A proclivity for entrepreneurship: A comparison of entrepreneurs,small business owners,and corporate managers

Despite intensive inquiry, relatively little is known about the entrepreneur, the central figure in entrepreneurship. The question of how an individual who operates his or her own business differs from a corporate manager remains unanswered. In addressing this question, the primary purpose of this study was to investigate the potential of psychological constructs to predict a proclivity for entrepreneurship. The research model includes three classic themes in the literature: achievement motivation, risk-taking propensity, and preference for innovation.A survey of 767 small business owner-managers and corporate managers was assembled from a 20-state region, primarily the southeastern United States. The participants completed a questionnaire composed of the Achievement Scale of the Personality Research Form, the Risk-Taking and Innovation Scales of the Jackson Personality Inventory and questions pertaining to numerous individual and organizational variables. Respondents were first divided into two groups, managers and small business owner-managers. Subsequently, due to the often cited variations in entrepreneurs, the owner-managers were further categorized as either an entrepreneur or small business owner, using the widely cited Carland et al. (1984) theoretical definitions. Entrepreneurs are defined by their goals of profit and growth for their ventures and by their use of strategic planning. Alternatively, small business owners focus on providing family income and view the venture as an extension of their personalities. In this study, both groups of owner-managers were simultaneously compared with managers using hierarchical set multinomial LOGIT regression.The results indicated that the psychological constructs are associated with small business ownership, but with some important caveats. As hypothesized, those labeled entrepreneurs were higher in achievement motivation, risk-taking propensity, and preference for innovation than were both the corporate managers and the small business owners. This profile of the entrepreneur as a driven, creative risk-taker is consistent with much of the classic literature concerning the entrepreneur. Nonetheless, not all of the owner-managers fit this profile. When compared with managers, the small business owners demonstrated only a significantly higher risk-taking propensity. In terms of the constructs studied, the small business owners were more comparable to managers than to entrepreneurs.In addition to theoretical and methodological implications, the results presented here have important implications for small business owner-managers of both types. A major issue is the connection between the owner’s psychological profile and the characteristics of the venture, including performance. It would appear that psychological antecedents are associated with owner goals for the venture. Some owners will be more growth oriented than will others, and performance should be assessed in light of the owner’s aspirations for the venture. Moreover, owners should be aware of their own personality sets, including risk preferences, which may be more or less suited to different venture circumstances, including those with relatively high levels of risk.Planning in small businesses appears to enhance venture performance. Research has demonstrated the connections between psychological factors and planning behaviors in small businesses. Those labeled entrepreneurs in this study have goals of profit and growth, and tend to engage in more planning. An awareness of these psychological preferences and concomitant attention to planning behaviors have the potential to improve the performance of the venture, irrespective of owner aspirations.Venture teaming is becoming more popular among entrepreneurs. Balanced venture teams appear to improve the chances of entrepreneurial success (Timmons 1990), but a common source of conflict among venture team members is inconsistent or ambiguous motives for the new venture. Awareness of venture partners’ psychological predispositions in areas such as risk-taking could be used to identify and reconcile areas of potential conflict, and enhance the planning process in the small firm. In sum, an individual’s awareness of his or her psychological profile provides a number of advantages, not only to existing entrepreneurs, but also to aspiring entrepreneurs who should assess their perceived entrepreneurial opportunities against the backdrop of their psychological proclivity for entrepreneurship.     

The rise and fall of the Merlin-Gerin Foundry Business: A case study in French corporate entrepreneurship

This case study discusses the history of the creation and development within an established French electrical firm of a new business, a high-tech foundry, by a dynamic entrepreneur. We follow the trajectory of this internal venture from launch to apogee, divestment, and closure over a period of 26 years.First, we outline a framework for the selection of the external and internal variables that will allow us to interpret the case within the present theories and practices of internal corporate venturing. This framework is also useful for analyzing some particular aspects that may be attributed to the specific culture and environment of the Merlin-Gerin company. Second, we present the case history, which can be summarized briefly as follows. In 1959, the foundry of Merlin-Gerin, a leading French manufacturer of electrical apparatus, could not compete with outside suppliers. Roger Huet, an expert in aluminum casting, was hired to revitalize the business with new technologies and develop the PRECIAL (PRECIsion ALuminum) process. In 1967, he was able to market low-weight, high-strength parts to European airplane manufacturers with sales reaching $10 million. In 1970, McKinsey recommended that scarce capital resources should be reserved for the core business and that the foundry should be sold. Amazingly, this decision was not implemented for 12 years, because Huet convinced management that the foundry was profitable and had a brilliant future thanks to its unique technological skills. The foundry was sold to Alcoa in 1982 and closed down in 1985. Table 1 highlights the main events and the key corporate and entrepreneurial actions and reactions that determined the evolution and the ultimate fate of the internal venture. Third, we discuss the key factors that contributed first to the success and then to the demise of the venture, such as the culture and climate of the Merlin-Gerin and the Alcoa companies, major changes in corporate strategy and policy, discontinuities and schisms in technology and market strategies, and the leading role of the entrepreneur.Fourth, we analyze, in retrospect, whether this internal venture made a contribution to the Merlin-Gerin Company and whether the 12-year delay in implementing the divestment recommendation by McKinsey was financially and socially justified. Finally, we compare the processes observed in this company with models of corporate entrepreneurship previously developed by scholars and draw conclusions about the critical factors of success for an internal corporate venture.In our opinion, there are two unusual aspects, in addition to the international setting, that make this case interesting for both scholars and practitioners.

