Expanding to direct channel: Market coverages as entry barrier

A direct marketer can be either a manufacturer selling directly to the final consumers or a retailer that sells an assortment of products from multiple manufacturers. From a manufacturer's point of view, expanding to an online direct channel seems very attractive because intermediaries can be bypassed in reaching final consumers, while the Internet has substantially lowered the entry barrier. With the rapid diffusion of electronic commerce, numerous manufacturers have been considering a direct online channel as an alternative or a supplement to existing retailer channels. However, we observe in the real market that not many manufacturers are fully engaged in online retailing. One major factor frequently mentioned is the conflict with existing dealers who will not be pleased with a manufacturer's attempt to cannibalize their sales. This paper attempts to provide another explanation by comparing theoretical market coverage of manufacturers in a direct channel and a channel with intermediaries. We show that the direct channel can support fewer firms than the traditional retailer channel does, which becomes an effective entry barrier to latecomers. In equilibrium, the products are positively but finitely differentiated in their qualities, and the top two quality tiers would capture more than 75% of the direct channel's market potential (i.e., the “finiteness property”). Thus latecomers would find it difficult to gain a substantial market share against the existing pioneers in the competitive direct market unless they can find other meaningful ways to differentiate horizontally. The sales data of the online retail industry supports our finding.     

Do channel members value the multiple-cooperation strategy?

When the manufacturer distributes his products through online and traditional channels, what type of innovative marketing strategy can be utilized to solve the channel conflict and improve the performances of all channel members? Our research addresses this important question by initiating a triple cooperative strategy for channel members to employ in a manufacturer – retailer dual-channel supply chain. Our results show that when the product is less compatible with online channel than with traditional channel, channel members can utilize a triple cooperative strategy to improve channel coordination and their individual performances effectively and efficiently. First, the manufacturer can utilize supportive retail sales effort as a valuable coordination mechanism to improve the performances of all channel members in the dual-channel distribution. Second, a channel coordinative price strategy can be utilized to further improve the performance of whole channel. Finally, a profit sharing mechanism is needed to create a Pareto result for both the manufacturer and the retailer. Furthermore, we extend our model to study the value of triple cooperative strategy in a manufacturer – two competitive retailers supply chain and derive the optimum marketing strategy.     

On manufacturers complementing the traditional retail channel with a direct online channel

With the explosion of the Internet and the reach that it affords, many manufacturers have complemented their existing retail channels with an online channel, which allows them to sell directly to their consumers. Interestingly, there is a significant variation within product categories in manufacturer's use of the Internet as a direct distribution channel. The main objective of this study is to examine the strategic forces that may influence the manufacturer's decision to complement the retail channel with a direct online channel. In particular, we are interested in answering the following questions:

1. Why is it that in some markets only a few firms find it optimal to complement their retail channels with a direct Internet channel while other firms do not?
2. What strategic role (if any), does the direct Internet channel serve and how do market characteristics impact this role?

To address these issues we develop a model with a single strategic manufacturer serving a market through a single strategic retailer. In addition to the focal manufacturer's product the retailer carries products of competing manufacturers. Consumers in this market are one of two types. They are either brand loyal or store loyal. The retailer sets the retail price and the level of retail support, which impact the demand for the manufacturer's product. The retailer's decisions in turn depend on the wholesale price as well as the Internet price of the product if the manufacturer decides to complement the retail channel with an online channel. Our analysis reveals that the optimality of complementing the retail channel with an online channel and the role served by the latter depends critically upon the level of support that the retailer allocates to the manufacturer's product in the absence of the online channel. The level of support allocated by the retailer, in the absence of the online channel, depends upon the retail margins on the manufacturer's product relative to that on rival products in the product category. When the size of the brand loyal segment is small relative to the size of the store loyal segment then in the absence of the online channel, the manufacturer can lower wholesale price and enhance retail support, especially when the retail margins on the rival products are low. In contrast, when the size of the loyal segment is large and the retail margins on rival products are high the manufacturer will find it more profitable to charge a high wholesale price even if that induces the retailer to extend low levels of support. If the manufacturer decides to complement the retail channel with an online channel, some consumers who would have purchased from the retailer might prefer to purchase online. Our analysis reveals that when consumers' sensitivity to price differences across the competing channels exceeds a certain threshold it is not optimal for the manufacturer to complement the retail channel with an online channel. However, this price sensitivity threshold itself depends upon product/market characteristics, suggesting that manufacturers seeking to complement their retail channels with an online channel should look beyond the nature of threat the online channel poses to the retail channel in devising their optimal distribution strategies. When the retail margins on rival products are sufficiently small, complementing the retail channel with an online channel when optimal allows the manufacturer to price discriminate and enhance profits. In contrast when retail margins on rival products are sufficiently high, complementing the retail channel with an online channel serves to enhance retail support. We also identify market conditions under which profits of both the manufacturer and the retailer are greater with the online channel than that without it. This is particularly interesting since the online channel competes with the retail channel.     

