The IMF After the Asian Crisis: Merits and Limitations of the ‘Long‐term Development Partner’ Role

We examine the view, espoused by a number of commentators in recent months, that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) should seek to withdraw from its long‐term lending operations, in the wake of the recent financial crisis in Asia and elsewhere, and restrict itself to its ‘core competency’ of preventing and where necessary lending into financial crisis. This view is based on a belief that such long‐term lending crowds out both private sector operations and short‐term IMF lending; and that it is ineffective, because of weaknesses in the IMF’s conditionality. Both of these propositions, we argue, can be challenged. In the poorer developing countries there is virtually no private sector to crowd out, and Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) operations have been conspicuously successful, not only at promoting growth, but also at achieving structural changes not at all achieved by aid donors such as strengthening the tax base. Such changes inevitably require a longer time‐period than the standard three years of an IMF standby, not only in order to induce a production response but also in order to achieve the necessary measure of stabilisation and economic reform without imposing social pressures which wreck the production response. The latter argument is particularly powerful in middle income countries, and provides an argument for IMF support to these countries also whilst they are temporarily excluded from international capital markets. Often also a long‐term presence is needed to achieve effective leverage in short‐term operations. In such cases the IMF’s long‐term lending should be seen as preconditional to the success of, and not as an alternative to, its short‐term operations. We therefore argue for the retention of the Fund’s long‐term lending function; and for this function not to be transferred to the World Bank, which has less credibility in global financial markets and less comparative advantage in macro‐economic management. Measures are indeed needed to reduce the level of the IMF’s exposure to risk in poorer developing countries, but those, we believe, should consist of the preventive measures currently going on, and measures to increase the ratio of equity to debt, rather than measures which would jeopardise the progress in long‐term poverty alleviation capacity achieved by the Fund over recent years     

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Catalytic Effect: Do IMF Agreements Improve Access of Emerging Economies to International Financial Markets?

We investigate whether countries have access to loans with better conditions after an International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreement. We conduct an empirical analysis which takes into account both the maturity and the interest rate of public and publicly guaranteed private debt. A two‐stage least squares estimation method is used to avoid selection bias problems. Panel data covering 116 countries between 1984 and 2007 and two other subsets of this panel data are used. The results indicate an improvement in access to international financial markets when an IMF programme is announced. The improvement increases as the sample consists of better‐performing countries. We conclude that, the catalytic effect may lower the level of commitment, political will and ‘ownership’ of the programme of the borrower country. On the other hand, borrower countries should consider the catalytic effect in determining the amount of financial assistance from the IMF.     

Over‐optimism and the IMF

One way of assessing the impact of IMF programmes is to see whether performance and policy targets are achieved. However, does a failure to hit targets mean that the programmes have been unsuccessful, or could it be that targets have been too ambitious? This paper analyses political economy factors impinging on governments and on the IMF that may lead to serial over‐optimism. It goes on to examine the empirical evidence that is consistent with over‐optimism. Having considered whether over‐optimism is a cause for concern, and concluded that it is, the paper considers reforms that would allow realism to replace it. By eliminating over‐optimism it is argued that the psychology of failure surrounding IMF programmes could be significantly reduced or even broken.     

Reforming the IMF's Weighted Voting System

This paper surveys various proposals to reform the IMF's quota determination process and voting regime. We first provide some necessary context by describing IMF decision rules, including the methods by which the Fund determines quotas according to countries’ relative positions in the world economy. This section also addresses the arbitrariness of the IMF quota determination process and how IMF decision rules hamper developing country influence within the Fund. Following this, we review several proposals designed to provide developing countries greater voice in IMF decision‐making. We conclude that the problems of developing country representation are not likely to be fixed by either reallocating quotas on the margins of the existing IMF system or by tinkering with the quota‐determination formulas. Rather, more fundamental institutional adjustments will be required.     

