基于分成制的集中控制式供应链合同设计

考虑一个由制造商与分销商组成的供应链,制造商通过广告投入拉动产品销售,分销商通过促销活动推动产品销售。首先给出了制造商与分销商间的Nash均衡结果,然后通过制造商与分销商的期望收益函数解决了供应链中的合同设计问题。     

基于转移价格的分散控制式供应链合同设计

考虑一个由制造商与分销商组成的供应链，制造商通过广告投入拉动产品销售，分销商通过促销活动推动产品销售。首先给出了制造商与分销商间的Nash均衡结果，然后通过制造商与分销商的期望收益函数解决了供应链中的合同设计问题。     

供应链企业合作激励的委托代理机制研究

信息不对称引起委托代理问题。供应链企业间由于信息不对称也存在着代理人的逆选择及道德风险等委托代理问题。本文分析了制造商一分销商委托代理问题,并建立了激励机制模型。     

供应链中道德风险问题的模型分析

本文意在从委托代理理论的角度来看供应链管理的研究工作,就一个道德风险模型在供应链管理中的应用作了初步的探讨.本文首先在委托代理理论的基础上对两阶段供应链管理问题进行分析,通过对信息对称和非对称信息两种情况的分析分别得出最优合约,根据制造商与供应商各成本的变化,在一个供应商和一个制造商中建立了一个激励机制以期形成对制造商的即时响应.     

非对称信息条件下的供应链企业委托代理问题研究

供应链企业间存在着由信息不对称引起的委托代理问题,但是由于供应链固有的某些特征,其委托代理问题又不同于传统企业模式下的委托代理。本文主要从制造商的角度讨论了制造商——供应商委托代理中的有害选择和道德风险问题,并提出如何进行激励机制设计。     

产品类别对企业合作广告与定价策略的影响

研究由一个制造商和一个电子零售商组成的供应链,分析产品类别对企业合作广告与定价策略的影响。本文先后考察了合作广告下Stackelberg主从博弈和Nash合作博弈模型的建立与分析,比较了两种博弈均衡下的策略选择及其系统期望利润,用数学仿真软件检验了产品网络适应度对两个模型的合作广告费用和利润的影响,最后利用Nash讨价还价理论对合作利益进行了分配,并确定了制造商在渠道合作广告合作联盟协调中的分摊率,基于这个结果获得最佳的市场策略。     

制造企业与其分销商信息共享的激励策略研究——以某家电企业为例

21世纪的市场竞争实际上已不是单个企业之间的竞争,而是供应链与供应链之间的竞争,而供应链的真正优势在于通过信息共享,共同计划,来达到整个供应链的集成,以提高供应链的反应速度,降低成本,减少重复和浪费。分销商作为供应链的一个重要环节,起着联系制造商和客户的作用,它能否将获得的信息及时准确地与制造商共享,是影响整个供应链竞争的关键因素。本文结合某电器企业的具体情况,对制造企业如何激励其分销商信息共享进行实例探讨。     

基于供应链的虚拟企业

供应链一件产品从原材料到最终完成往往要经历许多个厂家的供应,生产和销售,在这个过程中,产品相对于不同的厂家处于不同的形态例如原材料,毛坯,初级产品,组装产品,商品等,产品从一个厂家流向加一个厂家,流经的路径就是一条供应链供应链的基本特征供应商,制造商,分销商都是一个动态的相对性的概念,我们统一把原材料云集配件的提供者称为供应商．把产品的生产者称为制造商．把产品的销售者称为分销商,一个厂家相对于不同对象可以分别被称为供应商,制造商和分销商．供应链模型供应链网状结构模型（图１）图中的箭头线表示供应链…     

基于系统动力学的供应链库存管理研究

供应链库存管理是供应链管理研究中的热点问题,在系统动力学与供应链库存管理特点的基础上,应用系统动力学来研究供应链库存管理。对供应链中的供应商、制造商、分销商分别建立了库存管理系统动力学模型,进行仿真,得出结论,为供应链库存管理提供一种定量与定性相结合的管理决策方法。     

非对称信息下三级供应链协调契约模型的构建

本文研究了非对称信息条件下由一个制造商、一个分销商和一个零售商组成的三级供应链的协调问题,建立了非对称成本信息下基于收益共享的供应链契约协调模型.给出了三级供应链协调的条件,最后通过算例分析说明模型设计的有效性.     

