Fixed costs per shipment

Exporting firms do not only decide how much of their products they ship abroad but also at which frequency. Doing so, they face a trade-off between saving on fixed costs per shipments (by shipping large amounts infrequently) and saving on storage costs (by delivering just in time with small and frequent shipments). The firm's optimal choice defines a mapping from size and frequency of shipments to fixed costs per shipment. We use a unique dataset of Swiss cross-border trade on the transaction level to infer the size and shape of the underlying fixed costs. The inferred fixed costs are specific to each firm–country–product combination. Our results suggest that the fixed costs per shipment of the average Swiss exporter are large, ranging between 0.82% of the export value in our most conservative specification and 5.4%. We document that the imputed fixed costs per shipment correlate negatively with language commonalities, trade agreements and geographic proximity.     

Trade Growth in a Heterogeneous Firm Model: Evidence from South Eastern Europe

In 2007 a free trade area (BFTA) will be created in the Balkans. In this paper we study BFTA‐induced trade growth in the SEE. Given that welfare impacts associated with trade growth depend on the growth channels, more goods and varieties exported or at higher price or more volume of exported goods and varieties, we study the structure of integration‐induced export growth in the Balkans. Given that no firm‐level trade data is available for the Balkans, we adopt the heterogeneous firm framework, which allows to decompose aggregate trade growth into intensive margin of trade and extensive margin of trade using only aggregate trade data. Our empirical findings predict that the BFTA would primarily increase the export volume through a growing number of shipments (the extensive margin of trade) suggesting that the actual welfare gains from the trade growth in the Balkans might in fact be larger than predicted in previous trade studies. We also found that reducing variable trade costs leads to higher export growth rates compared to reducing fixed trade costs by the same percentage.     

Establishment heterogeneity,exporter dynamics,and the effects of trade liberalization

We study the effects of tariffs and iceberg trade costs in a two-sector dynamic variation of the Melitz (2003) model extended to include a sunk cost of exporting, establishment-level uncertainty in productivity, capital accumulation, and material usage. We calibrate the model to match both cross-sectional and dynamic aspects of US producers related to export participation and the establishment lifecycle. We find a tariff equivalent of fixed export costs of 30 percentage points. We also find that a sizeable share of export profits is a return to the organizational capital from investing in export capacity rather than creating an establishment. We use the model to estimate the effect of reducing tariffs on welfare, trade, and export participation. We find that eliminating an 8 percent tariff increases the ratio of trade to GDP from 3.9% to 7.4% and raises welfare by 1.02%. Along the transition, consumption overshoots its steady state, even as trade and the capital stock grow gradually, so that the change in steady state consumption understates the welfare gain. Models without a dynamic export decision generate more gradual aggregate transition dynamics and smaller gains from trade. Capital accumulation and material usage are important sources of the welfare gains to trade.     

Establishment heterogeneity,exporter dynamics,and the effects of trade liberalization

We study the effects of tariffs and iceberg trade costs in a two-sector dynamic variation of the Melitz (2003) model extended to include a sunk cost of exporting, establishment-level uncertainty in productivity, capital accumulation, and material usage. We calibrate the model to match both cross-sectional and dynamic aspects of US producers related to export participation and the establishment lifecycle. We find a tariff equivalent of fixed export costs of 30 percentage points. We also find that a sizeable share of export profits is a return to the organizational capital from investing in export capacity rather than creating an establishment. We use the model to estimate the effect of reducing tariffs on welfare, trade, and export participation. We find that eliminating an 8 percent tariff increases the ratio of trade to GDP from 3.9% to 7.4% and raises welfare by 1.02%. Along the transition, consumption overshoots its steady state, even as trade and the capital stock grow gradually, so that the change in steady state consumption understates the welfare gain. Models without a dynamic export decision generate more gradual aggregate transition dynamics and smaller gains from trade. Capital accumulation and material usage are important sources of the welfare gains to trade.     

Lobbying costs and trade policy

We study how endogenous lobbying costs influence trade policies. Although in practice lobbying expenditures far exceed campaign contributions, the literature on the political economy of trade policy has focused on the latter. In this paper we develop a model in which informational lobbying costs play a role in determining the structure of protection. In the model, special interest groups can choose to send a signal to the policymaker regarding some information they possess, and the policymaker observes the signal before setting the trade policies. We find that lobbying expenditures directly affect the equilibrium policies. In order to test the predictions of the model we collected data on lobbying expenditures from the Center for Responsible Politics as well as data on trade and industry characteristic variables for the United States from other sources. We perform a structural estimation of the equilibrium trade policies and find support for our model. The empirical evidence indicates that lobbying expenditures play an important role in explaining the variation of protection across sectors. Moreover, the model leads to considerably lower and more reasonable estimates of the weight that the government places on social welfare relative to political contributions.     