1. 1. This internal venture continued for 26 years, an unusually long period compared to most corporate ventures (Fast 1979; Sykes 1986; Kanter et al. 1990, 1991b, 1992). The main reasons were the personality of the entrepreneur, his close relationship with the president, the unique technology, the initial market successes, the profitability and positive cash flow of the foundry, and, finally, corporate inertia.

2. 2. The recurring shift from agreement to disagreement of business goals and strategies between the corporation (first Merlin-Gerin and then Alcoa) and the entrepreneurial venture, which, in turn, led to alternate phases of cooperation and tension between the two parties.

Table 2 summarizes the evolution of the corporate and internal venture strategies and shows the gradual shift from strategic congruence to conflict that inevitably led first to the divestment and then to the closure of the foundry. Thus, some lessons could be drawn from this case on how to survive, if not to succeed, in the difficult game of corporate entrepreneurship.

1.

2.

     

The Effects of Pre-venture Plan Timing and Perceived Environmental Uncertainty on the Persistence of Emerging Firms

This paper explores the effects of when pre-venture planning occurs (early or late) in the sequence of activities accomplished during the process of new business emergence, and the moderating effects of environmental context (the degree of perceived financial, competitive and operational uncertainty), on the persistence of emerging business startup efforts. Using data from the U.S. Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED), our analyses found a strong main effect for business planning: Nascent entrepreneurs who completed a business plan were 2.6 times more likely to persist in the process of business emergence than those who did not complete a plan. In addition, the likelihood of venture persistence increased when nascent entrepreneurs engaged in planning early in the sequence of start-up activities in perceived uncertain financial and competitive environments, while venture persistence increased when nascent entrepreneurs engaged in planning late in a sequence of activities in perceived certain financial and competitive environments.     

Women business owners in traditional and non-traditional industries

Small businesses continue to grow in importance to the national economy. According to the Small Business Administration, America's 22 million small businesses generate more than half of the nation's Gross Domestic Product and are the principal source of new jobs. The National Foundation for Women Business Owners reported that between 1987 and 1994, the number of women-owned businesses grew by 78% and women-owned firms accounted for 36% of all firms. Although the growth in the number of women-owned businesses is encouraging, the size of such businesses remains small in terms of both revenues and number of employees, especially in comparison to male-owned businesses. One explanation for this disparity is that female business ownership is concentrated primarily in the retail and service industries where businesses are relatively smaller in terms of employment and revenue as opposed to high technology, construction, and manufacturing.One of the most fruitful streams of research in women's occupational choice has been based on social learning theory. Specifically, self-efficacy has been found to relate to both type and number of occupations considered by college men and women, and with regard to traditional and non-traditional occupations. Entrepreneurship researchers have also used social learning theory to study entrepreneurial intentions. This study builds on that background of women's career development and entrepreneurial intentions to examine differences between traditional and non-traditional women business owners. We examine 170 women business owners in various traditional and non-traditional businesses in Utah and Illinois. Questionnaires were the primary method of collecting data, in addition to 11 in-depth interviews from a sample of the survey respondents. Using a careers perspective, based on social learning theory, we hypothesized that women in these two different categories of industries would differ on levels of self-efficacy toward entrepreneurship or venture efficacy, their career expectations and their perceived social support. A second analysis was also done that explored the relationship between the same independent variables and success or performance of the business. The results offer support for using this integrative model to understand differences between women in traditional and non-traditional industries. The first analysis revealed that significant differences exist between the two groups on several of the independent variables. Traditional business owners had higher venture efficacy for opportunity recognition, higher career expectations of life balance and security and they reported that the financial support received from others was more important to them than those in non-traditional businesses. On the other hand, the non-traditional owners had higher venture efficacy for planning and higher career expectations for money or wealth than the traditional group.The second analysis explored whether success, as measured by sales, was affected by differences in venture efficacies, career expectations, or perceived support received by women in traditional businesses as compared to those in non-traditional ones. This analysis revealed that traditional women business owners might have different factors that contribute to their success than non-traditional owners. Specifically, for the traditional owners, venture efficacies for opportunity recognition and economic management as well as the career expectation of autonomy and money (or wealth) were positively related to sales. For the same group efficacy toward planning and the need for security were negatively related to sales. For the non-traditional women, venture efficacy toward planning and the career expectation of autonomy were positively related to sales while the expectation of money or wealth was negatively related. Also for the same group, the perceived importance of the emotional and financial support was negatively related to sales.In the past, most of the entrepreneurial research has used predominantly male samples of entrepreneurs. Those that include women entrepreneurs generally are comparative, between men and women. This study's comparison of two groups of women entrepreneurs offers a unique contribution to the field.Future research is recommended to further understand how venture efficacy and career expectations affect the decision to start a new business in a particular industry. It would be particularly beneficial to study venture efficacy and career expectations of prospective women entrepreneurs prior to the start of the business. Similarly, greater attention should be given to understanding how venture efficacy develops in different individuals.     

