Economic policy uncertainty,non-financial enterprises' shadow banking activities and stock price crash risk

At present, the structural contradiction between Economic Financialization and the real economy's long-term weakness has become increasingly prominent. As China enters a “new normal” stage of economic growth, the real investment rate drops, non-financial enterprises continuously allocate resources to the shadow banking system. The financial economy becomes increasingly divorced from reality. This leads us to the questions: will the shadow banking behavior of non-financial companies exacerbate the risk of stock price crash risk? How does the increase in economic policy uncertainty affect the relationship between non-financial companies' shadow banking activities and stock price crash risk?This article uses non-financial listed companies' data from 2007 to 2017 and conducts empirical analysis to answer this question. The study finds that companies engaged in high-leverage, high-risk shadow banking business exacerbate stock crash risk. This effect is only pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises and low social trust regions. The increase in the degree of economic policy uncertainty positively impacts the relationship between non-financial companies' shadow banking business and stock price crash risk. The theoretical mechanism is as follows: the rise in economic policy uncertainty amplifies the positive relationship between shadow banking activities of non-financial companies and stock price crashes by increasing bank loans, investors' sensitivity to external information, risk cross-contagion, and inefficient investment mechanisms. Various robustness tests do not change the research conclusion. This paper has important theoretical and policy guidance significance for reviewing the existing diversified shadow banking system and preventing systemic risks.     

Stock options,restricted stock,salary, or bonus? Managing CEO compensation to maximize organizational performance

CEO pay has gone through remarkable changes over the past two decades. The most striking new features have been the increased use of stock options in the early 2000s, and of restricted stock since then. Both forms of stock-based compensation are intended to resolve the agency problem that occurs when CEOs do not act in the best interests of stockholders, but each has its advantages and limitations. In this instalment of Organizational Performance, we discuss the history of their use and similarities and differences between the two, and argue that both are often overused. Bonuses based on strategic goals, on the other hand, may be underused. We conclude with a contextual approach to guide boards of directors in making choices among the forms of CEO compensation—stock options, restricted stock, salary, and bonus—to incentivize CEOs to work toward maximizing organizational performance. Briefly, stock options are most appropriate for growth firms, and restricted stock for stable firms. Both forms of stock-based compensation are more appropriate for new than for long-tenured CEOs.     

Are Stock Options Grants to CEOs of Stagnant Firms Fair and Justified?

Prior research has examined several ethical questions related to executive compensation. The issues that have received most attention are whether executives’ pay is fair and justified by performance. Since more recent studies show that stock options grants constitute the single largest component in executive compensation, we examine the relations of these grants to economic determinants and corporate governance for firms in the stagnant stage of their lifecycle. We find that, on average, stock options grants comprise a significant portion of annual CEO compensation (26.4%) for stagnant firms. We also find that economic (corporate governance) factors explain less (or more) of the cross-sectional variation in stock options grants for stagnant firms than for growth firms. Furthermore, we document lower pay-performance sensitivity (i.e., weaker incentive alignment) and no improvement in future firm performance from past stock options grants to CEOs of stagnant firms. In particular, our study provides empirical evidence on some inefficiencies associated with stock options grants to CEOs of low potential (stagnant) firms, a long-standing concern of business ethics researchers (Moriarty, 2005; Nichols and Subramaniam, 2001; Perel, 2003). Our results also provide support for the corporate governance reforms discussed in Matsumura and Shin (2005), especially those proposed provisions that curtail the power of CEOs in the governance of firms.     

Revisiting the risk-taking effect of executive stock options on firm performance

While the relation between equity-based compensation and firm performance has been widely discussed, the findings on how executive stock options (ESOs) affect firm value are still inconclusive. This research examines the risk-taking effect of ESOs on firm performance by taking into consideration managers' personal risk aversion. A three-stage-least-squares approach is adopted to examine a simultaneous system of equations describing option compensation, risk-taking, and firm performance. Evidence confirms that ESOs increase managerial risk-taking, but such risk-taking is constrained by managers' personal risk aversion. In addition, evidence indicates that managerial risk-taking induced by ESOs would increase both long-term and near-term stock returns. The negative impact on near-term and the positive impact on long-term returns on investment imply that it takes time for accounting performance to reflect the risk-taking effect of ESOs. These results further indicate that managers focus their concerns more on stock risk and return rather than near-term accounting results.     

The Role of Executive Stock Options in On‐Market Share Buybacks*

The increasing use of on‐market buyback programs in Australia may not be fully explained by the typical motivations of information signaling and free cash flows offered by previous researchers. For some firms at least, management may believe the shares are overvalued. It is in this context that we examine whether managers of firms with high levels of executive stock options have an incentive to initiate buyback programs. It has been argued that managers may be motivated to undertake on‐market buyback programs in order to neutralize the dilution of earnings per share caused by their stock options, rather than for signaling purposes. Our findings are consistent with this argument because we find that the higher the proportion of executive stock options outstanding the more likely it is for firms to undertake larger on‐market buyback programs. Overall our results indicate that the existence of executive stock options influences managers' decision to implement on‐market buyback programs but that it is not the only factor that managers take into consideration.     

