Institutional Investors on Boards: Does Their Behavior Influence Corporate Finance?

We examine whether the behavior of institutional investors representatives on boards leads to observable differences in corporate finance. We find that directors representing pressure-sensitive investors (i.e., banks and insurance companies) prefer lower financial leverage whereas pressure-resistant directors (i.e., mutual funds and pension funds) show no particular preference. When analyzed separately, directors appointed by banks and insurance firms have different attitudes. Bank representatives on boards increase both the financial leverage and the banking debt. This result suggests that some types of institutional directors provide financial resources to the firms on whose board they sit, supporting the view that boards manage the uncertainty associated with strategic decision making and provide firms with preferential access to resources and financial expertise. This research has interesting academic and policy implications for the debate over the proper degree of institutional involvement in corporate governance. Different institutional investors have different agendas and incentives for corporate governance, and, therefore, both researchers and policy makers should no longer consider institutional investors as a whole. In addition, our paper calls for new research on the causes and implications of institutional investor involvement in the corporate governance of nonfinancial firms. This new research could require new insights on the dynamics within the boards and on the interplay among the knowledge, incentives and attitudes of quite different directors.     

Socially Responsible Institutional Investment in Private Equity

This article studies institutional investor allocations to the socially responsible asset class. We propose two elements influence socially responsible institutional investment in private equity: internal organizational structure, and internationalization. We study socially responsible investments from Dutch institutional investments into private equity funds, and compare socially responsible investment across different asset classes and different types of institutional investors (banks, insurance companies, and pension funds). The data indicate socially responsible investment in private equity is 40–50% more common when the decision to implement such an investment plan is centralised with a single chief investment officer. Socially responsible investment in private equity is also more common among institutional investors with a greater international investment focus, and less common among fund-of-fund private equity investments.     

机构投资者对企业国际化的影响研究——来自2004～2007年制造业上市公司的证据

本文采用2004～2007年制造业上市公司的数据考察了机构投资者对企业国际化的影响。研究发现,机构投资者的持股对制造业企业的国际化有促进作用;并且不同类型的机构投资者的作用并不相同,其中基金和QFII有显著的促进作用。这些研究结果表明机构投资者积极主义在我国制造业上市公司中有所体现,机构投资者持股有利于我国制造业企业的国际化,实施"走出去"战略。本文基于以上结论,对我国发展不同类型的机构投资者提出了相应的建议。     

Outward foreign direct investment of publicly listed firms from China: A corporate governance perspective

This study examines the influence of key corporate governance factors on the internationalization decisions of emerging economy (EE) firms. By integrating the resource-based view and agency theory, it investigates the effects of controlling owner identity, non-controlling shareholder ownership, and the interactions of these with CEO power, in order to reveal their individual and joint effects on the outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) propensity of EE firms. This empirical study of 224 Chinese publicly listed firms found positive effects of ownership of domestic institutional investors and foreign corporations on the OFDI propensity of the firms, which were moderated by the power of the CEOs in these firms.     

Institutional Ownership and Private Equity Placements: Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms

This paper examines the impact of institutional ownership on the performance of private equity placements (PEPs) for listed firms in China. We find that the presence of institutional investors can alleviate the information asymmetries between listed firms and the market. The market reaction to PEP announcements is significantly smaller if there is a higher portion of institutional shareholdings. Long‐term firm operational performance after PEPs is positively correlated with institutional shareholdings. Moreover, we find that the relationship between institutional shareholdings and PEP performance is mainly driven by nonlisted corporate investors and mutual funds. Finally, the relationship between PEP performance and institutional shareholdings is stronger in smaller PEP issuers.     

Does corporate diversification create value in emerging markets? New evidence from Chile

Using a sample of 85 Chilean firms listed in the Santiago Stock Exchange from 2005 to 2013, we analyze the impact of corporate diversification on firm value. We consider voting rights of the main shareholder and institutional investors’ influence on firm value. We report firm‐value destruction for diversified firms. Regarding ownership concentration, we report a negative relation between the largest shareholder ownership and firm value. Separation between voting rights and cash flows rights of this shareholder is negatively related to firm value. While Pension Fund Administrators (AFP) mitigate firm value destruction in diversified firms, other institutional investors do not play an active role in controlling value destruction. Finally, if the largest owner is a family, we report firm‐value creation in diversified firms. Copyright © 2016 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Transfer of corporate governance practices into weak emerging market environments by foreign institutional investors

We advance the practice transfer theorising of corporate governance (CG) by developing a framework that uncovers how foreign institutional investors (FIIs) improve on CG practices of firms in weak institutional environments. Using hand-collected data for 85 listed Nigerian firms covering the 2011–2016 period, we show that FIIs bypass the weak regulatory environment in emerging markets by transferring good CG standards to host countries. Furthermore, FIIs’ ability to enhance the CG quality of firms in such environments is moderated by their home country’s legal system, with FIIs from countries with strong legal enforcement having an enhanced ability to improve CG practices of firms in weak institutional environments. However, cultural differences between the FIIs’ home and host countries negatively moderate this relationship. Our results are robust to the choice of estimation technique and various sources of endogeneity.     

