Efficient bargaining,welfare and strategic export policy

We present an efficient bargaining model and analyse the welfare effects of unionization, where rival exporting governments employ strategic export policy. The domestic firm is unionized and conducts a Nash bargain with its union to determine wage and employment. The union may be wage oriented, wage neutral or employment oriented. The foreign firm is non-unionized. Stability of the reaction function equilibrium in policy space is sufficient for the following results: (i) domestic welfare increases with the degree of wage orientation; (ii) an increase in the union's bargaining power leads to higher (lower) domestic welfare if the union is wage (employment) oriented; (iii) if the domestic social marginal cost of labour is less than or equal to the foreign marginal cost, domestic market share is higher under wage orientation.     

Cross-border mergers and acquisitions vs. greenfield foreign direct investment: The role of firm heterogeneity

We develop a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms to address two sets of questions: (1) what are the characteristics of firms that choose the various modes of foreign market access (exporting, greenfield FDI, and cross-border M&A), and (2) how does the international organization of production vary across industries and country-pairs? We show that the answers to these questions depend on the nature of firm heterogeneity. Depending on whether firms differ in their mobile or immobile capabilities, cross-border mergers involve the most or the least efficient active firms. The comparative statics on industry and country characteristics display a similar dichotomy.     

The perceived usefulness of knowledge supplied by foreign client networks

The network surrounding a firm's foreign clients has large influence on its ability to act in the market. How firms can utilize the knowledge supplied by client networks is therefore of great importance to their business with clients. Many studies show the usefulness of foreign clients and suppliers, whereas less attention has been given to the usefulness of knowledge supplied by clients’ network, such as clients’ clients, clients’ supplementary suppliers and competitors to the firm. This study contributes to international business research on networks by investigating the knowledge supplied by client networks for a firm doing business with a specific foreign client on a sample of 494 firms. A LISREL analysis demonstrates that knowledge supplied by client networks is more useful the more experienced the firm. Client networks are also more useful the more knowledge the firm has of its client, the more the firm needs knowledge of its clients and suppliers, the higher the cost of the client relationship, and the more standardized the product. A major conclusion is that the client network knowledge is more useful the further a firm's collaboration with the client, presumably as a result of the new, and more embedded business that the firm develops with the client. Implications are that client networks are resources that can be important competitive advantages for the internationalizing firm.     

Dumping as a signal of innovation

In the R&D-intensive industries, where technologies change rapidly, an innovative foreign firm may need to export greater than normal quantities to signal the level of the new technology it possesses. We find that such actions lead to sales below cost if the foreign firm has a relatively poor reputation for innovation, has a sufficiently high discount factor or possesses a new technology that significantly cuts its cost. We also show that antidumping reduces the costs of signaling, benefits the home firm, and may raise the profit to the foreign firm in the pre-duty period.     

Financial development,the choice of technology,and comparative advantage

In this general equilibrium model, banks and manufacturing firms engage in oligopolistic competition. A more advanced manufacturing technology has a higher fixed cost but a lower marginal cost of production. We show that manufacturing firms located in a country with a more efficient financial sector choose more advanced technologies and this country has a comparative advantage in the production of manufactured goods. Even though the foreign country has a less developed financial sector than the home country, the opening up of trade with the foreign country leads domestic manufacturing firms to adopt more advanced technologies. An increase in the level of efficiency in the financial sector of one country causes manufacturing firms in both countries to adopt more advanced technologies.     

Cross-border mergers and market concentration in a vertically related industry: theory and evidence

We present a tractable model of oligopoly to identify the linkages between local competition and cross-border mergers in a vertically related industry. We show that the incentives for cross-border mergers rise with vertical integration in an industry when the premerger concentration in that industry is sufficiently high relative to the concentration in the same industry in a foreign country. We also show that the incentives for a merger between a foreign firm and a vertically integrated home firm will be higher than that for a merger between a foreign firm and a disintegrated home firm, when the premerger concentration at home is low relative to the premerger concentration in the foreign country. We then analyze a firm-level panel of 90,614 M&A observations, between 1990 and 2012, from 86 countries. Logistic regressions confirm that market concentration is an important determinant of cross-border M&A. Our results support the conjectures of our theoretical model and are consistent with recent empirical findings and theoretical predictions.     

Optimal trade policy with quality-differentiated goods

In this article we apply the model of vertically differentiated products to international trade. A foreign firm competes with a domestic firm in the latter's market, producing products of varying quality. We examine the nature of the equilibrium in this case, assuming the firms compete in prices. Contrary to the popular belief, we show that a protectionist policy of imposing a tariff on the foreign firm raises overall welfare in the domestic economy, as well as induces the domestic firm to upgrade the quality of its product, if it produces the lower quality product. Furthermore, if minimum quality standards are imposed on the foreign firm, the domestic firm upgrades quality, and overall welfare in the domestic economy is higher.     