Three Estonian Companies' Management of the Russian Boycott During the Summer of 2007

ABSTRACT

This article analyzes three Estonian companies' management of the Russian boycott during the summer of 2007. The explorative nature of the study made a case study methodology a suitable research approach. The respondents' statements about the boycott revealed a “business as usual” attitude. This attitude isaccounted for as a sign of preparation for crises that facilitated the respondent companies' management of the boycott. Also, the sanctions appeared to strengthen the relations between the respondent companies and their Russian partners. The boycott was, therefore, not perceived as a major threat to the respondent companies' businesses in Russia.     

Corporate governance mechanisms and financial performance in China: panel data evidence on listed non financial companies

The objective of this paper is to provide empirical evidence on the influence of corporate governance characteristics and corporate ownership concentrations on the financial performance of Chinese companies. This is based on analysis of a panel data set covering the years 2001 to 2005. The characteristics considered are the ratios of independent directors and professional supervisors on the companies' two boards, and the level of concentration in and type of ownership of the companies. Our chosen performance metric is Tobin's Q. We find that ownership concentration in general is a significant factor in determining firm performance. The degree of board independence is significant, but it only appears to have a positive impact on performance in larger companies. The expertise of the supervisory board is not a significant determinant of corporate financial performance in China. Our findings support a continued focus on making improvements to the operation and effectiveness of China's institutions of corporate governance.     

SKU performance and distribution: A large-scale analysis of the role of product characteristics with store scanner data

This study investigates the relationship between distribution and market share across various consumer packaged goods (CPG) categories and specific stock keeping units (SKUs). The study identifies product-related characteristics that result in substantive deviations above or below market shares predicted by the distribution – market share relationship. The association of product price, brand (private label [PL] v. national brand [NB]) and pack size with above (or below) expected market share for a given distribution level is analysed. Results indicate larger pack sizes, PL and medium price levels result in market share above what would be predicted by an SKU’s distribution. This presents a source for competitive advantage in markets driven by push–pull dynamics.     

An expanded model for the valuation of employee stock options

The unique characteristics of employee stock options make straightforward applications of traditional option pricing models questionable. This study extends the standard pricing model to account for the dilution effect, the employees' exercise pattern, and the state‐dependent employee forfeiture rate. It also performs comparative analysis of popular existing models and the proposed models. Finally, the impacts of the above‐mentioned factors on the fair value of employee stock options are investigated. The results support the claim that our models reflect the reality better than existing models. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 29:713–735, 2009     

Parent control mechanisms,knowledge attributes,knowledge acquisition and performance of IJVs in Taiwan service industries

The study explores parent companies' use of control mechanisms in their international joint venture (IJV), IJV knowledge acquisition and IJVs' performance. Traditionally, control mechanisms are criticized for potentially limiting autonomous learning. However, we propose that knowledge-oriented control mechanisms used by the parent company on its subsidiaries could facilitate knowledge acquisition and learning. This study takes samples from 104 Sino-foreign joint ventures in service industries in Taiwan. The results of the study indicate that in IJV, parent companies require a ‘personnel training’ control mechanism as a guide for gaining codified knowledge from foreign partners. MNCs should apply ‘culture’ and ‘performance’ control mechanisms to gain non-codified knowledge. In turn, the tacit knowledge of IJV results in a better economic, competency-based performance, while explicit knowledge more significantly influences the synthetic performance.     

我国军工上市公司股权结构与经济绩效关系的实证研究

以我国军工上市公司为研究对象,运用主成份分析法求出其综合经济绩效,并在此基础上,进一步运用线性回归模型分别研究了综合经济绩效与军工上市公司的国有股比例、流通股比例、第一大股东持股比例和前五大股东持股比例等变量之间的关系.最后得出结论:我国军工企业国有股减持,增加流通股比例并不必然提高经济绩效.理想的状态是股权结构相对集中.即存在几个相对控股的股东对提高公司经济绩效较为有利.     

我国上市公司股份回购效应分析--兼论股权分置改革背景下回购的作用

我国股票市场成立以来曾发生过多次股份回购事件,本文运用事件研究方法和会计研究法进行实证分析,讨论股份回购对上市公司财富效应、绩效的影响,本文还提出了在股权分置改革背景下对股份回购的一些思考,认为回购对股权分置的解决具有较为实质的辅助作用。     

Attributes of social and human capital disclosure and information asymmetry between managers and investors

We extend the literature on voluntary disclosure by investigating the impact of precision attribute of social and human capital disclosure on information asymmetry. We provide evidence on how the stock market reacts to different levels of information precision. Overall, results suggest that quantitative disclosure reduces share price volatility and increases Tobin's Q. As expected, firm size attenuates the impact of precision attribute of disclosure on information asymmetry. Furthermore, it appears that firms take into account ultimate costs and benefits to shareholders when determining precision attribute of their disclosure. Finally, our results suggest that efficient governance leads to more disclosure. Copyright © 2009 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reversing the Similarity Effect in Stock‐Outs: A New Look at a Renowned Phenomenon in Consumers’ Brand Switching Behavior

