The financial determinants of corporate cash holdings: Evidence from some emerging markets

This paper investigates corporate cash holdings in developing countries. In particular, we look into the effect of capital structure and dividend policy on cash holdings in Brazil, Russia, India, and China and compare our results with a control sample from the US and the UK. Our sample contains 1992 firms across these countries for the period 2002–2008. We employ Instrumental Variables analysis to control for the endogeneity of the financial policies (cash holdings, capital structure, and dividend policy). Our results show some evidence that capital structure and dividend policy affect cash holdings. There are similarities between developed and developing countries on the factors determining corporate cash holdings. The results of our cross-country model provide evidence that capital structure, dividend policy, and firm size are important factors in determining cash holdings. Finally, we show that firms operating in countries with low shareholder protection hold more cash.     

Economic policy uncertainty and cash holdings: Evidence from BRIC countries

This paper examines the effect of Economic Policy Uncertainty (EPU) on cash holding decisions of firms in BRIC countries. Our focus is on the firms in BRIC countries, a particularly interesting group of countries to consider given their increasingly important role in the world economy. By using firm-level data through the 10 years period of 2006–2015, we find that firms prefer to hold more cash when uncertainty increases after controlling for firm level variables with industry and year fixed effects. The results are robust to alternative control variables, EPU calculations and selection of sub-samples. In addition to the country specific EPU levels, global EPU also has a significant positive impact on corporate cash holdings.     

Corporate governance and investment-cash flow sensitivity: Evidence from emerging markets

Controlling for country-level governance, we investigate how firms' corporate governance influences financing constraints. Using firm-level corporate governance rankings across 14 emerging markets, we find that better corporate governance lowers the dependence of emerging market firms on internally generated cash flows, and reduces financing constraints that would otherwise distort efficient allocation of investment and destroy firm value. Additionally and more importantly, firm-level corporate governance matters more significantly in countries with weaker country-level governance. This suggests substitutability between firm-specific and country-level governance in determining a firm's investment sensitivity to internal cash flows.     

Alignment or entrenchment? Corporate governance and cash holdings in growing firms

This study contends that the association between corporate cash holdings and corporate governance is subject to the investment environments that firms face. For example, firms with an abundance of investment opportunities have a strong incentive to hold cash in order to maintain their competitive positions. Shareholders accept high levels of cash holdings in such growing firms if corporate governance can protect their interests. This study examines the effects of corporate governance on cash holdings for a sample of high-tech firms. The results show that CEO ownership, the directorship of venture capitalists (VCs), and independent directors play critical roles in corporate cash policy. In addition, the boards are more effective when the firms' CEOs are also their founders or when VCs hold a large stake of company shares. The effects of corporate governance are more significant in younger firms while the effects of firm-specific economic variables are more significant in older firms in the sample.     

Governance mechanisms, investment opportunity set and SMEs cash holdings

This study analyses the effect of firm characteristics and governance mechanisms on cash holdings for a sample of UK SMEs. The results show that UK SMEs with greater cash flow volatility and institutional investors hold more cash; whereas levered and dividend paying SMEs with non-executive ownership hold less cash. We also find that ownership structure is significant only in explaining the cash holdings for firms with high growth investment opportunities, and leverage is only significant in explaining the cash held by firms with low growth investment opportunities. Our findings suggest that internal governance mechanisms are more effective for SMEs with high growth investment opportunities, while external governance mechanisms, such as capital market monitoring, are more effective for firms with low growth investment opportunities.     

高管的银行背景、所有权性质与企业现金持有决策

本文分析高管的银行背景是否影响企业现金持有决策,以及这种影响在国有企业和民营企业之间是否存在显著差异。基于中国非金融类上市公司2003－2013年的数据,检验发现,那些聘请具有银行背景的人士担任高管的企业具有显著更低的现金持有水平和更快的现金持有调整速度。相对于国有企业,高管银行背景对企业现金持有决策的影响在民营企业显著更强。上述研究结论有助于揭示社会资本在促进企业发展中的具体运行机制,为上市公司做出更优的现金持有决策具有重要的启示意义。     

Why Do Firms in Customer–Supplier Relationships Hold More Cash?

A firm is in customer–supplier relationships when its business depends on a small number of major customers/suppliers. In this paper, we provide evidence that relationship‐specific investments undertaken by firms in customer–supplier relationships are associated with high cash holdings in these firms. The evidence is consistent with the prediction of Titman's stakeholder theory that a firm relying on relationship‐specific investments maintains a high cash reserve as a cushion to sustain its relationship‐specific investments when negative shocks occur. Our findings suggest that relationship‐specific investments are important determinants of the precautionary motive to hold cash.     

