Executive Compensation and Corporate Fraud in China

This study investigates the relation between CEO compensation and corporate fraud in China. We document a significantly negative correlation between CEO compensation and corporate fraud using data on publicly traded firms between 2005 and 2010. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that firms penalize CEOs for fraud by lowering their pay. We also find that CEO compensation is lower in firms that commit more severe frauds. Panel data fixed effects and propensity score methods are used to demonstrate these effects. Our results also indicate that corporate governance mechanisms influence the magnitude of punishment. We find that CEOs of privately controlled firms, firms that split the posts of CEO and chairman, and CEOs of firms located in developed regions suffer larger compensation penalties for committing financial fraud. Finally, we show that CEOs at firms that commit fraud are more likely to be replaced compared to those at non-fraud firms.     

Good Apples,Bad Apples: Sorting Among Chinese Companies Traded in the U.S.

Committing financial fraud is a serious breach of business ethics. However, there are few large scale studies of financial fraud, which involve ethical considerations. In this study, we investigate the pervasive financial scandals, which by the end of 2012 involved more than a third of the US-listed Chinese companies. Based on a sample of 262 US-listed Chinese companies, we analyze factors that differentiate between firms that commit financial fraud and those that do not. We find that firms more predisposed to unethical behavior, due to their low regional social trust in the home country and low respect for regulations and laws as proxied by political connections, are more likely to commit accounting and financial fraud. They take advantage of low hurdles for listing via reverse mergers and avoid third-party monitoring through poor governance and auditors. Finally, we find evidence, after these scandals, of non-fraudulent firms differentiating themselves from the fraudulent firms by sending costly signals such as insiders purchasing shares, increasing dividends, and going private.     

Anti-corruption intensity and loan contracting: Evidence from non-state owned firms in China

We examine the effect of China’ s anti-corruption intensity on loan contracting efficiency. The findings suggest that conditional on the political connection (total factor productivity) of a firm, the anti-corruption intensity in the province in which a firm is located leads to less (more) favorable loan contracting terms. Additional analysis shows that the effect of anti-corruption intensity on loan contracting terms is stronger for firms with higher financing constraints and weaker external legal environments. We further find that higher anti-corruption intensity is related to lower credit growth at the macro level.     

Board Gender Diversity and Corporate Response to Sustainability Initiatives: Evidence from the Carbon Disclosure Project

This paper investigates the effect of female representation on the board of directors on corporate response to stakeholders’ demands for increased public reporting about climate change-related risks. We rely on the Carbon Disclosure Project as a sustainability initiative supported by institutional investors. Greenhouse gas emissions measurement and its disclosure to investors can be thought of as a first step toward addressing climate change issues and reducing the firm’s carbon footprint. Based on a sample of publicly listed Canadian firms over the period 2008–2014, we find that the likelihood of voluntary climate change disclosure increases with women percentage on boards. We also find evidence that supports critical mass theory with regard to board gender diversity. These findings reinforce initiatives being undertaken around the world to promote gender diversity in corporate governance while demonstrating board effectiveness in stakeholder management.     

CEO facial masculinity,fraud, and ESG: Evidence from South Korea

Researchers in finance and accounting find that male CEOs' high facial masculinity (fWHR: facial width-to-height ratio), which is known to be related to aggressiveness to achieve higher social status in the neuroendocrinology literature, shows dual impacts on corporate outcomes. For example, firms led by more masculine-faced CEOs have better financial performance (ROA) but are more likely to have a higher likelihood of financial misreporting. The harnessing of the strong achievement drive of masculine-faced CEOs to minimize potentially adverse corporate outcomes is of primary concern. We hypothesize that a well-designed environmental, social, and governance (ESG) practice could serve this purpose. Using a sample of South Korean public companies from 1998 to 2015, we find supporting evidence that a one-standard-deviation increase in fWHR is associated with a three-fold higher likelihood of corporate fraud and that the association is attenuated for firms with stronger ESG performance that includes voluntarily disclosing sustainability reports, holding less cash, and incentivizing with stock options.     

