纳税信用评级与超额现金持有水平

本文以2010—2019年A股非金融非ST上市公司为研究样本,实证检验了纳税信用评级与超额现金持有水平之间的关系,发现纳税信用评级为A显著降低了企业超额现金持有水平,纳税信用评级一方面,可以通过提高信息透明度来降低超额持现的代理动机;另一方面,可以通过缓解融资约束来削弱超额持现的预防性动机。     

公司治理视角下企业超额现金持有水平的研究——以江浙中小制造业上市公司的数据为例

文章以2011—2015年江浙中小制造业上市公司的面板数据为研究对象,探讨公司治理对企业超额现金持有水平的影响。研究结果表明:实际控制人控制权与现金流权偏离程度与超额现金持有水平负相关;管理层持股比例与超额现金持有水平呈U形相关关系;两职合一与超额现金持有水平正相关,且两职合一不仅会导致企业现金持有过度,还会导致企业现金持有不足;股权制衡度、董事会规模、独立董事比例与超额现金持有量之间并不存在显著的相关关系。     

稳中求进:实际控制人超额委派董事能促进企业创新吗

近年来,A股上市公司实际控制人超额委派董事现象备受社会舆论和学术界关注.在分散股权时代,实际控制人超额委派董事在强化董事会控制权的同时,客观上维护了上市公司控制权的稳定,提升了董事会决策的一致性,为管理者专注于提升企业长期价值营造了相对稳定的内外部环境.基于此,本文以企业创新为着眼点,研究实际控制人超额委派董事是否影响企业创新,发现实际控制人超额委派董事促进了企业创新.机制分析显示,实际控制人超额委派董事通过延长职位任期和增加货币薪酬降低了管理者对技术创新的风险厌恶,进而提升了企业的创新水平.本文还发现实际控制人超额委派董事对企业创新的促进作用在不存在多个大股东、高技术企业中表现得更加明显.本文不仅丰富了企业创新影响因素及实际控制人超额委派董事经济后果领域的研究文献,而且对现实中通过控制权优化提高企业创新能力具有重要的实践价值.     

股权结构、政治关联与超额现金持有水平研究

本文以2006~2012年在上证交易所和深证交易所上市的非金融类公司作为样本,从最终控制人的股权集中度、股权性质以及政治关联3个角度,深入地考察上市公司股权结构如何影响现金持有行为。研究发现:随着终极控制人股权集中程度的升高,上市公司的超额现金持有水平呈现出"U";相对于非国有上市公司而言国有上市公司持有的超额现金水平更低;而在非国有上市公司中,有政治关联的上市公司比没有政治关联的上市公司持有的现金水平低;并且国有上市公司持有的现金市场价值更低。这说明股权在集中到一定程度时能够有效缓解股东缺位的问题,但随着股权的进一步集中,新的大股东问题又应运而生。股权国有、政治关联能够有效缓解上市公司所面临的融资约束,降低现金持有水平。     

控股股东股权质押与现金持有水平:“掏空”还是“规避控制权转移风险”

本文以2013-2015年沪深两市上市公司季度数据为研究对象,考察了控股股东股权质押是否会影响上市公司现金持有水平,实证结果发现,控股股东股权质押比例与上市公司现金持有水平呈U型关系.当控股股东股权质押比例低于临界值时,由于资金占用等原因,上市公司现金持有水平降低;当控股股东股权质押比例高于临界值时,控股股东为了规避控制权转移风险,要求上市公司持有更多现金.这说明不同质押比例水平下控股股东出于不同目的对上市公司采取不同的财务政策,从而对现金持有水平产生非线性影响.上述结论在尽可能控制内生性问题后依然成立.在进一步的分析中,本文还发现,控股股东股权质押比例与上市公司现金持有水平呈U型的关系只在非国有企业中存在,上市公司现金持有水平的降低是股权质押的控股股东“掏空”所致的,增加的现金持有是来自公司资本性支出的降低和现金分红的减少,持有更多的现金能显著降低股价触及平仓线的可能性,股权质押的控股股东对上市公司现金持有水平的干预损害了公司价值.     