Over 40 years of research has established the robustness of the similarity effect (SE; Tversky, 1972 ), which states that the introduction of new options into choice sets predominantly reduces the choice share of similar options. The present work examines whether the SE systematically reverses when real brands are excluded from assortment subsets, as is the case with stock‐outs in real purchase decisions. To this end, within‐subject decisions are examined under certain out‐of‐stock (OOS) conditions in an enhanced experimental design that resembles real shopping environments. Specifically, unforced choices of experienced consumers, inclusive of real payments, are observed for products in online transactions. The results of two studies corroborate the existence of a reserved SE. Specifically, the OOS‐induced switching patterns systematically refute the assumptions of classic economic theory, since consumers disproportionately switch to alternatives which are similar to the unavailable item in contrast to dissimilar substitutes. Finally, managerial implications and potential directions for follow‐up research in the general domain of marketing are deduced.     

The Changing Rewards to Science: The Case of Biotechnology

Little is known about the form and or magnitude of compensation provided university-based scientists working on firm R&D. This is unfortunate, given the important role that university-based scientists play in R&D, and the growing literature concerning compensation and innovation. This paper sheds some light on these issues by examining the compensation of university-based scientists involved with 52 biotech firms that made an initial public offering between March of 1990 and November of 1992. Although the stock holdings of the university scientists are of particular interest, additional forms of compensation received by the scientists are also examined.We find that approximately 10 percent of the university-based scientists affiliated with these companies hold sufficient options or stock to require disclosure at the time of the public offering. A far larger proportion has an equity position in the firm. In many instances the scientists also receive consulting fees or salary from the firm and enter into licensing agreements with the firm. In addition to providing information concerning the compensation of university-based scientists, the empirical work suggests that the rewards to science can be significantly greater than previous work would suggest.     

投机倾向下的股权结构变迁

多年来我国上市公司的股权结构经历了数次大规模调整 ,在公司上市治理的过程中一再强调有效的股权结构 ,但实际治理情况不佳。其原因在于股权结构变迁是在政府诱致性政策下完成的 ,股权结构剔除非流通股成份后 ,投机者机会主义行为是构成现行股权模式的主要因素 ,由此形成的股东缺乏对公司治理机制的“关怀” ,所以提出股权结构要具有对生产要素的激励与约束能力的建议。     

悬置微带线的过渡设计

设计了一种新型微带-悬置微带线和波导-悬置微带线的过渡结构。此过渡模型工艺简单、尺寸紧凑、加工精度不高,在较宽的频带范围内实现了较好的过渡特性。这种过渡设计可以改善悬置微带电路的应用范围,同其它电路或系统可以更好地综合应用。通过仿真设计和样品测试,在整个Ka频段,波导-悬置微带线过渡结构插入损耗小于0.75 dB。     

Give everyone a prize? Employee stock options in private venture-backed firms

This study examines employee stock options in private entrepreneurial companies. I focus on private U.S. venture-backed firms because they are renowned for the intensity and organizational depth of their stock option grants. Contrary to simple stereotype, however, I show that 27% of U.S. venture-backed firms do not grant stock options to all employees. I seek to explain this by theorizing that the economic and legal settings in which venture-backed companies exist lead to both costs and benefits from the use of stock options to attract, compensate, incent, monitor, and retain certain employees, and that sometimes the costs exceed the benefits. I test the theory by determining whether variation in the organizational depth to which venture-backed firms grant employee stock options can be explained by proxies for these economic and legal costs. Such proxies include the fraction of employees who are in technical positions; the degree of flatness in the firm's organizational structure; its proximity to other venture-backed companies; the number of patents it has been granted; and the fraction of equity held by venture investors. The results support the theory and thereby imply that venture-backed firms grant employee stock options in an economically sophisticated manner.     

Compensating Outside Directors with Stock: The Impact on Non-Primary Stakeholders

Two obvious trends in corporate governance include broadening board accountability beyond shareholders’ interests and paying outside directors with equity compensation (stock and stock options). By integrating common agency and instrumental stakeholder theories, we examine the effect of stock compensation on secondary stakeholders and a firm’s participation in social issues, two areas where interests are less aligned with shareholder value. Consistent with our predictions, we found that while stock compensation may be an effective way to align directors’ goals to those of shareholders, it has adverse effects on important non-shareholder constituencies in the company’s operating environment.     

Does inside debt alleviate banks' risk taking? Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in the Chinese banking industry

This paper investigates the causal effects of inside debt on banks' risk-taking behavior by using a quasi-natural experiment of compensation deferring policy in the Chinese banking industry. We find that the policy reduces banks' risk-taking by approximately 16.25%. Banks with high levels of government control significantly reduced their risk-taking after the compensation deferring policy was enacted, while those with low levels did not have the same response. By showing that CEOs' compensation deferring significantly reduces banks' risk-taking in an emerging market, we offer direct evidence for the academic understanding of the governance role of inside debt in emerging markets with weak country-level investor protection. Our results provide timely empirical evidence for government regulators who are concerned about the costs and benefits of banks' risk shifting or the risk of the financial system.