Corruption and bank risk-taking: Evidence from emerging economies

This paper addresses the impact of corruption on banks' risk-taking behavior, using bank-level data from more than 1200 banks in 35 emerging economies during the period 2000–2012. We find consistent evidence that higher levels of corruption increase the risk-taking behavior of banks, in favor of the “sand the wheel” view in the corruption-development nexus. In addition, we examine the indirect effects of corruption on bank risks, and find evidence that the impact of monetary policy on banks' risk-taking behavior is more pronounced with the increasing severity of corruption.     

The effect of stimulus policy on lending behavior and bank risk: Evidence from the Chinese banking sector

Considering China's stimulus policy in 2008 as a quasi-natural experiment, our study attempts to provide evidence to understand how expansionary monetary policy is likely to influence bank risk-taking in emerging markets, specifically in China. Using data on Chinese counties from 2006 to 2011, we theoretically discuss and empirically observe a positive relationship between the stimulus policy and bank risk-taking, as measured by nonperforming loans. Such a nexus stems from the negative effect of the stimulus policy on banks' lending standards and the positive effect on banks' credit support to small and medium sized enterprises. In addition, our study is enriched by estimating the moderating effects of bank capitalization based on the “risk-shifting” effect and “search for yield” effect caused by the stimulus policy. Specifically, we find important differences across banking groups, such that small and medium-sized banks with low capitalization increase their exposure to risk, while large state-owned banks with high capitalization notably reduce their risk tolerance. The results of this study may help to characterize monetary policy and macro prudential regulation, especially for emerging economies.     

金融结构演变、货币政策与银行风险承担异质性

基于2002-2017年165家银行的面板数据,本文采用可行广义最小二乘(FGLS)方法实证检验金融结构演变视角下货币政策对银行风险承担渠道的影响。研究发现:金融结构的变化对银行风险承担具有显著影响,随着直接融资占比的上升,银行资产端风险承担显著减少,但负债端风险承担显著增加;控制住金融结构的作用之后,货币政策对银行资产端风险承担和负债端风险承担也具有显著的异质性影响,具体来说,价格型货币政策的紧缩使得银行资产端风险承担显著减少而导致银行负债端风险承担显著增加,数量型货币政策的紧缩则使得银行资产端风险承担和负债端风险承担同时减少;此外,货币政策与金融结构对银行风险承担具有显著的交互影响,随着直接融资占比的上升,价格型货币政策工具对银行资产端风险承担的影响减弱,对银行负债端风险承担的影响没有表现出显著变化,数量型货币政策工具对银行资产端风险承担和负债端风险承担的影响都受到削弱。研究结论的政策含义对货币当局、监管部门以及商业银行都具有重要意义。     

Revisiting the valuation of deposit insurance

This study proposes a framework for pricing deposit insurance that evaluates the effect of depositor preference laws and the issuance of contingent capital bonds. Four main findings emerge from this study. First, traditional option pricing models of deposit insurance overestimate insurance premiums. Second, only large issuances of contingent capital bonds decrease deposit insurance premiums under depositor preference. Third, the issuance of contingent capital bonds can partially offset banks' excessive risk-taking caused by regulatory forbearance. Finally, although large banks have implied too-big-to-fail risks, the deposit insurer's costs from large banks are not nearly as high as reported in previous studies.     

同业业务发展、货币政策传导与银行风险承担

商业银行同业业务逐渐从传统信用拆借演变为类信贷业务,一些银行通过同业业务实施监管套利、风险资产出表,同业业务的快速发展对原有货币政策传导体系形成干扰,甚至改变了商业银行的风险承担渠道。使用25家A股上市银行2008-2018年数据,在理论和实证两个方面分析了同业业务发展对银行风险承担的影响。理论上,同业业务能够提高银行风险承担水平和强化货币政策风险承担渠道,上述影响并同时对于不同银行伴有异质性。实证结论验证了理论推演的假设:同业业务发展与银行风险承担水平正相关,并对货币政策银行风险承担渠道具有强化作用;同业业务对大型银行的风险承担水平影响有限,但对股份制银行和中小银行的风险承担水平表现了较强的正相关性。分析货币政策风险承担渠道,中小银行对货币宽松与否更为敏感,其同业业务发展程度与货币宽松情况表现出较强的相关性。根据上述研究结论,监管政策应当更加关注银行体系分层结构下的同业业务发展引导,尤其是对于股份制银行和中小银行,应当逐步引导同业业务占比较高银行压缩同业资产,鼓励商业银行业务回归本源,支持实体经济发展。     

Revisiting the impact of institutional quality on post-GFC bank risk-taking: Evidence from emerging countries

This is the first attempt to address the impact of institutional quality on post-GFC bank risk-taking behavior. This study is conducted on 730 banks from 19 emerging countries covering the period 2011–2016. We used six indicators of good governance as a proxy for institutional quality. Both static panel and Dynamic GMM estimation are used to identify the impact of these variables on bank risk-taking; measured by Z-score. We evidenced that increasing government effectiveness, controlling corruption, and improving agents' confidence and adherence to the rule of law reduce banks' risk exposure and improve banks' stability. Besides supporting the Z-score model, the robustness test using σ(NIM) also provides evidence of the impact of regulatory quality on reducing bank risk. Surprisingly, both models tend to indicate that improving voice and accountability increase bank risk-taking in emerging countries. Furthermore, our study provides an interesting reconciliation to the major debate on the impact of size on bank risk.     