The Completion Rate of IMF Programmes: What We Know,Don’t Know and Need to Know

Although a great deal of attention has been paid to IMF conditionality and to the effects of IMF programmes, relatively little attention has been paid to their completion rate. However, the record is that the clear majority of Fund programmes are uncompleted. Is this a cause for concern and why is it that the completion rate is low? In principle, a number of factors could be at work. Gaining a better understanding of what these are should allow policy reform at the IMF to improve performance. While there are things that we do not know and need to know about programme completion, we know enough to delineate the broad direction that policy should take.     

The lending policy of the International Monetary Fund

In the worldwide economic and debt crisis of the eighties the International Monetary Fund increasingly became the “lender of last resort” for a great many Third World countries. With world trade weak and interest rates high, a considerable number of developing countries got into serious balance-of-payments difficulties. The demand for stand-by and extended arrangements with the Fund rose dramatically. The conditions or adjustment programmes linked to this lending not infrequently led to serious social and political tensions in the countries concerned. The term “IMF riots” was coined, and the conditionality of credit again became the subject of political and academic debate.     

Stabilisation and Structural Adjustment in Developing Countries

Abstract

This paper analyses and compares World Bank structural adjustment programmes and International Monetary Fund (IMF) stabilisation programmes in Malawi during the 1980s and Jordan during the 1990s. Both are small aid-dependant economies with a narrow export base making them vulnerable to exogenous shocks. The article pays particular attention to the political economy environment in which reform programmes are implemented and to the role of exogenous shocks, both adverse and favourable, in determining the outcome of the programmes. The sequencing of reforms is also assessed in both countries.     

Debt Relief for Low Income Countries: Is it Effective and Efficient?

Although a great deal of attention has been paid to IMF conditionality and to the effects of IMF programmes, relatively little attention has been paid to their completion rate. However, the record is that the clear majority of Fund programmes are uncompleted. Is this a cause for concern and why is it that the completion rate is low? In principle, a number of factors could be at work. Gaining a better understanding of what these are should allow policy reform at the IMF to improve performance. While there are things that we do not know and need to know about programme completion, we know enough to delineate the broad direction that policy should take.     

The role of training in reducing poverty: the case of the ultra‐poor in Bangladesh

Although microcredit is considered the main vehicle for increasing the income of the poor and alleviating poverty in Bangladesh, it is now well recognised that more than this is needed to reach the ultra poor in rural areas. Consequently, almost half of the Bangladesh population is in some way linked to non‐governmental organizations' development programmes, at the centre of which is poverty alleviation. The study reported here developed a comprehensive cross‐sectional intervention to examine whether the income of those who participated in the training programmes of non‐governmental organizations was related to that participation. The study was carried out in three leading organizations in three districts of Bangladesh using a quantitative associational research design. Three hundred responses were analysed using multiple regression analysis to elicit information from ultra poor clients who had received training. The results suggest that the post‐training income level of the trainees was negatively rather than positively related to the fact of their participation in training, the opposite of what human capital theory would lead us to expect.     

Scaling‐up Foreign Aid: Will the ‘Big Push’ Work?

International donors are substantially scaling‐up aid programmes. At the same time, there are widespread reservations over how much aid recipient countries can use effectively. Such concerns are supported by the aid effectiveness literature which finds that there are limits to the amounts of aid recipients can efficiently absorb. This article demonstrates that a ‘big push’ in foreign aid will not lead to diminishing returns as long as donors get the inter‐country allocation of aid right. This is true even if donors provide aid at levels equal to the well‐known target of 0.7 per cent of their gross national income.     

Should the IMF resort to private credit markets for refinancing?

The International Monetary Fund is at present examining the possibility of borrowing on private capital markets in order to meet its growing refinancing needs. Reservations concerning such a step have been voiced in particular by the oil-importing developing countries. Professor Konrad analyses the pros and cons.     

Das Securities Market Programme — viele Vorteile für den Euroraum

The Eurosystem’s Securities Market Programme (SMP,) the purchase of government bonds of euro area countries strongly affected by the crisis, started in 2010 and ended in 2012. The SMP benefited all parties concerned – the Eurosystem, all euro area countries and the crisis countries. The positive experience with the SMP can be replicated in the private sector with the creation of an exchangetraded fund (ETF), a Smart Beta ETF - SMP Fund. Like the SMP, the SMP Fund would buy government bonds, according to the ECB capital key. As an ETF, the SMP Fund would have low costs. Profits above the German Bund benchmark would be shared: 80% to investors, 10% to the SMP Fund and 10% to advisers who recommend the purchase. The related risks would be reduced by the diversification of the SMP Fund, the financing mechanisms of the euro area, especially the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) and the banking union. The SMP Fund could support the euro area fiscal capacity and the EU capital markets union. Past and future SMP profits create a fiscal capacity for the euro area with an initial amount of 50 billion Euro.     