两级物流服务商参与的供应链质量激励机制研究

两级物流服务商参与的供应链存在围绕产品质量以及物流服务质量控制的挑战。基于两级物流服务商参与的供应链质量特殊性设计了零售商主导下静态激励与动态激励相结合、个体单独激励与团队激励相结合的质量激励机制。研究表明：零售商对LSI的物流服务质量激励强度将影响LSI对FLSP的物流服务质量激励强度；制造商、LSI以及FLSP的质量努力水平与委托方对其质量激励强度系数以及其本身的质量努力效果系数成正比，与其各自的质量努力成本系数成反比；由于零售商对制造商以及LSI的团队激励并没有使得制造商与LSI提高产品质量及物流服务质量努力水平，因此，零售商缺乏提供团队激励的积极性；相比静态激励而言，当激励强度调节系数满足一定条件时，动态激励可以提高制造商的质量努力水平和零售商的期望收益；同时，零售商可通过改变激励强度调节系数来平衡自身期望收益最大化与质量努力水平最大化的目标，也即相比静态激励而言，动态激励机制更具优势。     

双渠道供应链环境下企业创新投入研究

电子商务环境下渠道冲突与和谐并存问题受到越来越多关注,利用Stackelberg博弈,在价格竞争与价格敏感需求条件下,构建零售商以创新投入降低其分销成本、制造商对其创新投入实施策略性补偿激励的双渠道供应链模型,研究发现策略性创新激励补偿能实现制造商与零售商收益的Pareto改进、实现消费者福利改进。     

供应链成员企业投资RFID技术的激励机制：共享收入与谈判批发价的比较

许多已有研究发现供应链成员投资RFID技术的动机是一致的，它们假定投资前后的批发价能以相同方式制定。然而，供应链成员在投资前可能已达成固定的批发价。考虑包含一个制造商(她)和一个零售商(他)的供应链系统，成员可采用如分享销售收入(RS)、重新谈判批发价格(WR)、二者并用(B)的激励机制。结果发现在WR和B下，当制造商的谈判权力中等且标签成本较小时，投资RFID能实现双赢，但两家企业的投资动机不总是完全一致；当初始批发价足够高时，若制造商的谈判权力足够强，制造商和零售商对WR的偏好都高于N，对B的偏好都高于RS；当初始批发价较低时，若制造商的谈判权力中等，双方对RS的偏好都高于WR。若制造商的谈判权力较强，供应链系统在B下的收益比WR下的高；若制造商的谈判权力中等或较弱，供应链系统在B或WR下的收益都比N和RS下的高。     

How a novel option contract helps a green product to enter a traditional product's retailing channel: A mathematical modeling approach

Multi-sourcing is a practical strategy in retail channels that allows retailers facing uncertainties to respond more effectively to consumers' needs by distributing market demand across multiple supply sources. In this respect, this research investigates a price-setting retailing channel, including two manufacturers (a traditional manufacturer and a green manufacturer) and one retailer where end-of-life products can be collected. The retailer faces an uncertain price-dependent demand and sets orders from both supply directions based on a low-cost ordering approach. The primary purpose of this study is to develop an optimal solution to allow the green product to enter the retailing channel of the non-green product. Accordingly, this research develops and compares two different contractual mechanisms from the standpoint of the green manufacturer/retailer and the supply chain (SC): (1) a penalty-based contract and (2) a modified call option contract mixed with a cost-sharing mechanism. The main contribution of the current paper is to investigate an option contract for the effective management of a closed-loop supply chain and combine it with a cost-sharing contract as a new approach. Another contribution is that the developed model considers two practical channels for collecting and returning obsolete products to the green manufacturer: (1) the retailer is responsible for collecting and returning obsolete products, and (2) collecting and returning obsolete products is outsourced to a third-party logistics provider (3PL). Eventually, the models' efficiency is verified by investigating different numerical experiments, discovering that the proposed reservation-based contract outperforms the penalty-based contract for both parties' profitability and retailing channel's improvement. Besides, the present study finds that hiring 3PL significantly increases the green manufacturer's profit compared to other scenarios.     