现金持有、融资约束与企业价值——基于门槛回归模型的实证检验

文章基于门槛回归模型,对融资约束是否会影响现金及超额现金与企业价值的关系进行实证检验。结果表明,现金及超额现金与企业价值的关系均存在显著的门槛效应。在弱融资约束企业,现金及超额现金的账面价值高于其市场价值,而在强融资约束企业,现金及超额现金的账面价值低于其市场价值,这支持了代理理论和融资约束理论,说明弱融资约束企业滥用现金的代理问题较为严重,现金持有对企业价值具有负向影响,强融资约束企业持有现金,能够抓住更多投资机会,现金持有对企业价值具有正向影响。     

终极所有权结构与上市公司现金持有探讨

以2006-2008年我国制造业上市公司为样本,实证分析了终极所有权结构与现金持有的相关性,并控制了董事会和财务特征等因素。我们发现:终极控股股东"两权分离度"与现金持有水平显著正相关,终极现金流权与现金持有水平显著负相关;股权制衡度、董事会规模、财务杠杆与现金持有显著负相关;现金流量、股利支付与现金持有水平显著正相关;没有证据显示终极控股股东性质、独立董事、公司规模、成长性对现金持有水平有显著影响。     

超额现金持有的上市公司特质研究——对我国制造业上市公司的实证分析

超额持有现金的上市公司具有什么特质呢?以我国制造业329家上市公司2004—2006年的数据为整体样本,通过界定超额现金持有上市公司,将整体样本分成超额现金持有和非超额现金持有两个子样本,从公司治理、财务方面设计变量对两个子样本进行比较分析。实证结果表明,与非超额现金持有公司相比,超额持有现金公司负债比率要低,长期业绩会变差,现金股利支付比率低,而股东保护度和管理费用率不存在显著差异。     

控股股东双重控制链特征对定增关联并购资产估值的影响——兼论业绩承诺的估值纠偏效应

选取2010—2018年沪深A股市场中向控股股东及其关联方定增并购并做出业绩补偿承诺的上市公司为样本，探究控股股东双重控制链特征对定增关联并购资产估值的影响。研究表明：“股权控制链”下两权分离程度越高、网状控制结构越复杂，定增关联并购资产的价格虚增程度越高；“社会资本控制链”下超额委派董事比例越高、经理人关系嵌入强度越大，定增关联并购资产的价格虚增程度越高。进一步研究发现，业绩承诺能够在一定程度上纠正上述估值偏差。具体地，相较于现金补偿业绩承诺与单向业绩承诺，股份补偿业绩承诺和双向业绩承诺的估值纠偏效应更显著，能够更好地抑制控股股东虚增资产价格的利益输送行为。     

高管政治关联与企业现金持有:“扶持”还是“掠夺”?——基于不同产权视角的研究

文章首次基于不同产权视角,研究企业的高管政治关联对企业现金持有行为影响机制的差异.以我国上市公司为样本研究发现,地方国企高管的政治关联分别对企业现金持有水平及其市场价值有显著的正向和负向作用,支持了高管政治关联的“掠夺”假说;民企高管的政治关联对企业现金持有水平及其价值均有显著的负向影响,支持了“扶持”假说;而央企高管的政治关联对企业现金持有水平及其价值均无显著影响.企业的产权性质会显著影响高管政治关联对企业现金持有行为的作用机制,这一结论对于企业财务领域的研究与实务具有较强的启示意义.     

高管的银行背景、所有权性质与企业现金持有决策

本文分析高管的银行背景是否影响企业现金持有决策,以及这种影响在国有企业和民营企业之间是否存在显著差异。基于中国非金融类上市公司2003－2013年的数据,检验发现,那些聘请具有银行背景的人士担任高管的企业具有显著更低的现金持有水平和更快的现金持有调整速度。相对于国有企业,高管银行背景对企业现金持有决策的影响在民营企业显著更强。上述研究结论有助于揭示社会资本在促进企业发展中的具体运行机制,为上市公司做出更优的现金持有决策具有重要的启示意义。     