Institutional Investors,Political Connections,and the Incidence of Regulatory Enforcement Against Corporate Fraud

We investigate two under-explored factors in mitigating the risk of corporate fraud and regulatory enforcement against fraud, namely institutional investors and political connections. The role of institutional investors in the effective monitoring of a firm’s management is well established in the literature. We further observe that firms that have a large proportion of their shares held by institutional investors have a lower incidence of enforcement actions against corporate fraud. The importance of political connections for enterprises, whether in a developed market such as the United States or an emerging market such as China, has been established by previous studies. However, we find evidence of another positive effect of political connections: they may reduce the incidence of enforcement action against corporate fraud. We also find that political connections play a more significant role in reducing regulatory enforcement incidents against non-state-owned enterprises and firms in weaker legal environments, whereas institutional ownership plays a more important role in reducing regulatory enforcement incidents against state-owned enterprises.     

Ultimate government control and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China

Using data of Chinese firms over 2004–2018, we find that firms controlled by government entities, particularly central government entities, are less prone to stock price crashes, as compared with privately controlled firms. The effect is robust to alternative estimation approaches and moderated by the Split-share Structure Reform and the anti-corruption campaign. The results attest to the incentive alignment view that controlling and minority shareholders align their interests and stock prices perform well. Further, we find that government-controlled firms exhibit less financial opacity, undertake less risky investments, and appoint myopic CEOs, through which stock price crash risk is diminished.     

Do Firms Spend More on Suppliers That Have Environmental Expertise? An Empirical Study of U.S. Manufacturers’ Procurement Spend

Stakeholders expect focal firms to improve their environmental performance. While firms may be able to accumulate the environmental expertise needed to achieve this goal internally, doing so may require significant time and resource commitments. Alternatively, buyer firms can leverage their suppliers’ existing environmental expertise and gain access to such expertise when they purchase products and services from these suppliers. The purpose of this study was to develop and test theory regarding under what conditions suppliers’ environmental expertise influences a buying firms’ procurement spend with these suppliers. We ground our study in transaction cost economics and agency theories and empirically test our hypotheses using a unique buyer–supplier dyadic data set. We find that buyer firms are willing to increase their overall business spend with suppliers that have strong environmental expertise, particularly when the buyer firms are more profitable and have higher levels of absorptive capacity. However, we find the opposite effect when the buyer firm’s executive compensation is linked to the firm’s environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance. Likewise, we also find that the buyer firm’s environmental concern ratings negatively moderate the relationship between the supplier’s environmental expertise and the buyer’s procurement spend with the supplier.     

Corporate fraud as a negative signal: Implications for firms’ innovation performance

Based on signaling theory, we explore the impact of corporate fraud on firms’ innovation performance. First, we propose that corporate fraud harms firms’ innovation performance. This is because, as a negative signal, fraud makes it difficult for firms to obtain the policy, funding, and human resources needed for outstanding innovation performance. We further argue that the institutional aspects of the signaling environment (e.g., industrial competition, regional institutional development, and social trust) will influence core stakeholders’ reception and interpretation of fraud signals. These factors, in turn, moderate the signaling effect of corporate fraud on firms’ innovation performance. Our views are supported by empirical and robustness tests using Chinese A-share listed firms from 2010 to 2019.     

Fraud,Enforcement Action,and the Role of Corporate Governance: Evidence from China

We examine enforcement action in China’s emerging markets by focusing on (1) the agents that impose this action and (2) the role played by supervisory boards. Using newly available databases, we find that supervisory boards play an active role when Chinese listed companies face enforcement action. Listed firms with larger supervisory boards are more likely to have more severe sanctions imposed upon them by the China Security Regulatory Commission, and listed companies that face more severe enforcement actions have more supervisory board meetings. Our findings are of interest, as supervisory boards in China are generally perceived to be dysfunctional. This study contributes to the existing literature in three ways. First, we shed light on the effects of supervisory boards whose role in a fraud setting has not yet been examined. Second, the study has important policy implications for governance reform. Finally, our analyses provide the most up-to-date picture of fraud and governance issues in China’s ever-growing markets.     