考虑零售商销售努力的双渠道供应链定价策略研究

随着电子商务市场的日益成熟,制造商建设线上直销渠道来适应新的商品销售环境成为趋势。制造商线上直销渠道的建立占领了部分原本属于线下零售渠道的市场份额,对线下零售渠道造成冲击。针对双渠道供应链中的竞争,将零售商销售努力行为考虑在内,通过构建博弈模型分别研究了在集中决策模式和分散决策模式下,制造商与零售商的定价策略。研究发现,在集中决策模式下,线下零售渠道与线上直销渠道之间的价格差异随着两个渠道潜在需求量之间差异的增大而增大,并且两个渠道的最优价格分别与其市场潜在需求成正比。在分散决策模式下,两个渠道的最优价格亦与潜在需求成正比,并且线下零售渠道的最优价格随零售商销售努力程度的增加而增加,线上直销渠道的最优价格随着零售商销售努力程度的增加而减少。     

Investigating a three-way interaction of manufacturer control,retail control and dependence on salesforce performance. Does the role of frontline employees matters ?

Dependence and retailer control on manufacturer's salesforce imply several challenges in retail channels. This research addresses how they affect the relationship between manufacturer control and salesforce performance due to the high level of salesforce investment. We conduct a moderated-moderation analysis.We investigate the moderating roles of retailer control and dependence on the relationship between manufacturer control and salesforce performance. To take into account the importance of the store frontline employee, we next studied the influence of his perception of the salesforce on the sales control systems in retailing. First, our results show that salesforce performance is influenced directly by manufacturer process control and, retail control and dependence moderate this relationship in two-way and three-way interactions. The salesforce subject to process control by manufacturer improves his performance under strong retailer outcome control while the manufacturer is in a low relative dependence. Second, employee perception of the salespeople mediates the link between manufacturer process and retailer outcome controls. We test our model in two studies and theoretically integrate retailer control, dependence, and employee perception of the salesforce, in the sales control literature. In the end, we provide practical implications to further improve salesforce performance and employee perception of the salespeople and future research suggestions.     

Shopping in the omnichannel supply chain under price competition and product return

In recent years, omnichannel retailing has created value for prospective consumers. The rise of omnichannel retailing has changed consumers' buying habits, and manufacturers are facing stiff competition from retailers. To reduce this competition effect, manufacturers and retailers often work together to reduce showroom display costs. Despite this practice, there is little understanding of how omnichannel retailing impacts supply chain (SC) profit under competitive conditions. We investigate the test-in-store-and-buy-online (TSBO) retailing strategy and its impact on SC profit and price competition between manufacturers. The retailer sells products of both manufacturers through its website but displays products of only one manufacturer in the showroom, which bears the displaying cost. The retailer adopts a return policy for the other manufacturer. Stackelberg game was used to examine how members of the chain interact, and Nash equilibrium was used to find optimal strategies for players under decentralized and integrated channels. The results show that the TSBO strategy in retailing benefits all supply chain players under the integrated channel. A further interesting finding is that omnichannel SC profits are highest when retailers adopt a return policy. When two manufacturers compete and adopt different sales models, the manufacturer who uses the TSBO retail model reaps the most profit. Several other managerial insights are drawn from sensitivity analyses.     