货币政策对我国上市银行风险承担的影响研究

2008年金融危机后货币政策对银行风险承担的影响属于经济学界的新兴研究热点。基于2007—2012年14家上市银行的数据,运用GMM动态面板估计方法实证检验了货币政策对我国上市银行风险承担的影响并分析了非国有银行的风险承担行为。实证结果表明,宽松的货币政策会激励银行的风险承担,非国有银行对货币政策变动的反应更为敏感。此外激励效果的产生依赖于银行的资产负债表特征和宏观经济形势。     

Market power and risk-taking of banks: Some semiparametric evidence from emerging economies

We investigate the impact of market power of banks on their risk-taking. Appling bank-level data from 35 emerging economies during the period of 2000–2014 to our semiparametric model of the market power-bank risk nexus with the Bayesian inference, we present consistent evidence that there is a significant nonlinear relationship between market power and risk-taking of banks. Bank stability is found bolstered with increasing market power, but this relationship tends to weaken and even reverse as banks' market power grow further over a threshold level.     

资本监管下中国97家商业银行风险承担行为的实证检验--基于一个新的研究框架

为了精确探索资本监管对商业银行风险承担行为的影响路径，本文建立资本监管约束商业银行风险承担动机、优化风险承担决策和预防风险承担后果这一新的研究框架。另外，本文以中国97家商业银行微观数据为样本，建立SD资本风险内生模型进行实证检验，实证结果证实本文结论突破了以往将资本监管对商业银行风险承担行为的影响简单概括为有效或者无效，使得政策启示更加具有针对性。     

行政处罚对银行风险承担的影响：仅罚机构还是兼罚责任人？

立足于我国监管部门大力整治银行业市场乱象的现状，文章系统梳理了不同类型行政处罚对银行风险承担的影响机制，并利用手工整理的2008-2018年银行行政处罚数据，对理论假说进行实证检验。经验结果显示，“仅机构处罚”不能显著降低银行风险承担水平，“双罚”可以有效抑制银行风险承担，并且这种抑制作用具有长期效应。异质性检验表明，“双罚”对大银行、国有银行和全国性银行风险的抑制作用更明显。机制检验发现,减少理财产品、同业业务等影子银行规模是“双罚”降低银行风险承担的重要渠道。研究还发现，随着责任人处罚严厉程度的上升，“双罚”对银行风险承担的抑制效果越好。政策启示在于，加大责任人问责力度，整治影子银行乱象，是监管部门防范银行风险的关键所在。     

The influence of risk-taking on bank efficiency: Evidence from Colombia

This paper shows evidence on the influence of risk-taking on bank efficiency in emerging markets and identifies heterogeneity in the way risk affects banks with different characteristics. We fit a stochastic frontier model with random inefficiency parameters to a sample of Colombian banks. The model provides accurate cost and profit efficiency estimates. The effects of risk-taking on efficiency vary with size and affiliation. Large and foreign banks benefit more from higher exposure to credit and market risk, while domestic and small banks from being more capitalised. We identify some channels explaining these differences and provide insights for prudential regulation.     

Does inside debt alleviate banks' risk taking? Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in the Chinese banking industry

This paper investigates the causal effects of inside debt on banks' risk-taking behavior by using a quasi-natural experiment of compensation deferring policy in the Chinese banking industry. We find that the policy reduces banks' risk-taking by approximately 16.25%. Banks with high levels of government control significantly reduced their risk-taking after the compensation deferring policy was enacted, while those with low levels did not have the same response. By showing that CEOs' compensation deferring significantly reduces banks' risk-taking in an emerging market, we offer direct evidence for the academic understanding of the governance role of inside debt in emerging markets with weak country-level investor protection. Our results provide timely empirical evidence for government regulators who are concerned about the costs and benefits of banks' risk shifting or the risk of the financial system.     

Monetary policy and bank risk-taking: Evidence from emerging economies

This paper addresses the impact of monetary policy on banks' risk-taking by using bank-level panel data from more than 1000 banks in 29 emerging economies during 2000–2012. We find that, consistent with the proposition of the “bank risk-taking channel” of monetary policy transmission, banks' riskiness increases when monetary policy is eased. This result is robust when we adopt alternative measures of monetary policy and bank risk, and use different econometric methodologies. In addition, we find that bank risk-taking amid expansionary monetary policy is less conspicuous in a more consolidated banking sector and when monetary policy is more transparent.     