Further evaluation of conglomerate performance

In the early years conglomerates were seen as the financial concept of the future. More recently their economic advantages have been seriously questioned. This article reviews the existing literature on conglomerate performance and extends the investigation through the early seventies. While conglomerates provide investors with less variability from market movements than do nonconglomerate firms, they provide less diversification than closed-end investment companies and mutual funds. Furthermore, risk adjusted performance measures of conglomerates did not differ significantly from those of other firms of portfolios. Thus, conglomerates should be viewed simply as another category of investments that plot along the security market line.     

异质性机构对企业集团关联交易影响的实证研究

以2004—2010年中国A股上市公司机构投资者持股数据、企业集团与上市公司关联交易数据为样本,研究二者之间的关系。结果表明:机构投资者持股对减轻企业集团关联交易现象影响显著,并存在着"U"型的关系,即随着机构持股比例的上升,其对企业集团关联交易的抑制作用先增强后减弱;民营企业中机构投资者对企业集团关联交易的抑制作用强于国有企业;不同类型的机构投资者与关联交易之间的关系存在差异,即证券投资基金和险资能够有效地抑制关联交易,而合格的境外机构投资者几乎对关联交易不存在抑制效果。     

Institutional ownership and technological relatedness: A test of endogeneity

Building on the previous literature on corporate diversification, institutional ownership and firm innovation, this study proposes an endogenous relationship between institutional ownership and corporate technological relatedness. Technological relatedness is the degree to which a set of industries in which a firm operates its businesses demand similar technological knowledge. A Vector Autoregressive analysis of data from U.S. manufacturing firms shows that firms enhancing technological relatedness attract more institutional investors and as predicted, this pattern is particularly strong for pension fund ownership. In contrast, the analysis fails to show that institutional investors cause a firm's business portfolio to increase in technological relatedness.     

Government ownership and stock liquidity: Evidence from China

This paper documents that state ownership is associated with higher stock liquidity, a finding consistent with lower investor risk perception of firms that benefit from state ownership, like preferential financing and implicit government guarantees. The effect is found to be stronger when government ownership confers stronger benefits like firms with state controlling rather than non-controlling shareholders, and when the benefits of government ownership are important – for smaller firms, for financially constrained firms, and especially during the financial crisis period. These results suggest that investors perceive government ownership as value-enhancing, which increases their willingness to trade in such stocks.     

Interview: The future is bright,the future is hedge funds: An interview with James R. Hedges IV,founder, president,and chief investment officer of LJH Global Investments

Founded in 1992, LJH Global Investments is one of the oldest global hedge fund advisory and fund of hedge funds management firms. Its disciplined approach to evaluating hedge funds and their respective managers is recognized by many financial services firms such as banks, asset management firms, and insurance companies. They rely on the firm as a sub‐advisor to build, manage, and service fund of hedge funds products. Its founder, James R. Hedges IV, was the first fund of hedge funds expert ever invited to speak to the Bank of Japan executives on the burgeoning hedge fund industry. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

The real effects of local mutual funds: Evidence from corporate innovation

This paper investigates whether the proximity between mutual funds and firms could explain corporate innovation. I find that local mutual funds tend to increase firms' R&D expenditures and productivity. Firms with greater local ownership produce more patents and patents with bigger impact. The positive relations are more pronounced for firms with low information quality and poor corporate governance. Further, local funds with more innovative firms outperform the ones with less innovative firms. Finally, firms with higher local ownership are less likely to fire CEOs who engage in innovation, which incentivizes CEOs for risky investments.     

Institutional Interest,Ownership Type,and Environmental Capital Expenditures: Evidence from the Most Polluting Chinese Listed Firms

This study empirically examines whether firms’ environmental capital expenditures impact institutional investors’ investment decisions in the Chinese market. We particularly examine the impact of ownership type on the relationship of environmental capital expenditures and the behavior of different types of institutional investors by classifying institutional investors into two categories, short-term and long-term investors. In addition, this study further investigates whether environmental capital expenditures related to ownership type increase firm value. We find that long-term institutional investors tend to invest in state-owned firms (SOEs) making environmental capital expenditures. Results also indicate that, with governmental backing and encouragement, the market value of SOEs making more environmental capital expenditures is likely to increase. However, no similar results are found for non-SOEs.     