Does mutual fund investment influence accounting fraud?

Does mutual fund investment deter accounting fraud? Using a bivariate probit model, this study examines the relationship between mutual funds and accounting fraud between 2007 and 2014. We observed mutual fund investment has significantly higher levels of fraud detection, reducing firms' propensity to commit fraud. This validates Chinese regulators' efforts to develop mutual funds to address accounting fraud. Open-end mutual funds outperform closed-end mutual funds in detecting accounting fraud and reducing fraud commission; redeemable shares appear to discipline managers. This effect is moderated by state ownership of listed firms: mutual funds cannot effectively detect fraud in state-owned firms.     

Family Control,Socioemotional Wealth,and Governance Environment: The Case of Bribes

This study examines the relationship between family control and young entrepreneurial firm’s bribing behavior around the globe. Relying on over 2,000 young firms from the World Bank Environment Survey, we find that family control helps to reduce a firm’s bribery behavior, but further investigation shows that this effect only exists in countries with weaker macro-governance environment. In countries with more established and transparent governance mechanism, family control does not seem to make any difference. We interpret our findings as the business family’s preservation of socioemotional wealth.     

Executive integrity,audit opinion,and fraud in Chinese listed firms

We examine the influence of auditors on mitigating corporate fraud in China, which is known to have weak legal enforcement, weak investor protection along with tight control of the media and labour unions. We find that firms with executives that have lower integrity, indicated by a greater degree of earnings manipulation, are associated with higher propensity of regulatory enforcement actions against corporate fraud in the subsequent year. We show that this effect is moderated by the issuance of a modified audit opinion report by the auditors. This finding implies that auditors can serve as external governance mechanism to discourage executives with lower integrity in committing fraud. Our results have policy implications for further strengthening auditor independence in emerging countries like China.     

Moderating effects of investor experience on the signaling value of private equity placements

We contend that young start-up firms requiring external capital are able to differentiate themselves from competitors through their choices of investors and financing mechanisms. Private placements of equity convey efficient signals to markets for several reasons. They are (short-term) irreversible, occur after a more rigorous analysis than public offerings provide, contain governance mechanisms, and are generally observable by outsiders. The disclosure that investors possess a superior reputation for evaluative ability conveys an additional, endorsing signal of the firm's prospects. This proves especially valuable for younger firms, less capitalized firms, and firms that have more recently received private equity from an experienced investor. Using an event history analysis on a sample of 329 publicly held biotechnology firms, we find firms that are perceived to be more uncertain and that disclose the presence of more prominent investors are better able to attract subsequent financing.     

Corporate fraud under pyramidal ownership structure: Evidence from a regulatory reform

This paper explores a causal relationship between firms' ownership structures and the likelihood of corporate fraud. We document that central firms that control the business group tend to commit corporate frauds related to unlawful intragroup trades (collusive activities and unfair transactions). Following South Korea's 2001 regulatory reform that imposes a ceiling on firms' total amount of shareholding of domestic companies, the frequency of corporate frauds was reduced more in central firms than in non-central firms as the controlling owner's cash-flow rights dropped more in central firms. These results suggest that controlling owners commit frauds to pursue their private benefit.     

Going Public to Grow? Evidence from a Panel of Italian Firms

This paper investigates the consequences of the decision to go public for the growth of Italian firms using US firms as a benchmark for comparison. We find Italian firms conducting IPOs are larger than US firms, but raise fewer funds from the IPO and grow more slowly afterwards. We also compare Italian IPOs across time. Firms going public in the 1990s display features that are more similar to US IPOs. We describe changes to the Italian economy and financial markets that are potentially responsible for the change. We compare firms of different size and with different governance structures, and we find that they behave differently after going public. Our results suggest that going public does not guarantee faster growth or more jobs. As such, public policies that simply increase access to equity markets may not be effective unless they provide incentives for the firms’ decision-makers to use the new capital to grow.      