Mini‐symposium on the WTO Non‐agricultural Market Access (NAMA) Negotiations

NAMA liberalisation alone will not be sufficient to achieve the development goals of the Doha Round. The structure of developing countries’ economies and weaknesses in their infrastructure and institutions mean that adjustment to liberalisation is often costly and export responses slow. To make NAMA work, developing countries will need technical and financial support to raise their ability to adapt to greater openness and globalisation pressures and to increase their export capabilities. Although developing countries should decide how to raise their ability to adjust and to increase exports, bilateral donors and multilateral agencies will need to fund NAMA support programmes. The WTO, however, is not the appropriate or competent international agency to provide or disburse such funding. It can provide technical advice and offers a negotiating vehicle for industrial countries to signal that the development aims of the Doha Round are recognised in substantive terms. If industrial countries support developing countries’ NAMA‐related adjustment costs in addition to offering NAMA tariff cuts, the chances of a successful Doha agreement and genuine pro‐development outcomes will be boosted significantly.     

SCALE‐INDEPENDENT TECHNOLOGICAL‐KNOWLEDGE BIAS,HUMAN‐CAPITAL ACCUMULATION AND GENDER INEQUALITY

We present a dynamic, non‐scale general‐equilibrium model with female and male human capital where Schumpeterian R&D and human‐capital accumulation are the engines of growth and gender wage inequality. Gender wage inequality is encouraged by changes in relative supply and relative demand of both human‐capital types. Relative supply restricts the levels of employed human capital. Relative demand is affected by the technological‐knowledge bias, which is driven by the price channel and is affected by human‐capital accumulation. In particular, the female‐premium per unit of human capital and per worker increases when the observed discrimination against women decreases or is removed.     

Transparency in non‐tariff measures: An international comparison

We construct an index of non‐tariff measures (NTM ) transparency based on notifications to the WTO under the sanitary and phytosanitary and technical barriers to trade agreements, the existence of a trade portal giving ready access to trade‐relevant regulations, the existence of NTM data collected under the MAST classification, and the results of an experiment conducted between 2015 and 2016 where we asked for specific regulations concerning the import of a particular product on behalf of a private company. The resulting country ranking shows that OECD countries are, by and large, the most transparent, but also shows that ASEAN countries score well compared to other developing countries.     

Capital Controls Re‐examined: The Case for ‘Smart’ Controls

The global financial crisis which began in east Asia in 1997 is not over, neither is the inquest into its implications for adjustment policy. In the wake of this crisis, we focus here on the role of capital controls, which formed a much publicised part of the crisis‐coping strategy in one country (Malaysia) and, less openly, were also deployed by other crisis‐afflicted countries. Evaluation so far has examined different target variables with different estimation methods, generally concentrating on efficiency and stability indicators and ignoring equity measures; it has also typically treated ‘control’ as a one‐zero dummy variable, ignoring the ‘quality’ of intervention and in particular the extent to which efficiency gains are obtained in exchange for controls. Partly because of these limitations, the literature has reached no consensus on the impact of controls; however, it is moving over towards acknowledging that the quality and type of controls is important, as well as their intensity. We propose an approach in which the government plays off short‐term political security against long‐term economic gain; the more insecure its political footing, the greater the weight it gives to political survival, which is likely to increase the probability of controls being imposed. The modelling of this approach generates a governmental ‘policy reaction function’ and an impact function for controls, which are estimated by simultaneous panel‐data methods across a sample of thirty developing and transitional countries between 1980–2003, using, for the period since 1996, the ‘new’ IMF dataset which differentiates between controls by type. We find that controls appear to cause increases in income equality, and are significantly associated with political insecurity and relatively low levels of openness to trade. They do not, in our analysis, materially influence the level of whole‐economy productivity or GDP across the sample of countries examined, although they do influence productivity in particular sectors. But the dispersion around this central finding is wide: the tendency for controls to depress productivity by encouraging rent‐seeking sometimes is, and sometimes is not, counteracted by purposive government policy actions to maintain competitiveness. Whether or not this happens is vital, on both efficiency and equity grounds. We make the case for ‘smart’ capital controls – controls which are time‐limited and contain an inbuilt incentive to increased productivity.     