The Role of Structural and Planning Autonomy in the Performance of Internal Corporate Ventures

Historically, autonomy has been treated as a broad one‐dimensional construct. This paper proposes that there are two major types of autonomy for internal corporate ventures (ICVs)—planning autonomy and structural autonomy—and examines their respective impact on performance. Little prior knowledge exists regarding the autonomy–performance relationship for ICVs despite the billions of dollars of corporate investment in ICVs. In this study, I collect primary data on 38 ICVs at different stages of development from both venture‐level and corporate‐level managers from over a dozen companies in the U.S. Midwest. I find that a negative relationship exists for planning autonomy regardless of venture stage. However, for venture structural autonomy, a more complex relationship was discovered, which ranged from positive to negative to curvilinear based on the venture's stage of development.     

The effects of perceptions of risk, environmental uncertainty, and growth aspirations on new venture creation success

This study extends Xu and Reuf (Strateg Organ 2:331?C355, 2004) by exploring the strategic and non-strategic risk-taking propensity perceptions of nascent entrepreneurs as it relates to the subsequent likelihood of venture formation success. In addition, the moderating influences of perceptions of environmental uncertainty and venture growth aspirations are also examined. Findings from an analysis of data from the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED) I indicate that an entrepreneur??s risk-taking propensity has no relationship to the likelihood of successfully starting a business. Perceptions of environmental uncertainty and venture growth aspirations were positively related to non-strategic risk-taking propensity, yet none of these variables (strategic and non-strategic risk-taking propensity, environmental uncertainty and growth aspirations) had a significant effect on venture creation success. We suggest that risk-taking propensity, as measured in this study, does not play a significant role in differentiating between nascent entrepreneurs or others, or between those that are successful or unsuccessful at starting businesses.     

Multinational enterprises and corporate tax planning: A review of literature and suggestions for a future research agenda

Corporate tax planning by the multinational enterprise (MNE), that is, the MNE’s ability to plan its tax affairs by using a multitude of strategies to reduce its tax bills legally, is a central research question in the literatures of international business, public economics, tax, finance, law and accounting. Underlying theoretical assumptions, approaches to empirical testing, profit shifting estimation strategies and findings are varied. Thus, it is important to conduct a critical literature review. In this paper, we offer new insights by studying the phenomenon from the international business (IB) perspective. We survey the academic literature on the MNE and corporate tax planning to examine the extent of knowledge on this topic and identify areas that we hope will stimulate interest among IB scholars for further research. We find materials across disciplines that are relevant to IB readers. We examine 120 articles in 51 scholarly journals and classic books published during the period 1966-2017. We identify the key mechanisms and the firm characteristics that may influence corporate tax planning. We suggest a research agenda where IB research can make clear contributions.     

The pervasive effects of family on entrepreneurship: toward a family embeddedness perspective

Families and businesses have often been treated as naturally separate institutions, whereas we argue that they are inextricably intertwined. Long-term changes in family composition and in the roles and relations of family members have produced families in North America that are growing smaller and losing many of their previous role relationships. Such transformations in the institution of the family have implications for the emergence of new business opportunities, opportunity recognition, business start-up decisions, and the resource mobilization process. We suggest that entrepreneurship scholars would benefit from a family embeddedness perspective on new venture creation.     