Political Connections and Industrial Pollution: Evidence Based on State Ownership and Environmental Levies in China

This paper examines the effectiveness of public enforcement by studying the effects of regulatory intervention to curb tunneling through intercorporate loans in China. Specifically, we explore whether public enforcement efforts in 2006 (blacklisting and sanctions) resulted in less tunneling, and ultimately in increased performance for tunneling firms. We show that tunneling is among the dominant factors increasing the likelihood of becoming blacklisted. We also find that firms’ tunneling mechanisms decreased significantly after the regulatory shock, and that their performance increased significantly compared to non-tunneling firms after the regulatory shock. Finally, we find a positive market reaction to the public announcement of tunneling both for firms that have been blacklisted and other tunneling firms that are not blacklisted. Collectively, these results suggest that public enforcement in the presence of a credible threat succeeds in deterring the effect on tunneling behavior in China.     

Where does ESG pay? The role of national culture in moderating the relationship between ESG performance and financial performance

This study investigates the moderating role of a country’s culture as an external contingency factor in the relationship between a firm’s environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance and financial performance. Using ESG performance data of 4978 firms from 48 countries for 17 years, we argue that the financial return from engaging in ESG varies depending on the countries’ cultural aspects because stakeholder evaluations and appreciations for a firm’s ESG performance differ across nations. We find that a country that espouses a culture of high individualism or masculinity tends to appreciate and reflect on this more explicitly, strengthening the relationship between a firm’s ESG performance and financial performance. Contrastingly, in a country with a culture of high power distance or uncertainty avoidance, firms’ ESG efforts are less likely to be associated with financial performance. Our findings have important implications for multinational enterprises facing various cultural environments when dealing with heterogeneous stakeholder demands across countries.     

A Survey of Governance Disclosures Among U.S. Firms

Recent years have featured a spate of regulatory action pertaining to the development and/or disclosure of corporate governance structures in response to financial scandals resulting in part from governance failures. During the same period, corporate governance activists and institutional investors increasingly have called for increased voluntary governance disclosure. Despite this attention, there have been relatively few comprehensive studies of governance disclosure practices and response to the regulation. In this study, we examine a sample of 50 U.S. firms and their public disclosure packages from 2004. We find a high degree of variability in the presentation and reporting format choices for many elements of the governance structure. This variability includes several items for which disclosure is mandated by regulators or legislative action. In particular, smaller firms offer fewer disclosures pertaining to independence, board selection procedures, and oversight of management (including whistleblowing procedures). There are also trends associated with board characteristics: boards that are less independent offer fewer disclosures of independence and management oversight matters. Moreover, large firms provide more disclosures of independence standards, board selection procedures, audit committee matters, management control systems, other committee matters, and whistleblowing procedures but do not appear to have a strictly superior information environment when compared to smaller firms. The findings raise questions about compliance with regulatory requirements and the degree to which conflicts of interest between managers and directors are being controlled. While there have been notable improvements in the information environment of governance disclosures, there remain structural issues that may possess negative ramifications for stakeholders.     

Do bank loans still convey information to investors? Evidence from the split share structure reform in China

Bank loans can convey information about the borrowing firms that have proper corporate governance systems. Using a sample of bank loan announcements in China, we find that the market reaction is positive after the split share structure reform in 2005, which aligns the interests of large shareholders and minority shareholders, government and public investors, and alleviates their tunneling incentives. We also find that this effect is more pronounced for private firms as the reform mainly enhances corporate governance for private firms. The signaling role of bank loans is less pronounced for firms with less severe information asymmetry after the reform, e.g. higher shareholdings of mutual funds and higher proportion of independent directors. Related party transactions decrease when they obtain bank loans after the reform, which reflects the alleviation of tunneling after the reform.