不同成长机会下的上市公司股权结构、资本结构与公司绩效——以A股流通服务业上市公司为例

文章以我国流通服务业上市公司为研究样本,分析了上市公司资本结构和股权结构对公司绩效的影响,以及成长机会在其中的调节作用.研究结果表明流通服务业上市公司第一大股东持股比例、第二到第十大股东持股比例、长期负债资本比对公司绩效存在显著正向影响;国有股持股比例、高管持股比例、资产负债率对公司绩效存在显著负向影响.随着公司成长机会的增加,第二到第十大股东持股,非国有法人股持股对公司绩效正向影响作用增强;而第一大股东持股比例、国有股持股比例、高管持股比例、资产负债率与长期负债资本比对公司绩效的影响并不随着公司成长性的变化而变化.文章研究对于流通服务业上市公司股权结构和资本结构优化提供了有益的启示.     

混合所有制企业的民营化程度如何影响高管薪酬-业绩敏感性？

在中国深化改革、推进转型的特殊背景下，探索出一条适合中国混合所有制企业实际情况的高管薪酬制度改革路径是现阶段中国国有企业改革亟待解决的问题之一。高管的薪酬-业绩敏感性是判断薪酬激励契约有效性的主要指标，基于此，文章首先构建一个委托-代理框架下的寡头市场模型，从理论上分析混合所有制企业的民营化程度与高管薪酬-业绩敏感性之间的关系；其次选择2007—2016年沪深两市A股经过民营化的国有控股上市公司数据进行实证检验。结果发现：总体上，提高混合所有制企业的民营化程度会显著增强高管薪酬-业绩敏感性；进一步分析发现，混合所有制企业中非国有股比例小于67%时，提高民营化程度会降低高管的薪酬-业绩敏感性；非国有股比例介于67%~75%之间时，提高民营化程度对高管薪酬-业绩敏感性没有显著影响；非国有股比例大于75%时，提高民营化程度会提升高管的薪酬-业绩敏感性。     

Building State-owned Assets Supervision System and Conducting Mixed Ownership Reforms to Reinforce Each Other's Collaboration

Improving the state-owned assets supervision system (SOASS) can effectively get over the defects of systems and mechanisms and further promote the reform of mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises (SOEs); and the deepening of the reform can advance the change of the SOASS to the supervision on capital. By analyzing the relationship between the SOASS and the reform of mixed ownership of state-owned enterprises, we have found that collaborative promotion of the change of the SOASS to the supervision on capital and promotion of the reform of mixed ownership can do good to ameliorating the corporate management mechanism, improving the market-oriented management mechanism of enterprises and completing the medium- and long-term incentive mechanisms, etc. to enhance business operation efficiency. Due to such prevailing problems as relative dispersion and vagueness of the policies relating to deepening the reform of SOEs, inconsistent progress of the reform of state-owned assets (SOAs) and SOEs, and corporate reform focusing on apprence, improving the SOASS and deepening collaborative development of the reform of mixed ownership of SOEs are hindered by some constraints. To construct and improve the SOASS and the reform of mixed ownership collaboratively, we should make efforts to promote the reform in the following five aspects, namely, placing importance to policy coordination, boosting synchronism of the reform of SOAs and SOEs at different levels and in different areas to coordinate the nationwide reform of SOAs and SOEs, facilitating reform of the mechanism of enterprises of mixed ownership through mixed capital, and promoting the SOASS and stimulating classified monitoring and reform of mixed ownership based on classified reform of SOEs.     

股权结构、股东保护与上市公司现金持有量

我国上市公司的治理结构一直是各方关注的焦点，尤其是股权结构、中小股东保护等问题。本文选取了2000年上市公司样本991个，定义了基于股权结构的股东保护变量，并在此基础上研究了股东保护与现金持有量之间的关系。研究结果表明，上市公司现金持有量差异较大，并且在股东保护较好的情况下，现金持有量相对较小，二者之间呈现负相走的关系。由于影响现金持有量的因素较多，我们选取了相当数量的影响因素作为控制变量，检验在其进入模型的情况下，对股东保护与现金持有量之间关系的影响；结果表明，股权结构影响下的股东保护与现金持有量具有负的线性相关性。     

Alignment or entrenchment? Corporate governance and cash holdings in growing firms

This study contends that the association between corporate cash holdings and corporate governance is subject to the investment environments that firms face. For example, firms with an abundance of investment opportunities have a strong incentive to hold cash in order to maintain their competitive positions. Shareholders accept high levels of cash holdings in such growing firms if corporate governance can protect their interests. This study examines the effects of corporate governance on cash holdings for a sample of high-tech firms. The results show that CEO ownership, the directorship of venture capitalists (VCs), and independent directors play critical roles in corporate cash policy. In addition, the boards are more effective when the firms' CEOs are also their founders or when VCs hold a large stake of company shares. The effects of corporate governance are more significant in younger firms while the effects of firm-specific economic variables are more significant in older firms in the sample.     