Entry liberalization and export performance: a theoretical analysis in a multi-market oligopoly model

This paper is an attempt to demonstrate how the entry (costless) of firms in an industry may have a dramatic effect on exports from an industry in a country. The results have tremendous implications for LDCs suffering from resource and BOP constraints but having reservoirs of cheap labor. The welfare effects of such entry liberalization policy (or subsidy) can be stated from the Bhagwati theorem that a reduction in an only (single) distortion is necessarily welfare improving by reducing monopoly or oligopoly distortions. However, we have shown that the entry liberalization policy is welfare superior to an equivalent subsidy policy where equivalent is defined in terms of the impact on exports. As a by product, we have also shown how one can integrate the oligopoly models of trade with the general oligopoly literature. The results on the limiting behaviour of an open economy oligopoly model extend the standard results in the oligopoly theory in a closed economy.     

General equilibrium trade modelling with Canada–US transportation costs

Transportation costs are an important topic in international trade, but seldom have researchers paid attention to general equilibrium trade modelling with transportation costs and explored their relevant effects. This paper uses numerical general equilibrium trade model structures to simulate the impacts of transportation costs on welfare and trade for a Canada–US country pair case. We compare two groups of model structures: Armington assumption models and homogeneous goods models. Within these two groups of models, we also compare balanced trade structures to trade imbalance structures and production function transportation costs to iceberg transportation costs. Armington goods models generate more absolute welfare gains from transportation cost elimination than homogeneous goods models. Welfare gains under balanced trade structures are larger in production function transportation cost scenarios than in iceberg transportation cost scenarios, but under trade imbalance structures, welfare gains are greater under iceberg transportation cost scenarios. Canada's welfare gains in the iceberg transportation cost scenario are significantly larger than gains in the production function transportation cost scenario. On trade effects, homogeneous goods models generate more export and import gains, balanced trade structures have more trade variations, and iceberg transportation costs generate more trade effects.     

Interacting factor endowments and trade costs: A multi-country,multi-good approach to trade theory

We provide a synthetic analysis of the different ways in which countries participate in the world economy. Classic trade questions are reconsidered by generalizing a factor-proportions model to multiple countries, multiple goods or multi-stage production, and country-specific trade costs. Each country's production specialization, trade and welfare is determined by the interaction between its relative endowment and its trade costs. We consider the effects of allowing one good to ‘fragment’ into component and assembly production. The volume of trade and welfare levels are higher with fragmentation for most countries, although for many countries these variables fall with fragmentation.     

The effect of the Uruguay round on the intensive and extensive margins of trade

Do tariffs inhibit trade flows by limiting the entry of exporters (‘firm extensive margin’) or by restricting the average volume exported by each firm (‘firm intensive margin’)? Using a gravity equation approach, we analyze how the decrease in tariffs promoted during the 90s by the Uruguay Round multilateral trade agreement affected the trade margins of French firms for 57 sectors and 147 countries from 1993 to 2002. Our main contribution is to estimate the elasticity of trade on both margins, controlling for the unobserved heterogeneity of trade flows thanks to a three-dimensional panel and to time-varying tariffs as a measure of variable trade costs. Our results show that the number of firms exporting in a given sector to a given destination is related to the level of tariffs. But they also show that the decrease in tariffs induced by the implementation of the Uruguay Round did not lead more firms to export and that it only induced incumbent exporters to increase their shipments. We control for two problems that may affect our basic specification: tariff changes may be endogenous and zero flows are not included. Our results are confirmed — even when the extensive margin is significant, its magnitude is very small.     

Structural estimation and solution of international trade models with heterogeneous firms

We present an empirical implementation of a general-equilibrium model of international trade with heterogeneous manufacturing firms. The theory underlying our model is consistent with Melitz (2003). A nonlinear structural estimation procedure identifies a set of core parameters and unobserved firm-level trade frictions that best fit the geographic pattern of trade. Our estimation model is consistent with the specified general equilibrium model, and we conduct general equilibrium counterfactual analyses to illustrate model responses. We first assess the economic effects of reductions in measured tariffs. Taking the simple-average welfare change across regions the Melitz structure indicates welfare gains from liberalization that are four times larger than in a standard trade policy simulation. Furthermore, when we compare the economic impact of tariff reductions with reductions in estimated fixed trade costs we find that policy measures affecting the fixed costs are of greater importance than tariff barriers.     

