基于战略的旅游饭店业职业经理人薪酬设计研究

本文对基于战略的旅游饭店业职业经理人的薪酬设计进行了探索性研究,提出了旅游饭店业职业经理人的薪酬设计的指导思想、主要内容、设计步骤和基本模型等问题.     

职业经理人薪酬管理新模式探索

本文从心理契约的角度研究职业经理人的薪酬激励机制,在分析了心理契约的内涵、维度和类型的基础上,指出职业经理人所特有的心理契约类型。并认为心理契约在职业经理人的薪酬管理中发挥着巨大的作用,弥补了委托—代理理论的不足,进而基于心理契约对职业经理人的精神薪酬进行探讨,为管理者提供了一个独特思考的角度。     

我国职业经理人激励机制探究

目前,我国现存职业经理人激励机制存在着薪酬分配与管理不合理、实行股权激励制度受限等问题.构建我国职业经理人激励机制,应完善股权激励制度和经理人市场的竞争机制及评价体系,优化培育职业经理人的外部环境,转变职业经理人薪酬支付方式,增强职业经理人的道德需要,从而保证经理人行为长期化、规范化,并加速与国际接轨.     

对我国民营企业职业经理人薪酬奖励制度的探讨

自从1992年改革开放后,随着我国经济的发展我国民营企业发展迅速,职业经理人在民营企业的发展中做出了巨大的贡献。本论文通过文献和调查走访的方式对我国部分民营企业职业经理人进行了相关的研究,分析了目前民营企业职业经理人薪酬奖励制度存在的问题。再结合当前民营企业经营过程中存在的问题,提出了完善我国民营企业职业经理人薪酬奖励制度的建议。     

国内外饭店职业经理人研究综述

我国对饭店职业经理人的研究从理论到实践两个方面都滞后于市场经济发达国家。中外职业经理人出现的经济背景和社会条件不同,研究的关注点差别较多。国外的研究最早关注于经理人角色、继而关注总经理的管理能力、经理人职业路径、经理人与雇主关系、经理人薪酬体系和经理人胜任力模型等。国内的研究则关注于饭店职业经理人界定、能力与素质、市场化问题、队伍建设与发展,近两年才出现饭店职业经理人角色研究。同时,在研究方法上还存在着以宏观研究为主,微观研究不足,定性研究较多,定量研究不够,研究方法单一,缺少对相关理论的系统研究和集合的问题。国内外研究者在研究内容、层次、视角上的差异,其实质反映了饭店职业经理人生存与发展的环境差异,即市场经济成熟度的差异。     

民营企业职业经理人绩效考评

对于职业经理人绩效考评的核心工作是与现行薪酬挂钩,与企业发展战略密切联系。笔者于2004年2月对几家浙江民营企业的聘有职业经理人的绩效现状进行了调查,发现大部分被调查企业对其绩效考评与现行薪酬无密切联系,更谈不上与企业发展战略密切相关。本文就此指出了民营企业中职业经理人绩效考评工作普遍存在的难题,并有针对性地分析其解决办法及今后发展方向。     

薪酬管制与经理人超额薪酬的研究综述

通过综述经理人超额薪酬和薪酬管制的相关文献,归纳总结经理人超额薪酬的衡量与影响超额薪酬的因素,分析薪酬管制产生的原因及其带来的经济后果,为薪酬管制与经理人超额薪酬的研究奠定理论基础,并对其未来研究方向进行了展望。     

基于企业规模的职业经理人绩效管理体系研究——以IT企业为例

职业经理人对企业的生存发展起着重要作用,且职业经理人的晋升、薪酬等都会直接参考绩效考评的结果,绩效管理对于职业经理人的行为有直接影响,所以,做好职业经理人的绩效管理工作对于企业的快速发展具有重大意义。以IT企业为例,针对不同的规模企业提出绩效管理建议。     