CEO career concerns and investment efficiency: Evidence from China

This paper investigates the impact of CEO career concerns on a firm's investment efficiency for publicly listed Chinese companies from 2002 to 2009. We use CEO age and appointment of new CEO as proxies for CEO career concerns. For the whole sample, we demonstrate that younger CEOs and newly appointed CEOs are prone to invest less and more efficiently. We divide our sample into state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises, depending on their ultimate ownership. The age effect seems stronger in state-owned enterprises and the new appointment effect seems stronger in non-state-owned enterprises. Our results indicate that CEOs have long-term career concerns that can improve a firm's investment efficiency even in a transitional economy such as China.     

Corporate cash holdings and promoter ownership

We examine the relationship between corporate cash holdings and promoter ownership for a sample of Indian non-financial firms. Consistent with the arguments of the ‘efficient monitoring hypothesis’, our results broadly suggest that promoter ownership is negatively associated with cash holdings, thereby highlighting the role of large owners in preventing cash accretion in an emerging market context. Indicating prominent influence of corporate ownership on cash management, we find that corporate non-promoter ownership is also negatively related with cash holdings. With regard to promoter ownership of foreign entities, our results suggest that cash holdings share a U-shaped relationship with ownership of foreign promoter corporations. In addition, our findings provide weak evidence to support a more pronounced negative association between cash holdings and promoter ownership for group-affiliated firms as compared to non-affiliated firms since the former faces lower financial constraints on account of access to internal capital markets. Finally, we perform long-term effect analysis in order to reinforce robustness of our results.     

晋升激励、金融市场化与担保圈现象

近年来,担保圈现象成为影响公司稳健运行和区域经济发展的一大问题,本文研究了担保圈问题的形成机理。结果发现,晋升激励越大、金融市场化水平越低,企业加入担保圈的可能性越大。控股股东的侵占风险越高,晋升激励和金融市场化水平影响担保圈形成的作用更强。晋升激励主要影响国企加入担保圈的行为,而金融市场化水平主要影响非国有企业加入担保圈的行为。本文揭示了担保圈的形成机理,对于新常态下通过深化改革、完善治理提升信贷资源配置效率具有一定的启示。     

Management pay-performance sensitivity, internal cash flow and investment behavior: A test of the free cach flow theory and asymmetric information theory

The relationship between investment and financing, the two basic components of corporate finance, is of significant interest to researchers and practitioners alike. The free cash flow hypothesis and asymmetric information hypothesis are two important theories to explain the relationship between investment expenditure and cash flow. In this paper, we examine how consistency between the interests of management and shareholders influences investment-cash flow sensitivity, and how the nature of the controlling shareholder influences this relationship, so as to analyze how much the free cash flow hypothesis and asymmetric information hypothesis can explain the practice of investment and financing in China. We use pay-performance sensitivity as a proxy for the degree of consistency between shareholders and management interests. We find that investment-cash flow sensitivity is affected not only by financial constraints that caused by asymmetric information, but also by the shareholder-manager agency problem. It is found that the asymmetric information theory has more explanatory power than the shareholder-manager agency theory. In addition, the relationship between investment-cash flow sensitivity and pay-performance sensitivity is affected by the nature of controlling shareholders. Specifically, in the state-owned enterprises, the investment-cash flow sensitivity is mainly ascribed to information asymmetry problems, but in the non-state-owned enterprises, the investment-cash flow sensitivity mainly results from free cash flow. Translated and revised from Kuaiji Yanjiu 会计研究 (Accounting Research), 2007, (10): 73–81