The impact of parallel imports on investments in cost-reducing research and development

We develop a two-country model of endogenous investment in process innovation by a manufacturer facing competition from parallel imports (PI). We find that the distortions associated with PI inhibit innovation. However, the difference between the manufacturer's expected profits under successful and failed innovation is U-shaped in the cost of engaging in PI. Thus, the reduction in R&D investment depends on both legality of PI and transport costs. The reduction in innovation could harm global welfare, depending on whether the manufacturer was deterring PI with a high wholesale price. If so, banning such trade would raise expected welfare.     

Optimal Rules of Origin with Asymmetric Compliance Costs under International Duopoly

We examine the optimal rules of origin (ROO) in a free trade area/agreement (FTA) by employing a stylized three-country partial equilibrium model of an international duopoly. We incorporate compliance costs of the ROO into the model. In particular, compliance costs are higher for a firm located in a non-member country of the FTA than for a firm (an internal firm) located in an FTA member country, whereas marginal production costs are lower for the former. The FTA member countries set the optimal level of ROO to maximize their joint welfare. An importing country within the FTA imposes tariffs on imports that do not comply with the ROO. We show that the optimal ROO may have a protectionist bias in the sense that they are set for only the internal firm to comply. ROO may also cause low utilization of FTAs when they are set such that even the internal firm does not comply with them. These cases arise depending on parameter values.     

Interacting factor endowments and trade costs: A multi-country, multi-good approach to trade theory

We provide a synthetic analysis of the different ways in which countries participate in the world economy. Classic trade questions are reconsidered by generalizing a factor-proportions model to multiple countries, multiple goods or multi-stage production, and country-specific trade costs. Each country's production specialization, trade and welfare is determined by the interaction between its relative endowment and its trade costs. We consider the effects of allowing one good to ‘fragment’ into component and assembly production. The volume of trade and welfare levels are higher with fragmentation for most countries, although for many countries these variables fall with fragmentation.     

Induced clean technology adoption and international trade with heterogeneous firms

This paper introduces an environmental externality and factor-biased technology adoption into a trade model with heterogeneous firms. This study explores how firms’ decisions of technology adoption and of exports are affected by openness to trade and the stringency of environmental regulations. It shows that: (1) these decisions induced by tightened environmental policies depend upon whether the upgraded technology is labor-biased or emission-biased; (2) the environmental impact of trade cost reductions on the aggregate emissions and price of emissions permits varies with the factor-biased feature; and (3) regardless of the factor-biased feature, the trade cost reduction induces firms to export and to upgrade the factor-biased technology, while it forces the least productive firms to exit the market. Moreover, the model is further calibrated to simulate policy scenarios of bilateral and unilateral variations in trade variable costs and environmental policies. The bilateral reduction of emissions cap may contribute to welfare gains in both home and foreign countries. The unilateral action of tightening environmental policy in the home country may hurt the home country, but makes the foreign country better off.     

An empirical assessment of the welfare effects of reciprocal dumping

Can two-way trade in similar products lead to lower welfare than if such trade was banned? Theory answers yes. To empirically investigate this proposition we examine Swedish imports of bottled water. Assuming one-shot (Bertrand and Cournot) competition, we can use the estimates from a structural model of demand to uncover marginal costs. We simulate the effect on consumer and producer surplus of banning imports. We do not find convincing evidence that banning imports would increase overall welfare. Given our choice of market this suggests we should not be overly concerned with the welfare effects of two-way trade in consumer goods that are close to homogenous.     

Determinants of Trade Costs and Trade Growth Accounting between India and the European Union during 1995–2010

This study aimed to utilise the micro‐founded measure of trade cost derived by Novy to estimate the relative bilateral trade costs of India with its European Union partners. The advantage of using such a model is that the trade costs can be derived entirely using observable trade data. The results show that Indian tariff equivalent with its major EU trading partners has declined by 20 percentage points between 1995 and 2010, with Malta and Latvia experiencing the greatest decline. The study then decomposes the bilateral trade growth to ascertain whether it is an outcome of increased domestic production or reduction in bilateral and multilateral trade barriers. Novy's model indicates that the decline in relative bilateral trade costs explains the greatest percentage of this trade growth, which is partially offset by decline in multilateral resistance terms that has diverted trade away to other trading partners primarily in South and South‐East Asia and North America.     