External pressure or internal culture? An innovation diffusion theory account of small retail businesses’ social media use

COVID-19 put unprecedented external pressure on small businesses to adopt or increase use of social media while not all small businesses are internally ready for this rapid change. This study investigated the roles of external pressures and organizational culture of openness and learning in driving small retail business owners'/managers' social media use decisions by impacting their perceived usefulness and barriers, based on the innovation-decision process model from the diffusion of innovations theory and the theory of reasoned action. An online survey with structured measurements was administered to 411 U.S. small retail business owners/managers. Results from structural equation modeling revealed that external pressures positively influenced small business owners'/managers’ perceived usefulness and barriers and social media use intention. In addition, the culture of openness and learning positively influenced the perceived usefulness while mitigating the perceived barriers, thereby directly and indirectly influencing the social media use intention. Theoretical and managerial implications are discussed.     

Establishing a new business venture unit within a firm

The rapid growth of the United States as a whole is basically a story of the discovery and adoption of novel and improved ways of satisfying wants and needs. Previously, these wants and needs have been championed by individuals such as J.P. Morgan (finance), James B. Duke (tobacco), Andrew Carnegie (steel), Cornelius Vanderbilt (railroads), and John D. Rockefeller (oil). Each of these entrepreneurs commercialized a new idea or invention—the essence of the innovation process. Each bridged the gap between science and the marketplace by developing and commercializing a marketable innovation.Although even more of a need to reach the market as quickly as possible exists today, the majority of the innovations commercialized each year come from new or smaller organizations-often the ones with the least amount of capability and resources to accomplish the task. Existing businesses, especially larger ones, are in a much better position to bridge this gap. These companies have the existing financial resources, business skills, and usually the marketing and distribution systems to successfully commercialize a new innovation. Recognizing this capability, large companies have tried to instill an entrepreneurial spirit or an internal venturing program in an attempt to increase the amount and success of new offerings. This activity has taken on a variety of forms, one of which is the new business venture unit.What are the characteristics of a new business venture unit? Are they more successful at introducing new products than autonomous entrepreneurs? These and other questions were addressed in a research project of Fortune 1000 firms consisting of a mail questionnaire and in-depth personal interviews.The majority of these firms did not have a new business venture unit (70%). Of those firms that did, the average age of their unit was 5.3 years and the range of ages was from a few months to 20 years. In addition, the range of employees in the new business venture unit varied greatly: from one to 100. Firms in the primary product lines of chemical and medical products, computers, beauty products, and feminine products tended to have new business venture units more than did firms in other product areas. These units contained a variety of departments, including marketing (the most frequent), finance, and research and development. Through modest increases in the number of new products introduced each year, the new business venture units also significantly increased the per- centages of sales attributed to products introduced within the previous three years. A good environment for a successful new business venture unit included: encouraging new ideas; allowing mistakes and failure; making available the resources of the firm; encouraging teamwork; establishing broad per- formance goals and an appropriate reward system; and having top management strongly support the unit.     

Managing threats in the global era: The impact and response to SARS

In early 2003, the SARS virus brought disruption of public and business activities in many areas of the world, particularly Asia. As a result of its impact, SARS quickly established itself as a new kind of global uncertainty and posed challenges for traditional methods of risk management. This article examines the impact that SARS has had through means of a case study and builds on this to provide recommendations for how uncertainty may be managed in an increasingly globalized world. Reconsideration of strategic and risk‐management approaches have become necessary. Supply‐chain management and corporate strategy require a fundamental rethink to balance the pursuit of efficiency with increased responsiveness and flexibility. Unpredictability and turbulence in the international business environment suggest that traditional planning approaches that assume linear growth may give way to more scenario‐based planning. This will encourage firms to contemplate a variety of possible futures and better prepare them for unanticipated events. Similarly, contingent‐based continuity plans help businesses continue running even during a crisis. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