经理人薪酬与企业价值研究

经理人薪酬一直都是社会关注的热点话题,近年来,"天价薪酬"、经理人贪腐等情况不断出现在公众视野中,从而关于经理人薪酬的质疑越来越多,对于经理人薪酬的制定方法也引起了学者的关注。本文研究经理人薪酬与企业价值的关系,证实了经理人薪酬的高低、持股经理人比例都与企业价值存在正相关关系,而领薪经理人比例、企业规模与企业价值存在负相关关系。     

旅游饭店业职业经理人战略性薪酬探讨

本文探讨了旅游饭店业职业经理人战略性薪酬的设计目标、基本原则、主要内容、与企业发展阶段相适应等问题,以期对旅游饭店业的薪酬战略做指导。     

Do founders matter? A study of executive compensation,governance structure and firm performance

This study compares founder-CEOs and professional CEOs in newly public firms in terms of executive compensation, governance structure, and firm performance. The paper applies a series of decomposition methods to separate founders' extrinsic characteristics from their intrinsic endowments. The paper finds that founder CEOs tend to earn smaller incentive compensation and smaller total compensation than professional CEOs. Founder-managed firms are associated with higher financial performance and are more likely to survive than professional managed firms. Firms with founder-CEOs are associated with even higher financial performance when the position of CEO and chairperson of the board is combined.     

Corporate Governance Reform and CEO Compensation: Intended and Unintended Consequences

Recent scandals allegedly linked to CEO compensation have brought executive compensation and perquisites to the forefront of debate about constraining executive compensation and reforming the associated corporate governance structure. We briefly describe the structure of executive compensation, and the agency theory framework that has commonly been used to conceptualize executives acting on behalf of shareholders. We detail some criticisms of executive compensation and associated ethical issues, and then discuss what previous research suggests are likely intended and unintended consequences of some widely proposed executive compensation reforms. We explicitly discuss the following recommendations for reform: require greater independence of compensation committees, require executives to hold equity in the corporation, require greater disclosure of executive compensation, increase institutional investor involvement in corporate governance (including executive compensation), and require firms to expense stock options on their income statements. We provide a brief summary discussion of ethical issues related to executive compensation, and describe possible future research.     

上市公司高管薪酬指数研究

高管薪酬问题是公司治理理论的核心,如何科学、客观、准确地评价高管薪酬是理论界和实践界共同关注的焦点。通过计算2008年1 581家上市公司的高管薪酬指数,提出基于公司业绩的高管薪酬指数,并分行业、地区和所有制性质分析了上市公司高管薪酬指数的特点,本文认为对高管薪酬的评价不能简单地使用高管薪酬绝对值,而应充分考虑高管薪酬与企业业绩的匹配程度。     

The Effects of Fraud and Lawsuit Revelation on U.S. Executive Turnover and Compensation

This study investigates the impact of fraud/lawsuit revelation on U.S. top executive turnover and compensation. It also examines potential explanatory variables affecting the executive turnover and compensation among U.S. fraud/lawsuit firms. Four important findings are documented. First, there was significantly higher executive turnover among U.S. firms with fraud/lawsuit revelation in the Wall Street Journal than matched firms without such revelation. Second, although on average, U.S. top executives received an increase in cash compensation after fraud/lawsuit revelation, this increase is smaller than that of matched non-fraud/lawsuit firms. Third, fraud/lawsuit firms were more likely to change top executive when chief executive officer (CEO) was not the board chairman and CEO had been on the board for a short time. Fourth, fraud/lawsuit firms were more likely to reduce their executive cash compensation when profitability was low, firms were involved in fraud, the compensation committee size was small, and the board met more often. These findings indicate that although, in general, U.S. fraud/lawsuits firms did not reduce their executive cash compensation, those involved in fraud were more likely to reduce their executive cash compensation than to change their top executives. The finding, that ethical standards is not a significant factor for U.S. executive turnover nor compensation reduction, suggests that ethics appears to play no part in the board’s decisions, and that U.S. firms may have ethical standards in writing but they do not implement nor enforce the standards.     