Competition for firms in an oligopolistic industry: The impact of economic integration

We set up a model of generalised oligopoly where two countries of different size compete for an exogenous, but variable, number of identical firms. The model combines a desire by national governments to attract internationally mobile firms with the existence of location rents that arise even in a symmetric equilibrium where firms are dispersed. As economic integration proceeds, equilibrium taxes initially decline, but then rise again as trade costs fall even further. A range of trade costs is identified where economic integration raises the welfare of the small country, but lowers welfare in the large country.     

Access of Tunisian Fruits and Vegetables to the EU Market: Potential Impacts of the Revision of the Entry Price System

Agricultural trade flows worldwide continue to be subject to country restrictions of a tariff and non-tariff nature. This is more so in the case of fruits and vegetables in view of their multiplicity. This hinders the exports of these products, which is an important objective sought by the economy of Tunisia. This article simulates the potential consequences of a possible opening up of the European market borders on fruits and vegetables coming from Tunisia and the rest of the world (ROW), following alternative tariff reduction schemes of the entry price mechanism practiced by the EU, particularly in its ad-valorem duty. The analysis uses a partial equilibrium model that takes into consideration economic aspects related to the exports of these products, regardless of their interactions with other agricultural commodities. The model is composed of a series of behavioral equations describing excess demand and supply of fruits and vegetables of all trading partners and attempts to simulate “international” market equilibrium for these commodities. Tomatoes, oranges and peaches were selected for the analysis and three trading blocs were taken into consideration: The European Union, Tunisia and the ROW. Two policy scenarios were examined (a) reduction by one third of the ad-valorem tariff and (b) its total elimination. The results suggest that the impacts would be concentrated in specific periods, varying with products and regions. In addition to possible trade volumes, Tunisia and other countries may also gain in value from exports. A significant increase in the prices of peaches and tomatoes for Tunisia would result from the liberalization process of the EU market. Volumes and prices of EU domestic supplies would however exhibit moderate reductions.     

An Analysis of Mercosur's Regional Trading Arrangements

After six years of stop‐start negotiations, Mercosur is no closer to signing a regional trading agreement (RTA) with the EU, whilst negotiations to finalise a Free Trade of the Americas Agreement (FTAA) have also stalled. This is due to various factors: economic crises in Mercosur, intransigence by member countries and uncertainty surrounding the outcome of the Doha Round. Estimates from the trade literature predict welfare gains to Mercosur from both RTAs whilst only one study assesses the additional benefits of removing non‐tariff barrier (NTB) trade costs which have remained largely unchallenged within the multilateral forum. In this paper, we improve the treatment of NTB estimates employing a theoretically consistent gravity specification, where calculated tariff‐equivalent estimates are subsequently implemented into a modified computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. Relative to a realistic baseline, and incorporating trade‐induced productivity and capital accumulation effects, we reassess the benefits of both regional initiatives to Mercosur, revisiting the claim that NTB trade cost abolition doubles the ‘standard’ welfare estimates. Contrary to previous studies, the results suggest that an FTAA yields greater gains to Mercosur than an EU RTA whilst the claim of Monteagudo and Watanuki (2003 ) pertaining to trade cost elimination is understated.     

China and the Trans‐Pacific Partnership: A Numerical Simulation Assessment of the Effects Involved

The Trans‐Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a new negotiation on cross‐border liberalisation of goods and service flows going beyond WTO disciplines and focused on issues such as regulation and border controls. This paper uses numerical simulation methods to assess the potential effects of a TPP agreement on China and also China's inclusion or exclusion on other countries. We use a numerical 11‐country global general equilibrium model with trade costs and inside money. Trade costs are calculated using a method based on gravity equations. TPP barriers potentially removable are trade costs less tariffs. Simulation results reveal that China will be slightly hurt by TPP initiatives in welfare when China is out, but the total production and export will be increased. Other non‐TPP countries will be mostly hurt in welfare, but member countries will mostly gain. If China takes part in TPP, she will significantly gain and increase other TPP countries' gain as well. The comparison of TPP effects and global free trade effects show that the positive effects of global free trade are stronger than TPP effects. Japan's joining TPP would be beneficial to both herself and most of other TPP countries, but which negative effects on China's welfare when out of TPP will increase further.