Owner as Manager,Extended Horizons and the Family Firm

Previous work on firm ownership structure suggests that organizations in which ownership and control are combined may be undervalued relative to the market investment rule because decision makers have an incentive to forgo investment projects that managers in firms with specialized ownership find profitable. However, the specialization of ownership and decision-making functions may result in substantial agency costs. This paper shows that these tradeoffs may not exist in family firms. The extended horizons characteristic of family businesses may provide the necessary incentives for decision makers to invest according to the market rule while limiting agency costs that arise when ownership and control are separated. Family ties, loyalty, insurance, and stability are expected to be effective in lengthening the horizons of managers and in providing the incentives for family managers to make efficient investments in the family business.     

International expansion of U.S. manufacturing family businesses: the effect of ownership and involvement

Family firms play an important role in today's global economy. However, limited empirical research has identified factors that spur these firms' internationalization. Highlighting the altruism that pervades family firms, this exploratory study examines the individual and interactive effects of family ownership and involvement on subsequent internationalization of a firm's operations. Results from the analyses of 409 U.S. manufacturing firms show that family ownership and involvement in the firm as well as the interaction of this ownership with family involvement are significantly and positively associated with internationalization. The implications of the findings for research and managerial practice are discussed.     

Institutional investors,selling pressure and crash risk: Evidence from China

Inconsistent with prior literature on the US stock market, our evidence shows the negative role of institutional investors who exacerbate subsequent crash risk in China. This is because institutional ownership amplifies the selling pressure in response to firm’s bad news, which in turn leads to higher stock price crash risk. The positive relation between institutional ownership and crash risk is more (less) pronounced for transient (dedicated) institutional investors, suggesting the selling pressure of short-term investors is heavier. Additionally, competition of institutional investors strengthens institutional selling pressure and hence exacerbates the effect of institutional ownership on crash risk.     

The influence of political risk on the scope of internationalization of regulated companies: Insights from a Spanish sample

Political risk not only constitutes a threat for multinational enterprises but can also be a source of opportunities. Exposure to and accumulated experience dealing with political risk allows firms to better implement a wide set of political actions such as negotiation of entry conditions, lobbying, litigation, campaign contributions and coalition formation, leading to preferential conditions, reduced environmental uncertainty, reduced transaction costs and increased long-term sustainability to the firm. These advantages facilitate investments in countries with higher and more diverse levels of risk and make political risk to be positively associated with the firm's scope of internationalization. This effect is not homogeneous across firms. Drawing from a sample of 164 Spanish companies with investments in 119 countries, we find that the impact is greater for companies in industrial sectors that are the object of greater governmental regulation than it is for firms in non-regulated manufacturing or service sectors, with less frequent interactions with home and host-country institutions.     

Chinese venture investments in the United States, 2010–2017

This article contributes to the understanding of Chinese venture investors in the United States by comprehensively measuring the amount and type of venture investments coming to the United States from China. Venture activity is examined by focusing on the number of investments made by venture capital funds, both U.S.‐ and China‐based that include Chinese corporations undertaking corporate venture capital (CVC). Chinese participation in venture funding of United States emerging companies increased from 21 investments in 2010 to 407 in 2016 and 2017. Venture capital funds account for 78% of the investment activity, with Chinese CVC undertaking 22% of the investments. We contribute to the literature of CVC by providing definitions of three specific types of investing firms: corporate funds, strategic investors, and strategic partnerships. In addition, we provide data and examine the motivations of Chinese firms forming strategic partnerships with United States startups.     

Family Control,Socioemotional Wealth and Earnings Management in Publicly Traded Firms

We examine the unique nature of agency problems within publicly traded family firms by investigating the earnings management decision of dominant family owners relative to non-family. To do so, we draw upon literature demonstrating that family owners are loss averse with respect to the family’s socioemotional wealth, or the affective endowment derived from firm ownership and control. Our theory and findings suggest that potential reputational consequences of earnings management lead family principals to engage in less of this practice relative to non-family firms, and that founder family firms are less likely than non-founder family firms to use earnings management. Moreover, the family-firm effect varies with the firm size, the degree of CEO entrenchment, and the firm’s stock structure. We provide important insights regarding differences between family and non-family principals in the use of unethical accounting practices, thereby extending agency theory and advancing an underdeveloped research area.