New venture strategy and profitability: A venture capitalist's assessment

This study uses theoretically justified criteria from the industrial organization (IO) strategy literature and applies it to a new domain, namely, venture capitalists' decision making. Specifically, the study investigates the types of information venture capitalists utilize when evaluating new ventures and how venture capitalists use this information to assess likely new venture profitability. In the interest of advancing our understanding of the decision making policies of venture capitalists, this study addresses many of the limitations of previous research.A review of IO research suggests important relationships between a number of strategy variables and new venture profitability. Some of the relationships proposed by IO strategy research are contingent in nature. The strategy variables and their relationships with profitability are investigated in the domain of venture capitalists' decision making. Individual and aggregate decision making analyses identified those strategy variables (criteria) venture capitalists utilize in assessing likely new venture profitability, namely, timing, key success factor stability, lead time, competitive rivalry, educational capability, industry-related competence, timing × key success factor stability interaction, timing × lead time interaction, and timing × educational capability interaction.On average, the most important criterion for venture capitalists in their assessment of profitability is industry-related competence. The second tier of importance is competitive rivalry, timing, and educational capability. The third tier of importance is lead time, key success factor stability, and timing × lead time interaction. Other interactions are less important. Therefore, while venture capitalists use contingent decision policies, main effects dominate. If venture capitalists use a reported 8 to 12 minutes on average to evaluate a business plan (Sandberg 1986), then this study's findings may help the inexperienced venture capitalist allocate time towards assessing those attributes of primary importance. Although more complex relationships exist between the attributes, the inexperienced venture capitalist can take comfort from this study's findings that main effects dominant amongst senior venture capitalists. Senior venture capitalists may take less comfort from their importance placed on main effects in light of research from IO, which suggests the importance of contingent relationships. The results may also have practical application towards training.How should venture capital firms train their new employees? Should venture capital firms rely solely on experienced venture capitalists lecturing the inexperienced on the criteria they use in assessing a new venture proposal? Like most decision makers, venture capitalists have limited insight into their assessments and venture capital firms need to be aware of the gap between “espoused” policies and policies “in use.” The information being taught needs to be supplemented with venture capitalists' decision-making research that investigates decision policies “in use”, such as this study. Venture capitalist training could also involve experiential learning, in conjunction with cognitive feedback about the decision policies used, to accelerate the learning process. Experiential learning using cognitive feedback maximizes industry related learning while minimizing the cost of inexperienced decisions. For the entrepreneur seeking capital, this increased understanding of venture capitalists' decision making may help them better target their business plans and presentations at those criteria venture capitalists' find most critical to the profitability of a new venture.     

Designing transformative learning experiences for managerial transition to integrative CSR

Business leaders have increasingly committed to redefining corporate purpose in terms of corporate social responsibility (CSR). The challenge now is to enact this commitment. This article argues that to do so, managers must adopt a new cognitive frame (or mental lens). Specifically, managers must disengage from their existing instrumental frames, under which they consider CSR only instrumentally as a means to drive profit and pay only peripheral attention to external stakeholder goals, and instead engage with an integrative frame, in which CSR goals are intrinsic to business plans and are considered equivalent to, and simultaneously with, the firm’s financial goals. To enable managerial transition from the established instrumental frame to a novel, challenging, integrative frame, this article presents a transformative learning experience (TLE). In the TLE, managers first are immersed in a business initiative explicitly designed to expose the inadequacies of the instrumental frame for the redefined corporate purpose. This activates disorienting dilemmas in which the instrumental frame no longer applies but a new frame is not yet apparent. In the second phase, firms provide managers with heuristics such as metaphorical reasoning to enable experimentation with an integrative frame. This article provides guidelines for the structure in which this process should be embedded, how this process can be activated, and the process and learning outcomes to measure.     

The anatomy of a corporate venturing program: Factors influencing success

The author proposes a classification framework for factors that affect corporate venture success. Then, a database of 37 new venture investments by Exxon, including 18 venture capital investments, is analyzed for insight into the relative affect of these factors on venture technical and financial success. This article presents a statistical analysis of those factors which were quantified.As a group the venture capital investments were financially far more successful for Exxon than the internally initiated ventures. This striking difference stimulated the retrospective analysis reported here. The author was in a position to observe the program over its entire life span and had first-hand knowledge of each venture's technology, markets, and personnel. Because of the mix of venture capital and internal investments, the author was also in a position to compare the two modes of investment.Factors affecting venture success are broadly classified as extrinsic and intrinsic. Extrinsic or environmental factors are those determined by the form of investment sponsorship (e.g., corporate or venture capital) and the characteristics of the investment sponsor. Extrinsic factors are segregated into two categories: structural and procedural. These factors are defined as the degree of difference between the corporate and venture environment in each category.The four structural factors (technology, market, organization, and people) are summed up as the overall degree of structural congruence. The author postulates that the degree of congruence is directly related to venture success within the corporation. To take the corporation into new markets some incongruence is required. Too much incongruence probably pushes the risk of failure too high. The corporation's procedures for management of this incongruence will determine the degree to which it can successfully diversify its business.The four procedural factors (control, selection of venture managers, incentive compensation, and financing) are dealt with as differences between the corporate environment and an independent venture environment. Major differences in procedural factors usually exist between corporate and venture capital sponsored ventures. They probably explain to some extent the relative greater financial success of the Exxon venture capital investments as a group. However, the statistical analysis results indicate that the identified intrinsic factors are more important in explaining relative venture success.Intrinsic factors are those inherent to the venture itself, and are subdivided into two categories: product related (market and technical risk levels) and managerial (relative experience levels). Each of the 37 Exxon ventures was rated for success and for the intrinsic factors using a simple ordinal range of 3 to 6 values. The product related risk factors showed a significant inverse correlation with financial success. The level of venture managers' prior experience in the venture's target market area and their level of prior general managerial experience showed an even greater correlation with financial success. The sample correlation coefficient between the financial success rating SF and the sum of the ratings for prior marketing and managerial experience (XS + XM) was 0.809 with a standard error of only 0.105.Selection of the influential extrinsic and intrinsic factors is largely within the control of corporate management. An approach to selection of these factors similar to that used by private venture capital fund managers should greatly improve the overall success of internal corporate ventures.     