Why would a big retailer refuse to collaborate on manufacturer SPIFF programs?

Big retailers that carry a large assortment of products rely on knowledgeable salespeople to provide purchase advice to customers and match customers with suitable products. Interestingly, big retailers vary in their policies regarding whether to allow their salespeople to receive manufacturer SPIFF (Sales Person Incentive Funding Formula) payments, which motivate salespeople advising at no cost of the retailer. In this study, we investigate a big retailer’s incentive to block manufacturer SPIFF programs, which has the consequence of demotivating salespeople from advising customers, from the perspective of vertical channel interactions. We scrutinize a big retailer’s decision to maximize its profit through managing its channel interactions with upstream manufacturers offering horizontally differentiated products, customers uncertain about true fits with competing products, and its salesperson who can match customers with suitable products through offering purchase advice. Our analysis shows that motivating the salesperson to advise customers is profitable for the retailer only if the such advising has moderate effectiveness in matching consumers and suitable products, and only in this case would the retailer collaborate on manufacturer SPIFF programs. Otherwise, salesperson advising hurts retailer profit and the big retailer benefits from blocking manufacturer SPIFF programs. Our study reveals the interesting theoretical insight that the incentives of a big retailer and upstream manufacturers to motivate sales advising reside in their incentives to battle for a more favorable channel status.     

Decomposing the effect of advertising: What happens in the retail channel?

The diverging interests of manufacturers and retailers famously give rise to the double marginalization problem but have consequences far beyond pricing. Advertising is another marketing instrument that is under the control of the manufacturer but its ultimate effect on consumer demand also depends on retailers’ pricing decisions. We decompose the effect of advertising in the channel and highlight an additional route through which advertising affects sales, namely via the changes in the retail price that a strategic retailer makes in response to changes in demand following manufacturer advertising. The total demand effect of advertising thus comprises the direct effects of advertising on market shares, and the indirect effects coming through adjustments that the retailer makes to the in-store prices of all the brands in a given product category in response to the shifted demand due to advertising. We match advertising data for four different categories (both food and non-food) to store-level scanner panel data, which also include information on wholesale prices. Controlling for wholesale prices, we establish in a reduced-form model that the retailer reacts to manufacturer advertising by changing retail prices instead of simply imposing a constant markup on the wholesale price. To further explore the role of the strategic response of the retailer in a systematic fashion and quantify the effects derived in the decomposition, we estimate a discrete-choice model of demand and determine the magnitude of the direct and indirect effects. We find that the indirect effect of advertising through retailer prices is about half the size of the direct effect, and thus substantively affects advertising effectiveness.     

信息共享下双渠道制造商与零售商协调研究

随着internet的应用越来越广泛,许多制造商不仅使用传统的销售商渠道销售产品,而且通过网上直销的方式进行产品销售,双渠道增加了渠道之间的竞争。零售商为了在渠道竞争中获得优势,可以通过花费一定的成本增加零售产品价值。通过建立博弈模型分析强势制造商在对零售商信息完全、信息不完全情况下的定价策略,分析得出制造商获得零售商信息的价值,以及零售商愿意向制造商分享成本信息时的临界收益,旨在提出参考建议。     

Cross-channel effects of omnichannel retail marketing strategies: A review of extant data-driven research

The authors review 50 empirical retailing research papers that have appeared over the last 20 years to take stock of what we know, need to know better, and do not know yet about within-retailer cross-channel effects of omnichannel retail marketing strategies on (a) consumer responses over their purchase journeys, i.e., online and/or offline search, purchase intention, frequency, amount, returns, loyalty, and (b) the retail firm's aggregate outcomes (e.g., sales, costs, profits, product returns) by channel and overall. Specifically, the authors focus on five strategies: (1) the addition of online channel by an offline retailer; (2) the addition (or subtraction) of offline channels by an online retailer; (3) addition of mobile shopping channel (website and/or app) by offline and/or online retailer; (4) cross-channel integration strategies; and (5) retail marketing mix strategies. The author/s integrate findings from empirical research on these strategies into a number of ‘insights’ about ‘what we know’. Prominent among these are the following: Adding a transactional online channel to an offline channel improves the retailer's overall sales even though offline channel sales can be cannibalized to some degree. Adding an offline channel by an online retailer, however, boosts online channel sales as well as overall sales of the retailer. Similarly, adding a mobile shopping channel usually increases customer purchase frequency and amount and overall sales of the retailer in the long-term. Strategies for greater cross-channel integration generally have a positive effect on a retailer's overall performance while online advertising has positive effects on offline channel consideration and sales as well as overall sales of a multichannel retailer. Other insights or findings that need further study or open questions are also identified. The paper closes with managerial implications of the derived empirical insights, and suggestions for future research.     