Institutional Investors on Boards: Does Their Behavior Influence Corporate Finance?

We examine whether the behavior of institutional investors representatives on boards leads to observable differences in corporate finance. We find that directors representing pressure-sensitive investors (i.e., banks and insurance companies) prefer lower financial leverage whereas pressure-resistant directors (i.e., mutual funds and pension funds) show no particular preference. When analyzed separately, directors appointed by banks and insurance firms have different attitudes. Bank representatives on boards increase both the financial leverage and the banking debt. This result suggests that some types of institutional directors provide financial resources to the firms on whose board they sit, supporting the view that boards manage the uncertainty associated with strategic decision making and provide firms with preferential access to resources and financial expertise. This research has interesting academic and policy implications for the debate over the proper degree of institutional involvement in corporate governance. Different institutional investors have different agendas and incentives for corporate governance, and, therefore, both researchers and policy makers should no longer consider institutional investors as a whole. In addition, our paper calls for new research on the causes and implications of institutional investor involvement in the corporate governance of nonfinancial firms. This new research could require new insights on the dynamics within the boards and on the interplay among the knowledge, incentives and attitudes of quite different directors.     

The Effectiveness of Capital Regulation on Bank Behavior in China

This paper examines the impact that ownership and governance structures have on how Chinese banks react to regulatory pressure. We find that the current regulatory regime induces banks to increase their capital, but its effectiveness in doing so varies based on whether the bank is listed or not, and also who is the majority shareholder. We also find that the degree of central government ownership and the political ties the chief executive officer of the bank has play an important role in the risk‐taking behavior of banks. Overall, our results have a number of policy implications supporting the need to further reduce state ownership of banks in China to mitigate the prevailing moral hazard and dual‐agency problems that arise from the government being both the regulator and the majority shareholder.     

Financial openness,disclosure and bank risk-taking in MENA countries

In this paper, we analyze the risk-taking behavior of banks in emerging economies in a context of international capital mobility. Our paper highlights a new channel through which depositors can exercise pressure to control risk-taking. Depositors can reallocate their savings away from their home country to the more protective system of a developed economy. We recover a classical result according to which increased competition resulting from more international financial openness induces banks to take excessive risks. We find however that sufficiently high financial openness is necessary for a positive link between financial transparency and safe risk management. Finally, we test the relationship between disclosure, financial openness and bank risk-taking for a panel of 258 banks from the MENA region and Turkey.     

Bank governance,regulation and risk-taking in Ghana

ABSTRACT

Excessive risk-taking could spell doom for the financial market and the economy as a whole as evidenced by the recent global financial crisis of 2007/08. In this study, we document the impact of corporate governance on bank risk-taking behaviour whilst accommodating the moderating effect of forms of ownership on the relationship in a regulated environment as banks do not operate in a vacuum. A panel study with data spanning from 2000 to 2013 under the fixed effects model after several model diagnostics and performance of the Hausman specification test was used. We find reserve requirement regulation to significantly influence risk-taking positively. We advocate the reversal of the recent increase in the reserve requirement from 9% to 11% and rather recommend an increase in the regulatory capital adequacy ratio from the current 10%.     

Bank risk-taking and competition in developing banking markets: Does efficiency level matter? Evidence from Africa

We contribute to the existing literature on the nonlinear nexus between competition and risk-taking by exploring how differences in efficiency levels affect the risk-taking of banks when competition increases. Based on a sample of 430 African banks, this paper reveals that, banks with high and low efficiency tend to take more risk than those with average efficiency level. This study further suggests that bank specific characteristics and macroeconomic dynamics, play an important role in the competition-risk-taking nexus within African banking industry. Besides, while the penetration of African Cross-border banks does not stimulate risk-taking in the hosts domestic markets, an improvement of banking regulation (Basel 2.5, 3 and further) is mandatory to mitigate their possible adverse effects on the competition-financial stability nexus.     

Economic policy uncertainty,bank deposits,and liability structure

This study used data from 2009 to 2017 to investigate the impact of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) on the liability side of Chinese commercial banks. The results show that the increase in EPU leads commercial bank customers to shift from term to demand deposits, which shortens deposit maturity and triggers commercial banks' liquidity-hoarding behavior. Our research provides insights into the motives and strategies behind commercial banks' liquidity hoarding and offers implications for risk management, monetary policy, and systemic financial risk prevention.     

Sectoral credit reallocation: An excessive bank risk-taking explanation

This paper develops a theoretical model to provide an alternative explanation for the credit to nontradable sector growing faster than credit to tradable sector, after a US expansionary monetary policy, based on an excessive risk-taking channel. This is, a reduced foreign interest rate decreases bank default probability, which in turn diminishes banks’ incentives to take excessive risk. This produces a reallocation of loan supply to nontradable sector since tradable loans are riskier. Using monthly sectoral credit data at the bank level for the Peruvian economy in the 2004–2019 period, we find evidence of the excessive bank risk-taking channel on sectoral credit reallocation.