International mergers: Incentives and welfare

Information asymmetry creates incentives for firms from different countries to merge. To demonstrate this point, we develop a model of international oligopolistic competition under demand uncertainty and asymmetric information. We show that when domestic firms but not foreign firms are completely informed of local market demands, information sharing enhances the profitability of a merger between a domestic firm and a foreign firm. We also examine how such a merger affects the non-merging firms' profits, consumer surplus and social welfare.     

Does home bias affect firm value? Evidence from holdings of mutual funds worldwide

This study finds strong evidence that home bias affects firm valuation at both country and firm levels. At the country level, increasing the bias of domestic investors toward home equity lowers the market valuation of home equity. At the firm level, firm value increases as the compositions of local equities held by domestic and foreign investors tend toward the firms' global market capitalization weights, but decreases as their weights deviate from global weights. Overall, the evidence is consistent with the optimal global risk-sharing hypothesis that the greater risk sharing between domestic and foreign investors in international capital markets reduces the cost of capital and hence enhances market valuation.     

Optimal integration strategies for the multinational firm

We examine integration strategies of multinational firms that face a rich array of choices of international organization. Each firm must provide headquarter services from its home country, but can produce its intermediate inputs and conduct assembly operations in one or more of three locations. We study the equilibrium choices of firms that differ in productivity levels, focusing on the role that industry characteristics such as the fixed costs of foreign subsidiaries, the cost of transporting intermediate and final goods, and the regional composition of the consumer market play in determining the optimal integration strategies.     

Institutional development and firm profitability in transition economies

Although transition economies experience significant institutional transformations that vary in their pace and magnitude, our understanding of how such changes influence firm performance is rather limited. We examine how variations in institutional reforms and international openness in 16 transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) influence firm profitability. We enhance the understanding of this subject by showing that such institutional changes have different effects on the competitive advantages and in turn profitability of domestic firms and foreign subsidiaries. Our analysis of over 230,000 observations reveals that institutional reforms benefit domestic firms. Conversely, a completely different pattern emerges for foreign subsidiaries, indicating that institutional reforms have negative consequences for their profitability. Hence, in contrast to the established assumption that developed institutional environments are advantageous for foreign subsidiaries, the nature of institutional changes makes domestic firms the main beneficiaries.     

Efficiency and Ownership Structure: The Case of Poland

We examine the effects of foreign entry on productive efficiency during the Polish investment liberalisation. The performance of foreign acquisitions is compared to foreign firms entering the market through greenfield entry, as well as domestic acquisitions of privatised firms, domestic greenfields and remaining state‐owned (non‐privatised) firms during the period 1995–2000. We find that foreign privatised firms have realised larger productivity gains than all types of domestic firms and that this is not due to higher price‐cost margins, which is consistent with the idea that foreign firms bring in firm‐specific knowledge. Foreign greenfields have the highest average labour productivity, while foreign privatisations show the largest productivity increase.     

A Dynamic Growth Model with Equity for Guarantee Swap and Asymmetric Information*

We develop an endogenous dynamic growth model in which a financially constrained firm optimizes the entrance timing and financing structure in different information exposure scenes. An innovation financing tool called equity‐for‐guarantee swap is introduced to solve the dilemma of financing constraints. The productivity of the firm is a random variable following a two‐point distribution and its value can be observed in advance by the entrepreneur but not by the insurer. Our main goal is to fix the fair guarantee cost with asymmetry information and examine how the cost differs from the one under the same situation except with symmetric information. We solve a Nash equilibrium of the game between the entrepreneur and the insurer and specify the condition to determine whether a separating equilibrium or pooling one will be achieved. We find that at the separating equilibrium, the high‐profit firm will sacrifice a profit to send a signal for the purpose of separating itself from the low‐profit one by increasing the latter's mimicking cost. The pooling equilibrium occurs when the insurer can not distinguish the firm's type and therefore, the insurer demands the same guarantee cost for all firms.     

Institutional and transaction cost influences on MNEs’ ownership strategies of their affiliates: Evidence from an emerging market

This paper examines the impact of institutional, and transaction cost specific variables on MNEs’ choice of equity ownership in their foreign affiliates. We consider the determinants of the choice of foreign investors between full ownership (setting up a wholly owned greenfield subsidiary or engaging in a full acquisition) and sharing ownership with a local firm (establishing a greenfield joint venture or making a partial acquisition). Drawing on both transaction cost and institutional theories, a number of hypotheses are developed. Based on a dataset of 6838 foreign affiliates in Turkey, the empirical analysis reveals that institutional variables are important in explaining the equity composition of foreign affiliates. Particularly important in determining equity ownership were found to be political risk, cultural distance, linguistic distance, agglomeration, location and the size of the affiliate. A distinguishing feature of the paper is that we examine the marginal effects of the independent variables in explaining ownership patterns of MNEs.     