How a novel option contract helps a green product to enter a traditional product's retailing channel: A mathematical modeling approach

Multi-sourcing is a practical strategy in retail channels that allows retailers facing uncertainties to respond more effectively to consumers' needs by distributing market demand across multiple supply sources. In this respect, this research investigates a price-setting retailing channel, including two manufacturers (a traditional manufacturer and a green manufacturer) and one retailer where end-of-life products can be collected. The retailer faces an uncertain price-dependent demand and sets orders from both supply directions based on a low-cost ordering approach. The primary purpose of this study is to develop an optimal solution to allow the green product to enter the retailing channel of the non-green product. Accordingly, this research develops and compares two different contractual mechanisms from the standpoint of the green manufacturer/retailer and the supply chain (SC): (1) a penalty-based contract and (2) a modified call option contract mixed with a cost-sharing mechanism. The main contribution of the current paper is to investigate an option contract for the effective management of a closed-loop supply chain and combine it with a cost-sharing contract as a new approach. Another contribution is that the developed model considers two practical channels for collecting and returning obsolete products to the green manufacturer: (1) the retailer is responsible for collecting and returning obsolete products, and (2) collecting and returning obsolete products is outsourced to a third-party logistics provider (3PL). Eventually, the models' efficiency is verified by investigating different numerical experiments, discovering that the proposed reservation-based contract outperforms the penalty-based contract for both parties' profitability and retailing channel's improvement. Besides, the present study finds that hiring 3PL significantly increases the green manufacturer's profit compared to other scenarios.     

Omnichannel retailing operations with coupon promotions

This paper explores an omnichannel retail system under which the retailer offers coupons via online channels for market share and profit. It investigates the action mechanism of coupon promotion on omnichannel price and operational decisions by employing a theoretical model. Three coupon distribution modes are investigated; a scenario in which the omnichannel retailer does not offer coupons, offers coupons with a common face value, or offers coupons with a different face value. The results show that the distribution of coupons does not always lead to increased market share. Rather, market volume may be reduced if the competition between different channels is intense. When conducting a coupon promotion, the retailer always charges a higher price, but if the negative effects of coupon promotion for the competitive channel are relatively large, the retailer will reduce their price. Larger cross-selling revenue comes from ‘Buy Online, Pick Up in Store’ channel, indicating a stronger willingness to offer coupons and higher profits for the retailer. If the retailer takes the channel characteristics and consumers' channel preferences into consideration and offers different coupon face values across channels, they will derive higher profits.     

Optimal generic and brand advertising efforts in a decentralized supply chain considering customer surplus

While the previous researches of advertising efforts decisions focus on only the firms' profit target, no literature introduces corporation social responsibility target into advertising efforts decisions of a supply chain (SC). To fill this gap, we consider a two-stage SC with a manufacturer and a retailer where the SC members consider the customer surplus. Both the retailer and the manufacturer can invest in generic advertising efforts to influence and increase the products' sales volumes. This paper investigates the following four scenarios: (1) The retailer cares the customer surplus (Model I); (2) The manufacturer cares the customer surplus (Model II); (3) Both the retailer and the manufacturer care the customer surplus (Model III); (4) We then extend the model III to the case that the manufacturer invests in both the generic and brand advertising efforts (Model IV). The objective of this paper is to determine the optimal retail price, the optimal advertising efforts, and the optimal profits of SC members, and find the influence of customer concern level on the SC performance. Finally, numerical examples are conducted to investigate the influence of the customer concern levels of the retailer or the manufacturer on the profits of the SC members and the entire SC. We also study the joint impacts of the customer concern levels of the retailer and the manufacturer on the SC performance. We find that the SC obtains the highest profits when the retailer's customer concern level and the manufacturer's customer concern level are relatively high, and the best cooperative strategy for the retailer and the manufacturer is that they improve customer concern level simultaneously.     

