外商投资企业清算办法（节选）

外商投资企业清算办法（节选）（１９９６年６月１５日国务院批准１９９６年７月９日对外贸易经济合作部发布）第一章总则第一条为了保障外商投资企业清算的顺利进行，保护债权人和投资者的合法权益，维护社会经济秩序，根据有关法律的规定，制定本办法。第二条在中华人民...     

调解中心开展外商投资企业清算业务的可行性及实务分析

2001年以来,中国国际贸易促进委员会河北调解中心受外商投资企业审批机关的委托,先后组织对十五家外商投资企业进行清算并取得了较好的效果。笔者通过组织特别清算业务的实践认为,利用调解中心为居间公正的专业调解机构的优势,拓展外商投资企业清算业务,可取得良好的社会效益和经济效益。     

国家工商行政管理局关于处理经营期限届满后不进行清算的外商投资企业问题的答复

工商企字［２０００］第２６８号河北省工商行政管理局 :你省《关于如何处理经营期限届满后不进行清算的外商投资企业的请示》（［２０００］第１８５号）收悉。现答复如下 :一、外商投资企业经营期限届满 ,应依照《外商投资企业清算办法》进行清算。清算报经企业权力机构确认、审批机关备案 ,在法定时限内向登记机关申请注销登记。二、非公司外商投资企业不按照规定申请注销登记的 ,登记机关根据《中华人民共和国企业法人登记管理条例》第３０条第１款第（３）项处理。三、公司制外商投资企业（以下简称公司）不按照规定向公司登记机关报送…     

论破产重整与破产预防

我国正在重新制定破产法。在新破产法草案中 ,规定了破产清算、破产和解和破产重整制度。中国现行破产法中并没有规范意义上的破产重整制度。《破产法 (试行 )》规定的和解整顿制度 ,其实质是行政机关进行的内部整理 ,并非司法意义上的重整。破产重整制度的本质是司法性破产预防制度。该制度的立法目标是通过司法程序帮助困境企业实现再建和清理债权债务。破产立法理念及理念指导下破产法功能的演变是现代破产法规定破产和解和破产重整制度的基础。破产的本质在于破产清算 ,而破产和解和破产重整的本质却在于破产预防。从破产到破产预防是破产立法理念发展的一个必然选择。     

关于外商投资企业清算期财政财务管理有关规定的通知

关于外商投资企业清算期财政财务管理有关规定的通知财政部财工字［１９９５］２２２号为了加强外商投资企业清算期间财政财务管理工作，现将有关问题规定如下：一、外商投资企业应依据国家有关法律、法规及本规定，做好清算期间财务管理工作，并接受财政机关检查监督。二...     

外商投资合伙企业登记管理不可忽略的“不同”

修订的《合伙企业法》施行两年多后,作为其配套的行政法规——《外国企业或个人在中国境内设立合伙企业管理办法》（以下简称《办法》）已由国务院制定颁布;紧接着,国家工商总局也出台了配套部门规章——《外商投资合伙企业登记管理规定》（以下简称《规定》）。由此,一种全新的外商投资企业形式——外商投资合伙企业（包括普通合伙和有限合伙）正式登上我国经济舞台。由于国务院的《办法》取消了商务部门审批、     

指导外商投资方向规定

第一条为了指导外商投资方向，使外商投资方向与我国国民经济和社会发展规划相适应，并有利于保护投资者的合法权益，根据国家有关外商投资的法律规定和产业政策要求，制定本规定。第二条本规定适用于在我国境内投资举办中外合资经营企业、中外合作经营企业和外资企业（以下简称外商投资企业）的项目以及其他形式的外商投资项目（以下简称外商投资项目）。第三条《外商投资产业指导目录》和《中西部地区外商投资优势产业目录》由国家发展计划委员会、国家经济贸易委员会、对外贸易经济合作部会同国务院有关部门制订，经国务院批准后公布；根…     

商务部对日韩冷轧薄板征反倾销税实施期限5年

商务部等四部委联合发布《产品全部直接出口的允许类外商投资企业产品出口情况检查暂行办法》（以下简称《办法》），规定“产品全部直接出口的允许类外商投资企业”（以下简称“全出口企业”）若出口率低于100％，将被依法处罚。《办法》规定，国家有关部门将对产品全出口企业实行情况检查制度，即省级商务主管部门会同相关部门对2002年10月1日以后设立的全出口企业产品出口情况进行核查，     