The value of family control during political uncertainty: Evidence from Thailand's constitutional change in 2014

We examine the effect of family control on firm value and corporate decision during Thailand's constitutional change arising from the 2014 coup d'état. We find that Thai family firms perform poorly when compared to non-family firms during the period of political uncertainty. The effect is more pronounced when firms have high expected agency costs from outside investors. Further, we find that family firms delay their investments, hold less cash, pay smaller dividends and have poorer access to debt financing sources relative to non-family firms. The reductions in investment and financing activities may at least partially account for their underperformance. Our evidence is consistent with the view that family control enhances firms' survivorship by establishing political connections in times of political uncertainty at the expense of minority shareholders.     

Asset or constraint: Corporate reputation and MNCs’ involvement in the least developed countries

This study investigates the relationship between corporate reputation and a firm's involvement in the least developed countries (LDCs), where the most impoverished base of the pyramid markets are located. We draw upon extant literature in corporate reputation and international business to develop competing hypotheses regarding the foreign investment of the highly reputable firms in the LDCs. Corporate reputation can be a double-edged sword: while it can be a valuable asset to be leveraged in the LDCs, it demands monitoring and protection which might be challenged by a firm's LDC presence, thereby constraining the involvement in LDCs. Our results show that corporate reputation has a negative effect on a firm's foreign direct investment involvement in LDCs, supporting the view that reputation could constrain firm action in uncertain environments. We contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between reputation and international action than that of existing literature.     

Outside directors,firm life cycle,corporate financial decisions and firm performance

We investigate whether directors with multiple outside board directorships are related to corporate financial strategy across firm life cycle stages. Using a large sample of firms from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, we find that when the number of directors with multiple board seats increases, firms' level of cash holdings rises, capital expenditure declines, selling, general and administrative (SG&A) expenses increase, and firm performance decreases. We further demonstrate how the relationship varies across different stages of their life cycle. Our findings have significant implications for policy makers, regulators and stockholders in GCC countries and in other emerging markets.     

Optimal cash holdings under heterogeneous beliefs

This paper explores a one‐period model for a firm that finances its operations through debt provided by heterogeneous creditors. Creditors differ in their beliefs about the firm's investment outcomes. We show the existence of Stackelberg equilibria in which the firm holds cash reserves in order to provide incentives for pessimistic creditors to invest in the firm. We find interest rates and cash holdings to be complementary tools for increasing debt capacity. In markets with a high concentration of capital across a small interval of pessimistic creditors or by a few large creditors, cash holdings is the preferred tool to increase the debt capacity of the firm.     

Investment Committee,Corporate Cash Holdings and Corporate Life Cycle

We investigate the association between voluntary formation of board investment committee (IC) and corporate cash holdings of nonfinancial firms over the corporate life cycle stages for a large sample of Gulf Cooperation Council firms during 2005–2016. We find that IC increases corporate cash holdings in growth and maturity stages of firm, compared to introduction, shake‐out, and decline stages. These results have important implications for investors, policy makers, and regulators. Our findings are robust to various econometrics specifications.     

Why do firms hold so much cash? An innovation explanation

Theory holds that knowledge has positive economic consequences. While US corporations defend record high level cash holdings citing the precautionary motive in response to changing firm characteristics, I find that knowledge‐based innovation can partially explain these changes. Using distance to the nearest research university as a measure of knowledge intensity, I show that knowledge‐intensive firms hold more cash, even after controlling for firm R&D. Moreover, knowledge‐intensive firms exhibit higher marginal value of cash and save more cash from cash flows than their less knowledge‐intensive counterparts. Overall, the precautionary motive appears to dominate the agency motive, with the effect of knowledge on cash holdings strengthening over time. Copyright © 2014 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Exploring the innovation strategies of young firms: Corporate venture capital and venture capital impact on alliance innovation strategy

We investigate how governance structure and power influence alliance exploration strategy. Adopting a real options perspective and the agency view, we suggest that innovation strategies differ based on the firm's governance authority. We find that the motivations of corporate venture capitalist firms, venture capitalists, and firm founders may have an impact on the formation of exploratory alliances among adolescent firms. Using a sample of 122 adolescent firms, we examine the influence that governance structure has on the firm's alliance portfolio and innovation potential. While the influence of corporate venture capitalist firms alone do affect alliance formation strategy, corporate venture-backed firms with founders having high influence (knowledge or ownership in the firm) are more likely to form innovation-focused alliances. In contrast, venture capitalist-backed firms tend to avoid innovation-focused alliances, preferring more exploitive ones, even when founders have high influence within the firm.     