Empirical investigation of channel reactions to brand introductions

We investigate how incumbent manufacturers and retailers alter their pricing behavior in response to new product introduction. In performing our analysis, we need to be cognizant of the fact that the observed price changes can be due to entry-induced changes in a) demand conditions or b) costs or, on the other hand, to the competitive behavior of c) manufacturers and/or d) the retailer. In order to separate these four changes, we posit that manufacturer and retailer pricing is an outcome of maximizing a combination of shares and profits. This enhanced objective function allows us to measure competitive conduct benchmarked as less or more competitive than under the Bertrand-Nash framework. Our empirical analysis is based on the toothpaste category for the time period January 1993–February 1995. During this period, there were three brand introductions in two rounds of entry. Using the estimates from the demand and the supply model, we compute the changes in the retail and wholesale prices that are attributable to changes in demand conditions, manufacturer and retailer competitive conduct, and cost changes. These results support our conjecture that inferring the change in conduct solely based on a change in observed prices is likely to be erroneous. For the first new brand entry, we find that the brand introduction did not significantly increase competition between manufacturers. As a result, the balance of channel power between the manufacturers and the retailers remained unaltered. Both retailer and manufacturer profit margins increased after the first entry. However, subsequent to the second entry, retailer share of channel profits increased at the expense of the manufacturers; manufacturers even saw a decline in their absolute profit margins. We believe that this research will provide insight for manufacturers and retailers regarding how the various channel participants are likely to react to new product introduction. Furthermore, policymakers interested in understanding competitive reactions to new product introduction should find this research useful.     

Retail environment and manufacturer competitive intensity

We study how the intensity of competition and the degree to which manufacturers enjoy market power depends on the retail environment in a given market. Past research has discussed the growing importance of retailers and the power they enjoy over manufacturers. Yet, the empirical literature to date has not determined which retail characteristics have the largest impact on competitive behavior.Our starting point is the estimation of a structural demand-and-supply model, where both consumers’ decisions and the strategic interactions between manufacturers and retailers are explicitly modeled. We identify the type of competitive behavior of manufacturers by measuring the deviation from a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. This measure of competitive conduct is expressed as a function of key retail characteristics such as size of the retailer, its assortment depth, and category expertise.We illustrate the proposed approach using data for the ground coffee category in Germany. Our findings indicate that retail characteristics have indeed a significant effect on competitive intensity among upstream firms and on their ability to exercise market power. Hence, a manufacturer considering entry into a new market should not only take into account its competitors but also the specifics of the retail environment in this market.     

Entry mode selection and its impact on an incumbent supply chain coordination

This paper considers a supply chain where a manufacturer sells its product through a retailer. In such a market, a potential entrant can make a substitute product by imitating the incumbent's product and then sells it to the common market with one of three alternative entry modes: (i) selling through the incumbent's retailer, (ii) selling through another independent retailer, or (iii) selling directly to consumers. Faced with the entrant's entry, the manufacturer has managed to offer a value-added service to add to its product's value at a cost. We investigate the entrant's optimal entry mode when the manufacturer offers profit-sharing contracts to the retailer and when it does not, and discuss the impact of the potential invader's entry on the incumbent firms' performances. The results show that: (1) the entrant sells directly to consumers when faced with weak value competition, and sells through another retailer against fierce value competition. (2) If the value competition is relatively fierce and the efficiency of the value-added service is relatively high as well, the incumbent firms can benefit from the new entry. (3) A profit-sharing contract, as a coordination policy, can fully coordinate the incumbent supply chain no matter whether there exists a potential entrant or not, yet the entry can affect the distribution of the profits between the incumbent manufacturer and retailer.     