以组织制度为视角探析外资法体系之重构

我国外商投资企业立法在实际运作中已经出现种种弊病,就组织制度而言已与《公司法》相差甚远。因而,我国迫切需要对外商投资企业法律制度作出重大调整,以建立既适应市场经济要求又符合世贸组织基本原则的外资立法。本文试图以外商投资企业立法在企业组织制度上与《公司法》的差距为视角来重构统一的外资法的框架体系。     

关于转发国务院法制办公室对于外商投资企业投资者出资及清算具体应用问题的复函的通知

《中外合资经营企业合营各方出资的若干规定》（1987年12月30日国务院批准，以下简称《出资规定》）、《〈中外合资经营企业合营各方出资的若干规定〉的补充规定》（1997年9月2日国务院批准，对外贸易经济合作部、国家工商行政管理局令[1997]第2号）和《外商投资企业清算办法》（1996年6月15日国务院批准，     

特别清算论——对我国公司法修改中的一点建议

特别清算,是与普通清算相对应的一种清算制度,其在日本公司法及我国台湾地区的公司法中均有规定,克服了普通清算对债权人利益保护不周的弊端,也避免了破产清算的高额花费,较好地兼顾了当事人自治与社会秩序,均衡了效益与公平。我国现行公司法中缺乏对特别清算的相关规定,进而造成了某些公司未经清算即丧失主体地位的情况,极大地损害了社会主义市场经济信用体制的建立,在未来公司法修改中,诚有加以填补的必要     

GENERAL INTENSITY SHAPES IN OPTIMAL LIQUIDATION

The classical literature on optimal liquidation, rooted in Almgren–Chriss models, tackles the optimal liquidation problem using a trade‐off between market impact and price risk. It answers the general question of optimal scheduling but the very question of the actual way to proceed with liquidation is rarely dealt with. Our model, which incorporates both price risk and nonexecution risk, is an attempt to tackle this question using limit orders. The very general framework we propose to model liquidation with limit orders generalizes existing ones in two ways. We consider a risk‐averse agent, whereas the model of Bayraktar and Ludkovski only tackles the case of a risk‐neutral one. We consider very general functional forms for the execution process intensity, whereas Guéant, Lehalle and Fernandez‐Tapia are restricted to exponential intensity. Eventually, we link the execution cost function of Almgren–Chriss models to the intensity function in our model, providing then a way to see Almgren–Chriss models as a limit of ours.     

OPTIMAL LIQUIDATION IN A LIMIT ORDER BOOK FOR A RISK‐AVERSE INVESTOR

In a limit order book model with exponential resilience, general shape function, and an unaffected stock price following the Bachelier model, we consider the problem of optimal liquidation for an investor with constant absolute risk aversion. We show that the problem can be reduced to a two‐dimensional deterministic problem which involves no buy orders. We derive an explicit expression for the value function and the optimal liquidation strategy. The analysis is complicated by the fact that the intervention boundary, which determines the optimal liquidation strategy, is discontinuous if there are levels in the limit order book with relatively little market depth. Despite this complication, the equation for the intervention boundary is fairly simple. We show that the optimal liquidation strategy possesses the natural properties one would expect, and provide an explicit example for the case where the limit order book has a constant shape function.     

亏损股价影响因素研究:回顾与展望

投资者对亏损上市公司扭亏的预期,使得亏损上市公司的股价与其盈余信息呈现出"弱相关性",这说明亏损上市公司股价受到很多"表外因素"的影响。对此,从公司重组、清算期权价值、预期卖壳的可能性及其他非会计信息等方面对国内有关亏损上市公司股价影响因素的研究进行了分析,从预期的角度提出应将投资者的各种预期收益作为亏损公司股价的主要影响因素,并在此基础上提出了需要进一步研究的问题和方向。     

The CALM Method

Abstract

This paper addresses the need for an assessment/summative evaluation regarding the CALM (The Consignment Auction Li—quidation Marketing) Method of Mass Product Distribution. Originally developed and initiated in 1993, in response to the common need business organizations have for product liquidation outlets, this nontraditional form of distribution targets audiences contemplating the distribution of products, including manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, and other entrepreneurs.

The topic of distribution is considered to be one of four primary “marketing tools” referred to as the “marketing mix.” In addition to distribution, the other three components of the marketing mix are product, price, and promotion. The mass distribution of products via consignment auction liquidation outlets may be viewed as an additional channel of distribution. However, mass consignment auction liquidation on a national basis has not been adequately assessed or evaluated. There is little published about this type of product distribution.