Preference Erosion,Government Revenues and Non‐tariff Trade Barriers

Developing countries benefiting from developed country unilateral trade preferences fear that Doha Round tariff cuts will erode the value of those preferences. That these programmes confer significant benefits, however, is not clear. Studies indicate that the impact of preference erosion would be minimal for most developing countries. But for a small subset of middle‐income and least‐developed countries, concern may be warranted. WTO members, should address affected countries’ concerns, perhaps by tailoring WTO tariff negotiations to lessen adjustment pressures and providing development assistance. Developing countries also are anxious that lower tariffs will reduce government revenues. Dependence on tariff revenue is diminishing and trade liberalisation need not result in lower total tax revenues or even lower customs revenues. Much depends on a country's current tariff and trade regime, its tax structure and its overall economic structure. At some point, a country does need to broaden its tax base and look to other revenue sources to offset declining tariff revenues. Tax reform, therefore, complements trade reform. A third area of developing country concern is non‐tariff barriers (NTBs), which may limit market access even after tariffs are reduced. Despite prior WTO work in this area, NTBs remain a thorny issue for all WTO members.     

The returns to training in Russia: a difference‐in‐differences analysis

The experience of developed countries – particularly member‐states of the OECD – has shown that employers are actively investing in developing the human capital of their employees. According to research conducted by the World Bank, more than half of the companies in developed countries provide their employees with training in one form or another. There is, however, reason to believe that the situation is quite different in Russia. Some studies have shown that the level of investment in training in Russia is much lower. This difference can be explained by the fact that employers do not see the point in such investment because it is much easier to lure employees with the required qualifications than to train their own staff. Moreover, Russia faces a problem with high employee mobility, meaning that companies are not sure that they will get a return on their investment. Given these circumstances, the present study examines whether investments in human capital in Russia are profitable. It investigates the wage return to job‐related training using a difference‐in‐differences estimator to control for unmeasured differences in ability and measured differences in past wages as a proxy for ability and motivation. Estimates use panel data from The Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey – Higher School of Economics from 2004 to 2011. As predicted, positive returns to training are identified and the returns increase absolutely with the level of past wages.     

Do High‐Skill Immigrants trigger High‐Quality Trade?

This paper investigates the links between product quality and the pro‐trade effect of ethnic networks using a large panel on bilateral stocks of immigrants with information for 19 OECD destination countries and 177 origin countries. In line with the approach of Rauch and Trindade, we classify traded goods according to their quality level and separately estimate pro‐trade elasticity of ethnic networks for each subgroup. We allow for heterogeneity of immigrants according to both the level of per capita income of their country of origin and their education level. Our findings suggest that the trend of the pro‐trade effect of immigrants over quality seems to be driven by the North–South specialisation across varieties for both supply and demand. Indeed, ethnic networks mostly facilitate imports of those varieties for which their countries of origin have a comparative advantage; as for exports, ethnic networks are more effective in promoting exports to their homeland of those varieties for which there is relatively higher demand. We show that the same trend applies to products characterised by the same degree of differentiation according to the classification proposed by Rauch and – given their lower liquidity constraints and advantages in human capital – we find a greater impact of high‐skilled migrants consistent across all quality levels.     

The IMF and the countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance

In November 1981 Hungary and, one week later, Poland applied for membership of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank). These applications have highlighted a subject which had been neglected for quite some time. This analysis deals with the problems and consequences which arise from the membership of countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon)—the economies of which largely conform to principles of central economic planning—in IMF, an institution organized according to market principles.