Why Greater Cash Holdings and Short-Term Debt Simultaneously Persist? The Case of Transition Economy

This study observes and explores a puzzle in Chinese firms whereby both cash holdings and short-term debt simultaneously account for more than 20% of total assets for at least two consecutive years over the sample period. This phenomenon conflicts with the principle of corporate value maximization, and is not clearly explained by the classical theories in corporate finance. Based on the implications in the extant literature and discussions of institutional constraints of the transition economy in China, this paper develops four hypotheses that are involved with agency conflicts between the largest shareholders and creditors and the formation of this puzzling financial structure. The empirical analyses suggest that the largest shareholders with tunneling motives seek to hold more cash to serve their private interests and/or the consequent operational deficit of the listed corporations. To the ends, these corporations tend to manage the timing of short term debt financing to increase cash reserves temporarily at the end of year. Essentially, greater cash holdings on the balance sheet of these corporations related with the puzzle become a misleading signal for potential creditors, possibly contributing to the refinancing of short-term debt of these listed firms for the following year. Hence, the puzzling financial structure is connected with the timing of debt financing and adverse selection of creditors. This study enriches the stream of literature on cash holdings and debt maturity, and provides new evidence on the impact of agency problems of the largest shareholders on the association between cash holdings and debt maturity in the context of a transition economy.     

The use of foreign currency derivatives,corporate governance,and firm value around the world

This paper examines the impact of currency derivatives on firm value using a broad sample of firms from thirty-nine countries with significant exchange-rate exposure. Derivatives can be used for managers' self-interest, for hedging or for speculative purposes. We hypothesize that investors can appeal to a firm's internal (firm-level) and external (country-level) corporate governance to draw inferences on a firm's motive behind the use of derivatives, since well-governed firms are more likely to use derivatives to hedge rather than to speculate or pursue managers' self-interest. Consistent with this explanation, we find strong evidence that the use of currency derivatives for firms that have strong internal firm-level or external country-level governance is associated with a significant value premium.     

The Masculinisation of Ethical Leadership Dis/embodiment

Using a worldwide sample, we examine whether corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance has an impact on the value of cash holdings. We find that investors assign a higher value to cash held by firms that have a high CSR rating. This result is consistent with the idea that CSR policies are a means for managers to act in the shareholders’ interests by mitigating conflicts with stakeholders. Finally, we reveal that CSR performance has a positive impact on the value of cash holdings only for firms which operate in countries where shareholders are well protected from expropriation by managers and in countries where the institutional quality is high.     

Different forms of corporate philanthropy,different effects: A multilevel analysis

This study investigates how different types of corporate philanthropy impact employees' life satisfaction. Grounded in signaling theory, we explore and clarify the nuances among three types of corporate philanthropy values: the absolute value of corporate philanthropy, the value of a firm's corporate philanthropy relative to its past level, and the value of corporate philanthropy relative to the firm size. Results of multilevel analyses on a large scale sample with 218 firms and 2,261 employees at two time points reveal that: the absolute value of corporate philanthropy positively influences employees' life satisfaction; the value of a firm's corporate philanthropy relative to its past philanthropy negatively impacts employees’ life satisfaction; and the value of corporate philanthropy relative to the firm size positively affects employees' life satisfaction. The results indicate that the influences of corporate philanthropy on employees' life satisfaction vary depending on the evaluation benchmarks. Firms may benefit by taking their size and past philanthropy into consideration when making corporate philanthropy investment decisions.     

Foreign Ownership and Corporate Cash Holdings in Emerging Markets

This article examines the link between foreign ownership and corporate cash holdings. We utilize a data sample of firms listed on the Ho Chi Minh City stock exchange covering the period 2007–2015. Employing different econometric techniques for panel data, we find that higher foreign ownership is associated with more corporate cash holdings. This finding suggests that foreign investors in the Vietnam stock market are subject to precautionary motive and agency motive forcing firms to hold more cash. However, the outcome suggests potential agency problems because managers might subsequently use this cash reserve for their own advantages. These problems are even more pronounced in emerging markets where investor protection mechanism is weak. Accordingly, this highlights the importance of a monitoring mechanism to refrain corporate managers from investing in value‐destroying projects.     

Variation in Corporate Governance and Firm Valuation – an International Study

In this paper, we investigate the types of firms that are likely to deviate from common practice in corporate governance of their home countries and examine how the deviation is correlated with firm value. Our results show that firms with higher institutional holdings, lower insider holdings, and higher sales growth are more likely to deviate from common practice in civil law countries, whereas, in common law countries, especially in the USA, firms with lower institutional holdings, higher insider holdings, and lower sales growth are likely to deviate from common practice. We document a strong positive correlation between governance deviation and firm value in civil law countries. This relationship is robust to different testing and sample selection methods. The results, however, are mixed for US firms and not significant in other common law countries. Using the deviation from common practice as a proxy of firm‐level impact on corporate governance, our results provide evidence that firm‐level effect matters in governance quality and the effect varies across countries.