Managing Family Businesses in Small Communities

Small businesses located in communities with populations of less than 10,000 were identified in a national sample of family businesses and examined for differences in their management strategies (n = 384). These businesses were first clustered by level and type of management strategy and then analyzed to ascertain differences and similarities in both personal and business firm characteristics among the family business manager groupings. Problems associated with small business management and sources of assistance were also identified. Findings suggest that managers of small family businesses located in small U.S. communities who practiced strategies focusing on extensive planning and controlling perceived their businesses to be successful; however, these managers noted that their greatest problem involved development of sound marketing strategies.     

Engaging values in international business practice

Managerial decisions and behaviors in the international business arena have ethical implications across cultures and countries. The need for ethics and core values in business practice has been heightened by continued business scandals and ethical managerial lapses that have violated public trust. Global businesses can offer practical guidance and set ethical examples for others to follow by establishing corporate values beyond written business codes. Four key work values (Honesty, Fairness, Concern of Others, and Achievement) known to be present in businesses across cultures, are put forth as a baseline start for multinational corporation leaders. Offered is a process for making the core values unique to an organization, and for adopting and training managers in the use of core values. Presented is evidence of managerial implementation of the core work values, and managers’ alignment of work values with organizational strategies. By addressing the values and principles of their workplaces, international businesses can achieve cross-cultural ethical practices, managerial alignment, and global social responsibility.     

The birth and growth of toshiba's laptop and notebook computers: A case study in Japanese corporate venturing

This case study presents the “under the table” birth, accelerated growth, and ultimate success of two major technological and market innovations: (1) the Toshiba laptop computer, a project vetoed twice by corporate headquarters, and (2) the notebook computer, a project hidden from headquarters. Because of the vision, persistence, and championing efforts of a team of passionate Japanese corporate entrepreneurs, a new business was created that is now part of Toshiba's mainstream operations and that has become a significant contributor to the growth and profitability of the corporation. We follow the evolution of this corporate venture from initial failures in 1978 to the success of the laptop computer, first in Europe (1985), then in the United States, and finally in Japan. This was followed by the reincorporation of the venture in the corporate “mainstream” (1987), the worldwide success of the notebook computer (1989), and the continued growth of the business in parallel with repeated promotions of the entrepreneurs.First, a framework is presented for interpreting the case within current theories and practices of the management of innovation and the processes of championing innovative corporate ventures. This framework is expanded to include recent studies on how major corporations have achieved worldwide leadership in high-tech markets. Second, using the analogy of human life from conception to adulthood, the key phases, events, and entrepreneurial actions of Toshiba's PC business are summarized in Table 1. Third, the theoretical framework is applied to a discussion of the unusual aspects of this case. Fourth, we analyze the business strategy and the technology strategy developed by Toshiba. Finally, we summarize the cultural and organizational context of Toshiba as well as other critical factors that contributed to the enduring success of this corporate venture.There are four aspects, in addition to the international setting, that make this case interesting for both scholars and practitioners: (1) the “under the table” development of both the laptop and notebook, (2) the unexpected success of the first product, followed by a second success, (3) the evolution of champi oning at various organizational levels, and (4) the continuity of the strategic vision for Toshiba's information systems business from 1978 to the present, and how this vision was translated into specific business and technological strategies.From the perspective of management of innovation, the successes of both the laptop and the notebook computers were due to the “back to the future“ market research and design process summarized in Table 2. This process, where market requirements drive the design process, was developed by the lead entrepreneur, Tetsuya Mizoguchi, after repeated failures of the conventional process, where the results of R&D drive the design and productspecifications, regardless of market requirements. From the perspective of the championing processes, we can observe both bottom-up and top-down roles (Day 1994): Mizoguchi was the product champion and Nishida the marketing champion in Europe, while General Manager Koga protected Mizoguchi from interference by headquarters; executive champion Mizushima orchestrated the difficult transition of the venture into a corporate mainstream operation. The evolution of the championing process is summarized in Table 3, using the Venkatamaran et al. model (1992). We conclude that the most appropriate model for interpreting this case is a combination of the Day and Venkatamaran et al. models, which emphasizes both multiple championing roles and the transfer of the lead role from one champion to another during the corporate entrepreneurship process.The business strategy and market and technological strategies developed by Toshiba for achieving worldwide leadership in the portable PC market are summarized in Figures 1 and 2. More broadly, the process and critical factors that determined Toshiba's success can be visualized according to Figure 3. The corporate entrepreneurs and champions were driven away from mainframes by a vision of distributed and interconnected computing that compelled them to focus on personal computers. This focus determined the winning business strategy (fully compatible portable units) which in turn determined the technological and market strategies (miniaturization and complementarity to IBM). At the same time, this focus allowed the entrepreneurs to concentrate their scarce resources on the “back to the future” design process and develop unique core competencies. This coupling of winning strategies with unique core competencies made possible Toshiba's potential leadership in the marketplace. Actual leadership was achieved through continuous, step-by-step learning by doing and through market feedback that further reinforced the adopted strategies and enhanced the core competencies. Six critical factors contributed to the long-term success of the corporate venture: (1) the venture had the potential to achieve worldwide leadership in a mainstream area of the corporation, (2) the PC market in Europe and the United States (but not initially in Japan) was fragmented and highly receptive to unique innovations, (3) the corporate entrepreneurs were driven by a long-range vision of the business, with focused strategies and well-defined objectives, (4) the entrepreneurs were persistent and undeterred by repeated failures in the marketplace and by the distrust and hostility of headquarters, (5) the organizational context, because of slack internal controls, allowed the diversion of funds and manpower to the “under the table” venture and, finally (6) the role of entrepreneurs evolved from underground innovators to product, executive, and corporate champions in order to reinforce, broaden, and implement their vision.     