Ethical choices in the design and administration of executive compensation programs

Within the past few years, executives have come under increased scrutiny and criticism for the levels of compensation they receive. At the same time, corporate practices surrounding the design and review of executive compensation programs have received increased attention. While some recent executive misconduct has involved violations of the law, many academics and other corporate critics view the issues involving executive compensation more from an ethical than a legal perspective. Several dimensions of the executive compensation decision process offer significant opportunities for ethical choices. This article identifies the major components of executive compensation and highlights decision points in the design and administration of each component where ethical issues may arise. Proposals to reduce the potential for ethical misconduct are also offered.     

高管薪酬存在同伴效应吗？

以2007—2017年间沪深A股非金融类上市公司为研究样本，重点探讨了高管薪酬同伴效应的存在性、情景因素以及经济后果。研究发现，高管薪酬同时存在行业和区域同伴效应。而且，上述薪酬同伴效应在环境不确定性程度和非国有控股程度高的公司中更为显著。此外，高管薪酬同伴效应与企业发展的关系因时而异，即短期内可促进企业的发展，但中长期则抑制了企业的发展。进一步发现，模仿是解释薪酬同伴效应的内在逻辑。另外，薪酬同伴效应降低了薪酬业绩敏感性。研究不仅在理论上丰富了高管薪酬的研究内容，同时为高管薪酬方案的制定以及同伴效应外部性的运用提供了指导和借鉴。     

Executive Compensation and Earnings Persistence

Governing boards utilize executive compensation contracts in an attempt to align executive actions with corporate goals. The objective is to ensure that executive performance provides value to the organization in terms of successful outcomes. A key performance criteria typically specified in CEO compensation contracts is earnings targets. However, using earnings as a performance evaluation may be problematic because some firms exhibit robust and sustained earnings over time (high earnings persistence), and other firms, such as high growth oriented firms, exhibit weak or sometimes negative earnings over time (low earnings persistence). Our study reveals that the effect of high earnings persistence results in firms that focus more heavily on cash compensation (salary and bonus) rather than on equity compensation (stock options, etc.) to compensate executive performance. Additionally, for firms characterized by low earnings persistence, our study indicates that cash flows from operations act as a supplementary performance measure to accounting earnings, and become increasingly important as a means to justify executive cash compensation.     

Corporate spinoffs and executive compensation

This paper investigates the impact of corporate spinoffs on executive compensation. We find no significant association between executive compensation and stock returns prior to spinoffs, but a significant positive association between the two afterwards. We also find evidence that corporate governance generally improves after the spinoff. In addition, the positive association between executive compensation and stock returns is more pronounced for firms with greater improvements in their corporate governance. Overall, our findings support the notion that spinoffs create value by reducing agency costs.     

The impact of firm strategy on performance measures used in executive compensation

We investigate the relationship between firm strategy and the use of performance measures in executive compensation. Our analysis shows that there is an increased emphasis on sales in the determination of executive compensation for firms pursuing a cost leadership strategy, which seek to achieve their competitive advantage through low price and high volume. In contrast, there is a decreased emphasis on accounting measures in firms pursuing a differentiation strategy, which require investments in brand recognition and innovative products, investments that are subject to unfavorable accounting treatment. These results indicate that compensation committees link executive rewards to firm strategy.     

经理人报酬与公司业绩之间的相关性检验

以我国上市公司2000、2001、2002年年报数据为主要分析对象,运用线性回归的方法对经理人报酬与公司资本成本及公司业绩之间的相关性进行实证研究,并得出如下结论:经理人报酬与ROA呈显著的线性相关性,与ROE、△SMVA非线性相关,与SEVA存在较强的线性相关性。通过实证研究,还发现经理人报酬主要激励当前业绩和未来业绩,当期激励效果直接影响下期业绩水平。