Do Negative Consumption Experiences Hurt Manufacturers or Retailers? The Influence of Reasoning Style on Consumer Blame Attributions and Purchase Intention

Negative consumption experiences adversely influence consumer perceptions of manufacturers and retailers. The author theorizes and finds that analytical thinkers are more likely than holistic thinkers to attribute the cause of the negative consumption experience to the manufacturer, resulting in lower repurchase intention of the manufacturer brand. In contrast, holistic thinkers are more likely than analytical thinkers to attribute the cause of the negative consumption experience to the retailer, resulting in lower repurchase intention at the retailer. These findings are important to marketing managers at both ends of the marketing supply chain—manufacturers and retailers—who deal with consumers with diverse cultural backgrounds.     

供应链企业间的委托代理问题及道德风险的防范

供应链企业间由于信息不对称而存在委托代理问题,分析委托代理问题及道德风险的产生,建立相应的防范模型,并结合供应链实际作出风险分担和激励机制的设计方案,对于降低企业风险具有重要参考价值。     

Retailer voluntary investment against a threat of manufacturer encroachment

To elucidate supply chain cooperation between a manufacturer and a retailer, this study examines a model in which the retailer makes voluntary investments to reduce the marginal production cost of the manufacturer. The manufacturer is allowed to introduce a direct selling channel in addition to the indirect channel through the retailer (i.e., manufacturer encroachment), which however dampens the retailers’ investment incentives. The retailer can leverage its voluntary investments as a means of deterring manufacturer encroachment. We demonstrate that manufacturer encroachment is strategically deterred when the retailer’s cost-reduction technology is sufficiently effective. This strategic encroachment deterrence encourages the retailer to invest more, but it narrows the variety of channels from which consumers can select. When the latter effect dominates the former effect, consumer surplus declines with strategic encroachment deterrence.

     

基于共享契约的供应链合作伙伴收益分配协调机制

基于制造商共享契约前后的收益分配模型,根据Stackelberg动态博弈思想,从整个供应链收益最大化视角,分析制造商与零售商的共享收益合作区间,提出了基于共享契约的供应链合作伙伴收益分配协调机制。研究结果表明,制造商采用共享收益分配机制可使整个供应链系统得到协调,并在实践中具有可操作性。     

基于促销投资的非对称信息供应链契约研究

利用了委托代理理论和最优控制理论,分析对称信息和不对称信息两种情况下制造商和零售商的供应链契约。零售商进行促销投资,在对称信息情况下,制造商以批发价作为线性契约来协调供应链系统,批发价是促销投资的减函数;在非对称信息情况下,制造商以批发价和补贴作为非线性契约的协调机制,而批发价和补贴都是促销投资的增函数。     

Manufacturer marketing initiatives and retailer information sharing

This research examines a retailer’s incentive to share information with its supplier when the supplier can also undertake initiatives to increase retail demand. It is well known that a retailer is averse to sharing market information with a manufacturer due to concern for a manufacturer’s strategic use of such information. This research shows that despite such strategic exploitation of market information, a retailer may want to establish information sharing channels with its supplier. Information sharing essentially shifts power upstream which, in turn, enhances the manufacturer’s incentive to bear costs to boost retail demand: the manufacturer is induced to invest merely by knowing that information is on its way. Hence, the retailer benefits from information sharing ex ante despite the costly ex post exploitation by the manufacturer. This finding is a stark contrast to the most of previous results which consistently point out how bad it is for the manufacturer to have the retailer’s demand information before setting prices. In fact, due to the investment effect, information sharing can lead to gains for the retailer, manufacturer, and consumers alike.