drawn from the spacecraft operations domain.     

Fraud,Enforcement Action,and the Role of Corporate Governance: Evidence from China

We examine enforcement action in China’s emerging markets by focusing on (1) the agents that impose this action and (2) the role played by supervisory boards. Using newly available databases, we find that supervisory boards play an active role when Chinese listed companies face enforcement action. Listed firms with larger supervisory boards are more likely to have more severe sanctions imposed upon them by the China Security Regulatory Commission, and listed companies that face more severe enforcement actions have more supervisory board meetings. Our findings are of interest, as supervisory boards in China are generally perceived to be dysfunctional. This study contributes to the existing literature in three ways. First, we shed light on the effects of supervisory boards whose role in a fraud setting has not yet been examined. Second, the study has important policy implications for governance reform. Finally, our analyses provide the most up-to-date picture of fraud and governance issues in China’s ever-growing markets.