The effectiveness of the CALM Method utilized on a national basis and covering a 10-year time span is presented. Effectiveness was largely assessed through statistical observations of the effect of various independent variables on the dependent variable, “auction outlet profitability.” Independent variables include geographic location/region of each consignment auction outlet; population size of each consignment auction outlet's community; merchandise type; consignment term, etc. The CALM Method yields the opportunity for profitable liquidation of mass quantities of merchandise on a national basis. This assessment/summative evaluation yields the opportunity for insight regarding the method's actual effectiveness and adds to the limited amount of research found in this area of mass distribution.     

买卖型担保中流质条款效力的证成与强化

审判实践不应僵化地援引禁止流质规则来无效化买卖型担保中的流质条款，以避免将买卖型担保重新装回典型担保的制度牢笼。禁止流质规则作为强制性预防措施有一定的合理性，在其立法目的必要性日渐丧失的情况下，扩张解释或者类推适用禁止流质规则均不可取，买卖型担保中的流质条款合法有效。对债权人课以清算义务，能够强化流质条款的正当性，从而彻底扫清买卖型担保中流质条款有效化的伦理障碍。担保人应负初步举证责任，只有价值差额超过“24%年利率上限”时才能启动清算，以确保流质条款的效率优势。尽管流质条款与以物抵债具有相似性，但不得以禁止流质规则束缚非买卖型担保中的以物抵债。     

OPTIMAL LIQUIDATION OF DERIVATIVE PORTFOLIOS

We consider the problem facing a risk averse agent who seeks to liquidate or exercise a portfolio of (infinitely divisible) perpetual American style options on a single underlying asset. The optimal liquidation strategy is of threshold form and can be characterized explicitly as the solution of a calculus of variations problem. Apart from a possible initial exercise of a tranche of options, the optimal behavior involves liquidating the portfolio in infinitesimal amounts, but at times which are singular with respect to calendar time. We consider a number of illustrative examples involving CRRA and CARA utility, stocks, and portfolios of options with different strikes, and a model where the act of exercising has an impact on the underlying asset price.     

Firm exit after distress: differentiating between bankruptcy, voluntary liquidation and M&A

This paper examines firm-level determinants of mature firm exits after economic distress. Using nested logit models and a sample of 6,118 distress-related exits in Belgium, we analyze the type of exit that distressed firms experience. We show that 41% of the firms in our sample exit through a court driven exit procedure (mainly bankruptcy), 44% are voluntarily liquidated and 14% are acquired, merged or split (hereafter M&A). Distressed firm exit follows two distinct stages. First, a firm either decides to exit voluntarily or is forced into bankruptcy, which is the least efficient exit strategy. Compared to bankruptcy, the probability of a voluntary exit increases with higher levels of cash, lower leverage, holding no secured debt and being embedded in a group. If a firm exits voluntarily, it enters a second stage and decides either to exit through voluntary liquidation or through a M&A. Conditional on not going bankrupt, the likelihood of voluntary liquidation compared to M&A increases with higher levels of cash or secured debt, with smaller size and with an absence of group relations. We contribute to the firm exit literature by jointly analyzing three exit types and showing that bankruptcy and voluntary liquidation are fundamentally different exit routes. While voluntary liquidation is an important exit route for distressed firms, most previous studies have failed to distinguish between bankruptcy and liquidation. We hence contribute to the exit literature by showing that bankruptcy, voluntary liquidation and M&A are fundamentally distinct exit routes for distressed firms, driven by different firm level characteristics and following a two-stage process.     

太子奶的前世今生

<正>湖南省株洲市气势恢宏的体育中心,2010年12月4日聚集起了成群结队的生意人。他们胸前佩戴会议主办单位签发的证件,手持身份证,从多个通道在接受严格安检后缓缓步入会场。在现场,官方安排了大批警力和消防、医务等人员。     

The Choice between Bank Debt and Trace Credit in Business Start-ups

This paper investigates the choice between bank debt and trade credit in business start-ups. While trade credit is more expensive than bank debt, suppliers tend to follow a more lenient liquidation policy when client firms encounter financial distress. As a result, suppliers are more willing to renegotiate the outstanding debt or grant additional debt whereas banks are more likely to liquidate borrowers upon default. Given the risky nature of business start-ups, we argue that the entrepreneur’s choice of debt instruments reflects these differences in liquidation policy between lenders and is thus determined by the venture’s failure risk, the entrepreneur’s private control benefits that are lost upon liquidation and the liquidation value of firm assets. Using unique data on 325 first-time business start-ups, we find that firms in industries with high historical start-up failure rates and entrepreneurs who tend to highly value private benefits of control use less bank debt. These effects are especially prevalent in start-ups where assets have a high liquidation value and thus banks are more likely to liquidate the venture following default. An erratum to this article can be found at