Foreign Equity Trading and Average Stock‐return Volatility

We examine whether there is a relationship between foreign equity trading and average total volatility, measured as the value‐weighted average of stock‐return variance in the Istanbul Stock Exchange. We employ foreign equity purchase and sale data to track changes in foreign equity trading, which not only enable us to capture effective foreign investor participation but also to observe the potential asymmetric effects of incoming and outgoing funds on the average total volatility. Consistent with the implications of the asymmetric information hypothesis, we find that net equity flow is positively associated with average total volatility. Furthermore, we show that net equity flow affects the average total volatility through the local and idiosyncratic volatilities, suggesting that foreign investors engage in the production of firm specific and market wide information.     

Is the multinational firm in danger?: The threat of nationalism

A ground swell of nationalism in foreign countries may mean the end of the multinational firm; steps to accommodate to public sentiment in the host country offer only temporary relief, and the proposed. “supranational” corporation would still be considered an outsider. A new form of international business activity must evolve. One possibility is a management contract, whereby the Western firm supplies management skills and technical knowledge without the equity participation and direct control that have been the essence of traditional foreign investment. This device would remove the principal objection of host countries to direct investment from abroad—foreign ownership of local industry—and the foreign firm would benefit from some revenue—better than eviction.     

Optimal trade,industrial, and privatization policies in a mixed duopoly with strategic managerial incentives

Abstract

This paper examines optimal trade, industrial, and privatization policies in a home-market model of mixed international duopoly with strategic managerial incentives. Under linear demand and constant marginal costs, the optimal degree of privatization is shown to depend crucially on cost and demand parameters and on the availability of strategic trade and industrial policies. If both firms are equally efficient, optimal trade and industrial policies drive out the foreign firm and the privatization policy loses its effect on national welfare; however, if the home firm is less efficient, then full privatization combined with an import tariff and a production subsidy is optimal for the home country, while an export subsidy is optimal for the foreign country. If trade and industrial policies are unavailable and if both firms are equally efficient, full state-ownership, which drives out the foreign firm, becomes optimal; however, if the home firm is less efficient, only partial privatization is optimal, The state-ownership share is increased if either the market size grows, the home firm's efficiency increases, or the foreign firm's efficiency decreases. Further, the paper demonstrates the potential conflict between privatization and trade liberalization policies.     

The moderating role of local embeddedness on the performance of foreign and domestic firms in emerging markets

This paper examines the impact of the firm’s degree of local embeddedness on its performance in emerging markets using the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey Manufacturing Sector Module data on 15,715 firms covering 78 emerging markets. We use the degree of localization of sourcing and sales to measure the degree of embeddedness in the host country market. We argue that since embeddedness brings the firm into closer interaction with local firms and institutions, the costs of embeddedness should be lower for local firms than for MNE subsidiaries, since local firms can be assumed to be better able to decipher local institutions. We find that both dimensions are subject to a reversed U-shaped function. That is, by extending the degree of local sales and local sourcing up to a certain percentage, a firm can realize positive performance growth by becoming more embedded into the emerging market, but beyond this point, the performance impact is negative. We also find that foreign firms involved in local sales seem to lose part of their ability to exploit their ownership advantages as compared to foreign firms that export their production.     

Signalling cost with investment in compatibility

When buyers value products in terms of the expected compatibility between the current and the new vintage, firms can invest strategically in R&D to control for the switching costs. Open announcements of R&D budgets transmit information. The announcements determine the buyers' beliefs of the compatibility. As only an efficient firm finds it optimal to have a large R&D-budget, a firm can signal its unit cost. The likely outcome is a unique separating equilibrium if the marginal cost of R&D is low but the uncertainty over the rival's unit cost large. With high R&D cost, the dominating motive is to affect the rival's cost belief.     

Asymmetric Payoffs and Spatial Competition

We investigate the location choice of two firms whose objectives are the weighted average of their own profit and social welfare, in which they simultaneously decide their locations before setting their prices. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the asymmetric locations are influenced by the asymmetry of the firms’ objectives or by the asymmetry of firms’ marginal costs. We show that, when both firms have the same marginal cost, the equilibrium locations are always symmetric even in the case of the asymmetric objectives. On the other hand, the cost differences lead the asymmetric locations in equilibrium. That is, the asymmetric locations are a result of the cost asymmetry, but not the asymmetry of the firms’ objectives. We also demonstrate that the pursuit of profit by the cost-inefficient firm may increase consumer surplus.