Meaning Making by Managers: Corporate Discourse on Environment and Sustainability in India

The globally generated concepts of environment and sustainability are fast gaining currency in international business discourse. Sustainability concerns are concurrently becoming significant to business planning around corporate social responsibility and integral to organizational strategies toward enhancing shareholder value. The mindset of corporate managers is a key factor in determining company approaches to sustainability. But what do corporate managers understand by sustainability? Our study explores discursive meaning negotiation surrounding the concepts of environment and sustainability within business discourse. The study is based on qualitative interpretive research drawing from symbolic interactionism (Blumer, Symbolic interactionism: perspective and method. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1969) which postulates that meaning in discourse is an essentially contested domain dependent upon negotiation in the Habermasian tradition of mutually respectful dialogue (Habermas, The theory of communicative action: lifeworld and system: a critique of functionalist reason. Beacon Press, Boston 1987). Data from semi-structured intensive interviews of a small sample of senior corporate managers was analyzed to examine how corporate elites in India frame their approach to sustainability issues and respond to external pressures for deeper corporate responsibility. The findings point to the existence of a distinctively local narrative with strong potential for the discursive negotiation of personal and collective understanding of ethical and socio-cultural values that may help internalize broader sustainability considerations into corporate decision-making processes.     

Business Ethics Should Study Illicit Businesses: To Advance Respect for Human Rights

Business ethics should include illicit businesses as targets of investigation. For, though such businesses violate human rights they have been largely ignored by business ethicists. It is time to surmount this indifference in view of recent international efforts to define illicit businesses for regulatory purposes. Standing in the way, however, is a meta-ethical question as to whether any business can be declared unqualifiedly immoral. In support of an affirmative answer I address a number of counter-indications by comparing approaches to organized crime and to corporate crime, comparing the ethical critique of businesses studied in business ethics and those socially banned, and comparing the business ethics assumption as to businesses’ ethicality to societal ethical neutrality regarding war-related businesses. My conclusion: to help advance respect for human rights, business ethicists should apply their expertise to the task of defining illicit businesses.     