Manufacturer marketing initiatives and retailer information sharing

This research examines a retailer’s incentive to share information with its supplier when the supplier can also undertake initiatives to increase retail demand. It is well known that a retailer is averse to sharing market information with a manufacturer due to concern for a manufacturer’s strategic use of such information. This research shows that despite such strategic exploitation of market information, a retailer may want to establish information sharing channels with its supplier. Information sharing essentially shifts power upstream which, in turn, enhances the manufacturer’s incentive to bear costs to boost retail demand: the manufacturer is induced to invest merely by knowing that information is on its way. Hence, the retailer benefits from information sharing ex ante despite the costly ex post exploitation by the manufacturer. This finding is a stark contrast to the most of previous results which consistently point out how bad it is for the manufacturer to have the retailer’s demand information before setting prices. In fact, due to the investment effect, information sharing can lead to gains for the retailer, manufacturer, and consumers alike.     

Should manufacturers open live streaming shopping channels?

Live streaming shopping, as a novel sales channel, has caught much attention from researchers and practitioners. Its unique features, such as the commission rate, fixed fee and number of followers of the live streamer, appear different from traditional wholesale-contract sales channels. But few studies have examined the impact of these factors on manufacturers’ opening live streaming shopping channel decisions. To address this gap, we develop game theoretic models to examine whether a manufacturer should hire a live streamer to open a live streaming shopping channel on an e-commerce platform where the manufacturer's direct channel and third-party e-retailer co-exist. We consider the impact of the commission rate, fixed fee and number of followers of the live streamer on the operating decisions and profits of the manufacturer and e-retailer. Then we identify the threshold-conditions where the manufacturer and e-retailer are better off or worse off by opening a live streaming shopping channel. We show that opening a live streaming shopping channel may hurt or harm the manufacturer's profit, depending on the interaction of above three factors. The manufacturer may be willing to open a live streaming shopping channel when the commission rate and fixed fee are both small, or when the commission rate and number of followers are both large and the fixed fee is small. The e-retailer could also benefit from opening a live streaming shopping channel. These insights appear novel in the literature. We further show that opening a live streaming shopping channel could improve the consumer surplus. We extend our model to price competition to verify our main conclusions. These insights may help manufacturers decide whether or not to open live streaming shopping channels and help manufacturers and extant retailers develop optimal operating decisions and improve profits when participating in live streaming shopping.     

Manufacturer Support for a Partially Integrated Channel in South Korea: Power‐dependence vs. Marketing Effectiveness Perspective

This article introduces the unique context of a partially‐integrated channel (PIC) that incorporates both market and hierarchical governance forms. In so doing, it examines determinants of the manufacturer's support for a PIC. Using power‐dependence and marketing effectiveness theories, we collected data from 172 marketing managers in charge of PICs in 15 companies in South Korea. The results showed that from the power‐dependence perspective, demand volatility, manufacturer's competitive intensity, and channel concentration are positively related to a manufacturer's dependence on the retailer, which is positively related to the manufacturer's support for the PIC with a retailer. From a marketing effectiveness perspective, channel bonding and customer linking are positively associated with manufacturer marketing effectiveness, which is an antecedent to PIC support for a retailer. Copyright © 2013 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Impact of Brand Delisting on Store Switching and Brand Switching Intentions

A tool retailers often use to improve their negotiating position with brand manufacturers is to delist - or threaten to delist - the manufacturers’ brand. Because brand manufacturers rely mainly on retailers to sell their products to consumers, a brand delisting will cause a sales loss for the brand manufacturer. Therefore, many brand manufacturers feel enormous pressure to give in and improve buying conditions to favor the retailer. The question thus emerges: Can a brand manufacturer resist a retailer's threat to delist its brand(s)? If a brand delisting severely hurts retail sales, it is easier for a brand manufacturer to resist. The authors study the impact of brand delistings on store switching and brand switching using a controlled online experiment and in-store shopper survey. They develop and test a conceptual model with several antecedents of consumers’ reactions to a brand delisting and conclude that brand equity, market share, and the products’ hedonic level drive store and brand switching.