Competing models of entrepreneurial intentions

Why are intentions interesting to those who care about new venture formation? Entrepreneurship is a way of thinking, a way of thinking that emphasizes opportunities over threats. The opportunity identification process is clearly an intentional process, and, therefore, entrepreneurial intentions clearly merit our attention. Equally important, they offer a means to better explain—and predict—entrepreneurship.We don't start a business as a reflex, do we? We may respond to the conditions around us, such as an intriguing market niche, by starting a new venture. Yet, we think about it first; we process the cues from the environment around us and set about constructing the perceived opportunity into a viable business proposition.In the psychological literature, intentions have proven the best predictor of planned behavior, particularly when that behavior is rare, hard to observe, or involves unpredictable time lags. New businesses emerge over time and involve considerable planning. Thus, entrepreneurship is exactly the type of planned behavior Bird 1988, Katz and Gartner 1988 for which intention models are ideally suited. If intention models prove useful in understanding business venture formation intentions, they offer a coherent, parsimonious, highly-generalizable, and robust theoretical framework for understanding and prediction.Empirically, we have learned that situational (for example, employment status or informational cues) or individual (for example, demographic characteristics or personality traits) variables are poor predictors. That is, predicting entrepreneurial activities by modeling only situational or personal factors usually resulted in disappointingly small explanatory power and even smaller predictive validity. Intentions models offer us a significant opportunity to increase our ability to understand and predict entrepreneurial activity.The current study compares two intention-based models in terms of their ability to predict entrepreneurial intentions: Ajzen's theory of planned behavior (TPB) and Shapero's model of the entrepreneurial event (SEE). Ajzen argues that intentions in general depend on perceptions of personal attractiveness, social norms, and feasibility. Shapero argues that entrepreneurial intentions depend on perceptions of personal desirability, feasibility, and propensity to act. We employed a competing models approach, comparing regression analyses results for the two models. We tested for overall statistical fit and how well the results supported each component of the models. The sample consisted of student subjects facing imminent career decisions. Results offered strong statistical support for both models.(1) Intentions are the single best predictor of any planned behavior, including entrepreneurship. Understanding the antecedents of intentions increases our understanding of the intended behavior. Attitudes influence behavior by their impact on intentions. Intentions and attitudes depend on the situation and person. Accordingly, intentions models will predict behavior better than either individual (for example, personality) or situational (for example, employment status) variables. Predictive power is critical to better post hoc explanations of entrepreneurial behavior; intentions models provide superior predictive validity. (2) Personal and situational variables typically have an indirect influence on entrepreneurship through influencing key attitudes and general motivation to act. For instance, role models will affect entrepreneurial intentions only if they change attitudes and beliefs such as perceived self-efficacy. Intention-based models describe how exogenous influences (for eample, perceptions of resource availability) change intentions and, ultimately, venture creation. (3) The versatility and robustness of intention models support the broader use of comprehensive, theory-driven, testable process models in entrepreneurship research (MacMillan and Katz 1992). Intentional behavior helps explain and model why many entrepreneurs decide to start a business long before they scan for opportunities.Understanding intentions helps researchers and theoreticians to understand related phenomena. These include: what triggers opportunity scanning, the sources of ideas for a business venture, and how the venture ultimately becomes a reality. Intention models can describe how entrepreneurial training molds intentions in subsequent venture creation (for example, how does training in business plan writing change attitudes and intentions?). Past research has extensively explored aspects of new venture plans once written. Intentionality argues instead that we study the planning process itself for determinants of venturing behavior. We can apply intentions models to other strategic decisions such as the decision to grow or exit a business. Researchers can model the intentions of critical stakeholders in the venture, such as venture capitalists' intentions toward investing in a given company. Finally, management researchers can explore the overlaps between venture formation intentions and venture opportunity identification.Entrepreneurs themselves (and those who teach and train them) should benefit from a better understanding of their own motives. The lens provided by intentions affords them the opportunity to understand why they made certain choices in their vision of the new venture.Intentions-based models provide practical insight to any planned behavior. This allows us to better encourage the identification of personally-viable, personally-credible opportunities. Teachers, consultants, advisors, and entrepreneurs should benefit from a better general understanding of how intentions are formed, as well as a specific understanding of how founders' beliefs, perceptions, and motives coalesce into the intent to start a business. This understanding offers sizable diagnostic power, thus entrepreneurship educators can use this model to better understand the motivations and intentions of students and trainees and to help students and trainees understand their own motivations and intentions.Carefully targeted training becomes possible. For example, ethnic and gender differences in career choice are largely explained by self-efficacy differences. Applied work in psychology and sociology tells us that we already know how to remediate self-efficacy differences. Raising entrepreneurial efficacies will raise perceptions of venture feasibility, thus increasing the perception of opportunity.Economic and community development hinges not on chasing smokestacks, but on growing new businesses. To encourage economic development in the form of new enterprises we must first increase perceptions of feasibility and desirability. Policy initiatives will increase business formations if those initiatives positively influence attitudes and thus influence intentions. The growing trends of downsizing and outsourcing make this more than a sterile academic exercise. Even if we successfully increase the quantity and quality of potential entrepreneurs, we must also promote such perceptions among critical stakeholders including suppliers, financiers, neighbors, government officials, and the larger community.The findings of this study argue that promoting entrepreneurial intentions by promoting public perceptions of feasibility and desirability is not just desirable; promoting entrepreneurial intentions is also thoroughly feasible.